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Abstract
The Thesis sets out to examine judicial use of customary law in the criminal 
justice process in the Northern Territory of Australia.
The broad context of the Thesis is the relationship between state law and 
customary law and the role of the judiciary in interpreting and developing that 
relationship. The Thesis concentrates on criminal law as it is the subject area 
where the conflicts are most acute and on the Northern Territory as it is the 
jurisdiction with the largest proportion of Aborigines living traditional lifestyles.
The categorisation of the acquisition of Australia as by settlement has meant that 
customary law had been largely excluded from the state legal process. However, 
changes in the political climate have led to increasing demands for some 
recognition. The Thesis examines the legal difficulties inherent in such 
demands, considers the options and concludes that, on balance, the judiciary are 
the body best placed to resolve such difficulties.
The Thesis begins with an overview of the nature of customary law and of the 
theoretical arguments for and against the recognition of such law. This is 
followed by a consideration of the various methods by which such recognition 
might be achieved. It is argued that the role of the judiciary in the evolution and 
regulation of the use of customary law in this context is crucial and that it is 
often the most appropriate body to decide such issues. This argument is 
elaborated in the following three Chapters which consider those areas of the 
criminal justice process where the judiciary have most frequently engaged with 
this dilemma. The Chapters consider procedural issues, substantive law and 
sentencing. The final Chapter summarises and evaluates the arguments 
presented and sets out the conclusion.
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Introduction:
This Introduction outlines the topic and structure of the Thesis. It describes the 
central proposition, the scope, methodology, and structure, and includes a 
literature survey. It then sets the context for the Thesis by a brief discussion of 
the nature and content of customary law, of the possible ways in which such law 
may relate to the state, and of the main state proposals for some recognition of 
customary law. The Chapter concludes with a section introducing some of the 
arguments which support the central proposition of the Thesis.
0.1: Outline of Thesis:
1. Central proposition argued in the Thesis:
The Thesis examines the ways in which Northern Territory criminal Courts deal 
with customary law in the treatment of Aboriginal defendants and argues that 
the use of judicial reasoning and discretion is the most effective way of 
according some recognition to such law.
ii. Scope of Thesis:
The following points should be noted at the outset:
19
a. The Thesis is written by a lawyer and from a modernist, positivist 
perspective on law and the state, the perspective from which the 
judiciary, as an organ of the state, inevitably operates. This perspective 
assumes that Courts may not apply any system of law which is not 
recognised and validated by the state.1 The integrity of this position is 
not undermined by the fact that the judiciary itself often makes law. 
Modernism and positivism require that the judiciary applies only law 
made by organs of the state, not that it applies only law made by organs 
of the state other than itself. In practice, of course, the judiciary often 
creates law which has similar or identical content to an already existing 
extra-legal norm, including, on occasion, a norm of customary law. 
However, the legal validity of such a law derives from the status of the 
judiciary as an organ of the state and not from its prior existence. Whilst 
there is some consideration of broader debates and conceptual issues in 
order to give an outline of the intellectual discourse within which the 
judiciary operates, the Thesis is not a work of jurisprudence, 
anthropology or social science and, therefore, this perspective will not be 
justified but assumed. Moreover, whilst reference will be made to the 
major insights of these disciplines, they will not be discussed in detail.
1 For an exposition o f this position and the challenges which it poses to the acceptance o f non­
state systems, see: Griffiths. J. ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ 24 Journal o f Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law, 1986, 1-55, especially pp. 1-8. See also: Galanter. M. ‘The Modernization of 
Law’ in Weiner. M. (ed.) Modernization: the Dynamics o f Growth New York: Basic Books, 
1966, at 153-161. See also Chapter 2.
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b. There is some consideration of state and government initiatives -  and 
indeed non-state and non-government initiatives - but it is not intended 
provide an exhaustive analysis of the Australian state’s treatment of 
Aboriginal customary law nor to recommend, except in the broadest 
possible terms, courses of action to be taken by organs of the state other 
than the judiciary. It is appreciated that the judiciary does not operate in 
isolation, but its work is the central point of the Thesis which is, 
essentially, concerned with the way in which judges can give effect to 
non-state legal systems within the criminal justice process.
c. The Thesis concentrates on criminal law because this is the area which 
poses the broader dilemma of competing legal systems in its most acute 
form. States are especially concerned to maintain control -  usually 
monopoly - over criminal law and it is the area in which the public has 
the greatest stake. It is also the area of law where sanctions are 
potentially most severe and, therefore, the question of the acceptability 
of various forms of punishment and the possibility of either dual or no 
sanction is of more concern than in other areas of law.
2 There are several legislatures and several jurisdictions within the Commonwealth o f Australia. The 
structure of the Australian federal system is such that criminal law is primarily a matter for the 
States. Criminal offences may only be created by the Commonwealth as an incident to the exercise 
of some other power, one of which is the governance of federal territories. New South Wales, 
Victoria and South Australia remain governed by the common law in regard to criminal offences 
although there is also a great deal of statutory criminal law. The Commonwealth is also a common 
law jurisdiction in so far as it possesses criminal law powers. Queensland, Western Australia and 
Tasmania have all adopted Criminal Codes which are the guiding law for criminal matters. The 
Australian Capital Territory is largely, though not entirely, governed by the law of New South 
Wales and can, therefore, be counted as a common law jurisdiction in criminal matters. The 
criminal law of the Northern Territory is contained in the Criminal Code Act. 1983 which
21
d. The Thesis considers the question posed primarily in the context of the 
Northern Territory which has the highest proportion of Aboriginal 
inhabitants.3 The dilemma is, therefore, posed most acutely in that 
system. However, the Northern Territory Courts do not operate in a legal 
or intellectual vacuum and reference will be made to other jurisdictions 
where relevant.
e. The Thesis covers the period from the mid-1950’s (when the decisions of 
the Northern Territory Courts began to be systematically recorded) to the 
present day. Reference will be made to earlier cases where relevant and 
this will be particularly so in Chapter 1.
iii. Methodology:
The primary materials, on which the Thesis largely relies, are the Judgments and 
Sentencing Remarks of the Courts. It is assumed that these are the clearest and 
most authoritative indicators of judicial thinking and creativity. There is also 
consideration of the major secondary literature in so far as it elucidates the 
practice of the judiciary. Finally, the author undertook some brief fieldwork in
consolidated the various South Australian statutes and ordinances which had been the source of the 
applicable criminal law prior to self-government in 1976. The Code is loosely based on the 
Queensland and Western Australia Codes.
3 The most recent figures available are from the 2001 Census which showed 50,785 indigenous 
inhabitants in the Northern Territory out of a total population of 202,729 - i.e. approximately 25%: 
Australian Bureau of Statistics website http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats (last accessed on 1 
December 2004). For an overview of available statistical information, see: A Statistical Overview o f 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples in Australia Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission website http://www.hreoc.gov.au/socialJustice/statistics (last accessed on 1 December 
2004).
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the mid-1990’s at a point when judicial activism in this area appeared to be 
increasing. This took the form of research into (then) unpublished materials and 
some interviews. Reference will be made to the latter at the relevant points in 
the Thesis. However, it should be noted that the interviews were too few and 
insufficiently systematic to allow of more than informative and anecdotal value.
There are, admittedly, some limitations to this methodology. First, reliance on 
public statements4 does not disclose whether there is a coherent paradigm 
informing the decisions or whether they are ad hoc. However, this does not 
appear to be significant as the contention of the Thesis is that judicial decision 
making should be exercised with flexibility and should not be overly constrained 
by a dominating paradigm. Moreover, even if such a paradigm were found to 
exist, given the scope of judicial discretion discussed in the Conclusion, it could 
be extended or altered by the judiciary as and when necessary or desirable. 
Second, it is acknowledged that the evaluations of customary law both by the 
judges and by the author of the Thesis are made from a standpoint external to 
that system. Inevitably this leads to partial understanding. However, the Thesis 
is not aiming to study customary law per se, but the reaction of the judiciary and 
the methodology employed is valid for that purpose.
4 ‘Public’ includes, for present purposes, unreported decisions or remarks.
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iv. Outline of structure:
The Thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 1: The first Chapter considers the status of any pre-existing 
customary law system and the effect of the British arrival in 1770-1788. 
If the system survived 1770-1788, there would be a strong argument that 
the state legal system should -  or at least could - be applying customary 
law. This Chapter will examine the international law on the acquisition 
of territory which was applicable in 1770-1788, and the application of 
that law to the historical events. It will then analyse judicial 
understanding and interpretation of those events. There have been three 
clear phases in the evolution of such judicial understanding. The first 
began with the establishment of a fully functioning legal system in the 
1820’s and lasted for some sixty years, by which time the judiciary was 
virtually unanimous in its view that Australia had been terra nullius and 
the acquisition had been by settlement. There was then a long period 
with virtually no further development of the law. The second phase 
began in the 1970’s when a new series of challenges, largely inspired by 
increasing political awareness among Aborigines, was mounted to the 
established understanding. None were successful in altering the 
judiciary’s position. The third phase was initiated by the decision of the
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High Court in the Mabo5 case. This case decided that the original 
categorisation of Australia as terra nullius was in error. However it did 
not overturn the established position on settlement. Although the case 
was concerned with native title, it has proved the impetus for attempts to 
gain recognition for other areas of customary law. It will be argued that 
the Mabo decision was partially incorrect and that such customary law as 
existed did not survive 1770-1788 as a legal system. This means that, 
from the perspective of the Courts, Aboriginal law can only be 
recognised to the extent that it is in some way approved by the state.
Chapter 2: Given that customary law can only be legally effective if the 
state recognises it, the next question to consider is whether the state must 
or should grant such approval in the sense of endorsing a separate legal 
system or rules and, if so, to what extent? This will involve, firstly, a 
brief overview of Australia’s international law obligations. There are 
three possible areas of law where such an obligation might be grounded; 
international human rights law, the law on the rights of minorities or 
groups and the law on the rights of indigenous peoples. It will be 
concluded that there is no such obligation capable of binding the 
judiciary.6 The Chapter will then consider the moral and philosophical 
arguments which may inform the decision-making powers in a state,
5 Mabo v. State of Queensland (No. 2) (19921175 CLR1.
6 There may be an obligation on the state of Australia to recognise customary law to some extent, 
but this area of international law is uncertain and still developing. It will be considered in Chapter 2. 
However, the judiciary, as an arm of the state and an organ of domestic government, is not 
empowered to apply international law in the absence of executive or legislative endorsement.
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including the judiciary: the doctrines of equality and non-discrimination, 
multiculturalism and legal pluralism. It will be concluded that there are 
persuasive arguments to consider at least partial recognition, but that the 
endorsement of such a separate set of norms as legally binding is 
problematic. In the light of this analysis, the next three Chapters will 
consider the ways in which the judiciary has dealt with the issue to date 
and suggest ways forward. The intervention of the judiciary takes place 
at three stages in the criminal justice process and a Chapter will be 
devoted to each stage.
Chapter 3: This Chapter will deal with the way in which the judiciary has 
made use of customary law in deciding procedural issues. It should be 
noted that customary legal systems do not draw a distinction between 
procedural and substantive elements of the law.7 However, the state legal 
system within which the judiciary operates does draw such a distinction 
and that practice is followed in the Thesis. This Chapter discusses 
several such procedural issues - for example, the institution of the jury 
trial - which have no direct customary law ramifications, but where such 
law might impact upon the interaction between an Aborigine and the 
legal system. It then goes on to consider two procedural issues which are 
inextricably connected with customary law: first, the implications of 
customary law for the taking of Aboriginal evidence and second, the
7 Infra 39-40.
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proof of customary law. This Chapter will be considerably shorter than 
the following two as there is less caselaw available on this issue than on 
either substantive law or sentencing.
Chapter 4: This Chapter will deal with the way in which the judiciary has 
made use of customary law in the substantive law, in considering the 
elements of offences and defences. There is little scope for such use in 
the case of offences -  apart from the possibility of customary law being 
relevant to the establishment of intent -  but it has been used extensively 
in considering whether the elements of defences have been made out. 
The Chapter will concentrate on four defences, though others will be 
mentioned. By far the greatest amount of judicial consideration has been 
given to provocation, where discussion has centred on the relevance of 
Aboriginality and customary law to the assessment of the gravity of the 
provoking act and the expected standard of self-control. In relation to 
duress and diminished responsibility, there has been much less caselaw 
and the possible application of the defences to customary law 
circumstances raises difficult and sensitive questions. The defence of 
intoxication has no specific customary law connotations, but it is 
considered in brief as many offences involving Aborigines take place 
against a background of indulgence in alcohol and this may have 
consequences in terms of the analysis of the offence. It is, for example, 
sometimes difficult to determine whether a violent incident was merely a
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drunken revenge attack or whether it involved customary law 
punishment.
Chapter 5: This Chapter will deal with the way in which the judiciary has 
made use of customary law in sentencing. In terms of the number of 
defendants affected, this is much the most significant stage of judicial 
use of customary law. It is far less problematic than such a use in 
determining the elements of substantive offences and defences as the 
judiciary is possessed of a wide discretion as to factors that may be taken 
into account at the stage of sentencing. Matters which may not be 
relevant to guilt may nevertheless be relevant to the sentence imposed. 
The judiciary has made use of two broad categories in considering issues 
which arise when sentencing an Aboriginal defendant. The first, 
Aboriginality per se, may not generally be taken into account. The 
second, factors associated with Aboriginality, may be. These categories 
will be discussed and their application in the case of customary law 
analysed. There will be particular consideration of the relevance of 
payback -  customary law punishment -  both to sentencing and to the 
wider law.
Conclusion: This Chapter will bring together the arguments and debates 
which have been raised throughout the Thesis. It will conclude that the 
most effective way of incorporating elements of customary law within
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the state legal system is by the use of judicial reasoning and discretion 
and that the benefits of such judicial flexibility outweigh those of the 
certainty which may be attained by constitutional or statutory regulation 
or endorsement.
v. Literature survey:
The primary ‘literature’ considered by the Thesis is case-law, mainly from 
Australian federal, state and territory jurisdictions -  particularly the Northern 
Territory - but also from foreign and international jurisdictions where 
appropriate. There is also consideration of relevant constitutional or statute law 
from the same range of jurisdictions.
Several of the areas covered by the Thesis have been the subject of extensive 
consideration in the secondary literature which is discussed and referenced at the 
appropriate point. This literature falls into several categories, in each of which 
the various sources tend to cover substantially the same ground and, therefore, 
the Thesis cites only a representative sample in each category.
1. Journal articles: there are numerous journal articles on areas covered by 
the Thesis. Generally a significant case, piece of legislation or 
government initiative prompts a large number of articles: thus, the rash 
of publications on Mabo. on the ‘stolen generations’, and on the
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Australian Law Reform Commission Report on customary law. These 
articles contain insight into and analysis of the areas which they cover 
and are particularly useful in providing differing perspectives on an 
issue. However, none of them provide a systematic and comprehensive 
coverage of the subject area of the Thesis. Examples include Hill’s 
‘Blackfellas and Whitefellas: Aboriginal Land Rights, the Mabo decision, 
and the Meaning of Land’8, Amankwah’s ‘Post-Mabo: The Prospect of the 
Recognition of a Regime of Customary (Indigenous) Law in Australia’9, 
Kennedy and Nance’s ‘Stolen Generations: the Kruger Action’10 and 
Byers’ ‘The Kruger Case’11.
2. Edited collections on Aborigines in Australia: these generally include 
chapters on a broad range of topics such as the effect of imprisonment, 
alternative justice schemes or the question of settlement. Examples of 
this type of collection are Hazlehurst’s Ivory Scales: Black Australia and
1the Law and Johnston, Hinton and Rigney’s Indigenous Australians and 
the Law 13. These collections include some work which is relevant to the
8 Hill. R. P. ‘Blackfellas and Whitefellas: Aboriginal Land Rights, the Mabo decision, and the 
Meaning of Land.’ Human Rights Quarterly 17 (1995) 303.
9 Amankwah. H.A. ‘Post-Mario: The Prospect of the Recognition o f a Regime of Customary 
(Indigenous) Law in Australia.’ University o f Queensland Law Journal Vol. 18, (1994-1995) 15.
10 Kennedy. L. and Nance. D. ‘Stolen Generations: the Kruger Action’ Aboriginal Law Bulletin 
Vol. 3, No. 78, February, 1996, 11.
11 Byers. M. ‘The Kruger Case’ Public Law Review Vol. 8, December 1997, 224.
12 Hazlehurst. K.M. (ed.) Ivory Scales: Black Australia and the Law Kensington, N.S.W.: New 
South Wales University Press, 1987.
13 Johnston. E., Hinton. M. and Rigney. D. Indigenous Australians and the Law Sydney: 
Cavendish Publishing (Australia) Pty Limited, 1997.
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subject of the Thesis14, but they are not concerned with a focused study of 
the work of the judiciary.
3. Themed collections: on, for example, comparative law, alcohol abuse, 
indigenous rights in international law. Examples of this type of 
collection are Havemann’s Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand15 and Hocking’s International Law and 
Aboriginal Human Rights16. These collections are informative on the 
particular aspect which they cover, but again are not concerned with a 
focused study of the judiciary.
4. Books on a discrete topic: these are comparatively rare. They provide a 
more in depth study of a particular issue, for example, dispute resolution, 
but do not focus on the main area of the Thesis. An example of this is
17Behrendt’s Aboriginal Dispute Resolution .
5. General texts on particular subject areas such as criminal law, 
international law, sentencing and evidence: these often include a chapter 
or section on Aborigines or indigenous peoples. Whilst they contain
14 See, for example: Debelle. B. ‘Aboriginal Customary Law and the Common Law’ in 
Johnston. E., Hinton. M. and Rigney. D. Indigenous Australians and the Law Sydney: 
Cavendish Publishing (Australia) Pty Limited, 1997, 81-100.
15 Havemann. P. (ed.) Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Australia, Canada and New Zealand 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
16 Hocking B. (ed.) International Law and Aboriginal Human Rights North Ryde: Law Book 
Co., 1988.
17 Behrendt. L. Aboriginal Dispute Resolution Leichardt, New South Wales: Federation Press, 1995
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some relevant materials, these books are primarily concerned with the 
areas of law which they set out to address and not with judicial use of 
customary law. Examples include Findlay’s Problems for the Criminal 
Law1*, Gans and Palmer’s Australian Principles o f Evidence19and 
Lindley’s The Acquisition and Government o f Backward Territory in 
International Law. Being a Treatise on the Law and Practice Relating to
9 0Colonial Expansion
6. Literature from areas other than law: texts on anthropology, history, 
politics, cultural theory, legal philosophy, religion. These are referred to 
at appropriate points, but are generally not considered in detail as the 
Thesis is primarily concerned with the judiciary and state law. Examples
91include Levy’s The Multiculturalism o f Fear and Neal’s The Rule o f Law
99in a Penal Colony: Law and Power in Early New South Wales
7. Conference papers and collections, published and unpublished: for 
example, conferences held by the Australian Institute Criminology and 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission. As with published 
edited collections, these collections include some papers which are
18 Findlay. M. Problems for the Criminal Law Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001.
19 Gans. J. and Palmer. A. Australian Principles o f Evidence Coogee, NSW: Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, (2nd ed.) 2004.
20 Lindley. M.F. The Acquisition and Government o f Backward Territory in International Law. 
Being a Treatise on the Law and Practice Relating to Colonial Expansion London: Longmans, 
Green and Co. Ltd., 1926.
21 Levy. J.T. The Multiculturalism o f Fear Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
22 Neal. D. The Rule o f Law in a Penal Colony: Law and Power in Early New South Wales 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
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relevant to the subject of the Thesis23, but they are not generally primarily 
concerned with the work of the judiciary in the use of customary law. 
Examples include Aboriginal Justice Issued  and The Use o f Customary 
Law in the Criminal Justice System
8. Government publications: there have been numerous studies and proposals 
undertaken by various governments, including by Law Reform bodies. The 
most important for present purposes are the Australian Law Reform 
Commission’s Report The Recognition o f Aboriginal Customary Laws 
and the Northern Territory Law Reform Committee’s Towards Mutual 
Benefit: An Inquiry into Aboriginal Customary Law in the Northern 
Territory11. These will be discussed at the relevant points in the Thesis. 
Both Reports include recommendations, but they do not, of course, focus 
entirely on the recognition of customary criminal law nor do they make a 
sustained argument that such recognition is best left to the judiciary.
9. Non-governmental organisations: there are some Reports of work 
undertaken by non-governmental organisations. These are comparatively
23 See, for example: Debelle. B. supra n 14, 81-100.
24 Aboriginal Justice Issues Canberra: Conference Proceedings 21, Australian Institute of
Criminology, 1992.
25 The Use o f Customary Law in the Criminal Justice System Canberra: Proceedings - Training 
Project No. 23, Mar. 1-5 1976, Australian Institute o f Criminology, 1976.
26 Australian Law Reform Commission’s Report The Recognition o f Aboriginal Customary Laws 
(Summary Report, Full Report 2 Volumes), Final Report No. 31 Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1986.
27 Northern Territory Law Reform Committee Towards Mutual Benefit: An Inquiry into Aboriginal 
Customary Law in the Northern Territory Darwin: Northern Territory Law Reform Committee, 
2003.
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unimportant, but provide some information and analysis. An example is 
Brady and Palmer’s A Study o f Drinking in a Remote Aboriginal 
Community28.
10. Theses or Dissertations: there are some studies on areas akin to the subject 
matter of the Thesis. Examples are Coles’ Matter o f Principle and 
Practice: The Sentencing o f Australian Aborigines in the Northern 
Territory Supreme Court, 1974-198229, McCorquodale’s Aborigines: A
■JA
History o f Law and Injustice, 1829-1985 and Kingsbury’s Indigenous
3 1Peoples in International Law . There is inevitably some slight overlap of 
material between Coles’ work and the present Thesis, but his work deals 
solely with sentencing and covers only a twelve year period. None of these 
works, including Coles’, is on the precise area of the Thesis and none is 
concerned to establish the argument that the judiciary is the most 
appropriate body to recognise customary law in the criminal justice 
process.
28 Brady. M.A. & Palmer. K. A Study o f Drinking in a Remote Aboriginal Community Adelaide: 
Report prepared for Australian Associated Brewers, Western Desert Project, School of 
Medicine, Flinders University, Adelaide, South Australia, 1982.
29 Coles. G. A M atter o f Principle and Practice: The Sentencing o f Australian Aborigines in the 
Northern Territory Supreme Court, 1974-1982 B. Litt. Thesis, Australian National University, 
1983.
30 McCorquodale. J. Aborigines: A History o f Law and Injustice, 1829-1985. PhD Thesis, 
University of New England, August 1985.
31 Kingsbury. B. Indigenous Peoples in International Law D. Phil. Thesis, University o f Oxford, 
1990.
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11. International comparisons: there is a considerable literature on the use of 
customary law in other jurisdictions. Moreover, the issue of 
incorporation is a live one in several jurisdictions giving rise to law 
reform proposals. Thus, for example, the Papua New Guinea Law 
Reform Commission not only conducts studies on the question, but also 
has a constitutionally guaranteed role in relation to the integration of 
customary law into the state system. The Thesis is not a work of 
comparative law and this literature is referred to only briefly. Examples 
include Karsten’s Between Law and Custom: “High” and “Low” Legal 
Cultures in the Lands o f the British Diaspora -  The United States, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand, 1600-190032 and Zorn and Corrin Care’s 
“‘Barava Tru”: Judicial Approaches to the Pleading and Proof of Custom 
in the South Pacific’33.
However, despite the extensive literature outlined above, there has (to the 
author’s knowledge) been no systematic attempt to place the role and practice of 
the judiciary within the debate on the recognition of customary law. Several 
studies contain some discussion of these issues. Yeo, for example, has written
32 Karsten. P. Between Law and Custom: “High” and “Low” Legal Cultures in the Lands o f the 
British Diaspora -  The United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 1600-1900 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
33 Zorn. J.G. and Corrin Care. J. ‘“Barava Tru”: Judicial Approaches to the Pleading and Proof 
of Custom in the South Pacific’ International and Comparative Law Quarterly July 2002, 51.3 
(611).
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extensively on criminal law in general and homicide in particular, and on the 
relevance of ethnicity, including Aboriginality, to the application of that law.34 
He has also written specifically on Aboriginality35, but the focus of this work is 
on the definition and recognition of Aboriginality rather than on the significance 
of the actions of the judiciary in taking account of customary law. Purdy has 
written on the effect of the application of the common law to colonised people36, 
but her work is primarily concerned with the adverse characterisation -  and 
often criminalisation - of ethnic groups. This involves some consideration of the 
judiciary, but neither it nor customary law is the focus of her work. The 
significance of the present work lies in its distinctive contention that the 
judiciary is the most important agent in taking into account that which is 
commonly referred to as customary law, not least because it will be responsible 
for applying any legislative incorporation. In order to establish this argument, it 
undertakes a comprehensive study of the practice of the judiciary at all stages of
34 See, for example:Yeo. S.M.H. Partial Excuses to Murder Leichardt, New South Wales: 
Federation Press with the assistance of the Law Foundation o f New South Wales, 1990; 
Unrestrained Killings and the Law: Provocation and Excessive Self-Defence in India, England 
and Australia Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998; Compulsion in the Criminal Law North 
Ryde, New South Wales: Law Book Co. ltd., 1990; ‘Native Criminal Jurisdiction after Mabo’ 
Current Issues in Criminal Justice Vol.6, No.l, July 1994, 9; ‘Ethnicity and the Objective Test 
in Provocation.’ Melbourne University Law Review. Vol. 16. June, 1987, 67; ‘Sex, Ethnicity, 
Power of Self-Control and Provocation Revisited.’ Sydney Law Review, Vol. 18, 1996, 304; 
‘Power of Self-Control in Provocation and Automatism’ 14 Sydney Law Review 3. March, 1992.
35 ‘The Recognition of Aboriginality by Australian Criminal Law’ in Bird. G., Martin. G. and 
Neilsen. J. Majah: Indigenous Peoples and the Law Leichardt, New South Wales: Federation Press, 
1996,228
36 ‘British Common Law and Colonised Peoples: Studies in Trinidad and WestemAustralia’ in 
Bird. G., Martin. G. and Neilsen. J. Majah: Indigenous Peoples and the Law Leichardt, New 
South Wales: Federation Press, 1996; Common Law and Colonised Peoples: Studies in Trinidad 
and Western Australia Aldershot: Ashgate Dartmouth, 1997; ‘Postcolonialism: The Emperor’s 
New Clothes’ Social and Legal Studies Vol. 5 (3) 405-426 1996; “‘I Suspect You and Your 
Friends are Trifling with Me”: Encounters between the Rule o f Law and the Ruled’ Australian 
Journal o f Law and Society (2000-2001) 15, 67-89.
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the criminal justice process and considers the advantages -  and possible 
disadvantages - of judicial discretion and flexibility.
0.2: Customary Law and the State:
Before considering the recognition of customary law by the state and the part 
played by the judiciary in such recognition, it is necessary to examine briefly the 
nature and content of that law and its relation to the state. There is, of course, a 
massive general literature on customary law, its nature and its relationship to other 
systems of law. Many of the considerations are applicable across all states which 
have populations which either did or still do act out of compliance with such a 
customary system, though some take particular forms in Australia.37 In the present
37 See, for example, the works cited infra n 55 and also: Evans-Pritchard. E.E. The Nuer New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1969; Hogbin. ELI. Law and Order in Polynesia: A Study o f Primitive 
Legal Institutions Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1934; Twining. W.L. The Place o f 
Customary Law in the National Legal Systems o f East Africa Chicago: University of Chicago Law 
School, 1964; Roberts. S. Order and Dispute Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979; Maine. H. 
Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History o f Society, and its Relation to Modem Ideas 
London: Murray, 1876; Abel. R.L. ‘The Comparative Study of Dispute Institutions in Society’ Law 
and Society Review Vol. 8 (1973) 217-347; Diamond. AS. The Evolution o f Law and Order 
London: Watts, 1951; Moore. S.F. Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.
Note also the specifically Australian works. These tend to be general works of anthropology which 
include consideration of law and order mechanisms. There are comparatively few studies dealing 
only with customary law. See, for example: Spencer. B. and Gillen. F. The Native Tribes o f Central 
Australia London: Macmillan, 1899; Spencer. B. Native Tribes o f the Northern Territory o f 
Australia London: Macmillan, 1914; Radcliffe-Brown. A  The Social Organization o f Australian 
Tribes Sydney: Oceania Publications, 1931; Elkin. AP. The Australian Aborigines: How to 
Understand Them Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1938; Strehlow. T.G.H. Aranda Traditions 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1947, Journey to Horseshoe Bend Sydney: Angus and 
Robertson, 1969, and Songs o f Central Australia Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1971; Meggitt. M. 
Desert People: A Study o f the Walbiri Aborigines o f Central Australia Sydney: Angus and 
Robertson, 1962; Stanner. W.E.H. On Aboriginal Religion Sydney: University of Sydney, Oceania 
Publications, 1963, and White Man Got No Dreaming: Essays 1938-1973 Canberra: Australian 
National University Press, 1979; Hiatt. L.R. Kinship and Conflict: A Study o f an Aboriginal 
Community in Northern Arnhem Land, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1965; 
Bemdt. R.M. and C.H. (eds.) Aboriginal Man in Australia Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1965, The 
World o f the First Australians Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, (5 ed.) 1992 and A World that
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context, three questions need to be considered: first, what is meant by the concept 
of ‘customary law’?; second, how is its content to be determined?; and third, what 
is its relation to the state system? Detailed consideration of these questions is 
beyond the scope of the Thesis. This is particularly so in the case of the first 
question. The nature of customary law is primarily a matter of anthropology and 
legal philosophy and is not per se of direct interest to the judiciary. The second and 
third questions are more relevant to the present work as they can, indeed must, be 
considered by the judiciary if they are to make use of customary law. It must be 
reiterated that the focus of the Thesis is the judicial process. This approach should 
not be understood to deny that Aboriginal people may well have a different -  and 
doubtless better-informed - perspective on at least the first two of these three 
questions, but it is the views of the judiciary which are the subject of the Thesis. In 
all three questions, it is proposed merely to outline the major issues and debates 
and to do so from its perspective.
Was Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1993; Bemdt. R.M. (ed.) Australian Aboriginal 
Anthropology Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1970; Bemdt. R. and Tonkinson. 
R. (eds.) Social Anthropology and Australian Studies: A Contemporary Overview Canberra: 
Aboriginal Studies Press, 1988; Gale. F. (ed.) Woman’s Role in Aboriginal Society Canberra: 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1970; Tindale. N.B. Aboriginal Tribes o f Australia 
Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1974; Shapiro. W. Social Organization in 
Aboriginal Australia Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1979; Maddock. K. The 
Australian Aborigines: A Portrait o f their Society Ringwood: Penguin, (2nd ed.) 1982; Bell. D. 
Daughters o f the Dreaming Melbourne: McPhee Gribble, 1983; Myers. F. Pintupi Country, Pintupi 
Self: Sentiment, Place and Politics among Western Desert Aborigines Washington: Smithsonian 
Institute Press, 1986; Williams. N. Two Laws: Managing Disputes in a Contemporary Aboriginal 
Community Canberra. Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1987; Keen. I. (ed.) Being Black: 
Aboriginal Cultures in ‘Settled’ Australia Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 1988; Burbank. V. 
Fighting Women: Anger and Aggression in Aboriginal Australia Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1994; Hiatt. L.R. Arguments about Aborigines: Australia and the Evolution o f Social 
Anthropology Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
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i. The nature of customary law:
This is the most complex of the three questions. There is no clear and 
universally accepted definition of ‘customary law’ or ‘customary legal systems’. 
It would appear that all that can be said with certainty is that customary law and 
systems encompass many more areas of life than do their state counterparts - 
that there is, for example, no clear distinction between what the state would 
categorise as law or morality, or as law or religion - that the norms in all spheres 
of life are considered to be binding, and that the norms are part of the 
understanding of the whole community and are not simply imposed -  or indeed 
revoked - by a specialised body.38 A further characteristic of customary systems
38 Definitions of customary law given by both lawyers and anthropologists seem to agree on 
these elements. See, for example: “In Aboriginal society there was no system of government in 
any institutionalised sense. There was no body which made any laws and no hierarchy o f courts 
or other enforcing authorities. There were tribal elders but no chieftains nor any ruling class. 
There was no hierarchical system of government within a tribe or group of tribes. Nevertheless, 
mechanisms for the maintenance of order and the resolution of disputes existed. When they 
spoke of law, Aborigines did not distinguish in the way white Australians do between norms of 
social behaviour and mandatory rules, a breach of which might result in severe consequences. 
All o f this would be understood as law. The law had no separate identity so that a system of 
legal rules cannot be easily identified.” Debelle. B. supra n 14 at 82; the Mardudjara (a Gibson 
Desert people) term for law “ ... connotes a body of jural rules and moral evaluations of customary 
and socially sanctioned behaviour patterns’; it is practically a synonym for ‘traditional culture’” 
Tonkinson. R. The JigalongMob: Aboriginal Victors o f the Desert Crusade Menlo Park, California: 
Cummings Publishing, 1974, 7 at 70, cited in Maddock. K. ‘Aboriginal Customary Law’ in Hanks 
P. & Keon-Cohen B. (eds.) Aborigines and the Law: Essays in Memory o f Elizabeth Eggleston 
North Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1984, 212-237, at 212; “Aboriginal Customary law is very 
broad in its full context, covering topics such as criminal matters, copyright, adoption, land 
ownership and usage, and basically every other aspect of western legal system (sic.), as well as other 
sacred and sometimes secret issues that are far broader than the scope o f the western legal system.
... Aboriginal customary law is fundamentally a means o f dispute resolution based on traditional 
spiritual beliefs and cultural traditions that provide sanctions against those actions which are harmful 
to the community. In a criminal context fundamentally customary law is simply a means o f a 
community establishing its set of basic values and providing a means to punish those who transgress 
against established community laws. It also provides a means where an aggrieved victim of an 
offence can have recompense, where any existing family or community tension resulting from the 
offence can be resolved quickly and as a means to ensure that disputes within communities and 
between sections of communities do not fester and lead to greater ongoing tension and conflict. 
Customary law is fundamentally a means of maintaining social order..” Aboriginal Justice Advisory
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is that no distinction is drawn between those areas which state systems would -  
in general - categorise as substantive and those they would categorise as 
procedural. Whilst this distinction is readily understood and accepted by 
positivist lawyers, there has been much debate amongst anthropologists and 
legal theorists as to whether ‘law’ is composed of rules or of process. The debate 
was current for much of the twentieth century, but was substantially resolved 
with the publication of Rules and Processes: The Cultural Logic o f Dispute in 
an African Context39 in 1981 and the view that law is an amalgam of both rules 
and process is now widely accepted.40 There is, however, still room for debate 
about the types of rules and the types of process which go to make law: this 
issue will be dealt with when considering the relationship between customary 
law and the state.
None of the definitions of customary law outlined above answers the question 
‘what is customary law?’ to the satisfaction of a positivist lawyer. Whilst there 
are certainly difficulties in attempting to identify the nature of customary law in 
terms of admissibility of evidence, disputes about content and so forth, these 
difficulties can be contained within the conceptual framework of a judge in the 
Australian system. More problematic for such a judge, is to understand a 
customary law system and corpus as ‘legal’ and to apply it within the state
Committee of the New South Wales Attorney-General’s Department, Government of New South 
Wales Strengthening Community Justice: Some Issues in the recognition o f customary law undated, 
at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ajac.nsf/pages/customarvlawDP (last accessed on 25 June 2005).
39 ComarofF. J.L. & Roberts. S. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1981.
40 Some scholars analyse the question as one of dispute settlement: see, for example: Roberts. S. 
supra n 7.
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framework. For the state system, ‘customary law’ is almost an oxymoron. 
However, for many indigenous groups ‘law’ carries the much wider meaning 
discussed above. Whilst custom and law share many features -  for example, 
they are predictable and breach carries sanction -  they also have many 
differences -  for example, the relevance of the status of the parties, the concept 
of taboo matters and the requirement for positivist law decisions to either follow 
authority, whether statute or precedent, or to provide justification for not 
following those authorities. The existence of these two quite different and 
irreconcilable concepts of law is a fundamental and insoluble problem in the 
application of customary law by the state systems. State Courts will only ever be 
able to apply customary ‘law’ which can somehow be fitted into their 
understanding o f ‘law’ and ‘system’.41
Various attempts have been made to facilitate the understanding and use of 
customary law by the Courts. Eggleston analysed the structure and functioning 
of Aboriginal traditional law and the difficulties posed for recognition in her still 
influential work Fear, Favour or Affection: Aborigines and the Criminal Law in 
Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia%2. She distinguishes ‘pure’ 
tribal law, as it existed pre-contact with white society, from ‘modified’ tribal 
law, which itself takes stronger or weaker forms according to the lifestyle of its
41 This is indisputably so. Even the most extensive form of ‘recognition’ would still have to be 
applied by the Courts within their own powers and jurisdiction. This would not, of course, be the 
case if there were an alternative system where customary law issues did not come before state 
Courts at all. However, as the Thesis is concerned with the role of the judiciary, such an alternative 
will not be discussed in detail.
42 Eggleston. E.M. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1976, at 276-305.
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adherents. Her argument is that the main way in which state Courts can take 
customary law into account is by the extensive use of anthropological evidence 
which will assist in fitting such law into a scheme which may be applied by the 
Courts. This use of anthropological analysis and evidence appears to be the most 
satisfactory -  or the least unsatisfactory -  way in which the judiciary can inform 
itself on customary law and it will be discussed below and in detail in Chapter 3.
It is important to note the effect which the interaction of the customary system 
with the state system has had on the former. Colonial authorities adopted a 
variety of approaches, frequently pursuing policies of indirect rule, recognising 
existing hierarchies and leaving them to apply customary law -  though 
sometimes with a state sanction attached - at least in the main and on issues 
which were solely between the natives. This approach tended to rigidify and 
distort customary law, causing it to become static in a way characteristic of 
statute law, or even to some extent of common law - which, though flexible, is, 
to some extent, constrained by the doctrine of precedent - but which is alien to 
the nature of customary law. It also interfered with the structure of traditional 
societies, increasing the power of the chiefs and reducing the participation of the 
other members of the society in the negotiating process which was often an 
integral part of customary law systems. The integrity of the systems was thereby 
adversely affected and the result was the application of something which was
42
not in reality customary law - true customary law requiring, as discussed, above 
a combination of content - rules - and system - process.43
The judiciary, in practice, rarely concerns itself with consideration of the nature 
of customary law. Of far greater concern is the determination of the content of 
that law and the relationship of that law to the state system. These questions will 
now be examined.
ii. The content of customary law:
The next question to arise is how to determine the content of customary law? 
For the state legal system, this is conceptually more straightforward than 
determining the nature of customary law and relies largely on the evidence of 
informed parties, Aboriginal or white. Yet whilst the question may be 
conceptually simple, the answer is not always easy to find. The judiciary is 
accustomed to looking to statute, to case-law, possibly to international law. 
Customary law is, as already discussed, not the same type of system. It certainly 
has rules, but it is more than rules.44 How are the judges to know what the 
content of the customary law is? There have been some attempts to resolve this 
difficulty, but they have been of varying success. Early attempts, such as the
43 On these points, see: Snyder. F.G. Capitalism and Legal Change: An African Transformation 
New York: Academic Press, 1981; Chanock. M. Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial 
Experience in Malawi and Zambia Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. See infra 45-46 
on the ‘hybridisation’ o f customary law.
44 On this point, see: Renteln. AD. and Dundes. A  (eds.) Folk Law: Essays in the Theory and 
Practice o f Lex Non Scripta New York: Garland Publishing, 1995.
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Restatement o f African Law45, sought to codify the relevant law and essentially 
provide a sourcebook for the judiciary. It is now generally recognised that, for a 
variety of reasons, codification does not work.46 However, occasional attempts 
are still made to at least partially ‘codify’ customary law: for example, the 
Australian Institute of Judicial Administration recently published the Aboriginal 
Benchbook for Western Australian Courts41 which attempts to provide an 
outline of customary law as guidance for magistrates making decisions in cases 
which involve such a law.48 Generally, however, the judiciary will rely on either 
established anthropological opinion, if current and applicable, or on expert 
evidence before them in a given case. Thus, questions about the content of 
customary law are largely questions about evidence, about how to decide what 
the system contains. As far as the judiciary is concerned, these are not 
conceptual questions49 and it is not proposed to discuss them at this point. They 
will be considered in full in Chapter 3. For now it is sufficient to note the 
questions raised and to add the caveat that even whilst considering evidence the
45 This project commenced in 1959 at the School of Oriental and African Studies of London 
University and published several volumes over a number of years, each volume attempting to codify 
the customary law either of a particular state and/or on a particular subject.
46 Codification is conceptually inappropriate given the nature of customary law outlined above: it 
ignores the fluidity and, at least partially, process-based nature of customary law. As Roberts points 
out such attempts are “ ... all flawed by an underlying assumption that the material they are dealing 
with can safely be submitted to those forms of analysis which lawyers can use upon English law”. 
Roberts. S. supra n 37, at 195. Moreover, even if these difficulties were to be resolved, codification 
fixes customary law at a particular time and so would need constant updating. Other problems also 
arise -  for example, who determines the content o f the code? - but these are not peculiar to 
codification and also arise in relation to, for example, expert evidence.
47 Fryer-Smith. S. Aboriginal Benchbook for Western Australian Courts Carlton, Victoria: 
Australian Institute of Judicial Administration Incorporated, 2002.
48 See also: Law Commission of New Zealand M aori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law 
Study Paper No. 9, Wellington: 2001.
49 Such matters may, of course, be considered to be ‘conceptual’ by the customary system itself.
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Courts inevitably do so from within their own mindset and so may be 
constructing, at least partially, their own version of customary law.50
The argument that the customary law applied by Courts is never ‘pure’ but a 
hybrid created by the mix of the two systems is frequently made. This 
hybridisation of customary law is not a new phenomenon. Whilst many scholars 
agree that there were indigenous legal systems in existence before the advent of 
the colonisers and cite examples of such systems,51 others argue that what is 
now identified as customary law did not exist as an indigenous system before 
colonisation, but is a hybrid produced by the interaction of received law and 
indigenous law and by the codification -  thus preventing evolution - and 
ongoing construction of customary law by the Courts and officials of the 
colonial power.52 Related to this hybridisation and the consequent existence of 
various forms or degrees of customary law -  for example, ‘pure’ or ‘modified’ - 
is the question of terminology. ‘Customary law’ goes under a variety of names: 
folk law, people’s law, native law, indigenous law, unofficial law.53 It should be 
noted at this point, although against the background of the above debates, that
50 On this point, see, for example: Shaw. W.S. ‘(Post) Colonial Encounters: Gendered Racialisations 
in Australian Courtrooms’ in Gender, Place and Culture, Vol. 10, No. 4, 315-332, December 2003.
51 See, for example: Gluckman. M. The Judicial Process among the Barotse o f Northern 
Rhodesia Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1955, and The Ideas in Barotse 
Jurisprudence New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1965; Nadel. S.F. The Nuba Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1947; Rattray. R.S. Ashanti Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923.
52 See, for example: Mann. K. and Roberts. R. Law in Colonial Africa Portsmouth, NH: 
Heinemann, 1991; Snyder. F.G. ‘The creation of “customary law” in Senegal’ in Ghai. Y.P., 
Luckham. R. and Snyder. F.G. (eds.) The Political Economy o f Law New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987; and Woodman. G.R. ‘How State Courts Created Customary Law in 
Ghana and Nigeria’ in Morse. B.W. and Woodman. G.R. (eds.) Indigenous Law and the State 
Dordrecht: Foris, 1988. On Australia, see: Eggleston. E.M. supra 35.
53 It is worth noting that the terminology is often inconsistently applied.
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the term ‘customary law’ will be used throughout the Thesis to apply to all 
forms of non-state law recognised by Aborigines, whether that law be pure or 
modified.
iii. The relationship of customary law to the state system:
The relationship of customary law to a state system is, at least in theory, easily 
analysed.54 There are essentially two views: the first is that the state has the 
monopoly of law-making and any other system can only have legal effect if it is 
validated by the state, a kind of delegated legislation; the second is that the state 
does not have such a monopoly and that its legal system is simply one among 
others, one of which may be customary law. A positivist legal system, such as 
that of Australia, necessarily takes the first view.
The interaction between customary law and the state has been analysed in a 
number of studies55, dealing both with situations where a body of traditional law
54 The following discussion on possible understandings of the relationship between customary law 
and the state overlaps -  though is not identical to - the analysis of legal pluralism infra 157-162.
55 See, for example: Llewellyn. K.N. and Hoebel. E. A  The Cheyenne Way Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1941; Hoebel. E.A The Law o f Primitive Man Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1954; Weber. M  On Law in Economy and Society New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1954; Malinowski. B. Crime and Custom in a Savage Society Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, 
Adams, 1926; Gluckman. M. supra n 20; Schapera. I. A Handbook o f Tswana Law and Custom 
London: Oxford University Press for International African Institute, 1938; Gulliver. P.H. Social 
Control in an African Society London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963; Nader. L. Law in Culture 
and Society Chicago: Aldine Press, 1969: Bohannan. PJ. Justice and Judgment among the Tiv 
London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1957; Chanock. M. supra n 
10.; Moore. S.F. ‘Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate 
Subject of Study’ 7 Law and Society Review, Galanter. M. ‘Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private 
Ordering, and Indigenous Law’ 19 Journal o f Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1; Pospisil. L. 
Anthropology o f Law: A Comparative Theory New York and London: Harper and Row, 1971; 
Fitzpatrick. P. The Mythology o f Modem Law London: Routledge, 1992. For a synthesis of the early
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existed within societies which were then (in the main) colonised by (mainly 
European) states and with situations of pluralism within states which is not a 
clash between pre-existing traditional law and externally imposed law, but 
reflects the heterogeneous make-up of the society. These latter studies are less 
concerned with adversarial interaction between state and ‘unofficial’ law and 
more with the way in which different normative orders can interact.56
The method and effects of the imposition of colonial law upon customary law 
varied both according to the system of the coloniser and to the perceived system 
of the colonised. The British colonisers were inclined to leave much of 
indigenous law in force, at least as it operated inter se and as long as it did not 
offend English notions of natural justice or equity -  the repugnancy principle - 
and to make use of local authority structures within the overall dominant 
hierarchy. However, the colonisers’ perceptions of the colonised were also 
relevant. In this respect, international law laid down criteria for assessment of 
the systems of those colonised and the results of that assessment determined 
whether those systems were deemed to have survived colonisation, and if so, in 
what form. The British assessment of the Aborigines and their lifestyle meant
theories, see: Hooker. M.B. Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. For an interesting overall view of the importance of 
customary law today, see: Sheleff. L. The Future o f Tradition: Customary Law, Common Law and 
Legal Pluralism London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000, especially 79-90.
56 For example, Moore developed the concept of the semi-autonomous social field -  a field which 
can make rules and can induce compliance, but which is itself subject to rules and forces from the 
world around it. Moore. S.F. supra n 55.
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that the usual British policy towards customary law was not pursued in 
Australia.57
It might be said that many of the works dealing with the imposition of colonial 
law upon customary law were primarily concerned with how to determine the 
content and pedigree of law that could be enforced -  would the state take 
cognisance of traditional law? Or, as Yilmaz says, all forms of ordering are 
rooted in official law.58 Most of the studies dealing with heterogeneity outside 
the colonial context take the view that there are legal orders other than the one 
run by the state and that the interaction between those is the subject matter of the 
doctrine of legal pluralism -  or, Yilmaz again, there are other forms of ordering 
which interact with the official law.59
Aboriginal customary law in Australia would appear to fit more accurately into 
the first category, indigenous law imposed upon by colonialism. It might, 
therefore, have been expected that the British would deal with it as outlined 
above and leave it, or some of it, in force until there was a problem. Indeed, in 
reality, much of customary law remained operative for some time after 
settlement, but this was largely a matter of the practical impossibility of
57 This will be discussed in Chapter 1. However, it should be noted that even when the colonial 
powers left the customary system in force, they did not doubt that the state should have the final say, 
even if that final say were to accord some form of recognition. This is, in effect, delegation where 
the content of the delegated powers replicates the indigenous system.
58 Yilmaz. I. Dynamic Legal Pluralism and the Reconstruction o f Unofficial Muslim Laws in 
England, Turkey caul Pakistan PhD Thesis, University o f London April, 1999, at 67, now published 
as Muslim Laws, Politics and Society in Modem Nation States: Dynamic Legal Pluralism in 
England, Turkey and Pakistan Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2005.
59 Yilmaz. I. supra n 58 at 67.
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suppressing it totally and immediately. However, the legal position was -  as will 
be argued in Chapter 1 - that, with the exception of residual rights, the 
settlement of Australia meant that there was no cognisable legal system in force. 
Therefore, from the perspective of the judiciary there was no option to leave 
local law in force, nor to incorporate indigenous legal hierarchies. However, it 
would have been quite possible to treat the existing system as if it were legal, to 
leave it in operation, and essentially to make it law by validating it.60 This was 
not done in 1770-1788, but there is no reason why it should not be done now. 
Indeed, it could be argued that this is what happens on an ad hoc basis when the 
judiciary takes customary law into account.
Customary law could also be granted some recognition within the second type 
of situation outlined above, that of a state with an heterogeneous population. 
Essentially, in theory, Australia is a single-system state, but there is a body of 
the population which regulates its life by separate rules. Whilst this form of 
recognition is obviously less satisfactory for Aborigines -  it amounts to the 
acceptance and perpetuation of the colonial treatment of them and their systems 
-  it is not without some, albeit minor, advantages. The state’s requirements for 
claiming some form of minority right, or some form of cultural accommodation, 
are likely to be less strict than for the endorsement of a separate legal system 
and it may be possible to make out a case for the former when it is not possible
60 Such a system would, of course, always be under the control of the state legal system and could 
be dismantled at any time.
to do so for the latter. The possible use of this approach to justify the recognition 
of customary law will be discussed in Chapter 2.
iv: Proposals to date for the recognition of customary law:
If it is decided to accord some recognition to customary law, the question arises of 
the method by which this is to be done. The most radical solution would be to 
grant powers of self-government to various groups who would then be able to use 
customary law if they chose to do so.61 This is extremely unlikely. The state has 
never recognised Aboriginal groups as states or nations - indeed such status has 
rarely been claimed by Aborigines themselves -  and there is no indication that they 
will ever do so. Another possibility is to acknowledge that the customary law 
system survived settlement and is still in force to the extent that there has been no 
subsequent inconsistent legislation. It will be argued in Chapter 1 that, for a variety 
of reasons, such an acknowledgment is not possible within the legal framework of 
the Australian state.
Given the above, any recognition is likely to be effected by the ordinary 
common law -  by statute or by judicial decision - within the state’s legal system. 
This can be done in two ways. The first is incorporation by common law which, 
in matters other than land and property rights, consists in recognising customary 
practices or methods of establishing situations, which practices or situations then
61 This is the position of) for example, some tribes in the United States: see infra 141-143.
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invoke the application of the general law: thus, a customary marriage might be 
accepted as a procedure establishing a marriage which is legal by the state’s 
criteria with all that entails 62 The second way is simply to validate the content 
of all or part of the customary law by statute or by judicial decision. The 
difference between these two methods is that in the former the customary norms 
are used per se as reference points for state law. In the latter, the state is 
essentially making law in the normal way, but the content of that law replicates 
the customary system or a norm thereof. All the proposals outlined below are 
premised on the use of the common law to grant recognition.
There have been many initiatives which display the openness of both the 
Australian state in general and the Northern Territory in particular to granting a 
degree of recognition. However, the limited extent to which these proposals 
have been implemented is an indicator of the very real difficulties inherent in 
any such attempt and it is these difficulties which render the judiciary the most 
appropriate body to further recognition. The major proposals are listed here in 
chronological order63 with a brief comment and, where appropriate, will be 
discussed and referenced at the relevant points in the Thesis.
62 Levy describes these types of incorporation as “typically recognitions not of customary ways of 
making law, or of the content of customary law, so much as customary ways o f establishing legal 
conditions and situations.” Levy. J.T. The Multiculturalism o f Fear Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000, at 167.
63 The Recognition o f Aboriginal Customary Laws (Summary Report, Full Report 2 Volumes), 
Final Report No. 31 Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986. There had 
been some earlier discussion, but the present debate can be said to date from the 1986 Report. 
The Reference was prompted by the decision o f Wells J. in the case of R. v Sydney Williams 
(1976) 14 SASR 1. In this case the defendant was convicted of the manslaughter o f an 
Aboriginal woman and Wells imposed a two year suspended sentence upon the defendant’s 
agreement to submit himself to rule o f the tribal elders for a year. The case caused great
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1. The Australian Law Reform Commission Report The Recognition o f 
Aborisinal Customary Laws. 198664: The Commission argued that there was 
a case for appropriate recognition of customary law and that this would not 
be racially discriminatory. However, this recognition should be on an issue 
by issue basis, not a general recognition of the entire customary system. The 
Commission was not in favour of new and separate legal structures unless a 
need was clearly demonstrated and it rejected the notion of a general 
customary law defence. It did recommend a partial customary law defence 
which, if made out, would reduce murder to manslaughter if the killing had 
been carried out under the compulsion of customary law.65 This 
Recommendation has never been implemented. The Report made specific 
recommendations on certain aspects of customary law -  family matters, 
inheritance, hunting and gathering rights - and on local justice mechanisms. 
It also made a number of recommendations in relation the criminal justice 
process. Some of these recommendations take the form of principles to be 
followed or matters to be considered66 and many would, if implemented, 
depend on judicial discretion67. There is no doubt that if all the 
recommendations were to be implemented, customary law would be 
accorded much more recognition in the state legal system than is presently
controversy although Kirby points out that Wells was merely following the long-established 
practice o f the judiciary: Kirby. M. Reform the Law: Essays on the Renewal o f the Australian 
Legal System Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983, at 123.
64 The Australian Law Reform Commission supra n 63.
65 Paragraphs 451-453. For discussion of the desirability o f specific customary law or more general 
cultural defences, see infra 332-333.
66 For example, prosecuting authorities should consider not proceeding in certain cases which 
involve customary law: Paragraph 475.
67 For example, judges should have the power to empanel single-sex juries if they think it 
appropriate on customary law grounds: Paragraph 595.
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the case. This is, however, very unlikely to occur and it remains the case that 
the judiciary is the organ most likely to be able to achieve this recognition. 
Moreover, the Report itself recognises the importance of judicial discretion. 
It recommends, for example that general legislative endorsement be given to 
the practice of taking into account customary law factors in sentencing, but 
recognises that the interpretation and application of such a provision would 
depend on the judiciary68
2. The Australian Law Reform Commission Report Multiculturalism and the 
Law69: The Commission argued for greater recognition of cultural 
background, but stressed that multiculturalism is not unlimited and is subject 
to, inter alia, the rule of law and equality. It restated the view expressed in 
its earlier Report on customary law that a separate legal system was not 
desirable and that it was preferable to make the general system more 
accommodating of cultural difference. It also rejected the notion of a cultural 
defence, except in extremely limited circumstances.70 The Report was not 
primarily concerned with the position of Aborigines or with customary law 
and its treatment of these issues adds little to its earlier Report on customary 
law.
68 Paragraph 517.
69 Multiculturalism and the Law Sydney: Report 57, Australian Law Reform Commission, 1992.
70 The Commission endorsed its earlier Recommendation for a partial customary law defence for 
Aborigines accused of murder -  supra 52 - but rejected it in all other cases: paragraph 811 and 8.12.
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713. Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. 1992 : The
Commission acknowledged that there was a large number of Aborigines in 
the Northern Territory who still lived their lives in accordance with 
customary law and who often felt alienated from the mainstream system. 
The Report recommended that some respect for and recognition of 
customary law would assist in reducing this sense of alienation, but did not 
propose separate legal systems. It urged compliance with the Australian Law 
Reform Commission Report on customary law.72
4. Office of Indigenous Affairs progress Report. 1994: In response to the Royal 
Commission into Deaths in Custody’s Recommendation 219 the 
Commonwealth requested a further report on the progress of 
implementation. That Report73 found that there had been no implementation 
due to the complexity of the issues and the fragmented nature of government 
in Australia.74
71 Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, National Report o f the Royal Commission 
into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (5 Volumes) Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1991-1992.
72 National Report o f the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody Recommendation 
219, supra n 37, Vol. 4, at 97-102.
73 Office of Indigenous Affairs, Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Aboriginal 
Customary Laws, Report on Commonwealth Implementation o f the Recommendations o f the 
Australian Law Reform Commission Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994.
74 For an overview of community law and justice plans in the Northern Territory, see: Northern 
Territory Government, Department of Community Development, Sport and Cultural Affairs A 
Model for Social Change: the Northern Territory’s Aboriginal Law and Justice Strategy 1995-2001.
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5. Meetings of Ministers for Aboriginal Affairs and Federal and State
Attomevs-General: to discuss ways of preparing for formal and informal 
recognition in each jurisdiction.75
6. The Sessional Committee of the Northern Territory Legislative Assembly on 
Constitutional Development: in the course of its work on drafting a new 
Constitution for the Northern Territory the Committee became aware of the 
strength of customary law and of the demands for recognition. It produced 
two Discussion Papers which deal with the issue. The first76 raised various 
questions about the desirability of recognition and possible methods. The 
second77 raised the possibility of extending community control of 
‘customary rights and practices’ - which may include customary law - 
already permissible to some extent under the Local Government Act. The 
Committee submitted its Report79 to the Legislative Assembly in November 
1996 and recommended express recognition of customary law as an official 
source of Northern Territory law under the new Constitution, on a par with 
common law, but, like common law, subject to statute. This appears to be a
75 Sarre. R. Aboriginal Customary Law Paper presented at ‘Cross Currents: Internationalism, 
National Identity and Law’ Australasian Law Teachers’ Association, 1995. The meetings are 
described at 2 but no further details are given and it has not been possible to obtain a record o f  
the meetings.
76 Sessional Committee on Constitutional Development Discussion Paper No. 4 Recognition of 
Aboriginal Customary Law August 1992.
77 Sessional Committee on Constitutional Development Discussion Paper No. 6 Aboriginal Rights 
and Issues -  Options for Entrenchment July 1993.
78 See, for example, the Lajmanu Community Government Scheme, clause 13 (zf). The Local 
Government Act (NTl allows communities to apply for approval of election o f a Governing Council 
whose powers will be decided by the community and may extend to the making o f by-laws 
enforceable by the Northern Territory police.
79 Sessional Committee on Constitutional Development ‘Foundations for a Common Future ’ The 
Report on Paragraph 1(a) o f the Sessional Committee on Constitutional Development’s Terms o f 
Reference on a Final Draft Constitution for the Northern Territory Volume 1, November 1996.
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sensible way forward and is similar, though not identical, to the position in 
some other jurisdictions.80 It is difficult to assess exactly what the result of 
such a provision would be. However, the interpretation and application of 
the provision would depend on the judiciary. It may be that the judges would 
be able to make more use of customary law if expressly authorised to do so 
by constitutional provision or statute. This would not, however, reduce their 
importance, but rather enlarge the areas within they could exercise their 
discretion.
7. Northern Territory Attorney-General ’ s Concept Proposal. 1996: The then 
Attorney-General released a paper proposing three principles to be adopted 
in recognising customary law.81
8. Northern Territory Statehood Conference 1998: The Conference resolved 
that customary law should be accepted as a source of law in the Constitution 
of the proposed new state. The Draft Constitution was rejected by voters and 
the move to statehood was not approved.
9. Northern Territory Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
2002: The Committee resolved to conduct an inquiry into indigenous
80 See, for example, the position in Papua New Guinea: infra n 321.
81 Hatton. S. The Recognition o f Aboriginal Customary Law: A Concept Proposalfor the Northern 
Territory 1996. The three principles were: recognition o f commonality between the state and 
customary systems, that recognition of customary law should be driven from the ‘bottom up’, and 
that customary laws which breached international human rights standards could not be recognised.
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government in the Territory and issued a discussion paper82 on wide range of 
options.
10. Towards Mutual Benefit: An Inquiry into Aboriginal Customary Law in the 
Northern Territory83 Northern Territory Law Reform Committee 2003: The 
Committee made twelve Recommendations. Several deal with general 
cultural awareness, others with increasing Aboriginal participation in the 
general justice system or establishing consultation procedures on, for 
example, sentencing. Recommendations 5, 6 and 11 are potentially the most 
far-reaching. Recommendations 5 suggests the establishment of a 
consultation process in relation to ‘promised brides’, Recommendation 6 the 
establishment of an inquiry into the issue of payback and Recommendation 
11 with the implementation of the Northern Territory Statehood Conference 
resolution that customary law be recognised as a source of law. It is difficult 
to comment on Recommendations 5 and 6. Obviously, any discussion of the 
issues is to be welcomed, but until the results are known, little more can be 
said. It is likely, however, that any eventual proposals will involve the 
application of judicial discretion at some point.
82 Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs of the Legislative Assembly of the 
Northern Territory Discussion Paper No. 1 An Examination o f Structural Relationships in 
Indigenous Affairs and Indigenous Governance within the Northern Territory June 2002.
83 Northern Territory Law Reform Committee Towards Mutual Benefit: An Inquiry into Aboriginal 
Customary Law in the Northern Territory Darwin: Northern Territory Law Reform Committee, 
2003.
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11. Western Australia Law Reform Commission on customary law: The
Commission is currently carrying out work in this subject. Two background 
papers84 have been issued, but no date has been announced for publication of 
the Report.
As well as these general proposals, there have been numerous more specific 
recommendations for recognition -  on, for example, the establishment of 
community courts or schemes, or the specific acceptance of customary law in 
land, property or family matters - some of which have been implemented. 
Where relevant, they will be discussed and referenced at the appropriate point in 
the Thesis.
0.3: Conclusion:
This Conclusion aims to raise some of the arguments which will be developed 
throughout the Thesis in support of the central proposition. It is intended merely 
to provide an introduction and, therefore, matters which are discussed more fully 
in the main body of the Thesis are referenced at the point of that discussion.
The situation addressed by the Thesis is one of great sensitivity. It is beyond 
doubt that Aborigines have suffered serious injustices: in their original
84 Williams. V. The Approach o f Australian Courts to Aboriginal Customary Law in the Areas o f 
Criminal, Civil and Family Law Background Paper No. 1. Perth: Law Reform Commission of 
Western Australia, December, 2003; Cooke. M. Caught in the Middle: Indigenous Interpreters and 
Customary Law Background Paper No. 2, Perth: Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, 
March 2004.
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dispossession of their lands and the accompanying violence; in the policies of 
segregation and then of assimilation85; in the ill-treatment meted out by some 
officials; in the pervasive racism of the wider society. It is also beyond doubt 
that many Aborigines today still suffer from problems caused by the 
fragmentation of their societies and the destruction of their authority structures: 
poor social conditions and health, alcohol and drug problems, disproportionate 
involvement in the criminal justice and prison systems. Faced with such 
problems, and perhaps aware of a sense of responsibility for at least some of 
them, it seems desirable to grant recognition to at least some customary law. It 
might appear that this would reverse some of the historical injustice and 
possibly help to restore the integrity and coherence of Aboriginal societies. 
However, whilst this view might be understandable in terms of morality, it is not 
necessarily a sound basis on which to make legal decisions.
85 The assimilation of Aborigines within wider society was, for some years, official policy in 
Australia. After much discussion, it was introduced in the Northern Territory in 1951 and continued 
until approximately the late 1960’s. The details of the policy changed slightly over time, but the 
overall aim was clear: “all Aborigines and part-Aborigines will attain the same manner of living as 
other Australians and live as members of a single Australian community, enjoying the same rights 
and privileges, observing the same customs, and influenced by the same beliefs, hopes and loyalties 
as other Australians.” The Policy o f Assimilation: Decisions o f Commonwealth and State Ministers 
The Native Welfare Conference, Canberra, 26-27 January 1961, issued by the Department of 
Territories, Canberra, cited in Tatz. C. Aboriginal Administration in the Northern Territory o f 
Australia Ph.D. Thesis, Australian National University, 1964 at 261. It should be noted that 
although the formal policy of assimilation is no longer in force, its effects continue. In some cases, 
individual Aborigines have lost the connection with their culture; in other cases, the integrity of the 
culture itself has been damaged. Despite the widespread acceptance today of the desirability of at 
least some endorsement o f differing cultural norms -  see Chapter 2 for discussion o f these points - 
many of these effects are difficult to reverse. Moreover, the state legal system assumes the 
assimilation o f customary law to its own standards: this is, of course, the dilemma examined 
throughout the Thesis.
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If Aboriginal customary law is to be recognised, it must be within the 
framework of the existing legal system. The events of 1770-1788 cannot be 
undone. The acquisition of sovereignty by the British cannot be denied and the 
jurisdiction of the present-day Australian legal system cannot be defeated. 
Attempts to gain recognition for customary law must begin from the present 
situation. This means that if such recognition is to be granted, it can only be by 
one of three methods.
First, international law might impose an obligation on the state of Australia to 
recognise. It will be argued in Chapter 2 that no such obligation currently exists 
and there is no reason to think that it will so exist in the future. Second, the 
legislature -  at state, territory or federal level -  might pass legislation giving 
effect to customary law. This is a possibility. Some such legislation already 
exists and there are numerous proposals, such as those discussed above, to 
extend legislative provision. It seems reasonable to assume that at least some 
further recognition will be granted by this means. However, very little of the 
legislation -  whether enacted or proposed -  deals with the criminal law. 
Criminal law is the ‘hard case’. For reasons discussed in Chapter 2, the state is 
reluctant to allow differential provisions in criminal law and extremely reluctant 
to allow its monopoly of the content and enforcement of such law to be 
compromised. There are various schemes to allow Aboriginal communities to 
play a greater part in the administration of the criminal law -  for example, to
86 See infra 329-330.
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make their views known in the sentencing process - but none of these extend to 
determining the content of the law. The third method by which some recognition 
might be granted is by the intervention of the judiciary. As outlined above, the 
judiciary is able to intervene at various stages in the criminal justice process. Its 
powers are not unlimited: constitutional law or even an ordinary statute will 
bind it. However, in a common law system such as Australia -  even in the Code 
states such as the Northern Territory -  the judiciary exercises considerable 
power and influence. In strict theory its role is to interpret and apply the law, but 
there can be little doubt that, in many instances, it makes law.
The judiciary is accustomed to analysis - to refining, distinguishing, developing 
concepts - and is endowed with a wide discretion and a high degree of 
flexibility. Whilst it is certainly the case that legislation on criminal matters may 
make provision for distinctions and different standards, once enacted, it is fixed. 
Of course, it can be repealed or amended, but in reality this rarely happens 
unless there is a very serious defect. Thus, for example, in the case of 
provocation, which will be discussed in Chapter 4, the law is almost entirely 
judge-made. The possibility of considering ethnicity in relation to the criteria 
for establishing the defence is a judicial creation. Some of the Codes now make 
provision for such an understanding of the defence -  for example, s. 34 of the 
Northern Territory Criminal Code - but these were introduced many years after 
the judiciary began to employ it.
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The judiciary has, therefore, played a crucial role in the increasing recognition 
of customary law within the legal system in general and the criminal justice 
system in particular. The judges in the Northern Territory have been especially 
progressive in this respect. From the early days of the Territory’s legal system, 
the judiciary was taking account of customary law in ways not widely practised 
at that time. Much of the early consideration of customary law - and indeed of 
general issues relating to Aborigines and the legal system -  is to be found in the 
judgments of Kriewaldt. J., the sole judge in the Northern Territory for much of 
the 1950’s. His contribution, and its strengths and weaknesses, will be discussed 
at various points throughout the Thesis. After Kriewaldt’s death, there was a 
long period of relative judicial quietude in the Northern Territory. The reasons 
for this are not easy to assess. It seems unlikely that the cases simply ceased and 
it has been suggested that subsequent judges were simply not as interested as 
was Kriewaldt in Aborigines and in ensuring their fair treatment under the 
criminal law. By the 1970’s the judiciary was again making decisions which 
advanced the use of customary law in criminal matters and this continues to the 
present day.
It has been suggested above that the likelihood of any substantial legislative 
recognition of customary law in criminal matters is low, but it is not impossible. 
The Northern Territory Law Reform Committee’s Recommendation for the 
establishment of an inquiry into the issue of payback has already been 
mentioned. Any eventual legislation on this issue would be enormously
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significant: payback is arguably the situation which poses the dilemma of the 
two competing systems most acutely. However, even if the legislature were to 
pass far-reaching legislation either rejecting or endorsing the practice -  or more 
likely settling on some middle ground such as the use of payback as a 
sentencing consideration -  the judiciary would still be, as it were, the ‘front line’ 
applying, interpreting and developing the law. This would always be the case 
whatever the legislation. It is for these reasons that the judiciary is more able 
than any other body to make use of customary law within the criminal justice 
system.
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Chapter 1: The status and effect of the acquisition of Australia in 1770-1788:
settlement and terra nullius 
1.1: Introduction:
The Thesis assumes that Aboriginal customary law is not per se binding on the 
courts of Australia and that it is, therefore, legitimate to discuss whether, and if 
so how, customary law should be used by the criminal Courts. Until 1992 it 
would undoubtedly have been possible to make those assumptions. However, 
the High Court decision in the case of Mabo v. State of Queensland (No. 2)87 
(hereinafter ‘Mabo’) requires that the matter be re-examined. The decision in 
Mabo will be discussed in detail below88, but it should be noted at the outset that 
it contains argument on two issues which appear relevant to the present work: 
first, was the common law rule that some rights may survive a finding of terra 
nullius and acquisition by settlement applicable in the present case?; and second, 
were the events of 1770-1788 rightly categorised under international law as the 
acquisition of terra nullius by settlement and, if so, what were the consequences 
of that categorisation? It is contended that only the second point is of importance 
to the Thesis as a whole. The common law rule on the survival of certain rights 
is largely irrelevant as it concerns predominantly property rights. As such, it 
was, of course, crucial to the decision in Mabo but provides little support for the
87 (1992) 175 CLR 1.
88 Infra 100-108.
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8 9contention that customary ‘criminal’ law may have remained in force. 
However, the re-examination of the categorisation of the events of 1770-1788 as 
settlement of terra nullius is of considerable importance as if customary law, 
including possibly customary criminal law, survived 1788 then it can, indeed 
arguably should, be taken into account by present day Courts. The Chapter will 
analyse the way in which the Australian legal system has dealt with Aboriginal 
customary law for the past two hundred years and, thereby, set the scene for the 
examination of possible ways forward.
First, it will consider the occupation of Australia and whether that occupation 
was rightly categorised at the time as ‘settlement’. It will conclude that, however 
morally unacceptable it may be today, the categorisation was correct.
Second, it will examine the Australian Courts’ treatment of the issue before 
1992 and demonstrate that the original categorisation as settlement was almost 
universally accepted by the judiciary. Some judges -  and, of course, most if not 
all Aborigines -  did not accept the categorisation or the consequences which 
flowed from it. These views will also be discussed.
89 For discussion of this issue, see infra 113-117. The term ‘customary criminal law’ is imprecise as 
‘criminal’ is not a transferable concept, implying as it does the existence of a state monopoly over 
the proscription and punishment of certain types of behaviour. It will be used of those matters and 
procedures in customary law which are the equivalent of criminal matters and procedures in state 
law.
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Third, it will consider the decisions in Mabo. Wik Peoples and Thavorre People v 
Queensland90 (hereinafter ‘Wik’) and derivative caselaw and will stress that Mabo 
did not overturn the view that Australia was acquired by settlement and that whilst 
these cases are of considerable importance to native title, their possible application 
to other areas of law is limited.
Finally, it will consider the possible subsistence of Aboriginal rights in the 
present day criminal justice system.
1:2: History of the Occupation of Australia:
i. International law relating to the acquisition of territory and ensuing 
jurisdiction current in 1770-1788:91
Historically there were many methods of acquiring territory92 but only three are 
relevant to the present discussion: treaty or cession, settlement and conquest. 
Whilst the law in this area developed as a means of deciding one European
90 (1996) 187 CLR 1.
91 On this point, see generally any text on public international law, but especially relevant is: 
Lindley. M.F. The Acquisition and Government o f Backward Territory in International Law. 
Being a Treatise on the Law and Practice Relating to Colonial Expansion London: Longmans, 
Green and Co. Ltd., 1926, and Roberts-Wray. K.O. Commonwealth and Colonial Law London: 
Stevens, 1966. For general histories o f international law, see: Ruddy. F.S. International Law in 
the Enlightenment: The Background o f Emerich de Vattel's Le Droit de Gens Dobbs Ferry, New 
York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1975; and Nussbaum. A  A Concise History o f the Law o f Nations 
New York: Macmillan Company, 1962.
920n these points, see: Verzijl. J.H. W. International Law in Historical Perspective Part III State 
Territory Leyden: A.W. SijthofF-Leyden, 1970, at 297-346. Most of these methods o f acquisition 
are no longer possible. In particular, it is generally accepted that title may no longer be acquired 
by conquest. However, there are arguments to the contrary: see, for example: Korman. S. The 
Right o f Conquest: The Acquisition o f Territory by Force in International Law and Practice Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996.
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claim against another, the lands being acquired were usually inhabited by 
indigenous peoples. Thus, the early law on the acquisition of territory is 
inextricably connected with the law on the rights of such peoples and it is this 
aspect which is relevant to the present work.
The importance of being able to establish title to territory first arose as a major 
issue in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when European explorers began to 
claim lands throughout the globe. The earliest major attempt to set out a 
justification for such acquisitions was in the sixteenth century when Pope 
Alexander VI (1492-1503) sanctioned the Spanish Empire in the Americas on 
the grounds that he held temporal lordship over lands which lordship he might 
grant to others. The theory that the Papacy enjoyed sovereignty over all territory 
was subject to increasing criticism throughout the fifteenth century, partly due to 
the growth of Protestantism and the consequent reluctance to grant the claims of 
the Papacy, but also on account of the treatment of the indigenous peoples by 
the Iberian conquerors.93 Moreover, whilst it was the ostensible justification for
93 On these points see: Stogre. M. That the World May Believe: The Development o f Papal Social 
Thought on Aboriginal Rights Sherbrooke, QC: Editions Paulines, 1992, esp. 10-11, 20 and 47-124. 
In fact, whilst the Papal Bulls issued in this respect are often cited as marking the high point o f Papal 
claims, the reality was that by this time the power of the Papacy was already waning. It is at least 
arguable that colonisation would have proceeded with or without Papal approval and that the Papacy 
was simply trying to reserve its control over evangelisation and to protect the natives from the 
abuses of Spanish power rather than that it was exercising temporal power. Indeed, Korman points 
out that such was the decline of the Papacy’s temporal influence by this point, that Papal donation as 
a means of acquiring territory was only recognised by Spain and Portugal and then only as effective 
between themselves. The other major European colonial powers, France, Holland and England, did 
not recognise the validity of Papal donation and in asserting title as against them, Spain and 
Portugal relied rather on discovery or conquest than on the actions of the Papacy. Korman. S. The 
Right o f Conquest: The Acquisition o f Territory by Force in International Law and Practice Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996, n 92 at 43. Nor should it be assumed that there was no criticism o f the 
approaches o f both the Papacy and Spain from within the Church. The most prominent critics 
were the Dominican theologians Bartolome de las Casas (1474-1566) and Francisco de Vitoria
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the acquisition of lands in the first great wave of European colonial expansion, it 
was not in any meaningful sense the basis of modem international law on the 
acquisition of territory which law was derived from common law concepts. 
There was, here, no question of sovereignty, a concept which did not develop 
until Bodin (1530-1596) and had little influence on international law until much 
later. The law which operated in legitimating the Iberian Empires in South 
America was the medieval law which regarded territory as the personal property 
of the monarch or ruler. Whilst there may have been arguments over what was 
or was not the property of the Papacy and over whether the right to deal with 
such property was unlimited, there was no real argument about the underlying 
principles.
A major development came with the work of Grotius (1583-1645). He is
generally regarded as having ‘secularised’ the law of nations, in that his
postulates turned on reason and not divine will, and in effect become the father
of modem international law.94 Until this point, the prevailing philosophy in
Europe was a naturalist one and accepted that there was a ‘right order’ to which
all human conduct, including that of monarchs either religious or secular, should
conform. The source of that order was variously conceived: for the religious or
theologians - such as de las Casas and Vitoria - God, for the secular - such as
(1480-1546). For discussion o f their work see, for example: Marks. G.C. ‘Indigenous peoples in 
International Law: The Significance of Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolome de las Casas’ 13 
Australian Yearbook o f International Law (1992) 1-51.
94 Though see Janis. M. W. ‘Religion and the Literature o f International Law: Some Standard 
Texts’ in The Influence o f Religion on the Development o f International Law ed. Janis. M.W. 
Dordrecht, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991, at 61-84, for arguments that 
Grotius remained deeply influenced by both the works of the sixteenth century Spanish 
theologians and by his Protestant background.
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Grotius - natural law or right reason, but in all cases it was accepted that there 
were inbuilt limits on what could rightly be done by rulers. It was within this 
framework that it had been possible to criticise the actions of both the Spanish 
rulers and the Papacy.
The foundations of international law, as recognisable today, and as prevailed in 
the period 1770-1788, were laid in the late seventeenth century - though not 
substantially developed until the mid-nineteenth century - by the work of 
theorists such as Pufendorf (1632-1694), Wolff (1679-1754) and Vattel (1714- 
1769) who began to develop a system of laws applicable to states, the beginning 
of the present day doctrine of state sovereignty. Anaya points out that this model 
of international law which recognised only two categories of subject - 
individuals or states - made it almost impossible for non-European indigenous 
societies to be recognised other than as a collection of individuals.95 They did 
not qualify as states - as the concept was based on the European model which 
involved notions such as territorial exclusivity, hierarchy and centralisation -  
and could, therefore, be disregarded.
By 1770-1788 most commentators -  both international96 and English97 - argued 
that title to territory was gained by purchase or cession, by conquest, or by first
95 Anaya. S.J. Indigenous Peoples in International Law New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996 at 15.
96 ‘International’ in this context must be understood as European.
97 In 1770-1788 there was no rigid divide between domestic or municipal and international law. Had 
there been such a divide, the fact that the acquisition of territory was justified under the domestic 
law of the acquirer would be irrelevant. However, as there was no fully developed system of public
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discovery98 and effective occupation (i.e. settlement), a position which, apart 
from the arguable prohibition of conquest, remains substantially unaltered today. 
Inevitably their understanding of the requirements for each method of 
acquisition was affected by the ideas discussed above and particularly by the 
acceptance of only two subjects: individuals and states. In Australia there was 
no purchase or cession. Therefore, the only way in which the acquisition of the 
territory was legally justified is if it was by conquest99 or by settlement. The 
difference lies essentially in the perceived status of any pre-existing inhabitants.
For land to be acquired by settlement there are two requirements: that the land 
be terra nullius and that the claimant occupies it by exercising both first 
discovery and effective occupation. Land which is terra nullius - literally no- 
one’s land - is deemed to be available for acquisition. However, the term "terra 
nullius'has been variously understood over time and its exact meaning, even at a 
given period, has not always been clear. According to the understanding current 
in 1770-1788, it was not necessary that land be physically unoccupied: the 
crucial factor was that there should be no-one who had established rights in the 
land. If it was occupied by peoples who were not considered to have established 
ownership, then it was available for acquisition despite their presence. Whether
international law, the legality or otherwise of an action was determined by a consensus of legal 
opinion across the European world.
9 For a consideration of the concept of ‘discovery’, see: Sheleff. L. supra n 55 at 93-119.
99 The right to acquire territory by conquest was not unlimited. However, the law on this point 
will not be considered in detail as the dominant understanding for the past two hundred years has 
been that Australia was acquired by settlement. The rules on conquest would only be relevant if 
that categorisation were in error.
70
ownership had been established depended on European assessment of the 
lifestyle and societal structure of the inhabitants.
By 1770-1788 ‘terra nullius’had come to mean land which, although it may be 
inhabited, was not cultivated or tilled.100 Certain beliefs about the development 
of society and the rights of individuals were commonly held (though with many 
variations) in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. One such 
belief was that man lived first in a state of nature in which the only property to 
which he had an inherent right was the labour of his body. This could be used to 
acquire more property by, for example, mixing the labour of the body with the 
produce of the earth, by gathering and thus acquiring a right to the produce. 
Further rights could be obtained by settling in one place and cultivating the 
earth. It followed from this that nomadic tribes who did not cultivate land could 
not be considered to have asserted any legal title to it.
A second factor to be considered in determining whether the original inhabitants 
of territory had established rights in it was the structure of their society. It was 
often held necessary, reflecting European notions of social organisation, for 
there to be some form of hierarchical leadership.101 The social groupings of 
peoples who did not possess any recognisable hierarchy were regarded as too
100 This view is pre-eminently expressed by Locke. See ‘The Second Treatise on Government’ 
Chapter Five (first published 1689) in Locke J. Political Writings London: Penguin Books, 1993, at 
273-286. On this point, see: Kolers. A  ‘The Lockean Efficiency Argument and Aboriginal Land 
Rights’ Australasian Journal o f Philosophy Vol. 78, No. 3, September 2000, 391-404.
101 This requirement is predicated on an Austinian concept of sovereignty: sovereignty is about 
obedience which may be enforced by a superior. However, Lindley says: “Sovereignty may reside 
in the community as a whole, and not necessarily in some superior individuals, or body of 
individuals.” Lindley. M.F. supra n 91 at 21.
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primitive to count as societies and assumed not to possess such attributes as a 
legal system and, therefore, not to have rights. Whilst this understanding of terra 
nullius may well be untenable today, it was dominant in 1770-1788 in both 
English and international legal thinking.102
Once land is deemed to be terra nullius and thus available for acquisition by 
settlement, the second requirement for establishing such a title must be met. The 
concept of occupation has two elements: first discovery and effective 
occupation. It follows from what has been said above that first discovery does 
not require that the land has no inhabitants when the settlers seeking to claim the 
title arrive. First discovery is essentially about staking a claim to terra nullius 
before any other state does so. Historically this amounted to being the first 
European power to arrive at the land. A preliminary right to possession is 
established by formal claiming of the land on behalf of a sovereign who has 
authorised such an act and a symbolic act of sovereignty such as the planting of
102 Blackstone and Vattel were, for example, cited with approval in Campbell v. Hall (17741 20 
St. Tr. 239 and the principles in that case were applied in the New South Wales case of Cooper 
v. Stuart (1889) 14 App. Cas. 286. For the present day understanding o f terra nullius, see: 
Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara (1975) ICJ 12. However, what is relevant here is the 
understanding current in 1770-1788. According to the doctrine of intertemporal law, it is by 
those rules that the acquisition must be judged. The doctrine has been defined in the following 
way: “ .. a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light o f the law contemporary with it, and not 
of the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled” per 
Huber J. in Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands. United States! 2 R. International Arbitration 
Awards 831 at 845, cited in Elias T.O. ‘The Doctrine o f Intertemporal Law’ 74 American 
Journal o f International Law April, 1980, 285. On the same point, see also: Sharma. S.P. 
Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1997, at 98-99.
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a flag. Preliminary rights of possession are inchoate and must be rendered real
103by effective occupation within a reasonable time.
Whether territory was acquired by purchase or cession, conquest or settlement, 
the acquisition was legal. The importance of deciding the method of acquisition 
lies in the fact that the consequences of the various methods are different. If 
there is a treaty, however procured and on whatever terms, issues such as the 
status of pre-existing law will often be dealt with in that document. If 
acquisition is by treaty, by cession or by conquest, the assumption is that there is 
pre-existing law, at least for the natives inter se, and in many cases this remains 
in force until it is altered. If acquisition is by settlement, no pre-existing legal 
system is recognised.104
ii. Application of international law to 1788:
The facts of the British acquisition of Australia may be briefly stated. Cook 
landed just south of present-day Sydney in April 1770, having been instructed to 
explore the area and discover its trading possibilities. There was contact with a 
few Aborigines, some attempts at trading and a minor skirmish. After a short
103 For discussion o f the symbolic actions used in establishing sovereignty see: Keller. A.S., 
Lissitzyn. O.J. and Mann. F.S. Creation o f Rights o f Sovereignty through Symbolic Acts 1400- 
1800 New York: Columbia University Press, 1938. For discussion of the usual English usage 
towards native governments, see 10-15, and for discussion o f English practice with regard to the 
symbolic actions performed in the claiming of land, see 49-99. It should be noted that the 
authors assert, in contrast to the usually accepted position, that there is no requirement for the
formal taking of possession to be supplemented by effective occupation, at 148-149.
104 On the general principles o f state succession, see: O’Connell. D.P. State Succession in 
Municipal Law and International Law Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967.
period of mainly scientific exploration, Cook sailed north and eventually landed 
on Possession Island. He hoisted the Union Jack and claimed, in the name of 
King George III, all the land from where he stood to Cape Everard in Victoria, 
the point at which the shore had first been sighted though no landing had taken 
place. Unfortunately for the Aborigines, the 1770 landings seemed to point the 
way to a solution to quite unconnected problems faced by the British. Initially 
interested only in trade, in the years immediately following 1770 Britain’s 
attitudes to its new possession began to change. There were several factors, but 
the overall cause of the change of attitude was the rise in crime in the United 
Kingdom coupled with the inability to deal with that rise by any of the 
traditional methods. For various reasons - economic and social - the 
Government wished to deal with this situation by continuing to use 
transportation. It therefore needed to find a new destination to replace the 
recently lost American colonies and settled on New South Wales. Once the 
decision to establish the colony was made, action was taken quickly. The First 
Fleet, under Phillip, landed on 20 July 1788 and was met by local Aborigines, 
but there was no violence. The colony was subsequently established at Port 
Jackson, now Sydney.
The legality of the British actions and the validity of their claim that acquisition 
was by settlement must be tested by reference to the law outlined above. Cook’s 
Instructions on setting sail stated:
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“You are with the Consent of the Natives to take possession of 
Convenient Situations in the (Southern Continent) in the Name of the 
King of Great Britain; or, if you find the Country uninhabited take 
Possession for His Majesty by setting up Proper Marks and Inscriptions 
as first discoverers and possessors.”105
The wording of these Instructions suggests that the Admiralty, and probably the 
Government, had no preconceived view as to whether or not the land was 
inhabited nor of the legal method by which it was to be acquired. If there were 
inhabitants, they were not simply to be massacred or dispossessed, but 
negotiations were required. If there were no inhabitants, the land could be 
acquired by settlement in accordance with established international law on the 
acquisition of territory.
Cook’s claiming of the land was carried out by the method appropriate for the 
acquisition of land by settlement. It seems clear that he was mindful of his 
Instructions, had decided that the appropriate method was settlement and had 
taken the necessary actions to establish a legal claim on that basis. The question 
arises as to whether Cook was correct to use this method of acquisition or 
whether he should have negotiated.106 It might seem that he ignored the 
Instructions in terms of obtaining the “consent of the natives” and that he
105 Admiralty Lords, Additional Secret Instructions for Lt. James Cook, 30th July, 1768, in The 
Journals o f Captain James Cook o f his Voyage o f Discovery, (ed.) J.C. Beaglehole, Hakluyt 
Society, Cambridge (1955-1967) Vol. 1. p.cclxxxiii, cited in Frost. A. Botany Bay Mirages: 
Illusions o f Australia's Convict Beginnings Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1994, 
at 183.
106 See infra 97-99 for the argument in R. v. Walker (1989) 2 Qd. R. 79 on the point that Cook 
exceeded his Instructions.
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thereby exceeded his authority. Despite the wording of the Instructions and 
despite having encountered natives, Cook simply claimed possession of the 
eastern part of the continent. However, Frost argues107 that Cook knew the legal 
requirements when claiming the land and that he considered the relevant 
questions: first, was the land terra nullius or had some population established a 
right to the territory?; and second, if it were terra nullius, was he the first 
European to discover it? He argues that Cook’s answer to the first question was 
that the land was terra nullius. He quotes extensively from the words of Banks, 
the leader of the independent scientific party which accompanied the voyage, 
and Cook, and argues that Cook’s decision that the land was terra nullius was 
made in accordance with the theories of Locke and other current writers on the 
law of nature and nations. Thus, he considered the lifestyle of the Aborigines and 
it seemed clear that the latter were, according to European ideas, at a very basic 
level of civilisation. This estimate of the state of Aboriginal life and society 
meant that to Cook the land was indeed terra nullius. Frost concludes that:
“had Pitt and his advisers known that the Aborigines were not truly 
nomadic, that they had indeed mixed their labour with the land and that 
they lived within a complex social, political and religious framework - 
that is had the British not seen New South Wales as terra nullius, then (I) 
believe that they would have negotiated for the right to settle the Botany 
Bay area. 108
Frost. A. supra n 105 at 183.
108 Frost. A. supra n 105 at p. 187.
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He goes on to point out that this conclusion is supported by the approach of the 
Government and its advisers to the settlement of other areas of the world at 
about the same date. It was the character of Aboriginal society and the 
consequences which the British believed flowed from that character which made 
the British pursue quite different policies109 in Australia from those which they 
pursued in other colonies.
As for the question of whether Cook was the first European to discover the 
territory, he found no evidence of European occupation and so he assumed that 
to be the case. He therefore took the requisite steps to establish preliminary 
occupation and claim the land.
It was almost inevitable that the Aborigines would suffer from the colonising 
process but it was no part of official policy that they should be subjected to the 
near genocide which was to result from British occupation. Cook’s Instructions 
required that if any natives were found, there should be negotiations.110 Similar
109 Korman. S. supra n 92 at 41-66 points out that it was very rare for the colonising power to assert 
that land was terra nullius and that acquisition was, therefore, by settlement. The spread of 
European rule into lands occupied by indigenous groups from the sixteenth century onwards was 
almost entirely justified on the basis of conquest.
110 Harring argues that in the early days of settlement there was, in fact, very little official policy 
and it seems that not a great deal of thought had been given to the place of the Aborigines in the 
settler society. He believes that this was due partly to misinformation, to a genuine belief that 
Australia was terra nullius and that there were very few inhabitants who would soon disappear 
into the interior. If this were so, it seems remarkably short-sighted. Even if the ideas about the 
numbers o f Aborigines and their presumed readiness to move into the interior had been correct, 
it could surely have been foreseen that the settlers would not be content with the original 
boundaries o f settlement, but would want to move further into the interior. He goes on to say 
that to the extent that there was a policy it was based on British experience in the colonies of 
Canada and the United States. In the late eighteenth century Britain's colonial experience was 
limited to those colonies and to the Caribbean, the Cape Colony, Guyana and India. Canadian 
Indian policy sought to maintain a tightly controlled frontier, minimising conflict by keeping 
very strict control on the whites and punishing them for infringements. Attempts were also made
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official policy was expressed in the Instructions dated 25 April, 1787, given by 
George III to Arthur Phillip. The natives were to be kindly treated and left alone 
as much as possible:
“You are to endeavour by every possible means to open an Intercourse 
with the Natives, and to conciliate their affections, enjoining all Our 
Subjects to live in kindness and amity with them. And if any of our 
Subjects shall wantonly destroy them, or give them any unnecessary 
interruption in the exercise of their several Occupations, it is Our Will 
and pleasure that you do cause such Offenders to be brought to 
punishment according to the degree of the Offence.”111
The Instructions given to Governor Darling in 1825 repeat that the natives and 
their property must be protected, although attempts to convert them to 
Christianity are encouraged:
“And it is Our further Will and Pleasure that you do to the utmost of 
your power, promote religion and Education among the Native 
Inhabitants of Our said Colony or of the Lands and Islands thereto 
adjoining; and that you do especially take care to protect them in their 
persons, and in the free enjoyment of their possessions; and that you do 
by all lawful means prevent and restrain all violence and injustice, which 
may in any moment be practised or attempted against them; and that you 
take such measures as may appear to you with the advice of Our said
to integrate the Indians into colonial society primarily through economic means. The application 
of this policy to the new colony was destined to fail as it was premised upon being able to 
control the white population, the very thing which was impossible in penal Australia. Harring. 
S.L. ‘The Killing Time: A History of Aboriginal Resistance in Colonial Australia’ Ottawa Law 
Review Vo!26:2, 1994, 385 at 393.
111 Historical Records o f Australia Series 1. Vol.l, 9 at 13.
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Archdeacon to be necessary for their conversion to the Christian faith
112and for their advancement in Civilisation.”
Clearly the assertion of sovereignty was not intended as a licence for the settlers 
wantonly to dispossess and kill the Aborigines. The violence and dispossession 
which occurred was not generally sanctioned by law113 nor was it the inevitable 
or intended result of British colonial policy. Such behaviour was however, on 
occasion, sanctioned by the local colonial governments in Australia. Thus, 
Governors from Phillip onwards sanctioned reprisals raids when the Aborigines 
had in some way ‘offended5 against English law.114 They did not, however,
112 Historical Records o f Australia Series 1. Vol. XII, 107 at 125.
113 Hairing provides an interesting synopsis o f the views of various academics as to the stance 
taken by the law with regard to the Aborigines during the early days o f contact. For Reynolds, 
the characteristic o f the law in those years was impotence expressed as inactivity: the law was 
powerless to protect or uphold as it did nothing to prevent the dispossession and ill-treatment of 
Aborigines. For Alex Castles, the attitude of the law to the Aborigines was one of ambivalence. 
By this he means that the law was potent, it could serve to protect or uphold, but it was applied 
inconsistently. Enid Russell argues a more specific variation o f ambivalence, stating that the 
legal position o f the Aborigines depended on who had the upper hand at the time: the Home 
Office and the humanitarians or the ordinary settlers. Neal sees the law as powerful and the 
situation as more complex. For him, the law authorised dispossessions but at the same time 
provided some rights, although these latter were largely illusory. Bridges and McCorquodale 
both hold that there was no thought-out policy on the place o f the Aborigines in the system and 
the law was essentially reactive according to the circumstances. Harring also makes the further 
point that when talking of the role of ‘law’ or the ‘application o f law’, it is not possible to talk of 
a monolith: different types o f law were applied or ignored in different contexts. Hairing. S.L. 
supra n 110 at 389-391.
11 Even Governor Macquarie, widely regarded as an enlightened administrator, authorised such 
raids. In 1815 he sent a punitive expedition to the Hawkesbury District. Fourteen Aborigines 
were shot and five taken prisoner, However, it is clear from his subsequent communication to 
Lord Bathurst that he considered that such raids must have a ‘justification’: “Stating in the first 
instance the causes which led to the necessity of resorting to Military Force, and holding out to 
the Natives various encouragements with a view to invite and induce them to relinquish their 
Wandering Predatory habits and to avail themselves of the indulgences offered to them as 
Settlers in degrees suitable to their Circumstances and Situations. It is scarcely possible to 
calculate with any degree o f Precision on the result that this Proclamation may eventually have 
on so rude and unenlightened a race;' but it has already produced the good effect of bringing in 
some of the most troublesome of the Natives, who have promised to cease from their Hostility 
and to avail themselves o f the Protection of this Government by becoming Settlers, or engaging 
themselves as Servants, as Circumstances may suit; and upon the whole there is reason to hope 
that the examples, which have been made on the One hand, and the encouragements held out on
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generally sanction aggression without reason or where the only reason was that 
the Aborigines stood in the way of further settlement. Most of the violence 
which occurred was the result of actions by individuals or groups acting outside 
the law and was bom partly of a misunderstanding of the consequences of the 
acquisition of sovereignty - that is, a belief that there was no limit to what the 
settlers could do -  but mainly of a simple disregard for the very law which was 
being asserted.
The colonial government did make some attempts to control the violence 
perpetrated by the settlers on the Aborigines. Such attempts largely failed for a 
number of reasons. First, much of the violence took place in remote 
geographical areas often beyond the official limits of settlement. These areas 
were difficult to police in practical terms. Second, the expense involved in 
making such policing effective was considerable. Third, and perhaps most 
important, any such attempts met with hostility from, and lack of co-operation 
by the settlers, who wished to be able to expand regardless of the presence of the 
Aborigines. Harring says:
“The essence of the problem of white killings of Aborigines and the law 
is that convict society was largely beyond the reach of the law, protected 
both by distance and a code of silence.”115
the other, will preserve the Colony from the further recurrence o f such Cruelties” L. Macquarie 
to Lord Bathurst, 8th June, 1816, Historical Records o f Australia Series I, Vol. IX, 139 at 140.
115 Harring. S.L. supra n 110 at 395.
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Despite its opposition to wanton violence, the colonial government was neither 
willing nor indeed able to curb pastoral expansion. Governor Gipps pointed out 
that whilst such a curb might well avoid conflicts with the Aborigines, it was no 
longer possible:
“As to the evils of dispersion, I fear it is now too late to talk of them, for 
we have beyond the boundaries nearly two millions of sheep and several 
hundred thousand head of cattle, which all the powers of the
Government could not bring back within the settled limits of the
colony.”116
However, there seems to have been little doubt about the legal position. Thus, 
for example, in 1826 Attorney-General Saxe-Bannister protested to Governor 
Darling about the illegality of a reprisals patrol in the Hunter River area:
“I have formed the opinion that the indiscriminate slaughter of offenders, 
except in the heat of immediate pursuit, or other similar circumstances, 
required preliminary solemn Acts - and that to order soldiers to punish 
any outrage whatever in their way is against the law, which is powerful 
enough to guard the Public Peace from any persistent aggression.”117
Thus, most violence was not sanctioned by the law. Even those who argued 
most strongly that British sovereignty and jurisdiction had been established
116 Gipps’ speech, quoted in the Sydney Gazette, 23 March, 1839, cited in Burroughs. P. Britain 
and Australia 1831-1855: A Study in Imperial Relations and Crown Lands Administration 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967, at 157.
117 Saxe-Bannister to Darling 9th September, 1826. PRO. CO. 323/146 £208, cited in Neal. D. 
The Rule o f Law in a Penal Colony: Law and Power in Early New South Wales Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991, at p.79.
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would, in the main, have agreed that if the Aborigines were to be subject to 
English law, they must also be protected by it.118
iii. Conclusion:
It is clear that within the law as it then stood the analysis of the events of 1770- 
1788 as settlement was correct The Mabo decision will be discussed in detail 
below119, but it should be noted that there is nothing in that decision to justify 
the assertion that this was not so. Despite the fact that the Court found that the 
view that Australia was terra nullius was in error, it still declined to overturn the 
categorisation of the events as settlement. It might seem that in the light of the 
Mabo decision that Australia was not terra nullius, its historical categorisation 
as such is now irrelevant. This is not so. It is arguable that part of the Mabo was 
incorrect in that it found that the acquisition of Australia fell into a category 
unrecognised by international law: land which is not terra nullius, but is 
nevertheless acquired by settlement. A future Court which took this point and 
sought to correct the position might revert to the pre-Mabo analysis.120 Given 
this point, consideration of judicial treatment of the issues remains relevant.
118 See Macquarrie’s Proclamations infra 86 nn 128,129.
119 Infra 100-108.
120 Alternatively such a Court might agree that Australia was not terra nullius and pursue the 
logic o f that argument by finding that the events of 1770-1788 were, in fact, conquest. Whilst a 
finding of conquest would not affect the acquisition o f sovereignty and would make the issue of 
the survival o f Aboriginal customary law clearer in theory, it would make little or no difference 
in practice as, at least with regard to criminal law, there is certain to have been subsequent 
inconsistent law which would extinguish any surviving custom.
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1:3: Judicial consideration of the classification of 1770-1788 as settlement and
of the consequent amenability of Aborigines to British jurisdiction121 prior to 
1992:
Most of the pre-1992 cases concern the public international law points 
subsequently discussed in Mabo, the applicability of the rules on the acquisition 
of territory and ensuing jurisdiction. Provided that the acquisition of territory 
was in accordance with the law, sovereignty and jurisdiction were established, 
but the method of acquisition determines the status accorded to customary law. 
When the British acquired Australia by settlement, English law became 
applicable throughout the colony. The claim that Australia was settled 
necessarily carried with it the assertion that there was no cognisable Aboriginal 
law or legal system in existence122. This was the legal position: the reality was 
quite different. Aboriginal societies encompassed systems which were most 
certainly legal in character and purpose although with a wider understanding of 
Taw’ and Tegal system’ than was common in eighteenth century English 
thinking.123 It is the subsistence of these laws and legal systems which gives rise 
to the dilemma faced in the Thesis.
I21The concept o f jurisdiction essentially involves the right o f a sovereign state to regulate, by its 
domestic law, all matters within its territorial boundaries. Jurisdiction is, at least in the present 
context, a much less complex and controversial area than the acquisition of territory and the 
classification o f that acquisition. Basically its establishment and scope follows automatically 
from the method of acquisition.
122 Apart from property rights which could survive. See infra 103-104.
123 This has been recognised by both academics and the judiciary. See, for example: Harring. S.L. 
supra n 110 at 391; Blackburn J. in Milirrpum v. Nabalco Ptv. Ltd. and the Commonwealth of 
Australia (hereinafter ‘Milirrpum’) (1970) 17 FLR 141, at 266-268.
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Whilst it was Cook’s estimate of the situation and his actions on landing -  
mistaken and ultra vires or not - which initiated the categorisation of the British 
arrival as settlement, there was little attempt to disavow his claims. The 
acceptance of this categorisation meant that the policy pursued in colonial 
Australia in relation to the acknowledgement of pre-existing laws and legal 
systems was very different from the indirect rule policy pursued in many other 
British colonies. There the colonisers left local hierarchies in place and 
incorporated them as a layer of colonial government. They were left to run the 
affairs of the original inhabitants and, in general, pre-existing local law 
remained in force and continued to govern the natives inter se. This pre-existing 
law was only amended or disregarded when a problem arose or if it impinged on 
the interests of the colonisers.124 In Australia this was not the case. Settlement 
meant that there was no acknowledgement of Aboriginal society or legal 
systems. In such a legal vacuum the laws of the settlers become immediately 
effective in totality (subject to the general principle of applicability125) 
throughout the land and applicable to all the inhabitants. Whilst some aspects of 
Aboriginal law may have survived the British arrival126, until 1992 the 
interaction of the white system, including the legal system and the Courts, with 
Aborigines and their law was within the conceptual framework of the legal
124 See, for example, British practice in St. Lucia referred to by Willis J. in the Bon Jon case. Port 
Phillip Gazette, 18th September, 1841, referred to in Bridges. B. ‘The Extension of English Law to 
the Aborigines for Offences Committed Inter Se, 1829-1842’ (Dec. 1973) Journal o f the Royal 
Australian Historical Society, Vol. 59. Pt.4,264-269 at 267.
125 It is clear law that even when a country is totally uninhabited, settlers take only such law as is 
applicable in the circumstances.
See infra 103-104.
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notions of settlement and terra nullius and that which flowed from those
notions.
It took some fifty years from 1788 to establish coherent and fully functioning 
governmental and judicial systems. During those years relations between the 
Aborigines and the settlers and the British understanding of what had happened 
in 1770-1788 were shaped by the colonial and local administrations, by the 
settlers themselves and by the practical realities of establishing the colony. It 
follows from the gradual nature of the establishment of the colony that the 
original assertions as to the contents of the terms ‘sovereignty’ and 
‘jurisdiction’, and the decision to classify Australia as ‘settled’ rather than as 
‘conquered’ or ‘ceded’, were not judicial opinions but political ones. It took 
time for the judicial system to formulate and express the legal basis of what had 
originally been political statements. It was the British Colonial Office which 
decided to acquire Australia and from the beginning held to a certain 
understanding of the factual acquisition which the Courts were able to fit within 
the scope of the legal doctrine of terra nullius. The relative status of political and 
legal argument in the acquisition of Australia is put well by Crawford: “Once it 
was decided to acquire the whole of Australia for the Crown, British authorities 
faced the question of method.”127 It was as a result of these political assessments 
that there were no treaties or agreements: having categorised Australia as 
‘uninhabited’, the British understanding would have been that there were no
127 Crawford. J. ‘The Aboriginal Legal Heritage: Aboriginal Public Law and the Treaty Proposal’ 
(1988) 62 Law Institute Journal, 1174-1179 at 1174.
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parties competent to conclude such treaties. Moreover, in the early days of the 
colonies, questions as to amenability of Aborigines to the British system were 
often addressed by the administration before they were addressed by the Courts. 
Although Macquarie’s 1816 Proclamation128 made no mention of the general 
amenability of Aborigines to English law for crimes committed inter se, the 
provisions relating to tribal punishment were the first attempt to interfere with 
native customs as they applied to Aborigines alone without affecting the white 
population. Moreover, in the same year Macquarie issued a second 
Proclamation129 which outlawed ten Aborigines, thus claiming by necessary 
implication that they were subject to the English law, though still not stating 
categorically the extent of that law’s applicability. By the time the courts were
iarticulating the position, it was de facto established.
Some expressed disquiet and argued that it was unwise and unjust, though not 
legally incorrect, to use the acquisition of jurisdiction to apply English law in 
toto. Thus the House of Commons Select Committee on Aborigines in the 
British Settlements stated in 1837 that to require from Aborigines “the 
observation of our laws would be absurd and to punish their non-observance of 
them by severe penalties would be palpably unjust.”131 This view was not,
128 Historical Records o f Australia, Series 1, Vol. IX, 141.
129 Historical Records o f Australia, Series 1, Vol. IX, 362.
130 There was an unsuccessful attempt to pursue a different policy in South Australia: see: Cassidy. 
J. ‘A Reappraisal o f Aboriginal Policy in Colonial Australia: Imperial and Colonial Instruments 
Recognising the Special Rights and Status of the Australian Aboriginals’ 10 Journal o f Legal 
History (1989) 365.
131 British House of Commons, Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), Report 26 
June 1837 at p.84, cited in Harring. S.L. supra n 110 at nn 30 and 87.
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however, incorporated in the actual recommendations and never gained 
widespread support. The Committee recognised both the existence of customary 
law and the importance of allowing it to continue to function and there was 
some suggestion that the two legal systems should coexist as they did in 
conquered colonies. Harring points out that the Report of the Committee is 
equivocal on this point for two reasons: first, that English law could not be seen 
to be sanctioning ‘barbarous customs’; and second, that if the Aborigines 
appeared to be beyond the reach of the settlers’ law, the settlers would take the 
law into their own hands.132 Some of the English colonists in Australia also 
believed in allowing customary law to continue to function.133 The Aborigines 
did not, of course, accept British sovereignty, though they may in some cases 
have bowed to what seemed inevitable, and as well as armed resistance, many 
challenged the establishment of both sovereignty and consequent jurisdiction 
through the Courts, a paradoxical position since those Courts only had any 
jurisdiction to hear the challenge if sovereignty were in fact established. Such 
challenges were infrequent and from the outset there was little doubt amongst 
the British in general, and the judiciary in particular, that sovereignty and thus 
jurisdiction had been established. The doubts expressed, such as they were, were 
over the scope of the jurisdiction and the manner of its exercise in relation to the 
Aborigines: were they amenable to British jurisdiction on all points and could 
they be treated differently from white settlers?
132 Harring. S.L. supra n 110 at 404.
133 South Australia seems to have allowed customary law to run for longer than the other colonies. 
The first conviction of an Aborigine for a killing inter se did not take place there until 1873. See: 
Griffiths. A.R.G. ‘Capital Punishment in South Australia, 1836-1964’ (1970) 3 Australian and 
New Zealand Journal o f Criminology, 214, cited in Harring. S.L. supra n 110 at 405.
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For most of the early judiciary, the question was straightforward: jurisdiction 
was established, all inhabitants were amenable to all aspects of jurisdiction 
which was to be exercised on the English rule of law model which did not allow 
for differential treatment.134 However, notwithstanding the policies of the British 
Government and the Proclamations of Governor Macquarie, some of the 
judiciary were not certain of the real nature of the colonisation nor of the 
correctness of the application of procedures and sanctions to Aborigines or for 
offences committed inter seU5 and there was, therefore, some lack of uniformity 
in the early decisions on these points.136 Just as physical settlement was gradual, 
so too was the articulation of the right to sovereignty and jurisdiction and the 
actual application of English law. However, over time the colonial system 
developed and unified and within fifty years the Australian Courts were 
delivering judgements which clearly set out the, at least majority, position.
Judicial consideration of the issues of settlement and jurisdiction can be divided 
into three phases. The first began in the 1820’s and lasted for about sixty years. 
By then the uncertainties appeared to be resolved. In the ensuing years there 
were a few cases on these points, but it was not until the 1970’s that the second 
phase began and the Courts were again faced with a major reconsideration of the 
issues. The third phase began in 1992 with the Mabo case.
134 See Chapter 2 for discussion o f this point
135 See: Kercher. B. An Unruly Child: A History o f Law in Australia St. Leonards, NSW: Allen 
and Unwin, 1995.
136 On the development of law in Australia generally, see: Bird. G. The Process o f Law in 
Australia: Intercultural Perspectives Sydney: Butterworths, (2nd ed.) 1993. See also: Hookey. J. 
‘Settlement and Sovereignty’ in Hanks P. & Keon-Cohen B. (eds.) Aborigines and the Law: Essays 
in Memory ofElizabeth Eggleston North Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1984, at 1-18.
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The first phase centred on two separate -  though connected -  issues. First, the 
analysis of 1788 as settlement and second, the consequences of that analysis in 
terms of the establishment of jurisdiction over Aborigines. There were two 
major decisions on the question of settlement per se: MacDonald v. L ew 137 and 
Cooper v. Stuart138. Both found that there was no doubt that Australia had been 
acquired by settlement, using the type of analysis discussed above. In the latter 
case before the Privy Council, the highest Court in the newly-established 
Australian judicial system, Lord Watson said:
“There is a great difference between the case of a Colony acquired by 
conquest or cession, in which there is an established system of law, and 
that of a Colony which consisted of a tract of territory practically 
unoccupied, without settled inhabitants or settled law, at the time when it 
was peacefully annexed to the British dominions. The Colony of New 
South Wales belongs to the latter class.”139
Thus, the position of the Courts on settlement and the subsequent acquisition of 
jurisdiction was established early and there was little dissent. However in these 
cases the references to Aborigines were purely for the sake of establishing 
settlement and, therefore, the applicability of the laws in question. No 
Aborigines were actually involved. When Aborigines were involved, the matter 
was less clear. From the beginning there was unease about the scope and 
exercise of jurisdiction and alongside the cases challenging settlement were 
others challenging the amenability of Aborigines to the jurisdiction to which
137 (1833) 1 Legge 39.
13814 App. Cas. 286.
139 At 291.
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settlement gave rise. Even in the early days some argued that whilst jurisdiction 
was certainly established, it did not extend to the Aborigines. In McHugh v. 
Robertson140 Holroyd J. made this point specifically although the case did not 
involve an Aborigine. He said:
“In determining that the restrictive law before mentioned was reasonably 
capable of being applied in New South Wales in 1828,1 have altogether 
put out of my mind the aboriginal inhabitants. The Imperial Parliament 
was not thinking of them. From the first the English have occupied 
Australia as if it were an uninhabited and desert country. The native 
population were not conquered, but the English Government and 
afterwards the colonial authorities assumed jurisdiction over them as if 
they were strangers who had immigrated into British territory, and 
punished them for disobeying laws which they could hardly understand, 
and which were palpably inapplicable to their condition.”141
The unease about jurisdiction over Aborigines was especially acute in relation to 
criminal law and particularly offences inter se. There was little difficulty or 
uncertainty if the criminal offence was by an Aborigine against a white settler 
and it is clear that from the very early days of settlement the Courts regarded 
Aborigines as amenable to English law for such offences.142 However, if the 
offence was by one Aborigine against another there was a certain reluctance to 
intervene whatever the theoretical position. As early as 1829 doubts were
140 (1885) 11 VLR410.
141 At 431.
1420n the general question of the applicability of English law to Aborigines see: Bridges. B. The 
Aborigines and the Law: New South Wales 1788-1855 Teaching History Vol. 4. Pt. 3. Dec. 1970. 
Note especially his assertion that the first application of legal process to an Aborigine was as 
early as 1812 when Moowattin was hanged for the rape of a white woman, at 45.
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expressed about the fairness of applying English law to Aborigines for offences 
committed inter se, though different courts took different views. In that year the 
first case143 to consider this issue arose when the Attorney-General sought an 
opinion from the Supreme Court of New South Wales144 on the amenability of 
an Aborigine to English law for a crime committed against another Aborigine 
and it was held that it would be unjust to apply it. The trial never came to Court.
The most important early case on the point is R. v. Jack Congo Murrell145 which 
came before the Supreme Court of New South Wales seven years later. The 
Court, with Forbes and Dowling again on the bench, unanimously reversed the 
opinion given in the Bob Barrett case and held that it had jurisdiction to try one 
Aborigine for the murder of another. The defendant’s Counsel put several 
distinct arguments. The general argument concerned the interaction between the 
original population and the newcomers and the assertion that it was unfair to 
apply the new law. There was also the more specific argument that as the 
settlers’ law did not give Aborigines the same protection as whites, they should 
not be subject to it. All the arguments were rejected. Burton stated in the 
judgement that the Aborigines had not reached the status of a sovereign people 
on the British arrival and therefore there was no question that they were not
143 Bob Barrett Sydney Gazette, 4th April and 16th June, 1829. Cited in Bridges. B. supra n 86 
at n 2.
144 For an overview of the early jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of New South Wales on this 
issue, see: Kercher. B. ‘The Recognition of Aboriginal Status and Laws in the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales under Forbes CJ, 1824-1836’ in Buck. A R , McLaren. J. and Wright. N.E. (eds.) 
Land and Freedom: Law Property Rights and the British Diaspora Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 
2001 at 83 -  102.
145 (1836) 1 Legge 72. This was the first reported case of the trial of an Aborigine. See Bridges. B.
supra n 86 for a full account of the background of the trial and the papers from the Supreme
Court Papers of the State Archives of New South Wales.
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subject to English law.146 Applying the principle of equality before the law, he 
went on to state that it would be scandalous to allow murders of natives by 
natives to go unpunished when murders of whites by natives would be 
punished147. The Murrell case is widely regarded as having settled the issue of 
jurisdiction over the Aborigines for crimes whether committed against whites or 
inter se. This seems to have been confirmed two years later in the case of Long 
Jack, accused of murdering his wife when drunk.148 The jurisdiction question 
having been settled in Murrell, he was found guilty149.
The cases so far examined are from the jurisdiction of New South Wales, but 
similar questions arose elsewhere and gave rise to similar debates. The first case 
on the point to be heard in Victoria was in 1841.150 In the Bon Jon case151 the 
defendant was charged with the murder of another Aborigine. The case came 
before Mr. Justice Willis in Melbourne. He was not prepared to accept as 
conclusive the opinion of the judges in the Murrell case on jurisdiction and 
reviewed all the arguments relating to the status of the ‘settlement’ and the
148 New South Wales State Archives, Supreme Court Papers, (62), cited in Bridges. B. supra n 86 
at n 12.
149 Burton passed the death sentence but commuted it to transportation for life. Harring. S.L. 
supra n 110 at n 86 argues that this was a way of reconciling the strict application of Murrell with 
justice. Records from this period are few, but this case seems to suggest that from the earliest 
days the judiciary used discretion to take account of the fact that the defendant was an Aborigine.
150 For an account o f Aboriginal violence and murder inter se in Victoria during the years 1841- 
1851 and the reaction of the judicial system, see: Davies. S ‘Aborigines, Murder and the Criminal 
Law in Early Port Phillip, 1841-1851’ (1987) Historical Studies, Vol. 22, No. 88, April, 1987, 
313-335; and Cannon. M. Who Killed the Koories? Port Melbourne, Victoria: William 
Heinemann, 1990, especially 77-83.
151 Unreported, but see: Bridges. B. supra n 86; Kercher. B. ‘R. v. Ballard, R. v. Murrell and R. v. 
Bonjon’ (1998) 3 Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 410. This was the first trial for murder 
inter se in the Port Phillip district. The Supreme Court in Melbourne only opened in April, 1841.
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question of amenability for crimes committed inter se. He concluded that the
natives were under British rule, but was not convinced that he had jurisdiction
over them for crimes committed inter se, supporting his opinion by reference to
the practice in other British colonies where systems of indirect rule were
established. He reserved the question of jurisdiction pending the result of the
trial. The charge was dropped as evidence suggested that Bon Jon did not really
understand the nature of the proceedings. Judge Willis remained unsatisfied on
the question of jurisdiction and sought clarification from the English legal
system via Governor Gipps. The Governor instead asked the advice of Chief
Justice Dowling who insisted that the matter was clear and had been
authoritatively decided by the full Bench in the Murrell case and applied in 1838
in the Long Jack case. No further action was taken. In 1848 Governor Gipps
issued instructions that in such trials “all Magistrates should proceed as they
1would if the parties were white men”.
The question of the amenability of Aborigines to the legal system of the settlers 
in Victoria seems to have been resolved beyond question in two later cases in 
the Supreme Court. In R. v. Peter153 the accused claiming that he was amenable 
only to the jurisdiction of his own tribe and not to English law. The argument 
failed and the Court held that everyone within the geographical area of the 
colony was subject to English law. Three months later in R. v. Jemmy154 the
152 Cannon. M. supra n 149 at 78.
153 29th June, 1860. Argus Newspaper. SC (Vic) Full Court
154 7th September, 1860. Argus Newspaper. SC (Vic) Full Court
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Court held itself bound by the decision in R. v. Peter and stated clearly that it 
made no difference whether the victim were white or a native.155
It is clear from the above analysis, that despite some dissenting voices, within 
eighty years of British arrival in Australia the main line of cases had effectively 
settled the question of the amenability to jurisdiction of Aborigines. On the 
whole, this was no longer challenged: the arguments now began to centre around 
the issue of what the English legal system actually contained? i.e. the extent to 
which Aborigines were to be treated differently and to which their own legal 
systems were to be recognised.
In the 1970’s and 1980’s a further series of cases was brought on essentially 
similar grounds - challenging notions of sovereignty, settlement and the 
amenability of Aborigines to the settlers’ jurisdiction - and the second phase of 
judicial consideration of the issues began. The impetus for this series of 
challenges was largely political. The preceding years had seen an expansion of 
political consciousness among Aboriginal communities and they were inspired 
to re-open the legal questions. None of the cases were successful or added much 
to the jurisprudence of the Courts in these issues. However, they should be 
mentioned briefly as they indicate that the issues were again prominent and set 
the stage for Mabo.
155 On similar issues in Western Australia, see: Reece. R.H.W. “‘Laws of the White People”: 
The Frontier o f Authority in early Western Australia’ in Hocking B. supra n 16 at 110-136.
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The 1971 case of Milirrpum, otherwise know as the Gove case, was the only 
pre-Mabo case in which the question of Aboriginal title to land had been 
considered. It was concerned solely with the question of land rights, but the 
discussion of Aboriginal society and notions of settlement, as well as the 
decision itself, proved a catalyst for this second phase of judicial consideration 
of the issues. It came before Blackburn J. sitting alone in the Supreme Court of 
the Northern Territory. He faced a difficult task as there was no domestic 
judicial statement on the question and he was essentially “adjudicating in a near 
vacuum”156. He concluded that there was no common law doctrine of native title 
in Australia and relied on the early line of cases related to the effect of 
settlement.157 He conceded, however, that as a matter of fact there had had been 
structured societies with law prior to settlement,158 although he maintained that a 
factual re-evaluation did not change the law.159
156 Ritter. D. ‘The ‘Rejection of Terra Nullius’ in Mabo: A Critical Analysis.’ Sydney Law 
Review Vol. 18, 1996, 5 at 13.
157 At 244-245.
158 He defined law as: “a system of rules of conduct which is felt as obligatory upon them by 
members of a definable group of people” and referring to the way of life of the people of Gove in 
the Northern Territory, he said that they possessed: “ .. a subtle and elaborate system highly 
adapted to the country in which the people led their lives, which provided a stable order of society 
and was remarkably free from the vagaries of personal whim or influence. If ever a system could 
be called ‘a government of laws, and not of men’, it is that shown in the evidence before me.” at 
266-268.
159 This decision has been widely criticised. For discussion o f the difficulties and the decision in 
this case, see: Hookey. J. ‘The Gove Land Rights case: A Judicial Dispensation for the taking of 
Aboriginal Lands in Australia’ (1972) 5 Federal Law Review 85; Watson. P. ‘The Gove Land 
Rights Case: Hard Cases make Hard Law’ (1994) 1 Canberra Law Review 97. For detailed 
discussion of the historical and anthropological background, see: Williams. N.M. The Yolngu and 
their Land: A System o f Land Tenure and the Fight for its Recognition Canberra: Australian Institute 
of Aboriginal Studies, 1986. For a study of the conflict of state and customary law in Yolngu 
society, see: Williams. N.M. Two Laws: Managing Disputes in a Contemporary Aboriginal Society 
Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1987.
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The issue of the amenability of Aborigines for crimes committed inter se was 
raised directly in 1976 when the case of R. v. Wedge160, came before Rath J. in 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The defendant argued that the Court 
had no jurisdiction over him as he was an Aborigine and put two arguments: 
first, that the Aboriginal people were, and still are, a sovereign people and are 
therefore not subject to English law; second, and in the alternative, that even if 
they are not a sovereign people, the English colonists brought with them only so 
much of the English law as was applicable to their circumstances161 and that this 
law affected only British settlers inter se. Rath J. held that the defence 
arguments were untenable as they were both premised on the assumption that 
the colony of New South Wales was not founded by settlement and there is clear 
authority, most notably Cooper v. Stuart, that it was so founded.
The case of Coe v. Commonwealth and Another162 in 1979 raised a number of 
issues. Coe sought, inter alia, a Declaration to restrain the Commonwealth of 
Australia from interfering with Aboriginal possession of lands which they still 
occupied and compensation for those lands which had been taken from them. He 
argued that before the Europeans came to Australia the Aborigines were in 
exclusive possession and that Australia was not terra nullius but occupied land 
and, as such, was acquired by conquest rather than by settlement. It followed 
from this analysis that Aboriginal sovereignty and title to land had survived
160 (1976) 1 NSWLR 581.
161 See supra n 125 on the principle of applicability.
162 (1979) 24 ALR 118.
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1788. The case went to the High Court which held that the question of 
Australian sovereignty was not justiciable in a domestic Court.163 The judges 
were divided on the question of whether or not acquisition was by settlement, 
but agreed that the issue of native title surviving 1788 remained open whatever 
the answer to that question.164 This was the first case in which the expression 
terra nullius was used by an Australian court to describe pre-1788 Australia. 
Three of the four High Court judges either ignored the expression completely or 
considered it a matter of international law and of no relevance to a domestic 
case, but Murphy J. thought it relevant and that the plaintiff was entitled to raise 
and argue the issue. However having made that point, he reached no decision on 
the matter. Coe’s arguments all failed, but in the acknowledgement that the 
question of native title remained open and in Murphy J’s dissenting judgment 
there are, perhaps, indications that judicial opinion was beginning to move 
towards reconsidering the long-established positions on these matters.165
A recasting of the traditional position is to be found in the 1989 case of R. v. 
Walker166. Walker argued two points in his appeal to the Court of Criminal 
Appeal of Queensland, the first of which -  and the only one which is relevant -  
was that the District Court had no jurisdiction to try him. He maintained that 
Stradbroke Island, where the offences took place, was occupied both before and 
after 1770 by the Nunukel, from whom he was descended, and that they had a
163 Per Gibbs J. at 128-129.
164 Per Gibbs J. at 131.
165 Jacobs J. pointed out that there had been no decision of the High Court or the Privy Council 
stating that the land was settled, at 136.
166 R. v. Walker (1989) 2 Qd. R. 79.
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system of law and government under which they occupied and were entitled to 
those lands prior to European settlement. It followed from this that Cook acted 
illegally in claiming the east coast of Australia contrary to his Instructions which 
required the “consent of the natives”. The Nunukel had given no consent. The 
Court held on this argument that whatever the irregularity, if any, of the action 
by Cook, it had been ratified by subsequent British action. However, the Court 
conceded that there were unanswered questions and observed that the claim to 
sovereignty:
“ ... raises the issue of how it is that judges and others in Queensland 
apply, and regard themselves as bound to apply, these laws to Stradbroke 
Island; and conversely, why the Nunukel people, who in times long past 
once exercised sovereignty over Stradbroke Island, are, without any 
formal displacement of their own legal system, now expected and obliged 
to submit to laws not of their own making.”167
It went on to say that the duty of the Courts was not to answer such questions, 
but simply to administer and obey the law. However, it did attempt some 
explanation:
“ ... it may be said that the Nunukel legal system was at some unspecified 
time after 1788 overthrown by a revolution which introduced a new legal 
order for Stradbroke Island. The appellant obviously contests the 
legitimacy of that event, but the efficacy and durability of the regime, 
which displaced it and which now prevails, is not open to question.
... the fundamental fact, be it historical, political or social, is that we as 
judges recognise the authority in Queensland of laws having their source 
in the Imperial, Colonial, State and Commonwealth statutes to which I
167 Per McPherson at 83.
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have referred. We acknowledge no other legal system and we are not at 
liberty to do so.”168
Walker appealed and that appeal was heard after the decision in Mabo. It is 
discussed below.169 For now it is sufficient to note that the appeal confirmed 
McPherson’s judgment in all respects. This case, like Coe, did not depart from 
the traditional position that the only applicable law and jurisdiction was that of 
the state - there was no other - but the Court was willing to admit that this had 
not always been the case. There is an acknowledgement that the Nunukel had 
been sovereign and had possessed a legal system. The result was the same, but 
the reasoning, as in Coe, shows signs of an increasing judicial awareness that a 
different analysis was possible. Apart from Willis in Bon Jon, there had been 
little early dissatisfaction with the traditional understanding of settlement and 
jurisdiction, but the cases in the second phase began to show an awareness that 
something needed to change. The judges did not depart substantively from the 
established law, but the judgments showed an increasing tendency to revise 
earlier assessments. The opportunity for substantive change -  though it will be 
argued below that the decision was incorrect and that the change was, in any 
event, of no great legal significance other than in the area of native title -  came 
in Mabo. the first case in which the issue of native title was considered by the 
High Court.170
168 Per McPherson at 84.
169 Infra 115-117.
170 Mabo gave rise to extensive academic comment. See, for example: Hocking. B. ‘Aboriginal Law 
Does Now Run in Australia - Reflections on the Mabo case: from Cooper v. Stuart through 
Milirrpum to Mabo’ Sydney Law Review Vol. 15, 187 (1993); van Krieken. R. ‘From Milirrpum to 
Mabo: the High Court, Terra Nullius and Moral Entrepreneurship’ University o f New South Wales
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1.4: Judicial consideration of the classification of 1770-1788 as settlement and
of the amenability of Aborigines to Australian jurisdiction post 1992:
Mabo concerned claims by the Meriam people to their traditional homelands in 
the Murray Islands. They could only possibly succeed if the Court accepted two 
pre-requisite analyses: first, that they had at some point enjoyed such rights, i.e. 
that the assumption by the British in 1788 that the Aborigines had no right to the 
land was wrong, either because the land was not terra nullius or because title to 
land could exist even where land was terra nullius; and second, that, if such 
rights had existed, they had survived settlement. If such rights were found to 
have existed, they could have survived in one of two ways: either as part of a 
customary system which survived 1770-1788 and was cognisable by the state 
system or as a customary property right which was subsumed into the state 
system and recognised as a common law right. The Court found that the 
categorisation of Australia as terra nullius was wrong and that a legal system 
and legal rights to property existed at the time of the British arrival. It went on to 
find that the rights had survived 1770-1788 and that, to the extent that they had 
not been extinguished, they still survived. It is beyond the scope of the Thesis to 
discuss the Mabo case in detail as much of the specific argument deals with land
Law Journal Vol. 23(1) (2000); Webber. J. ‘The Jurisprudence of Regret: the Search for Standards 
of Justice in Mabo’ Sydney la w  Review Vol. 17, 5 (1995); Ritter. D. ‘The “Rejection of Terra 
Nullius” in Mabo: A Critical Analysis’ Sydney Law Review Vol. 18, 5 (1996); Simpson. G. ‘Mabo, 
International Law, Terra Nullius and die Stories of Settlement: An Unresolved Jurisprudence’ 
Melbourne University Law Review Vol. 19,195, June 1993.
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rights. However, the main lines of argument in the decision need to be 
examined.
The Meriam people accepted that sovereignty had been established and that the 
lands had been annexed by the Crown. As a result ultimate or radical title171 
vested in the Crown. However, they maintained that their traditional - native 
title - rights had survived 1788. They accepted that these rights now derived 
from the Crown as common law rights, that they were not absolute and could be 
extinguished by the clear and unambiguous action of the Crown. However, they 
argued that as such action had not been taken in relation to the lands which were 
the subject of the claim, their rights were still in existence. The Government of 
Queensland argued that on annexation they had become absolute owners and 
were in law in possession of the lands. Therefore, no possessory title on the part 
of the Meriam people could exist.
Essentially the Court decided in favour of the Meriam people. It should be noted
at the outset, that the judges spelled out very clearly that there was no question
that the British had indeed acquired sovereignty in 1788. There was no
possibility of denying that - nor were the Meriam people attempting to do so -
and any such attempt would not be given a hearing in an Australian municipal
171 It was established in Attorney General v. Brown (1847) 1 Legge 312 that the Crown held 
Australia in feudal title and thus English land law was applicable in toto. For discussion of this point 
see: Buck. AR. “ Strangers in their own Land’: Capitalism, Dispossession and the Law’ in Buck. 
AR., McLaren. J. and Wright. N.E. (eds.) supra n 144 at 39-56. Karsten argues, however, that the 
early decisions on property matters show some improvisation alongside the strict application of 
English land law rules: Karsten. P. “They seem to argue that Custom has made a Higher Law’: 
Formal and Informal Law on the Frontier’ in Buck. A.R., McLaren. J. and Wright. N.E. supra n 144 
at 63-81.
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Court. This is, of course, the only logical position as such a Court only has any 
jurisdiction if sovereignty was, in fact, established. The question before the 
Court was the effect of that acquisition of sovereignty.
179The Court set out the two lines of argument outlined above . On the public 
international law points the judges found that the assertion that Australia was 
terra nullius in 1788 was no longer tenable -  though it still categorised the 
acquisition as by settlement - and would be out of line with international 
thinking. Justice Brennan said:
“If the international law notion that inhabited land may be classified as 
terra nullius no longer commands general support, the doctrines of the 
common law which depend on the notion that native peoples may be ‘so 
low in the scale of social organisation’ that it is ‘idle to impute to such 
people some shadow of the rights known to our law’ (In re Southern 
Rhodesia (1919) AC at 233-234) can hardly be retained. If it were 
permissible in past centuries to keep the common law in step with 
international law, it is imperative in today’s world that the common law 
should neither be nor be seen to be frozen in an age of racial 
discrimination.”173
and again:
“It is contrary both to international standards and to the fundamental 
values of our common law to entrench a discriminatory rule which,
172 Supra 64.
173 At 41,42.
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because of the supposed position on the scale of social organisation of 
the indigenous inhabitants of a settled colony, denies them a right to 
occupy their traditional lands.”174
This amounted to an acceptance that Aborigines who were in occupation of the 
land at the time had enjoyed some form of title and it was at least possible for 
that title to have survived.
On the common law argument, the Court considered the distinction between 
different aspects of sovereignty. The power to govern is a matter of public law; 
title to land is a matter of private law. The assumption of the first does not 
automatically and immediately give a right to the second. If land occupied by an 
incoming power was terra nullius in the sense of being uninhabited, then on 
arrival that power acquired both the power of government and absolute title to 
the entire territory. If, however, it was not terra nullius or was terra nullius but 
was inhabited, then it was still possible for the incoming power to acquire the 
power of government under the rules of public international law on the 
acquisition of territory discussed above. However, this acquisition of public law 
rights would not automatically displace the private law rights and systems of the 
occupants, including rights to land. Those rights and systems, governed by 
common law, would survive until the arriving power used its right to govern to 
enact inconsistent law. Once it had done that, the enacted law would prevail
174 At 42.
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over the inconsistent existing law in governing private law rights such as title to 
land.175
Both arguments were examined in some detail in Brennan J.’s judgment. He 
affirms that the acquisition of New South Wales was by settlement176 and states 
that this was possible due to the currency in 1770-1788 of an “enlarged notion 
of terra nullius”177, ‘enlarged’ in that land which was inhabited could still be 
regarded as terra nullius. The categorisation of the events as settlement meant 
that there was a presumption that no sovereign existed and that there was a legal 
vacuum. On arriving, the British acquired sovereignty and common law filled 
the vacuum, being immediately and universally applicable within the territory. 
However, Brennan goes on to say that as the presumption of a legal vacuum 
was, in fact, erroneous, common law did not totally applicable.178 He then points 
out that a distinction must be drawn between the Crown’s acquisition of title to 
the colony -  a consequence of acquiring sovereignty -  and the ownership of 
land -  a matter of common law. The two matters have been confused by the 
enlarging of the notion of terra nullius. After considering various authorities, 
including Roberts-Wray179, he concludes:
“It was only by fastening on the notion that a settled colony was terra
nullius that it was possible to predicate of the Crown the acquisition of
175 For a useful discussion of the distinction between the acquisition of sovereignty and the
acquisition of title to land, see Roberts-Wray. K.O. supra n 91 at 625-636.
ownership of land in a colony already occupied by indigenous 
inhabitants. It was only on the hypothesis that there was nobody in 
occupation that it could be said that the Crown was the owner because
there was no other. If that hypothesis be rejected, the notion that
180sovereignty carried ownership in its wake must be rejected too.”
Thus, the Aboriginal property rights which existed before settlement could 
survive.
Brennan next considers the common law understanding of the same points. The 
common law on title to land attributed radical title to the Crown once 
sovereignty was established, but it “is not a corollary of the Crown’s acquisition 
of radical title to land in an occupied territory that the Crown acquired absolute 
beneficial ownership of the land to the exclusion of the indigenous
101
inhabitants” . Thus, under common law too, property rights could survive.
Until 1992, the survival of Aboriginal property rights had never been expressly 
recognised in Australia. The one case which had considered the issue -  Milirrpum 
- had expressly held that the non-recognition of individual or collective aboriginal 
rights to land at common law was justified. However, it had been arguable even 
before Mabo that the decision in Milirrpum needed revisiting and that the 
classification of Australia as settled did not necessarily mean that all pre-existing 
rights to land were null and void. In many other common law countries such
rights survived. Hocking points out that, in general, British colonial policy 
consistently declined to abrogate pre-existing indigenous property rights when 
sovereignty was established whichever method of acquisition had been 
employed.182 Indeed, Brennan cites a number of cases, some of which were
183decided at a relatively early date, to inform his analysis of the issue in Mabo. 
Thus, in one sense the High Court was saying nothing new -  although it was 
new in Australia - but its reassessment of the legal consequences of 1788 had 
major implications. It cannot be doubted that on arrival the British acquired the 
power to govern, but if the land was not terra nullius - if the enlarged notion 
was reduced to its proper proportions - they did not automatically acquire 
absolute title to those lands which were subject to private law rights and those 
rights survived their arrival. It was, of course, possible for the Crown, exercising 
its power to govern, to act in a way which was inconsistent with the continuation 
of those rights and, if they had done so, the private rights were extinguished. 
However, if the Crown had not acted in such a way then the private rights, 
including title to land, would still be in existence.
Once it is accepted that common law recognises a form of native title, provided it 
has not been extinguished, then the question arises as to its nature.184 The Court
182 ‘Colonial Laws and Indigenous Peoples: Past and Present Law concerning the Recognition of 
Human Rights of Indigenous Native Peoples in British Colonies with particular reference to 
Australia’ in Hocking. B. (ed.) supra n 16, 3-17, at 4.
183 Lvons (Mavor of) v. East India Co. (1836) 12 ER 782, cited at 36; Case of Tanistrv (1608) 80 ER 
516 and Witron and Blanv (1674) 84 ER 789, both cited at 49.
184 Various questions also arose as to the content of native title, what amounted to acting in a way 
which extinguished title and how to prove continuing connection. These questions are not strictly 
relevant here and so will not be examined in any detail. The Court’s position is summarised by 
Brennan J. at 69-70. It should be noted that whilst most of the discussion has centred on native title
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held that such title reflected the rights which the inhabitants had enjoyed to their 
lands in accordance with their own traditional laws and customs; in other words it 
was a condition of the survival of native title that the claimants were still 
exercising those rights in a manner clearly connected to the original way of life. 
However, by insisting on this requirement the Court has confused the issue by 
asserting that the property rights which exist in some way derive their current 
validity from customary law. What survived 1788 in Australia was common law 
Aboriginal title,185 completely compatible with the finding of terra nullius and 
acquisition of sovereignty by settlement. It may be that the Courts now wish to use 
customary evidence to decide who had such rights, what they were and whether 
they still exist, but they cannot be considered to be binding customary titles. The 
Court was divided on the issue of the exact nature of native title though clear that it 
was not related to sovereignty. It is worth noting that whilst common law title may 
have less symbolic or cultural value than customary title, it gives different and 
arguably greater rights to the group. Under customary title they must use the land 
in accordance with customary rules, including frequently prohibitions on 
alienation; under common law, they may do as they wish, in theory even alienate. 
Mabo failed to pursue the full logic of its position by its finding that aboriginal
to land, what could have survived is a system of property rights which would include such interests 
as hunting and fishing rights, rights of passage and, to a certain extent, intellectual property. See: 
Mason v. Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572 and Yanner v. Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351. For the 
applicability of the Mabo principles in respect of indigenous rights in art, see: Gray. S. ‘Peeking into 
Pandora’s Box: Common Law Recognition of Native Title to Aboriginal Art’ Griffith Law Review 
(2000) Vol. 9, No. 2, 227-247. On intellectual property rights generally, see: ‘Copyrighting Culture: 
Indigenous Peoples and Intellectual Rights’ in Hastrup. K. (ed.) Legal Cultures and Human Rights: 
The Challenge o f Diversity The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001, at 42-65.
185 On this point in general, see: McNeil. K. Common Law Aboriginal Title Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989. The common law doctrine of Aboriginal rights presumes continuity of rights -  see 
Campbell v. Hall (1774) 98 ER 848 - and gives pre-existing custom the force of law under English 
law. However, such force is derived from the common law and subject to change.
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land subject to native title is inalienable. This seems incorrect: if it is common law 
title, supported by the fact that it can be extinguished by subsequent dealing, then it 
should be alienable.
The categorisation of Aboriginal title is a difficult issue and the difficulties are not
1 Q /f
peculiar to Australia. In the Canadian case of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia 
Lamer. CJ argued that aboriginal title was a hybrid owing something to common 
law title and something to customary law. Thus, the landholders may do things not 
part of the customary usage, but not if inconsistent with the attachment to the land 
which formed the basis of their title. Part of this attachment, according to Lamer, 
was to pass the land from one generation to the next and thus the title does not 
include the right to alienate.187 Both Mabo and Canadian jurisprudence188 are 
following the settled position in the United States, expounded in the Marshall 
judgements189, that indigenous land is inalienable. However, those judgements 
were based primarily on the status of the tribes as sovereign nations. Moreover, the 
recent Treaty190 between the governments of Canada and British Columbia on the 
one hand and the Nisga’a nation on the other grants fee simple. Thus, the land may 
be sold -  as far as Canadian law is concerned - though the Nisga’a would retain 
sovereignty just as the Crown does in England.
186 (1997) 3 SCR 1010
187 At 111, 113.
188 For a comparison o f the positions in Australia and Canada, see: Dick. D. ‘Comprehending 
‘the genius of the common law’ -  Native Title in Australia and Canada compared post- 
Delgamuukw’ (1999) 5(1) Australian Journal o f Human Rights 79.
189 See, for example: Worcester v. Georgia 31 US 515 1832 and, less centrally, Johnson v. 
M’lntosh 21 US 543 1823.
190 Nisga’a Final Agreement 1998 at http://www.gov.bc.ca/tno/negotiation/nisgaa/docs/ (last 
accessed on 1 December 2004) Chapter 3(3), (4) and (5).
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There has been considerable case-law on Mabo and a flurry of legislative
activity191 which is considered here only in outline. The decision in Mabo left 
two major issues unresolved: native title on pastoral leases and native title to the 
seas. The first issue was resolved by the High Court decision in Wik in 1996. 
The lands which were the subject of the claim included some areas in respect of 
which the Crown, i.e. the Queensland Government, had granted pastoral 
leases.192 The claimants argued that their titles were not extinguished by these 
grants, but continued to exist concurrently with the interest of the leaseholders. 
Whilst the specific point at issue in Wik was the effect of pastoral leases on 
native title, the Court’s comments were of wider applicability.193 The High 
Court took the view, applying Mabo. that the crucial requirement for 
extinguishment was that the interest which it is claimed extinguished the title 
conferred exclusive possession. In deciding this, it is necessary to look both at 
the common law or legislation under which the instrument is granted and at the 
instrument itself. If they displayed a clear intention to extinguish native title and
191 The Mabo decision was given statutory effect by the Native Title Act 1993 . The Act established 
a National Native Title Tribunal and laid down the procedures for determining native title rights and 
for deciding what dealings were permissible on native title land. The Native Title Act 1993 was 
amended by the Native Title Amendment Act. 1998 which was prompted by the High Court 
decision in Wik. and severely curtailed native title rights. In addition to Commonwealth provisions 
there are various State and Territory regimes. The relevant legislation in the Northern Territory is 
the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act. 1976 which was prompted by the Milirrpum 
decision. The Act which has been amended twice is currently being reviewed by the 
Commonwealth. Further claims of land on pastoral leases were made possible by the Pastoral Land 
Act. 1992.
192 Pastoral leases are a special form of land tenure created by the British Colonial Office as a 
response to the seizing by squatters of large areas of land in the 1830’s and 1840’s. A feature of the 
leases was that they did not grant the squatters exclusive tenure and that the land remained in the 
ownership of the Government. Whilst the leases did not grant exclusive tenure, they did grant 
exclusive rights of use for grazing.
193 On this point see ‘Forum - Wik: The Aftermath and its Implications’ University o f New South 
Wales Law Journal Volume 3, No. 2, June 1997.
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conveyed a specific right to exclusive possession, then the native title was 
extinguished. If, however, the rights were not necessarily in conflict and could 
continue to co-exist, then the native title was not necessarily extinguished. In the 
present cases the High Court found that whilst the holders of the leases had been 
granted certain rights over the land, they were not entitled to exclusive 
possession and any native title which existed would not necessarily be 
extinguished. The second issue left unresolved by Mabo was native title to the 
seas. This was resolved in the Commonwealth v. Yarmirr194 where the Court 
said that non-exclusive native title rights in the seas could be recognised. The 
Court continues to develop the jurisprudence on the nature and extent of native 
title. The two other most important cases are Western Australia v. Ward and 
O’rs195 where the Court found that native title was not a single indivisible right, 
but consisted of a bundle of connected rights and that it is possible for the title to 
be only partially extinguished, and Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal 
Community v. Victoria and OTs196 where the Court found that native title is 
extinguished if the group concerned has ceased to practice its traditional lifestyle 
in a way which is clearly connected to that of the time before settlement.197
194 (2001) 208 CLR 1.
195 (2000) 99 FCR 316.
196 (2002) 194 ALR 538
197 These cases have generated much academic comment and analysis: see, for example, 
Cockayne. J. ‘Members o f the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v. Victoria; Indigenous and 
Colonial Traditions in Native Title (2001) Melbourne University Law Review 25; Bartlett. R. 
‘An Obsession with Traditional Laws and Customs Creates Difficulty Establishing Native Title 
Claims in the South: Yorta Yorta’ Western Australian Law Review Vol. 31, Feb. 2003, 35-46; 
Barnett. K. ‘Western Australia v. Ward; One Step Forward and Two Steps Back: Native Title 
and the Bundle o f Rights Analysis’ (2000) Melbourne University Law Review 17.
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The decision in Mabo is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. The reliance on 
public international law, and on its current thinking on terra nullius, is misplaced 
on two grounds. First, public international law has no precedential value in the 
Australian legal system and cannot even be argued to be persuasive in the face of 
clear domestic authority to the contrary such as Cooper v. Stuart. It would have 
been possible, of course, for the High Court to overrule Cooper v. Stuart and it 
could then have looked to international law to provide persuasive authority. 
However, it did not do so. Second, having looked to international law, the Court 
then misapplies it. First, it fails to take due account of intertemporality. Whilst that 
doctrine could be displaced - and in any event, as a doctrine if international law, 
does not bind the High Court - it does exist and, the Court having invoked 
international law, should not simply be ignored without adequate justification. 
Second, the Court invents a new method of acquiring territory: settlement of land 
which is not terra nullius. There is no basis in international law for such a finding 
and by the invention of this new category, the High Court created further 
difficulties. If the Court had found that, as the land was not terra nullius, the 
acquisition was not by settlement but by conquest, it would have employed a 
recognised means of acquiring territory and, moreover, the end result would have 
been very similar. Whilst customary law would have survived conquest until 
extinguished by subsequent incompatible law, very little, and certainly no criminal 
law, would not have been so extinguished.198 What survived would have been, in 
the main, customary property rights.
198 Supra 64-65 and n 89.
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It would have been more appropriate, and more correct, for the Court to have 
founded its decision entirely on domestic law. If it was intent on undoing the 
original categorisation of the events of 1770-1788 as settlement of terra nullius, it 
could simply have overruled Cooper v. Stuart without any discussion of 
international law. As the Court of last resort in the Australian system, it has the 
power to overrule previous decisions, including those of the Privy Council. It 
would then have been free to reassess the acquisition of the territory and its 
consequences.
If the Court was primarily interested in the development of the common law to 
allow the recognition of native title, it is submitted that it should have analysed the 
matter as one of the survival of property rights as common law native title. This 
would have rendered any discussion of settlement and terra nullius unnecessary 
and the same conclusion would have been reached. However, it seems clear that 
the decision was made in its present form at least partly for political reasons, out of 
a desire to right a historical wrong and to promote justice and fairness as the Court 
perceived them: what Webber describes as a “jurisprudence of regret”.199 This 
view is supported by the fact that terra nullius was largely irrelevant to the facts of 
the case, the plaintiffs’ rights being a matter of common law title native title. In the
199 Webber. J. supra n 170. On these points, see also: van Krieken. R. and Simpson G. both supra n 
170. Simpson says: “The judgment represents legal decision-making at its most politically charged 
and emotionally resonant” at 196 and that the “High Court appears to have developed a theory of 
acquisition that is politically expedient but ultimately indefensible.” at 197-198.
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final analysis, these laudable aims have produced a decision which is legally 
flawed.
1:5:. Subsistence of customary criminal law Post-Mabo:
The most immediately apparent application of the terra nullius doctrine is, of 
course, in relation to native title, but there are other areas where it may have 
application200 and the implications of this decision for the recognition of other 
areas of pre-existing law are not clear. The decision in Mabo. and the ensuing 
case-law and legislation, accept customary land law as the basis of assessing 
claims to native title. It has been argued in a series of cases since Mabo that if 
customary land law survived 1788 and the establishment of British sovereignty, 
then other forms of customary law, including on matters which are part of state 
criminal law, may also have survived. These arguments will now be considered, 
but there is in reality nothing in the Mabo decision to substantiate them and all 
such attempts to date have failed. None of the cases develop the law 
significantly and it will be sufficient to cite three as indicative of the general 
arguments. Moreover, even if the reasoning in Mabo is applied to other areas of 
pre-existing law, they must not only have survived settlement, but not have been 
subsequently extinguished. Therefore, any inconsistent statute or judicial 
decision would serve to defeat them. Clearly in the field of criminal law this 
extinguishment would be likely to be total.
200 See Yeo, ‘Native Criminal Jurisdiction after Mabo’ (July, 1994) Current Issues in Criminal 
Justice, Vol. 6. No. 1, 9.
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One of the first criminal cases to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court basing 
its arguments on Mabo was R. v. Archie Glass201. Sulley J. rejected the 
argument saying:
“Before leaving the case I should perhaps advert, however briefly, to what 
the applicant has been pleased to describe as a challenge to the jurisdiction 
of the Court. It is based, as I have followed it, upon the notion that the 
recent decision of the High Court in the Mabo case entails by reason of 
that decision’s rejection of the common law doctrine of terra nullius, that 
the courts of this country, and this court in particular, do not have 
jurisdiction over a person in the present position of the applicant.
It is apparent from what the applicant has said in support of that challenge 
that he is misinformed as a good many other people seem to be about what 
exactly the High Court said in the Mabo case and about what exactly are 
the limits of the consequences. I think that it needs to be said very plainly 
indeed that it would be a very great mistake for anybody in the position of 
this applicant to run away with the idea that the Mabo decision, taken at its 
highest point, entails that there has been introduced into this country a 
differential system of law which creates classes of citizen to some of 
whom the law applies and to some of whom it does not apply.
... Generalised appeals to the Mabo decision, to terra nullius, to undeclared 
states of war, to customary and tribal law and practice, to something said 
by Mr. Justice Rath decades ago and to the International Court of Justice 
at the Hague, will not sway this Court, and I hope will not sway any other 
Court, from the principles that all are equal before the law and that the law 
applies equally to all.”202
201 Supreme Court o f New South Wales - Criminal Division. Sulley J. 22 January 1993. 
Unreported. See: Behrendt. J. Aboriginal Law Bulletin Vol. 3. No. 63. August 1993, 18.
202 At 18-19.
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Six months later the case of R. v. Leeton James Jackv203 came before the same 
Court and again the accused argued that the Court had no jurisdiction in the light 
of the Mabo decision. However, in this case the argument was slightly different. 
It was accepted in argument that prior to the Mabo decision the Murrell case 
was binding authority for the proposition that the instant Court had jurisdiction 
to try Aborigines. The question was whether Mabo had overruled Murrell. 
Campbell J. said:
“For the reasons stated by Rath J. in R. v. Wedge (1976) 1 NSWLR 581 at 
586, I am bound by the decision in Murrell unless Mabo has expressly 
overruled that decision or, perhaps, the reasoning of the High Court 
clearly overrules the earlier decision.
It is common ground that Mabo does not expressly overrule Murrell, and I 
am of the view that the reasoning in the judgements does not impliedly do 
so.
... It is my opinion that I remain bound by Murrell to hold this Court had 
jurisdiction to deal with the charge against the accused. Further, I would, 
on authority and principle, take the same view were I not so bound.”204
It seems to have been established beyond doubt that customary criminal law did 
not survive 1770-1788 by the High Court decision in the appeal case of Walker 
v. New South Wales205. Walker claimed that he could not be guilty of an offence 
because he was not amenable to State or Commonwealth criminal law, the
203 Supreme Court of New South Wales - Criminal Division. Campbell J. 10 June 1993. 
Unreported. See: Flood. S. Aboriginal Law Bulletin. Vol. 3. No. 63. August 1993,19.
204At 19.
205 (1994) 69 ALJR 111.
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Australian Parliaments having no power to legislate for Aborigines without 
consent. The Court ruled that the pleadings were untenable as they were 
couched in terms which asserted the legislative incapacity of the state and 
essentially denied that sovereignty had been acquired in 1770-1788. Mason CJ. 
referred to his own judgment in the case of Coe v. The Commonwealth206 where 
he pointed out that there was nothing in Mabo to suggest either that the Crown 
lacked sovereignty or that the Aboriginal people possessed it:
“Mabo (No. 2) is entirely at odds with the notion that sovereignty 
adverse to the Crown resides in the Aboriginal people of Australia. The 
decision is equally at odds with the notion that there resides in the 
Aboriginal people a limited kind of sovereignty embraced in the notion 
that they are a ‘domestic dependent nation’ entitled to self-government 
and full rights (save the right of alienation) or that as a free and 
independent people they are entitled to any rights and interests other than 
those created or recognised by the laws of the Commonwealth, the State 
of New South Wales and the common law.”207
However, he goes on to point out that, regardless of the way in which the 
pleadings were drafted, counsel for Walker had argued on the point of the 
possible recognition by the common law of a surviving customary criminal law, 
analogous to the native title recognised in Mabo. The Court rejected that 
argument and stated clearly and unambiguously that the criminal law was the
206 (1993) 118 ALR193.
207 At 200.
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same for everyone regardless of race208 and that there was no analogy between 
native title and criminal law. Even if customary criminal law had existed and 
survived, it had been extinguished by general criminal statutes 209 Such a 
definitive statement from the High Court rules out any possible argument that 
some form of customary criminal law survived 1770-1788.
1.6: Conclusion:
It has been argued that the acquisition of Australia was correctly categorised as 
by settlement. The law which validated it now seems morally unacceptable, but 
that does not affect the legality of the acquisition. The reasoning in the Mabo 
case is not inconsistent on this point. The finding of terra nullius is declared to 
have been wrong. There can only possibly be two reasons why this might be so: 
either that the then current law was applied incorrectly and the finding can 
therefore be overturned; or that the present law can overturn that finding even 
though it was correct at the time. The first suggestion would require not only 
that the assessments on which the finding of terra nullius was made were 
wrong, but also that they have not since been ratified. The second argument 
requires that the current law may reverse a finding made over two hundred years 
ago even though it was correct at the time. Both these approaches are possible.
208 At 113.
209 At 115. Subsequently Walker was charged with another offence and applied to the High Court 
for an Order that he be tried by a magistrate sitting with the Elders of the area where the offence 
occurred. This application was rejected. See: Walker v. Speechlev S133/1997 (17 August 1998) 
High Court of Australia Transcripts, cited and discussed in Purdy. J. ‘“I Suspect You and Your 
Friends are Trifling with Me”: Encounters between the Rule o f Law and the Ruled’ Australian 
Journal o f Law and Society (2000-2001) 15, 67-89, at 67-74.
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The judiciary cannot, of course, admit to making new law, however desirable, 
and thus the common law courts are frequently faced with the need to reinterpret 
a previous decision in order to reach a different conclusion. However, whichever 
of the two approaches is taken, the result ought to be either an acknowledgement 
that the British occupation was illegal or a reclassification of the events as 
conquest. The High Court took neither of these courses of action and did not 
overturn the finding of settlement, the inescapable consequence of finding that 
the land was not terra nullius. Instead it seems to have invented a new category 
of acquisition -  settlement of occupied land. Whatever the correct interpretation 
of 1770-1788 or of the Mabo decision, it is beyond dispute that sovereignty and 
jurisdiction were acquired by settlement. It is possible that some property rights 
survived, but this does not amount to a recognition that there was customary law 
system in force which system has survived until the present day210 and is of little 
assistance in areas other than native title.
210 In reality, of course, the customary legal system has survived in the unofficial sphere, 
unrecognised by the state.
Chapter 2: Analysis of possible arguments for the recognition of customary law
2.1: Introduction:
Given the conclusion reached in Chapter 1 that customary law did not, in the view 
of the state, survive settlement as a cognisable legal system, the next question is to 
what extent should or can customary law be relevant to the present-day Australian 
criminal law? The first point to consider is whether there is an obligation upon a 
state to recognise the existence of customary law, particularly in respect of an 
indigenous population. It will be demonstrated that there is no such obligation. The 
arguments for and against voluntary recognition will then be discussed. On balance 
it seems that some recognition is desirable and the Chapter will then outline a 
variety of ways in which such recognition might be effected. However, all these 
proposals are problematic, both practically and theoretically, and it will be 
suggested that the best way forward is minimal incorporation thus maintaining 
largely uniform standards, but with flexible application by the judiciary. The 
actions of the judiciary will be discussed in detail in Chapters 3 -5 .
2.2: Obligation to recognise customary law:
Once it is acknowledged that Aboriginal customary law did not survive 1788 as 
a cognisable system, an obligation to recognise it today can only be derived 
from one source: public international law, law which, of course, binds the
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Australian state. It might seem paradoxical for Aborigines to look to 
international law for assistance in asserting their claims. It was, after all, 
international law which categorised the acquisition of Australia as settlement 
and thereby refused recognition to customary law. However, international law is 
no longer the exclusive preserve of western states, though they undeniably 
remain the most powerful actors. The international community today is more 
diverse than in 1788 and the approach of the western powers has shifted. Thus, 
it is not unreasonable to examine international law to see if it will support claims 
for recognition.211 It is beyond the scope of the Thesis to examine international 
law in detail or to look at the consequent question of whether, if such an 
obligation does exist, there is any scope for the judiciary to incorporate such law 
in their judgments in the absence of legislation.212 Australia clearly has multiple 
obligations under international law many of which affect the situation of 
Aborigines, in some cases disproportionately or specifically.213 The application 
of public international law, including international human rights law, to groups 
in general, and indigenous peoples in particular, is unclear and no attempt will 
be made to analyse it in detail. There are, however, three areas of international 
law which are relevant and need to be considered: international human rights
211 This point is made by Pritchard when considering the relevance of public international law to 
indigenous peoples and highlighting recent developments which have allowed non-state actors to be 
subjects: Pritchard. S. (ed.) Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Htartan Rights London: Zed 
Books Limited, 1998, at 2-3.
212 Australia has a dualist legal system and, therefore, international law obligations are not part of 
domestic law unless incorporated.
213 There is useful collection of links to internet websites dealing with Australia’s international law 
obligations in respect of indigenous peoples at: http://www.hreoc.gov.au/socialJustice/ intemat 
develop.html (last accessed 11 April 2004).
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law, the law on the rights of minorities and groups and the law relating to 
indigenous peoples.214
i. International Human Rights Law:
International human rights law requires states to respect and protect the various 
rights of individuals and, in some cases, groups. An Aborigine is, of course, 
entitled to the same individual rights as any other person and to seek the 
protection of those rights in the relevant fora. Moreover, the application of 
legitimate state laws and/or policies may affect Aborigines disproportionately 
and those laws and/or policies may be violations on the grounds of that 
disproportionality. Violations have arisen most frequently in relation to the 
rights protected under the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination. 1966215. (hereinafter ‘CERD’), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 1966 (hereinafter ‘ICCPR’), the 
International Covenant on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights. 1966. 
(hereinafter ‘ICESCR’) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Under all 
these systems specific aspects of the treatment of Aborigines has been 
condemned.216
214 Only international law applicable to Australia will be considered and, therefore, there will be no 
discussion o f for example, European regional regimes for the protection of minorities.
215 Note the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s General Recommendation 23 
on the rights o f indigenous peoples under CERD. Paragraph 4 calls on states to ensure against 
discrimination and also to recognise indigenous cultures including “traditions and customs”. It is, 
however, unlikely that this could be used to argue for the mandatory acceptance of customary law.
216 See, for example: Concluding Observations by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination: Australia 19/04/2000 UN Doc. CERD/C/304/Add. 101 which contained criticisms 
based, inter alia, on amendments to native title legislation, the ‘stolen generations’, the rate of
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Of particular relevance is Article 27 of the ICCPR which reads:
“In those states in which ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of the group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language.”
This Article has been the basis of many communications by indigenous peoples
9 1 7under the individual complaints procedure of the Optional Protocol. Article 
27 always gives rise to difficulty of interpretation, usually on two points. First, 
the wording suggests that the rights are given to individuals to practice aspects 
of their culture together with other members of the group. The Committee has
91 SImade this clear in General Comment 23 on Article 27 where it stated:
“The Covenant draws a distinction between the right to self- 
determination and the rights protected under article 27. The former is 
expressed to be a right belonging to peoples and is dealt with in a 
separate part (Part I) of the Covenant. Self-determination is not a right 
cognisable under the Optional Protocol. Article 27, on the other hand, 
relates to rights conferred on individuals as such and is included, like the 
articles relating to other personal rights conferred on individuals, in Part
9 1 Q
III of the Covenant and is cognisable under the Optional Protocol.”
Aboriginal incarceration, and mandatory sentencing; Concluding Observations of the Committee on 
Economic. Social and Cultural Rights: Australia 1/09/2000 UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.50 which 
contained criticism of the Native Title Amendment Act 1998. For a general discussion of 
Australia’s response to its obligations under United Nations human rights regimes, see: Hovell. D. 
‘The Sovereignty Stratagem: Australia’s Response to UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ Alternative 
Law Journal Vol. 28, No. 6, Dec. 2003,297-301.
217 Australia ratified in 1991. It also accepted the individual complaints procedure under CERD in 
1993.
218 General Comment No. 23 (501 (art. 271 adopted by the Human Rights Committee at its 1214th 
meeting on 6 April 1994.
219 Paragraph 3.1.
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However, it goes on to recognise the special quality of these personal rights:
“ ... The protection of (article 27) rights is directed towards ensuring the 
survival and continued development of the cultural, religious and social 
identity of the minorities concerned, thus enriching the fabric of society 
as a whole. Accordingly, the Committee observes that these rights must 
be protected as such and should not be confused with other personal 
rights conferred on one and all under the Covenant.”220
Second, it appears to require only that the state does not prevent this right from 
being exercised, rather than that it has a positive role to ensure that it is possible 
to do so. Both these restrictive interpretations are reasonable given the context: a 
regime for the protection of first generation, civil and political rights, premised 
on the rights of an individual to have the state refrain from interfering in 
particular aspects of her/his life. If read in that way, Article 27 adds little to the 
other provisions of the Covenant and is of no assistance to groups which cannot 
exercise the rights for some reason other than state interference. However, the 
Human Rights Committee has shown itself ready to depart from that 
interpretation in a number of cases. Thus, for example, in the Lubicon Lake 
Band case221 the Committee by protecting an individual’s right to culture, which 
included economic and social activity, protected his community’s claim to 
control over land and natural resources and thereby effectively used Article 27 
and the First Optional Protocol to protect a group right. Yet even if the Article 
can be read to impose positive obligations on the state - to ensure conditions
220 Paragraph 9.
221 Ominavak and the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada Communication No. 167/1984, Human Rights 
Committee, Report o f the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. A/45/50 (1990). See also: Kitok v. 
Sweden UN Doc. A/43/40 (1988) where the same reasoning was applied though there was no 
violation on the facts.
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under which members of minorities can exercise their rights, including the 
prevention of interference by others -  it cannot realistically be argued that it 
imposes a duty to recognise customary law. Indeed in Lovelace222, which 
concerned the discriminatory loss of rights of residence by a woman on 
marrying a non-Indian, the opposite was almost the case and Article 27 was 
understood to impose a duty to protect the rights of the individual by not 
recognising traditional principles governing group membership.
ii. Minority and Group Rights:
International law provisions on the protection of minority rights are usually 
related to the principles of equality and non-discrimination. There is a 
distinction between the recognition or acceptance of such minority rights, 
cultures or practices224 and an acceptance of the right of that minority to self- 
determination. As discussed above, whilst it seems that Article 27 gives rights to 
individuals rather than to the group, it is clear that some group rights are 
recognised at international law though their scope and enforceability is
222 Lovelace v. Canada. Communication No. 24/1977, Selected Decisions o f the Human Rights 
Committee under the Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1988) pp. 86-90.
223 For a discussion of Lovelace and of the apparent clash between the right o f indigenous women to 
equal treatment and of the group to self-determination, see: Knop. K. Diversity and Self- 
Determination in International Law Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 at 358-372.
224 These have enjoyed a long history and have been consistently recognised in the major 
international regimes and jurisprudence. See, for example: South West Africa Cases (Second Phase) 
(1966) ICJ Rep 1966 (Judge Tanaka dissenting opinion). See also: the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities 
General Assembly Resolution 47/135 1992.
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contentious.225 This is particularly so of the right to self-determination226, the
227availability and scope of which is uncertain outside a colonial situation. In 
order to claim the right to self-determination the group must satisfy the criteria 
of international law and it may then make a choice about its own future. The 
availability of the legal right to self-determination for indigenous groups is 
unclear. In the Lubicon Lake Band case the Human Rights Committee stated 
that Article 1 could not be the subject of an individual complaint under the 
Optional Protocol although it went on to consider the substance of the complaint 
under Article 27. Moreover, in its Concluding Comments on the initial report 
made by Azerbaijan, the Committee took the opportunity to make some general 
remarks on self-determination and stated specifically that the right in Article 1 
of the ICCPR is not limited to the colonial context, but extends to all peoples.228 
The right to self-determination does not necessarily include the right to secede 
and the majority opinion amongst scholars is that there is no right to secede 
except in two circumstances: overt colonialism or reclaiming state territory 
which is subject to unjust military occupation.229 However, the precise legal 
scope of self-determination short of secession is unclear. Lapidoth argues
225 On group rights generally, see: Alston. P. (ed.) People's Rights Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001.
226 Art. 1 of ICCPR and ICESCR. See also, the many General Assembly Resolutions defining the 
scope of the right, especially the Declaration on Principles o f International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in accordance with the Charter o f the United 
Nations Resolution 2625 (XXV) 1970.
227 For a general discussion of the right see: Crawford. J. ‘The Right o f Self-Determination in 
International Law: Its Development and Future’ in Alston. P. supra n 225 at 7-67.
228 Human Rights Committee, Report o f the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. A/49/40 (1994), 
paras. 291 ff, 296.
29 On these points see: Cassese. A  Self-Determination o f Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995 at 37-38.
230 The language of self-determination is often used imprecisely, in a political rather than a legal 
sense, to describe any choices made or actions taken by the indigenous group.
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that there is no right to autonomy outside full self-determination which is only 
clearly available in the two cases outlined above. However, her study explicitly 
excludes indigenous peoples and they may be a special case. The emerging 
law in this area is unclear and will be considered below, but it seems unlikely 
that it could be argued that the recognition of customary law is mandatory.
iii. Rights of Indigenous Peoples:
The most obviously applicable area of law, potentially providing a better 
prospect of recognition of customary law as an obligation, is the developing 
field of the rights of indigenous peoples. However, there is very little
231 Lapidoth. R. Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1996 at 177, cited in Buchanan. A. Justice, Legitimacy and Self- 
Determination: M oral Foundations fo r International Law Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004 at 342.
232 For consideration of the right to self-determination in the context of the Aborigines, see: ‘Self- 
determination and effective participation “within the life o f the nation”? An Australian perspective 
on self-determination’ at: http://www.hreoc.gov.au/social justice/international docs/
self determination, htm) (last accessed 12 April 2004) and Aboriginal and Torres Strait islander 
Social Justice Commissioner ‘Self-determination -  the freedom to ‘live well” in Social Justice 
Report 2002 at http://www.humanrights.gov.ay/socialjustice/sjreport_02/chapter2.html (last 
accessed 12 April 2004).
233 It is worth noting at this point that there is no universally accepted definition of ‘indigenous’. 
The most commonly used is that given by the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Populations:
“Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing in those territories .... They form at present non-dominant sectors of society 
and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their 
ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as 
peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal 
systems.” Jose Martinez Cobo Study o f the Problem o f Discrimination against 
Indigenous Populations. UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/ 1986/7/Add. 4, para 379 (1986).
There may be uncertainty as to whether a given group is an indigenous population, a minority or 
both. On the difficulties which arise over the precise definition, status and rights o f access of 
indigenous peoples at international law, see: Ketley. H. ‘Exclusion by Definition: Access to 
International Tribunals for the Enforcement of the Collective Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 8: 331-368, 2001, and Sheleff. L. supra n
126
55 at 153-171. Difficulties may also arise as to the status of an individual as indigenous. Such 
status is usually defined by descent, self-identification and acceptance by the group.
There is also no clear definition of ‘Aboriginally’. If, and howsoever, customary law is 
recognised it will be applicable mainly to Aborigines, though it might, for example, be 
applicable to a white person married to an Aborigine if that marriage were governed by 
customary law. Any such scheme will necessarily entail some method of determining who is an 
Aborigine for this purpose. There are difficulties both in identifying who is an Aborigine and in 
attempting to classify different groups of Aborigines. Early attempts at defining Aboriginally 
tended to concentrate on biological descent. On genetic descent as a determinant of 
Aboriginality, see: Australian Law Reform Commission Essentially Yours: the Protection o f 
Human Genetic Information in Australia Report 96 Sydney: Commonwealth o f Australia, March 
2003, paras. 36.1 -  36.75. Such a stress is unacceptable today for two reasons: first, it 
undervalues the importance of other elements of Aboriginal identity, such as social belonging; 
second, it is widely accepted today that ‘race’ is a socially constructed category and not simply a 
question o f genetic descent. The generally accepted test today for determining a person’s legal 
status as Aboriginal dates from the early 1980’s and is the threefold test outlined above - 
descent, self-identification, and acceptance by the community: Department of Aboriginal Affairs 
Report on a Review o f the Administration o f the Working Definition o f Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islanders Canberra: Commonwealth o f Australia, 1981, unpublished, cited in Essentially 
Yours at para. 36.14. This test was cited with approval by the High Court in The Commonwealth 
of Australia v. Tasmania (19831 158 CLR 1:
“By ‘Australian Aboriginal’ I mean, in accordance with what I understand to be the 
conventional meaning of the term, a person of Aboriginal descent, albeit mixed, who 
identifies himself as such and who is recognised by the Aboriginal community as an 
Aboriginal.” Per Deane J. at 273-274.
The Australian Law Reform Commission considered the question at some length in The Recognition 
o f Aboriginal Customary Laws (Summary Report, Full Report 2 Volumes), Final Report No. 31 
Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986, paras. 88-95. It agreed with the broad 
threefold test and concluded that “there are distinct advantages in leaving the application of the 
definition to be worked out so far as is necessary on a case by case basis.” at para. 95. This view was 
endorsed by the Northern Territory Law Reform Committee in its 2003 Report Towards Mutual 
Benefit: An Inquiry into Aboriginal Customary Law in the Northern Territory Darwin: Northern 
Territory Law Reform Committee, 2003 at paras. 3.2 and 3.3. The exact definition of Aboriginality 
has moreover, whilst much debated in political and academic fora, rarely been a significant issue 
before the Courts. On these points, see, for example: de Plevitz. L. and Croft. L. ‘Aboriginality 
under the Microscope: The Biological Descent Test in Australian Law’ Vol. 3, No. 1, Queensland 
University o f Technology Law and Justice Journal (2003) 1-17.
A further difficulty arises, however, in the assessment of the lifestyles of different groups. 
‘Aborigines’ are not, of course, a homogenous group. The Task Force appointed by the government 
of Western Australia to report on Aboriginal Social Justice in that state pointed out that Aboriginal 
people believed that there were at least six separate sub-groups or types of Aboriginal society: 
tradition-oriented communities in settlements formed prior to European occupation with a high 
degree of observance of cultural traditions; those in homeland centres or outstations who had moved 
to these settlements of their own will and were classified by the Task Force as self-governing; 
Aborigines in non-traditional communities such as government reserves or missions; Aborigines 
living in metropolitan urban communities, i.e. in discrete groups of dwellings or in areas with high 
concentrations o f Aboriginal people; rural isolated Aborigines living in minor urban centres and 
including those who do not live in groups; and metropolitan urban isolated Aborigines living in 
major cities but who could not be identified as part of an urban Aboriginal community. Western 
Australia Task Force on Aboriginal Social Justice Report o f the Task Force on Aboriginal Social 
Justice Perth: Government of Western Australia, 1994. Alongside these lifestyle divisions are tribal 
divisions. Presumably Aborigines in other states and territories would identify a similar diversity. 
Such distinctions may be important because, as will be discussed throughout the Thesis, judges have
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binding substantive law in this area: the only specific instruments are the 
International Labour Organisation Convention 107235 of 1957 and International 
Labour Organisation Convention 169 of 1989236. The provisions of Convention 
107 were essentially assimilationist237 in that they were intended to enhance the 
position of members of indigenous groups in order that they might enjoy the 
same rights and standards of living as other individuals and thereby to integrate 
them into wider society.238 It has been much criticised on that account, but as
often drawn a distinction between Aborigines who live ‘traditional’ lifestyles and others and that 
distinction has been relevant in their consideration of matters before them.
Attempts to define Aboriginality and to classify Aborigines into groups are not universally accepted 
as either possible or desirable. The Australian Law Reform Commission declined to give a 
definition of ‘traditional Aborigine’: Report 31 at para. 95 and the Royal Commission into 
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody acknowledged the difficulties, pointing out both that the definition 
and categorisation of Aboriginality has shifted over time and also that many Aborigines resent such 
attempts when made by non-Aborigines: Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, 
National Report o f the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (5 Volumes) Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1991-1992 at paras. 11.12.20 and 11.12.4. Charles 
argues that the use of terms such as ‘tribal’, semi-tribal’ and ‘urban’ are “colonial relics that, in an 
attempt to categorise, serve only to further mystify and confuse European conceptions o f Aboriginal 
life” Charles. C. ‘Sentencing Aboriginal People in South Australia’ (1991) 13 Adelaide Law Review 
90 at 92. He quotes Cowlishaw who argues that such categories are artificially created, based on 
racist notions and bestow meanings on otherwise neutral phenomena such as biological 
characteristics. See: Cowlishaw. G.K. ‘Colour, Culture and the Aboriginalist’ (1987) 22 Man 221 at 
227-228, quoted in Charles. C. at 93-94. See also: Cowlishaw. G.K. ‘Censoring Race in “Post- 
Colonial” Anthropology’ Critique o f Anthropology Vol. 20(2), 101-123 (2000) and Blaclfellas, 
Whitefellas and the Hidden Injuries o f Race Oxford: Blackwell, 2004. This bestowing o f meaning, 
Charles argues, renders the use of such categories inappropriate in judicial activities such as 
sentencing. However, despite these objections it seems likely that the judiciary will continue to 
classify people as Aborigines and to differentiate between ‘types’ of Aborigines -  albeit on a rather 
informal and inexact basis - in order to assess the relevance of customary law in a given case. 
Indeed, it is difficult to see how they can do otherwise if they are to take cognisance of customary 
law at all: the only alternative would seem to be to apply it to everyone.
234 For overviews o f the position o f indigenous peoples under international law see: Anaya. S.J. 
supra n 95; Brownlie. I. Treaties and Indigenous Peoples Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992; 
Crawford. J. (ed.) The Rights o f Peoples Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988; Pritchard. S. (ed.) supra n 
211; Thomberry. P. Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2002; Kingsbury B. ‘Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous 
Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law’ in Alston. P. supra n 225 at 70-110.
235 Convention 107 concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and other Tribal and 
Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries. 1957.
236 Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries. 
1989.
237 For discussion of assimilation, see supra n 85.
238 For discussion of this point, see Anaya. S.J. supra n 95 at 44-45.
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Anaya points out239, it served to put indigenous peoples on the international 
human rights agenda and thus on the public international law agenda, till then 
closed to them on the basis of its statist position. Convention 169 removed the 
assimilationist perspective and provided for greater recognition of indigenous 
institutions and lifestyles within the framework of the state. However, it should 
be noted that whilst Convention 169 is undoubtedly a more radical document 
than its predecessor, it is still based on the premise that the state retains ultimate 
authority over indigenous peoples: this is not a recognition of independence or a 
return to pre-colonial days. Moreover, the provisions dealing with customary 
law make it clear that whilst it should be taken seriously, it is not an alternative 
system of equal standing and that it is subject to the endorsement of the state 240
The United Nations, and its various organs, has produced a vast amount of 
documentation, studies and proposals on indigenous peoples241 including the 
Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples242. This is 
a wide-ranging document including specific rights to self-determination and to 
the use of customary law, though this latter right is expressed to be “in 
accordance with internationally recognized human rights standards”243. It does 
not, however, include any definition of ‘indigenous’. The recent Report of the
239 Anaya. S.J. supra n 95 at 45.
240 Articles 8, 9 and 10.
241 Non-Governmental Organisations have been crucial to placing issues on the agenda of the 
United Nations and to helping shape the content of the documents. However, they do not, of 
course, make law.
242 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56.
243 Article 33.
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Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Issues244 to the Human Rights Commission 
also recommends that states reform criminal justice systems in a way which 
“should include respect for indigenous legal customs”245. However, neither this 
Report nor the Draft Declaration has any legal force, although the latter may be 
useful as a standard-setting exercise. Indeed, nothing produced by United 
Nations has any legal effect in promoting the recognition of customary law. 
Brownlie says:
“The fact remains that in the sphere of law-making activity and the 
sponsorship of legally binding instruments, the United Nations has not 
done anything substantial to recognize the interests of indigenous 
populations outside the agenda of normal human rights protection.”246
iv. Conclusion:
It can be seen from the above brief analysis that there is no obligation on a state 
to recognise customary law as a system. Where a situation breaches 
international law, there is an obligation on the state to remedy it. However, 
whilst it is possible that the subject matter of such cases may relate to customary 
law, none of the provisions discussed place an obligation on the state to 
recognise such law as a right enjoyed by an individual or a group. Moreover, it 
should perhaps be noted that greater involvement of public international law
244 Indigenous Issues: Human Rights and Indigenous Issues Report o f the Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms o f Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen 
E/CN.4/2004/80 26 January 2004.
245 At 3.
246 Brownlie. I. supra n 234 at 66-67
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would not necessarily always operate to the advantage of those who seek to 
incorporate customary law. There are several reasons for this caution. First, non­
discrimination and equality before the law is a well-enshrined principle of 
international law. This need not be fatal to special regimes for indigenous 
peoples (indeed they may be supported by the notion of affirmative action) or 
for customary legal systems, but it is likely to provide baseline tests which must 
be met.247 Second, some of the content of customary law may fall short of the 
requirements of public international law and especially of international human 
rights law. Again this is not an insoluble problem - rights often clash -  but it 
should not be assumed that the recognition of customary law as a system would 
necessarily enable it to be incorporated in toto and to be free of any external 
supervision. Third, whilst the state may not be liable for, for example, 
unacceptable sanctions if it has not endorsed them - on the principles of the 
public-private divide and state responsibility - it will become liable if it has itself 
endorsed the customary system and this is likely to mean a reluctance to do so. 
Finally, international law may actually place an obligation on a state to alter or 
prohibit certain customary practices.248
It is, however, arguable that whilst the provisions discussed above do not create 
binding obligations, it is desirable to operate in a way which respects them and 
thus that they may, in fact, inform and encourage voluntary compliance and
247 See infra 137-145.
248 On this point see: An-Na'im. A  A  ‘State Responsibility under International Human Rights Law 
to change Religious and Customary Laws’ in Cook R  J. (ed.) Hitman Rights o f Women: National 
and International Perspectives Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994, at 167.
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recognition. This is the -  at least implicit - position taken by the judiciary when 
they make use of their powers of interpretation and discretion to further the use 
of customary law in the state legal system.249
2.3: Voluntary recognition of customary law:
Having concluded that there is no international legal obligation on Australia to 
give recognition to customary law, the next question is whether such recognition 
is desirable and should be accorded voluntarily. There are some significant 
practical reasons to recommend at least some acceptance and also several moral 
or philosophical arguments which suggest that it should be considered. The 
former are instrumentalist250 and aimed at the need to redress past injustice or 
the elimination of present social disadvantage. It may be, of course, that the 
recognition of customary law would go some way to achieving these ends. 
However, there is no inevitable causal connection and it would need to be 
established in each case. With that proviso, both instrumentalist arguments and 
those which maintain that the acceptance of diverse cultural norms is desirable 
per se can be used to support the case for recognition.
249 See: Cranwell. G. ‘Treaties and Australian Law Administrative Discretions, Statutes and the 
Common Law’ (2001) Queensland University o f Technology Law and Justice Journal 5.
250 ‘Instrumentalist’ is used to mean with a particular practical end in mind; it does not connote the 
absence of any moral consideration in the desire to meet that end.
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i. Instrumentalist arguments:
251a. Past iniustice
The first of these arguments is based on past injustice. This is not simply about the 
desirability of treating people or groups equally, but is tied to recognition of 
historical injustice. Whilst the international law of 1770-1788 meant that 
settlement was legally justified, there is no doubt that in 2004 it is understood to 
have been morally indefensible. This acknowledgement of moral failing and the 
accompanying sense of guilt have been the imperative behind many state
9 <9 *initiatives and policies, some of which will be discussed below. It is true that m 
most, if not all, of these situations there has been considerable lobbying and 
pressure by Aboriginal groups, by other activists and by Non-Governmental 
Organisations prior to such action being taken. Nevertheless, such action can only 
be effective, in the absence of legal obligation, if taken against a reasonably 
responsive state. This sense of failing and guilt has also affected judicial decision­
making, including as has already been discussed253, in relation to native title and 
Mabo. Webber254 maintains that this regret for past injustice caused a moral unease 
which was the main rationale behind the decision and Connolly says of the
251 For discussion of the theoretical basis of the ‘obligation’ to make recompense for past injustice, 
see: Thompson. J. ‘Historical Obligations’ Australasian Journal o f Philosophy Vol. 78, No. 3 
September 2000, 334-345; Sparrow. R. ‘History and Collective Responsibility’ Australasian 
Journal o f Philosophy Vol. 78, No. 3 September 2000, 346-359; Ivison. D. ‘Political Community 
and Historical Injustice’ Australasian Journal o f Philosophy Vol. 78, No. 3 September 2000, 360- 
373.
252 See, for example, infra 134-136 for discussion o f the stolen generations.
253 Supra 112-113.
254 See: Webber. J supra n 170.
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decision that it “was, of course, a political one in the sense that it was based on 
considerations of social policy”255. The moral imperative behind Mabo has also 
been operative in other judicial decisions and will arise at various points 
throughout the Thesis. This need for redress is not restricted to the original events 
of 1770-1788. The treatment of Aborigines both in the immediate aftermath of 
settlement and until very recent times has been deplorable. Clearly this cannot be 
undone, but a two-fold strategy is now necessary: first, some recompense for the 
past should be made256; and second, policies which ensure that no further injustice 
is committed or continues should be adopted. Often, of course, these are 
intertwined.
Recompense for the past may take various forms.257 There have been symbolic 
gestures - sometimes of greater importance than is immediately apparent - and the 
recognition of native title rights, which includes taking cognisance of at least some 
elements of customary law, goes some way to undoing the confiscation of lands. 
One of the most vexed questions is that of reparations and/or compensation. There 
is some progress towards acceptance of this concept, at least in limited 
circumstances. Thus, the Report o f the National Inquiry into the Separation o f 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families , which 
found various violations of human rights in respect of the stolen generations,
255 Connolly. P.D. ‘The Theory of Universal and Absolute Crown Ownership’ University o f 
Queensland Law Journal Vol. 18, 1994-1995,9 at 11.
256 The use of the term ‘recompense’ -  or similar - should not be taken to imply that the past can 
somehow be redeemed by payment of whatever kind.
257 On this point generally, see: Follesdal. A  ‘Indigenous Minorities and the Shadow of Injustice 
Past’ International Journal o f Minority and Group Rights Vol. 7 (2000) 19-37.
258 Sydney: Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, 1997.
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recommended, inter alia, reparations which were to include acknowledgement and
259apology, and resources for rehabilitation and monetary compensation. Whilst the
Commonwealth Government rejected many of the Report’s findings, it has 
established a fund for rehabilitation though thus far it will not countenance 
monetary compensation.260 Clearly the state fears a floodgates effect if reparations 
are granted. The ‘Stolen Generations’ is only one issue for which such claims seem 
at least morally justifiable. There have been a number of cases claiming 
compensation for genocide all of which have failed.261 Whilst monetary 
compensation will never be adequate, it is difficult to see what else can be offered
259 The Senate Legal and Constitutional Reference Committee recommended in its report Healing: 
A Legacy o f Generations, November 2000, on the implementation of the National Inquiry 
recommendations that a Reparations Tribunal should be established. See also the similar 
recommendations made by the Moving Forward -  Achieving Reparations for the Stolen 
Generations Conference, held on 15 - 16 August, 2001.
260 See: Pritchard. S. ‘The Stolen Generations and Reparations’ University o f New South Wales Law 
Journal Vol. 21(1) (1998) 259-267; and Jones. A. ‘The State and the Stolen Generations: 
Recognising a Fiduciary Duty’ Monash University Law Review Vol. 28, No. 1 (2002) 59-84. 
However, an alternative route to compensation has been demonstrated by the decision of the New 
South Wales Victims Compensation Tribunal in the Linow claim (unreported, but see (2003) 
Indigenous Law Bulletin 6) to make a monetary award to a member of the Stolen Generations. It 
should be noted, however, that all such applications would require leave under s.26 of the Victims 
Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 as they would be out of time and also that Linow’s award was 
on the basis of criminal assault, not on the removal per se. Both previous and subsequent litigation 
by members of the Stolen Generations has been largely unsuccessful: see, for example: Kruger v 
Commonwealth (19971 146 ALR 126, Cubillo v. Commonwealth o f Australia: Gunner v. 
Commonwealth of Australia (2000) FCA 97, Williams v. The Minister No. 2 (1999) NSWSC 843. 
Note also the various ‘stolen wages’ campaigns aimed at reclaiming lost earnings. On the Cubillo 
case, see: Ransley. J. and Marchetti. E. ‘The Hidden Whiteness o f Australian Law: A Case Study’ 
Griffith Law Review (2001) Vol. l,N o. 1, 139-152.
261 Attempts to obtain redress in international law fora  have failed as have domestic actions 
under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 1948. On 
this point, see: Nulvarimma and Others v Thompson (1999) FCA 1192; Mitchell. A. ‘Genocide, 
Human Rights Implementation and the Relationship between International and Domestic Law: 
Nulyarimma v. Thompson’ Melbourne University Law Review Vol. 24 (2000) 15-49; and 
Cunneen. C. ‘Criminology, Genocide and the Forced Removal o f Indigenous Children from 
their Families’ Australian and New Zealand Journal o f Criminology Vol. 32, No. 2, (1999) 124- 
138.
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at this stage. Claims for compensation for past injustices are not limited to 
Australia and are increasing throughout the world.
One form of recompense might, of course, be the recognition of customary law. 
The argument here is that past injustice denied and suppressed cultural norms 
which should now be reinstated and endorsed. However, this argument is more 
complex than those raised above. It has been argued in Chapter 1 that, from the 
perspective of the Australian legal system, it cannot be denied that customary law 
did not survive the events of 1770-1788 as a legal system. However, much of the 
customary system has in fact, survived even though the state views it as an extra- 
legal code. It is, of course, possible to validate such extra-legal norms, either by 
statute or by the exercise of judicial power to develop the common law, but 
difficulties arise in deciding exactly what should be validated. Presumably most 
people, including the judiciary, would accept that the state action in relation to the 
stolen generations, for example, was morally wrong, though they may not 
necessarily agree about what should now be done. The issue of the recognition of 
customary law is less clear. Whilst it is clearly arguable that the total disregard of 
customary systems was morally - if not legally -  wrong and requires some 
recompense, it is very unlikely that all customary law norms would be validated by 
the state which has other obligations in respect of, for example, international 
human rights standards.263 Moreover, it is not clear that the validation of all norms
262 On reparations generally, though mainly in relation to the United States o f A, see: Munford. C.J. 
Race and Reparations: A Black Perspective for the 21st Century Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World 
Press, Inc., 1996, especially pp. 413-439.
263 Such difficulties arise and are discussed throughout this Chapter.
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would, in general, be desirable264 or serve as redress to promote social justice. 
Arguments for such recognition, whether based on redress for past injustice or 
elimination of present disadvantage, must therefore establish either a causal 
connection in each case - i.e. that this particular problem will be addressed by 
recognition265 - or that the acceptance of diverse norms is, in itself, desirable.
b. Present day disadvantage and inequality266:
The second instrumentalist argument is that customary law can be used to address 
present-day disadvantage and inequality. Whatever the past causes, it is undeniable 
that Aborigines today suffer from enormous disadvantage. Almost every social 
indicator demonstrates this: health, education, employment, housing, domestic 
violence, child abuse, involvement in crime, substance abuse.267 It is, therefore, 
morally imperative that this situation be addressed. This is a general argument, 
applicable to all groups that suffer similarly, based on the belief that people should 
be treated equally. Such situations can only be addressed by creating conditions 
under which the group concerned is operating at the same level as other groups 
within society. The issue here is whether these disadvantages can -  or indeed 
should -  be addressed by differential treatment under the law. The recognition of
264 Presumably Aborigines would consider it desirable to validate all customary law. The analysis of 
the possibility and desirability of such validation is, of course, from the perspective of the state legal 
system.
2 5 Some such arguments will be discussed below in relation, for example, to the breakdown of law 
and order in some communities. See Chapter 5.
266 For discussion of the moral ‘obligation’ to address such disadvantage, see: Raikka. J. ‘The Moral 
Relevance of Cultural Disadvantage’ Australasian Journal o f Philosophy Vol. 78, No. 3, September 
2000, 374-390.
267 See supra n 3
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customary law would, of course, be differential treatment and would need to be 
justified.
The basic argument against differential treatment, and hence against recognition of 
customary law per se26*, is premised on the legal principle of equality and non­
discrimination which is enshrined in both international and Australian domestic 
law. The international provisions are numerous as the principle underlies all 
international human rights regimes as well as many public international law 
doctrines. The most important provisions are in the two specific anti-discrimination 
Conventions -  the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women. 1979 (hereinafter ‘CEDAW’) and CERD -  and in Article 26 of 
the ICCPR. In relation to the latter, the Human Rights Committee has pointed269 
out that the principle is not limited to those rights in the ICCPR but applies to all 
rights and freedoms.
The general rule applicable in Australia is that all citizens of the state should be 
treated equally and in the same way mutatis mutandis. The Australian 
constitutional and legal systems were derived from the English and the principle of 
the rule of law remains fundamental. The classic exposition of the rule of law was 
given by Dicey:
“That ‘rule of law,’ then, which forms a fundamental principle of the 
constitution,....
268 There may be arguments against particular provisions even if some is accepted
269 General Comment No. 18 (371 (art. 261
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.... means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance of 
regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes 
the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide 
discretionary authority on the part of the government. Englishmen are 
ruled by the law, and by the law alone; a man may with us be punished 
for a breach of law, but he can be punished for nothing else.
It means, again, equality before the law, or the equal subjection of all
classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary law
j . . ,  •>■>110courts;...
This principle is based firmly on a modernist, centrist view of the state. It is 
concerned with the maintenance of law and order, considered to be within the 
monopoly of the state, which both determines content and enforces compliance. 
The principle both rests on and reaffirms the authority and unique position of the 
state. Thus, the ‘rule of law’ excludes any recognition of customary law as an 
independently validated system: only state-enacted law can bind a man (sic.) 
and all people are subject to the ordinary law of the land administered by the 
ordinary courts.271 These concepts of non-discrimination and equality, expressed 
by the rule of law doctrine, have been strengthened and embodied in Australian 
domestic legislation, most notably in the Racial Discrimination Act. 1975 (Cth.Y 
They permeate all the organs of the Australian state, including the legal system,
270 Dicey. AV. Introduction to the Study o f the Law o f the Constitution Hampshire and London: 
Macmillan Education Ltd., (10* ed.) 1959, at 202-203.
271 It may be possible to include at least some customary law, both substantive and procedural, 
within the state system and thereby grant it a measure of independence, though the exemption of 
certain groups from the ordinary law is contentious. These points will be considered in Chapters 3-5. 
This situation is faced by many legal systems throughout the world and is the subject of much 
debate. See for example: Donovan. D.A. and Assefa. G. ‘Homicide in Ethiopia: Human Rights, 
Federalism, and Legal Pluralism’ 51 American Journal o f Comparative Law 505, Summer 2003; 
Sierra. M.T. ‘Indian Rights and Customary Law in Mexico: A Study of the Nahuas in the Sierra de 
Puebla’ Law and Society Review, Volume 29, Number 2, 227 (1995).
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and are accepted as a sine qua non by the Australian Law Reform 
Commission 272 As to judicial treatment of Aborigines, from the very earliest 
days of settlement the majority of the judges were at pains to stress the 
requirement of equal -  understood then as uniform - treatment before the law. 
This stress on formal equality was not unreasonable given the climate of the 
time: formal equality guarded (in theory at least) against Aborigines being more 
harshly treated than whites.273
However, whilst both international and Australian law are aimed at avoiding 
discrimination and ensuring equality, disagreement arises about how this should be 
achieved: by formal equality or by substantive equality. Those who support the 
rule of law in literal terms argue that equality may only be promoted by education 
and changes in attitude and that the only permissible legal intervention should be 
the negative one of anti-discrimination provisions: affirmative action or positive 
discrimination -  the terms are, for present purposes, interchangeable - is 
antithetical to the rule of law and simply creates another inequity. Others argue that 
attaining equality may sometimes require that people be treated differently: 
affirmative action or positive discrimination ‘levels the playing-field’.274 The latter
272 The Recognition o f Aboriginal Customary Laws (Summary Report, Full Report 2 Volumes), 
Final Report No. 31 Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986, para. 128.
273 Kriewaldt, for example, often stressed equality before the law in an attempt to guard against 
such hostile treatment. See Chapters 3-5.
274 Most of the general literature originates from the United States of America, but the arguments are 
universal. For general defences o f affirmative action policies, see: Ezorsky. G. Racism and Justice: 
The Case for Affirmative Action Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991; Rosenfeld. M. 
Affirmative Action and Justice New Haven: Harvard University Press, 1991.
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view has been endorsed at both international275 and national level276, but always 
with caution. The limits of permissible positive discrimination are strict. It is 
generally only permissible when it meets a baseline test, usually expressed in terms 
of justifiability or in relation to disadvantage based on race or sex, areas which 
provide most of the case-law and literature.
Can affirmative action be used by indigenous groups to argue for the recognition 
of customary law as a way of achieving equality? As with firstly non- 
discriminatory policies and then of affirmative action generally277, the issues have 
been most thoroughly discussed and litigated in the United States of America. The 
Supreme Court has engaged with this dilemma when making decisions concerning
275 See, for example: South West Africa Cases (Second Phase! (1966) ICJ Rep 6 (Judge Tanaka 
dissenting opinion). Also, of particular importance is the proviso in Article 1(4) of CERD. 
CERD prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin 
and this discrimination includes both distinction, exclusion and restriction on the one hand and 
preference on the other. Article 1(4) expressly excepts from the scope of Article 1(1) “special 
measures” -  essentially affirmative action policies - which, were it not for Article 1(4) would 
amount to racial discrimination. The special measures thus permitted are defined as:
Special measures taken for the sole purpose o f securing adequate advancement of 
certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be 
necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, 
provided, however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the 
maintenance o f separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall not be 
continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved. 
Commentators have not been able to reach agreement on the precise scope of these Articles, 
especially when read in conjunction with Article 2(2) which, unusually, “requires” certain action. 
However, what is clear is that there will be no right under CERD to establish and maintain for ever a 
separate legal system exempt from the supervision of the state.
™ Infra 143-144.
277 See the foundational Supreme Court cases of Shelley v. Kraemer 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Brown v. 
Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 US. 294 (1955); Resents of the University of 
California v. Bakke 438 US. 265 (1978); United Steelworkers of America. AFL-CIO-CLC v. 
Weber 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Fullilove v. Flutznick 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Note, however, the recent 
tendency of the Supreme Court to restrict the permissibility of affirmative action policies: 
Firefighters v. Stotts. 467 U.S. 561 (1984); Wvgant v. Jackson Board of Education 476 U.S. 267 
(1986); Adarand Constructors. Inc. v. Pena 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Note also that in all these cases the 
Court is operating under the authority o f and interpreting either the Constitution, usually the 
Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Act 1964. The judges are not simply introducing 
affirmative action out of nowhere.
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the Indian tribes. The precise details of the history of the relationship between 
government and tribe is irrelevant, though it should be noted that the government 
has a particular responsibility for the tribes, enshrined in the Constitution and re­
iterated in successive legislation and case-law. This relationship has been variously 
categorised278, but is essentially one of protection. A substantial body of 
federal/state law has developed around this relationship. Federal/state law contains 
little or no reference to customary law, but provides for a considerable degree of 
self-government by the tribes who are able to apply customary law as they see fit 
and without necessarily meeting the equal protection test. Federal/state law and 
policy with regard to Indians is itself, however, subject to the requirement of equal 
protection. This requirement has frequently been the ground for legal challenge 
when differential or preferential treatment has been afforded to Indians,279 but such 
challenges have failed, often expressly on the grounds that were they to succeed 
Congress would be unable to fulfil its responsibility towards the tribes. The 
justification is that the differential treatment is not based on race or ethnicity which 
would be impermissible - but on the political status of the tribes as a group to
278 For example, as ‘domestic dependent nations’: Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 30 U.S. 1 (1831); 
Worcester v. Georgia 31 U.S. 515 (1832) For a useful overview o f comparative jurisprudence 
on native title, see: Dick. D. ‘Comprehending ‘ the genius of the common law’ -  Native Title in 
Australia and Canada compared post-Delgamuukw’ (1999) 5(1) Australian Journal o f Human 
Rights 79; Bartlett. R. ‘Native Title: From Pragmatism to Equality before the Law’ 20 
Melbourne University Law Review 1995, 283; Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 
Native Title Report 2003 Sydney: Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 2004 at 167- 
208
279 See Morton v. Manscari 417 U.S. 535 (1974); Fisher v. Rosebud District Court 424 U.S. 382 
(1976): United States v. Antelope 430 U.S. 641 (1977)
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whom special responsibility is owed. Similar issues have arisen in other 
jurisdictions.280
The position in Australia is as follows. There is power under s. 51(26) of the 
Constitution to pass “special laws” for Aborigines (amongst others). 281 There is 
no constitutional protection of the concepts of equality and non-discrimination 
and the legal protection of these principles is contained in the Racial 
Discrimination Act (Cth) of 1975 which was passed specifically in order to 
incorporate CERD into domestic law. The relevant sections are 8(1), 9(1) and 
10(1) which read:
“8.(1) This part does not apply to, or in relation to the application of, 
special measures to which paragraph 4 of art 1 of the Convention applies
9(1) It is unlawful for a person to do any act involving a distinction, 
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or 
national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of 
any human right or fundamental freedom in the political, economic, 
social, cultural or any other field of public life.
10(1) If, by reason of, or of a provision of, a law of the Commonwealth 
or of a State or territory, persons of a particular race, colour or national 
or ethnic origin do not enjoy a right that is enjoyed by persons of another 
race, colour or national or ethnic origin, or enjoy a right to a more
280 Canadian constitutional laws, for example, make provision for legislative distinctions based on 
race and ethnicity provided they are aimed at a valid federal objective and are not punitive. 
Legislating for Canadian Indians, for whom the State has a specific constitutional responsibility, will 
be a valid federal objective.
281Despite disagreement amongst the judges, the High Court decided as early as 1982 that this 
proviso did not automatically entail discrimination Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 39 ALR 
417. See also: Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983) 46 ALR 625.
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limited extent than persons of another race, colour or national or ethnic 
origin, then, notwithstanding anything in that law, persons of the first- 
mentioned race, colour or national or ethnic origin shall, by force of this 
section, enjoy that right to the same extent as persons of that other race, 
colour or national or ethnic origin.”
Thus, the Racial Discrimination Act allows the type of special measures -  
affirmative action policies -  envisaged by Article 1(4) of CERD, but subject to 
the same limitations. The first major case on the Act was Gerhardv v. Brown282 
in which the High Court took the view that ‘special measures’ relating to the 
recognition of Aboriginal customary law would have to be, and were, justified 
under Article 1(4). There were differences of emphasis between the Judges, but 
they rejected the argument that “special measures” must be temporary. 
Essentially they said that the measures were not per se and necessarily 
permanent, but that they were valid for as long as necessary to achieve their 
purpose and that might be for ever. It is, however, doubtful whether this 
argument could be stretched to extend to the recognition of an entire and 
separate legal system: Gerhardv v. Brown concerned the very specific and 
limited point of access to traditional land and the need to protect that area. 
However, neither Gerhardv v. Brown nor any later decisions centred on 
customary law.
282 (1985) 57 ALR 472
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Affirmative action is an inappropriate concept on which to base arguments for 
the recognition of Aboriginal customary law. The literature283 surrounding 
affirmative action deals largely with such issues as access to education, 
employment, and health-care and sees the purpose of such action to be putting 
the disadvantaged group in the same position as the advantaged one: that is, 
allowing it the same degree of access to the same programmes or services, the 
same opportunities, the same degree of recognition for way of life, but within 
the law. Affirmative action is not aimed at supporting the demands of a 
disadvantaged group to establish an independent system and exempt itself from 
the ordinary state laws 284 Moreover, as already discussed, the general view is 
affirmative action should eventually become un-necessary: once equality is 
achieved, the action should cease. Such policies -  in both international and 
domestic law -  do not generally envisage the permanent establishment of 
separate systems. It is, therefore, difficult to see how this argument could be 
used to justify the on-going existence of a parallel customary legal system.
ii. Multiculturalism and Legal Pluralism:
The instrumentalist arguments examined above have defined ends in mind: the 
removal of injustice or disadvantage, past or present. As already stated, in order to 
make a case for the recognition of customary law in pursuit of those ends, a causal
283 See supra n 274.
284 There may be minor examples of this -  for example, exemption from certain legal requirements 
on the basis of religion but these would be minor and not the main thrust of the action. Moreover, 
those groups benefiting from affirmative action programmes are not usually trying to exempt 
themselves from the system but to obtain a fairer chance of operating within it.
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connection will need to be established. If that cannot be done, the arguments are 
not substantiated. However, there are other arguments which support the 
recognition of customary law on the grounds that it is desirable in itself, simply as 
an acknowledgement and endorsement of diversity. The view that diversity is 
desirable per se is grounded in the related theories of multiculturalism and legal 
pluralism which may provide a philosophical framework within which the 
recognition of customary law may be promoted.
a. Multiculturalism:
Theories of multiculturalism285 promote the belief, today almost universally 
accepted, that diversity is in itself a desirable goal and that it should be actively 
pursued: there is here no necessary suggestion that any group suffers disadvantage, 
though in fact it will nearly always be so. Why should multiculturalism be 
desirable? Parekh outlines the four main sets of arguments in favour of what he 
terms ‘cultural diversity’.286 Firstly, cultural diversity increases options and thus 
expands an individual’s freedom of choice. Secondly, that since human beings 
inescapably operate within and are affected by their cultures, they have a right to 
that culture which requires the recognition of diversity. Thirdly, cultural diversity 
creates, essentially, a more attractive and interesting world. Finally, the existence
285 There is some inconsistency in terminology. Thus, ‘multiculturalism’ is sometimes used to mean 
that all cultures should have the same chances -  i.e. in reality, equality and non-discrimination. This 
is the sense o f the term used by the Australian state in the National Agenda for a Multicultural 
Australia Office o f Multicultural Affairs, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 1989, and 
the Law Reform Commission Report Multiculturalism and the Law Sydney: Australian Law 
Reform Commission, 1992.
286 Parekh. B. Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2000, 165- 170
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of different systems encourages competitiveness, prevents dominance and 
encourages progress. Whilst Parekh criticises all four sets of arguments as bases 
for the desirability of multiculturalism, and some of his points are particularly 
relevant in the present context,287 nevertheless they do provide a conceptual basis 
for the desirability of multiculturalism. Parekh’s own argument is that no culture 
can incorporate all values equally and that, therefore, different cultures are good 
for society in that they complement each other and help to maintain a full range of 
value systems. This is so whether or not they are options which individuals could 
embrace and therefore is applicable to indigenous groups. Essentially Parekh’s 
point is that different cultures serve to broaden people’s understanding of their own 
cultures and thereby aid in their development.
The present debate on multiculturalism dates from the early 1990s when a number 
of scholars288 began to argue for the recognition of differential citizenship rights 
for minority or identity groups. These rights -  existing in addition to ordinary 
citizenship rights -  would allow the group a measure of autonomy in matters 
essential to maintaining the integrity of their culture, possibly including 
differentiated legal regimes. Much of the recent literature on multiculturalism
287 The first set of arguments would not provide any impetus to the recognition of indigenous rights 
such as customary law as they are not in any sense a choice which can be exercised by mainstream 
society, though arguably such recognition would increase choice for Aborigines if they can opt in or 
out. The fourth, like the first, will not protect the rights of indigenous groups who are not interested 
in competition or in expanding their options in this way.
288 On multiculturalism generally, see: e.g. Kymlicka. W. Liberalism, Community and Culture New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f Minority 
Rights New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, The Rights o f Minority Cultures Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, Citizenship in Diverse Societies Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; 
Taylor. C. ‘The Politics of Recognition’ in Gutmann. A. (ed.) Multiculturalism Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994; Young. I.M. Justice and the Politics o f Difference 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990; Parekh. B. supra n 285.
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comes from a liberal perspective and accepts the essentials of modernist thinking 
on the nature of the state and its relationship to its citizens. Several theorists have 
attempted to develop the classical concept of liberalism289 in order that it might 
more easily support cultural diversity.290 As liberals, tracing intellectual descent 
from Mill, all these theorists are essentially concerned with autonomy, but all have 
slightly different views on what constitutes such autonomy.
The most relevant of these theorists for present purposes is Kymlicka who has 
developed what has been called a “systematic and provocative account of self- 
determination for indigenous groups and minority nations within states”291. 
Kymlicka starts from the premise that human beings wish to lead a good life and 
that this requires autonomy. Autonomy, for him, consists in being able firstly to 
lead one’s life in accordance with one’s own belief systems and secondly to 
question those belief systems and change one’s mind. These elements necessitate 
being able to pursue different ways of life without the fear or imposition of 
punishment. He goes on to argue that culture provides a framework within which 
this process may take place. As culture is thus essential in the pursuit of individual 
autonomy, all cultures should have the right to exist and be protected on equal 
terms with others.
289 Parekh. B. supra n 286 at 34 outlines the main characteristics of classical liberalism: a belief in a 
strong and centralised sovereign state, the rule of law, equality of all citizens, individual rights and 
duties, and no entity standing between the individual and the state.
290 For discussion of the evolution of the concept of liberalism and its applicability in pluralist 
society, see: Parekh. B. supra n 286 at 80-113. He examines the work of Rawls, Raz and Kymlicka 
and maintains that, whilst their work is an advance on classical liberalism, it still fails to meet the 
challenge o f cultural diversity. On the development of liberalism, see also: Gray. J. Two Faces o f 
Liberalism Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.
291 Buchanan. A. supra n 231 at 19
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Kymlicka recognises several types of cultural groups which, he argues, should 
enjoy differing levels of recognition, the highest level pertaining to national 
minorities which, of course, includes indigenous groups. These groups are entitled 
to a substantial level of self-determination. However, as the value of culture lies in 
its encouragement of autonomy, cultures which do not serve to promote this, but 
instead limit the autonomy of their members by, for example, depriving them of 
civil and political rights, should suffer reduction of the recognition of their culture 
and regulation by the state to the extent necessary to protect such basic rights. The 
state should be sensitive in the extent and manner of its intervention, but should not 
refuse to act where basic liberties are involved.292 Of course, these arguments are 
subject to criticism on the ground that they assume that liberalism itself is the only 
paradigm for assessing the acceptability of diversity. However, in the context of 
the present work, it may be the most appropriate. Any theory of multiculturalism 
which is to find favour with the Australian judiciary -  operating within a 
modernist, positivist legal system - would necessarily be premised on a liberal 
view of society and rights.
It should not be assumed that there are no arguments against multiculturalism. 
Some of the opponents of the doctrine oppose it on the grounds that they hold a 
formal theory of equality and a strongly statist view of law and enforcement, but
292 Thus, Kymlicka argues that internal restrictions which limit the ordinary human rights of the 
members of a group should not be recognised: see Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of 
Minority Rights supra n 288 at 152-172.
149
most opponents293 base their arguments on the assertion that the values or 
traditions of the non-state culture are in some way oppressive or reactionary and 
can be harmful to individual members, often depriving them of rights which 
other members of society enjoy.294 There are, moreover, difficulties about 
deciding the boundaries and content of a culture. There is likely to be broad 
agreement about the essential elements of a culture, but beyond that members 
may have very different views. Any attempt to base recognition of customary 
law on theories of multiculturalism will need to address these issues and suggest 
some ways of dealing with the problems.295 Yet surely these arguments, 
powerful though they are, need not defeat the doctrine as a whole? Most 
theorists would accept that the state has a right -  indeed an obligation -  to 
control overtly cruel practices and that there can be no question of a cultural 
exemption or defence for, say, honour killings.296 However, even if the practices 
of minority groups were so repressive that the state would need to intervene in 
99% of circumstances to protect those affected, why should the theory not hold 
for the 1% whose practices are not cruel, simply different from those of the 
majority? Of course, there will be difficulties and disagreements about deciding
293 As a theory, rather than opposing, say, a particular manifestation such as recognition of custom. 
See, for example: Barry. B. Culture and Equality Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001.
2940ne o f the strongest critiques of multiculturalism on these grounds has come from feminism. On 
this point see generally: Schachar. A. Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and 
Women's Rights Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Schachar argues that insufficient 
attention has been paid to the effect of cultural accommodation on those accommodated, especially 
on dissident or disadvantaged members, often women, within the accommodated group: the paradox 
of multicultural vulnerability. Indeed Okin concludes that women in many minority cultures would 
be better off if their cultural group were to become extinct: see Okin. S.M. ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad 
for Women?’ The Boston Review 22:5 (Oct/Nov. 1997).
295 On this point, see: Parekh. B. supra n 286 at 142-178. See also: Bhabha. H.K. (ed.) Nation and 
Narration London: Routledge, 1993.
296 For discussion o f cultural defences, see infra 332-333.
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what amounts to behaviour which the state must challenge, but these should not 
be insoluble.
One of the most emblematic cases is Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez where
the US Supreme Court essentially rejected claims - made by individual members
- that the state should intervene to defeat the sexually discriminatory practices of
the Pueblo which practices would have been illegal under wider state law. Were
the rules of the Pueblo such that the state should have intervened or were they
simply different from those endorsed by the majority population? Levy argues
that unless such internal practices amount to “real cruelty”298 they should not be
legislated against, though they may be discouraged:
“Moreover, just as the range of cultural practices that are subject to 
legitimate reform is wider than the range that is subject to proscription, 
so is the range that is subject to legitimate criticism wider than that 
subject to reforming state action. To put it another way, not every 
cultural practice that is worthy of criticism as sexist is a legitimate target 
for state attempts to change it, and not every cultural practice that is a 
legitimate target for such external pressures for reform is a legitimate 
object of prohibition. This, by the way, is applicable to the criticism, 
reform, and proscription of cultural practices generally, and not only 
those whose problem is that they are sexually discriminatory.”299
He goes on to argue that pressure to reform cultural practices is often best 
applied by some form of multicultural accommodation which at least keeps the
297 436 US 49 1978. On similar points see: Canada ('Attorney Generali v. Lavell (1974) SCR 1349 
and Lovelace v. Canada supra at n 222.
298 Supra n 62.
299 Supra n 62 at 53.
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oppressed members of the minority in some contact with the dominant system 
which may be of some help to them both as individuals and in attempting to 
reform the group from within. Thus, if, for example, it is assumed that 
polygynous marriages are oppressive for women, it may be that their position is 
better served by some limited form of recognition which will then give them 
access to state benefits and protections available to married women than by 
complete refusal to recognise which will essentially leave them at the mercy of 
their own cultural group with no access to external assistance.
Discussion of multiculturalism is essentially about how a state should respond to 
cultural plurality within its borders; of what, if any, difference there should be in 
the way various groups are treated; of what these groups may legitimately claim. 
It is beyond the scope of this Thesis to attempt a thorough analysis of the 
debates surrounding multiculturalism, but some of the more pertinent features 
will be identified. Levy300 classifies ‘cultural right-claims’ under eight headings: 
exemptions from laws which penalise or burden cultural practices; external rules 
restricting non-members’ liberty in order to protect members’ culture; internal 
rules for members’ conduct enforced by ostracism or excommunication; 
recognition or enforcement of the traditional legal code by the dominant legal 
system; assistance to do those things the majority can do unassisted; self- 
government; representation of minorities in government bodies, guaranteed or 
facilitated; and symbolic claims to acknowledge the worth, status, or existence
300 Supra n 62 at 127.
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of various groups. Any or all of these types of right may be claimed by a cultural 
group, but the most relevant for present purposes are the first four. To what 
extent should the state be obliged by considerations of multiculturalism to grant 
these claims? Exemptions from laws which burden or penalise cultural practices 
can often be fairly easily accommodated within the general legal framework. 
Thus, there may be little difficulty over allowing indigenous groups to hunt 
otherwise protected species which are the basis of their traditional method of 
subsistence. However, this is clearly an allowance made by the dominant system 
and it can be overridden if other factors are considered more important.301 
External rules often take the form of restricting the mobility or access of non- 
members or of a particular power such as a veto over certain types of 
development. Internal rules controlling members’ compliance will not usually 
be the subject of state interference unless they are violent or cruel. The most 
pertinent type of claim-right under Levy’s scheme is for recognition or 
enforcement of customary law. The substantive areas in which this claim most 
often arises are family law, land rights and crime, but it is the latter which 
causes the most difficulty. There has been an increasing willingness in most
301 Both the possibility o f being overridden and the demonstration that this type of right is not 
restricted to indigenous groups can be demonstrated by the case of mandatory schooling. Thus, in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 US 205 (1972) the Amish were granted an exemption from mandatory 
schooling laws. However, many - including Kymlicka - argue that the decision is wrong in that the 
interests of the children are too important to allow for exceptions. The relevance of this for the 
present case is that some of the practices for which exemption is granted may be simply 
unacceptable. It will be a balancing act. Thus, people who wish to argue that the cultural practice of 
female circumcision should be exempt from the laws on child abuse are likely to fail on the grounds 
that the protection of the child is the greater interest.
302 This position is not entirely without difficulty as it is premised largely on the ability of a member 
to leave the group if the rules are unacceptable and this may well not be a realistic option though 
possible in theory: thus a Roman Catholic who believes that women should be able to be ordained to 
the priesthood may be able to become an Anglican with little difficulty, but a traditionally-oriented 
Aborigine from a remote community will have very little chance -  or indeed desire -  to move to a 
liberal metropolis.
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states with indigenous populations, including Australia, to recognise at least 
some of customary family law -  marriages, wills and intestacy, and adoption. 
This may be because recognition in this area is seen merely as analogous to the 
recognition of foreign law. Land rights have also been increasingly granted as 
discussed in Chapter 1. However, customary criminal law is a different matter. 
The difficulties arise both in relation to the substance of the law - some acts or 
omissions may be criminal under customary law but not under state law and 
vice-versa -  and to punishment -  some customary law punishments are 
themselves criminal by the law of the state and the question also arises as to 
double punishment under both systems. The question of jurisdiction is crucial. If 
it is proposed that the customary legal system should have exclusive 
jurisdiction, whether territorial or personal, then difficulties arise both as to the 
control of discriminatory, repressive or other measures which may be illegal 
under the general system -  for example, the treatment of women - and 
conversely as to the failure of the customary system to prohibit and punish 
behaviour which offends the general system - for example, sexual intercourse 
with a child who is under the age of consent set by state law. This inability to 
exercise any control over the activities of the customary legal system has proved 
a stumbling block for many theorists of multiculturalism. The answer sometimes 
posed is that there could be alternative jurisdictions where the individual can opt 
out of the customary legal system and opt in to the state one. This will be 
considered below, but for now it should be noted that this would be fraught with 
difficulty: first, at a theoretical level, it breaches the argument about equal
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protection for cultural and legal systems and actually gives a choice to these 
individuals which is not available to any other; second, it would involve 
numerous practical problems -  for example, the parties to a dispute may make 
different choices; third, it is not a realistic assessment of the position and 
freedom of the individual.303 For multiculturalists who hold a modernist view of 
the state and its powers and functions, there is no theoretical debate about status 
of law or the centrality of the state: the argument is simply that the state should 
try as far as possible to accommodate the different traditions and values of its 
population. There is here no suggestion that there is a multiplicity of legal 
systems, or at least a multiplicity of valid legal systems, though again the state 
may choose to endorse some.
The argument is sometimes made that multiculturalism is even more desirable 
when it leads to the promotion of the cultures of indigenous groups who have 
suffered greater historical injustice and may still be more disadvantaged than, say, 
an incoming ethnic minority whose customs are not endorsed by the state. Keal304 
maintains that it is possible to build persuasive moral arguments for action in 
relation to the wrongs perpetrated on indigenous peoples and that these arguments 
can be founded on more than a vague sense of guilt or sense that something is 
unfair. He maintains that there are three possible grounds for such an argument. 
The first lies in the damage caused by constructing the identity of others, almost 
always adversely, which harm survives the original context and so continues today.
303 See supra n 302.
304 Keal. P. European Conquest and the Rights o f Indigenous Peoples: The Moral Backwardness of 
International Society Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003
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This construction is then used to justify annihilation or, at best, domination. The 
second argument is based on the feasibility of the notion of collective 
responsibility and the desirability of reparations for past injustices. Thirdly, Keal 
discusses the question of the moral legitimacy of states and international society as 
a whole where there are still issues relating to indigenous peoples unresolved. All 
these arguments have some force. However, the assessment of whether they add 
extra weight to the case for multiculturalism when the group in question is 
indigenous is problematic. For example, it seems unlikely that practices which the 
state designates ‘cruel’ under Levy’s typology will be condoned if practiced by an 
indigenous group, but condemned if practiced by some other minority. It seems 
probable that whilst they may add another level of moral imperative, the 
application of theories of multiculturalism will not be significantly affected.
Australia has endorsed the principles of multiculturalism and government policy 
on multiculturalism has been set out in two major documents: The National 
Agenda for a Multicultural Australia and A New Agenda for Multicultural 
Australia®1. These are aimed at the promotion and acceptance of cultural 
diversity in all forms. However, they have little to say about Aborigines in 
particular or about the criminal justice system and so offer no real indication of 
the likelihood legislative recognition of customary law. More relevant is the
305 For general discussion of multiculturalism in Australia, see: Glass. A  ‘Multiculturalism, Law 
and the Right to Culture’ University o f New South Wales Law Journal Vol. 24 (3), (2001) 862-868; 
Levey. G.B. ‘The Political Theories of Australian Multiculturalism’ University o f New South Wales 
Law Journal Vol. 24 (3), (2001) 869-881; and Webber. J. ‘Multiculturalism and the Australian 
Constitution’ University o f New South Wales Law Journal Vol. 24 (3), (2001) 883-893.
306 Supra n 285.
307 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Commonwealth of Australia, 1999.
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30 8Australian Law Reform Commission Report on Multiculturalism and the Law 
which made recommendations for changes in the criminal justice system which, 
if implemented would seem to give some scope for customary law to be 
considered.309
b. Legal Pluralism310:
A second theoretical framework which might support the recognition of 
customary law is that of legal pluralism.311 In many ways legal pluralism might 
seem to be no more than the application of theories of multiculturalism to the 
fields of law, but it is often understood to be a rather stronger concept. The term 
‘legal pluralism’, like the term ‘post-modernism’ with which it has some 
conceptual connections, is imprecise.312 It is used to describe the many 
situations where the state does not enjoy a monopoly over the creation of
308 Sydney: Report 57, Australian Law Reform Commission, 1992
309 Supra 53.
310 For a useful overview of recent debates in the area, see: Woodman. G.R. ‘Ideological Combat 
and Social Observation: Recent Debate about Legal Pluralism’ (1998) 42 Journal o f Legal 
Pluralism 21-59.
311 Some theorists us the term ‘legal pluralism’, others ‘legal polycentricity’. For present purposes, 
the two may be treated as the same. See: Legal Polycentricity: Consequences o f Pluralism in Law 
eds. Petersen. H  and Zahle. H. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co. Ltd., 1995.
312 For general literature on legal pluralism see: Griffiths. J. ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ in 24 
Journal o f Legal Pluralism  1, p.2.; Pospisil. L The Anthropology o f Lcrw: A Comparative Theory 
o f Law, S.E. Merry ‘Legal Pluralism’ in 22 Law and Society Review 869; Nader. L. (ed.) Law in 
Culture and Society,; Allot! A.N. and Woodman. G.R. (eds.) People’s Law and State Law: The 
Bellagio Papers,; Sack. P. and Minchin. E. (eds.) Legal Pluralism: Proceedings o f the Canberra 
Law Workshop VII; Hooker. M.B. Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo- 
Colonial Laws Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975; Geertz. C. Local Knowledge: Further Essays in 
Interpretive Anthropology New York: Basic Books, 1983; Burman. S B. and Harrell-Bond. B.C. 
The Imposition o f Law New York: Academic Press Inc., 1979.
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norms.313 These various definitions may be accurate to a point, but 
unfortunately they do not progress the discussion. For present purposes it is 
important to highlight one crucial difference between the various uses of the 
term. Some scholars argue that the state is always the only source of law and 
that when a situation is described as one of legal pluralism it means simply that 
the state has somehow validated other norm-making systems either by 
delegation, by creating them anew or by endorsing pre-existing systems. In the 
event of a conflict between normative orders the state will always prevail. 
Others maintain that the concept of legal pluralism refers to a situation where 
the state is not viewed as the only or ultimate source of law: that there are other 
bodies or institutions or systems which can make law and that ability is not 
dependent on the state.314 Griffiths refers to the first meaning as a “juristic” view 
of legal pluralism and the second as a “social science” view315 and Bentzon, et 
al. write of “lawyer’s legal pluralism” and “anthropologist’s legal pluralism”316. 
The two views are variously categorised317 and differ in detail, but the overall 
features are clear. The Australian judiciary will, of course, endorse the first 
view.
313 For a useful overview of the area, see Allott. A  and & Woodman. G.R (eds.) People's Law 
and State Law: The Bellagio Papers Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1985.
314 This, of course, gives rise to debate over the nature of law itself. For an overview of this position 
see: Merry. S.E. Legal Pluralism supra n 312.
315 Griffiths. J. ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ 24 Journal o f Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 
1986, 1-55, at 5, 8.
316 Bentzon. AW., Helium. A , Stewart. J., Ncube. W. and Agersnap. T. Pursuing Grounded Theory 
in Law: South-North Experiences in Developing Women’s Law Harare: Mond Books, 1998, at 30.
317 Thus, Merry. S.E. ‘Legal Pluralism’ in Law and Society Review (1988) Vol. 22, No. 5, 1988, 
69 writes of classical and new pluralism; and Griffiths. J. supra n 315.
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Whatever the relationship between these forms of pluralism, the present Thesis 
is primarily concerned with the first form: whether formal recognition should be 
given to non-state normative orders. No doubt all states, including Australia, in 
which such a multiplicity of normative systems exists, acknowledge their 
existence in some degree or other.318 Some factors and norms influencing 
members of society may be individual and some may be determined by, inter 
alia, religion, ethnicity or indigeneity.319 Moore’s concept of semi- autonomous 
social fields is useful here.320 She argues that in any given situation any person 
is influenced by many different normative orders. Indeed these situations - 
social fields - are defined by having the capacity both to generate rules and to 
influence compliance. Each of these fields has its own sphere of operation but 
they are all influenced by each other: thus, semi-autonomous. Depending on 
whether one adopts a social science or a juristic view, these normative systems 
may or may not be viewed as law. For the state and its organs they will not be, 
except in so far as they derive power from the state.321
318 Detailed discussion of the position in other jurisdictions is beyond the scope of the Thesis. It is, 
however, worth citing, by way of example, the extensive literature originating in the Pacific area. 
See, for example: Corrin Care. J. ‘Conflict between Customary Law and Human Rights in the South 
Pacific’ Paper presented at the 12th Commonwealth Law Conference, Kuala Lumpur, September, 
1999; Brown. K. ‘Customary Law in the Pacific: An Endangered Species’ Journal o f South Pacific 
Law Article 2 of Volume 3, 1999; Fraser. I. ‘Pluralism? Dualism? Pluralism Long Dualism?’ 
Journal o f South Pacific Law Article 3 of Volume 3, 1999; and Demian. M. ‘Custom in the Court 
Room, Law in the Village: Legal Transformations in Papua New Guinea’ Journal o f the Royal 
Anthropological Institute 9, (2003) 97-115.
319 On these points, see: Australian Law Reform Commission Multiculturalism and the Law 
supra 53.
32 Moore. S.F Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1978.
321 This view is clearly elaborated in Galanter. M. supra n 1. It is perhaps worth noting that whilst 
Australia undoubtedly does take this view, not all states adopt a position of legal centralism. Some 
states may be prepared to accept the operation o f another legal system within their boundaries. In 
such cases, the state does not claim that the other system operates by its permission, that it derives 
its validity from recognition by the state, but accepts the system as valid on its own terms. This
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Given that the Australian state takes the juristic view, can legal pluralism posit 
any solutions when norms conflict or does it simply define the problem? The 
juristic view would allow customary law to operate within a certain field but 
there could only be one result if there were to be a clash: the state must 
prevail.322 There are, of course, arguments against this position, both 
conceptually323 and pragmatically324. The most persuasive argument in favour of 
legal pluralism is that centralist models have proved ineffective in subduing and 
replacing other forms of law: if the state has not managed to subdue all other 
normative orders, it can be assumed that the attempt to do so is mistaken and the 
case for legal pluralism is proved. There is some strength in this argument, but it 
is not conclusive. First, any theoretical case for legal pluralism must rest on 
more than the practical failure of the opposite position. Second, whilst there is 
room for debate about the extent, it can hardly be denied that the Australian 
legal system had effectively subdued and replaced much of Aboriginal 
customary law for many years. Indeed, it is arguable that it is the very success of 
that subjugation which has helped to create the moral climate which now sees 
some form of recognition as desirable in reparation. Moreover, whilst the 
argument on ineffectiveness does have some merit, it might also be argued that
could be argued to be the case in Papua New Guinea where customary law is part of the underlying 
law: s.3 The Underlying Law Act 2000. Such customary law can be overridden in certain 
circumstances, most notably by the enactment of an inconsistent statute, but in the event of a clash 
with common law, custom prevails.: s.4.
322 The judiciary may be creative in its application of the law, but it is not empowered to grant full 
independence to other normative systems.
323 On these points see: Moore. S.F. supra n 320 and Allot. A  The Limits o f Law London: 
Butterworths, 1980
324 For example, it is simply not realistic, other bodies continue to create “law”.
325 Although customary law was not destroyed - and the more remote the area from the towns, the 
less effective the subjugation.
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it does not prove a theoretical case for legal pluralism, but merely demonstrates 
the strength of an extra-legal code of behaviour which it might be sensible to 
validate at least to some extent. In other words, there might be a pragmatic case 
for a degree of legal pluralism, but this could be accommodated within a juristic 
view. Thus, the challenge faced by the Australian legal system is to address the 
continued existence of alternative, non-statist, non-legal (in its view) regimes - 
under conditions of non-recognition - and the relationship between those 
systems and the state systems. The Australian Courts cannot view customary 
law as a legal system on for the reasons already examined in Chapter 1. From 
their perspective, the customary legal system did not survive settlement as a 
binding legal system and, as it has not since been recognised, -  i.e. validated -  
as such, it can have no force. The Courts could, of course, validate an extra-legal 
norm within the normal process of developing the common law and this would 
render the norm legally binding. In terms of outcome on any given point, it may 
not matter whether the Courts consider a customary norm to be per se legally 
binding or whether they choose to validate it and thus render it binding.326 It is, 
however, of considerable theoretical importance, and, of course, of great 
significance to Aborigines, most of whom would presumably prefer their 
systems to be recognised as valid per se. The question here is whether there is 
any basis in the theories of legal pluralism upon which the Australian state and 
legal system may give some recognition to a system which it has both 
practically excluded and, more importantly in this context, theoretically denied
326 Although if  the norm derives its validity form the Courts’ recognition, the choice about when and 
how that recognition should be extended is exercised outside the customary system.
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as a legal system over many years.327 It seems that, as suggested above328, legal 
pluralism -  or rather, juristic legal pluralism - is essentially multiculturalism 
and, therefore, the arguments for its usefulness in justifying a call for the 
recognition of customary law are very similar.
2.4: Conclusion:
It has been demonstrated that from the perspective of the Australian state, 
including the judiciary, Aboriginal customary law has no legal validity of itself 
and can, therefore, unless incorporated in some way329, only be used as an extra- 
legal social code which may be considered as background information and may 
be used within the analysis and interpretation of the state law. It has also been 
shown that the arguments as to why some recognition should be granted to 
customary law are persuasive. The wholesale incorporation of customary law330 
is both impractical (for reasons which will be discussed below) and, many 
would argue, undesirable. It seems unlikely that the state would ever be 
prepared to sanction all of customary law in terms of content. It might, for 
example, be prepared to sanction some degree of corporal sanction but is 
unlikely to do so if it results in death or severe maiming. However, it is possible
327 For a useful overview of the state’s options, see: ‘Introductory Essay: The State’s Options’ in 
Morse. B.W. and Woodman. G.R. (eds.) Indigenous Law and the State Dordrecht: Foris, 1988, 5- 
24.
328 Supra 157.
329 Of course, even in the event of incorporation the legal validity o f such customary law is derived 
from the state.
330 It needs to be borne in mind that whilst customary legal systems share some features -  all 
Aboriginal systems, for example, trace creation to the Dreamtime -  they also contain differences. 
Thus, it would not be a question of incorporating one system but many in different areas of the 
country.
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to posit a number of positions between these two extremes, ranging from 
granting recognition to a few elements of customary law which will operate in a 
dominant state system to almost total incorporation. This might appear to be the 
way forward and these possibilities will be briefly outlined below together with 
some of the issues and difficulties which would arise in implementing them. The 
proposals will then be examined in the context of the criminal law and the role 
of the judiciary in the next three Chapters. Of course, if the state voluntarily 
recognises customary law, then the role of the judges will be to apply it. 
However, it is likely that there would still be ambiguities and room for 
interpretation and so the attitude of the judiciary is crucial. A fortiori, if the state 
has taken no such action, the decisions of the judges will shape the law. It will 
be seen that the judiciary have often taken an ad hoc approach which has 
amounted to informal acceptance of at least certain aspects of customary law 
and there seems to be no reason why this should not continue. It should be noted 
that many of the proposals outlined below have been tried in one form or 
another in Australia and these attempts will be discussed at the relevant points in 
the next three Chapters.
The question, therefore, next arises as to the best way to achieve such an 
outcome. This involves consideration of content, jurisdiction, fora for 
adjudication and choice of legal system.331 The main issues will be outlined in 
this section and then discussed more fully as and where they arise in the Thesis.
331 See infra n 335.
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Content:
With regard to content, there is an almost infinite variety of possible options. It 
is neither possible nor useful to attempt an exhaustive discussion of the 
possibilities. For present purposes it is sufficient identify the issues and make 
some preliminary comment.
Who should decide the content, that is, which parts of customary law are to be 
recognised? There are various possibilities. The state could decide by action of 
the legislature. If it did so, it would be necessary to take advice from relevant 
sources -  most importantly the Aborigines concerned, but perhaps also 
anthropologists, linguists, psychologists, police, and any other parties with some 
relevant expertise. Another possibility would be for a panel of Aborigines to 
decide. There would need to be careful procedures for the selection of members 
of this panel and matters such as fair representation would have to be taken into 
account. Moreover, the state would certainly retain a veto over the content. Any 
body of law decided on by any method would need to take account of and allow 
for the differing traditions of Aboriginal people. Thus, there might need to be 
regional or local state laws and panels. The requirement of accommodating 
differing traditions would be likely to prove a difficult to meet. How is it 
decided which group is entitled to differential law? Is it simple a question of size 
-  how large must a group be before it has such an entitlement? In the case of a
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panel decision, what if some groups disapprove of the traditions of other 
groups? The bodies deciding which traditions or laws should be recognised, 
whether the state or a panel, would be faced with all the problems raised in 
connection with the recognition of any customary law by the state, though 
admittedly in a less acute form. In reality, such decision-making by a panel of 
Aborigines alone is almost certain to prove problematical, both conceptually and 
practically; much more likely is that the state would decide, but seek advice for 
such a panel.
A further consideration is the pedigree of such content. What is being proposed 
is the recognition of customary law, not simply of a differential system. It would 
be impossible to reconstruct accurately the systems which prevailed in 1788, 
both because customary law evolves organically and due to hybridisation. Thus, 
the best that could be achieved would be a system which could either somehow 
trace direct descent from the pre-1788 systems or could claim to be authoritative 
on grounds of current practice and acceptance. Either of these would be very 
difficult to establish. It might -  indeed would -  be possible to obtain evidence 
from Aborigines, from anthropologists and historians and, subject to very real 
difficulties over translation of concepts and evidence and fluidity, to construct 
some kind of system. However, customary law is not like the positivist law of 
the state. There is no clear set of sources from which the whole authoritative law 
can be ascertained. Moreover, once the content was decided, there would need 
to be some provision for updating to allow for development.
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It is important to note that depending on the method of implementing 
recognition, the content will need to be more or less strictly defined. If, for 
example, it were decided to recognise certain elements of customary law by 
legislation, it is likely that the content of that recognition would need to be 
precisely defined. If recognition were to be implemented by the establishment of 
particular fora, - by for example, the establishment of some variant of tribal 
courts -  this would essentially be an exercise in delegating powers and, whilst 
some detail would be given of the content of the customary law which such 
courts could apply, this content would be defined as a component part of the 
court’s jurisdiction. If recognition is accorded by the judiciary, there is much 
less need for precision. The judges operate within the parameters of the state 
legal system and exercise discretion in applying such elements of customary law 
as are relevant in a given case and can be accommodated within the overall legal 
system. This is the most effective way of determining content and granting 
recognition as will be established by the analysis in the next three Chapters and 
the Conclusion.
Jurisdictional base:
The next point to consider is the criterion for differential application, the 
jurisdictional base. This may be territorial, personal identity or subject matter.
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It is perfectly possible to have a system under which a distinct legal system 
operates in a particular geographical area -  federalism would be the clearest 
example of this. By definition, in a federal system the central authority retains 
some power over the component parts. This may be a residual power, or it may be 
over certain matters, for example, the right to declare war. Similarly, delegated 
power to legislate may allow for a variety of systems within a state border and this 
is common, for example, in the case of local authorities. Thus, customary law 
could be applicable on Aboriginal land or in a certain area where the population is 
wholly or mainly Aboriginal. This has been done in, for example, the United States 
and Canada where domains or reserves have independent legal systems, in many 
cases amounting to virtual self-government with only such matters as foreign 
relations being reserved to the state. Precedents can also be found in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century arrangements in leased territories in China based on the 
principle of extraterritoriality. Under this system the foreigners residing in the 
leased territories were subject not to the Chinese law and Courts, but to special 
courts which applied their own law. This system of differing territorial jurisdiction 
will usually require rules relating to rights of habitation and access to the land and 
restrictions on outsiders. It should be noted that in both the examples cited above, 
the jurisdiction might equally have been based on membership of a group, i.e. on 
personal identity. It would be difficult to make a case for differential law based on 
territory unless the population of that territory was fairly homogenous.332 Whilst
332 The identification of the territorial base is problematic outside of ‘reserved’ lands. What is the 
position of non-Aborigines living in that area? If a non-Aborigine takes up residence on Aboriginal 
land for example, in the case of marriage - there is an argument that s/he has elected to accept the 
prevailing legal system. The situation is rather different in, for example, areas of cities where the
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territorial application has many advantages, there are also disadvantages. In such a 
system, how would the cultural identity of those who live outside the area be 
protected? Presumably they would be subject to the ordinary state laws. This 
would create a division in the community where members of the same group 
enjoyed differential rights according to where they lived. This may not be 
acceptable. There is moreover another disadvantage in that the creation of reserves 
or domains may lead to ghettoisation. Moreover, territorial application of this type 
appears antithetical to the notion of multiculturalism. What it, in fact, does is to 
divide the state into a number of monocultural regions of varying sizes.
The second possibility is incorporation on this base of personal identity: that is, 
certain people -  who may or may not be geographically dispersed throughout the 
rest of the population - are subject to a differential legal system. Perhaps the most 
widely known example of this type of differentiation is the millet system in the 
Ottoman Empire. Millets were distinct communities within the Empire, the term 
initially covering religious groups, but later expanding to include groups defined 
by nationality. The millets enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy in various 
spheres of life, including making and applying their own laws in their own Courts. 
However, the example of the millets does not really provide an answer to the 
present dilemma. First, they enjoyed considerable freedom because it suited the 
Ottoman Empire to allow it. There is little doubt that it would have been revoked 
in the event of a clash. Second, the members of the millet were in many ways less
Aboriginal population forms the majority in a given area. What of the non-Aboriginal population 
there? How are the boundaries of such territorial bases to be delimited? What if there is an area of 
three square miles inhabited entirely by Aborigines situated in the centre of a city?
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favoured than the ruling Muslims -  for example, they could not proselytise. Third, 
there was no attempt to engage with the problem of oppressive minority groups 
and their treatment of individual members.333 Even if these disadvantages are 
ignored, there are obvious difficulties in incorporating customary law on the basis 
of personal jurisdiction. First, in terms of membership of the relevant group. What 
criteria would be used to establish whether or not a particular individual was 
subject to the customary legal system? The usual tests for membership of an 
indigenous group are a combination of acceptance by the community, descent, and 
self-identification.334 How would disputes about membership be resolved? What if 
the three elements conflicted with each other or the persons involved disagreed as 
to whether or not the tests were met? Second, there would need to be a procedure 
by which an individual who was part of the relevant group could opt in or out of 
the customary system. This would be essential. All principles of equality and non­
discrimination would be violated if an individual were subject to a different legal 
system from that of the majority of the population without her/his consent. 
Third, there might be substantial difficulties in community relations if neighbours 
received different treatment for the same behaviour, possibly to the extent of one 
being sent to prison and the other not being liable for any offence.
333 Kymlicka discusses the millet system in some detail and concludes that it is inadequate as a 
model for a liberal theory of minority rights. See: Kymlicka. W supra n 292 at 156-158.
334 See, supra n 233 for discussion of the difficulties in defining indigenous and Aboriginal.
335 It should be noted that whilst the state may provide a mechanism of choice by which a person 
may opt in or out of the customary system, many such systems have means of coercion or 
persuasion in order to ensure that their members remain within the system and obey the laws. Even 
of such pressures are absent, it is likely that members have been socialised into belonging to the 
group. The ‘choice’ offered by the state is likely to prove illusory.
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Finally, it is often possible to incorporate customary law into statutes governing
<5 <5 '7  .
certain subject matter -  for example, inheritance or adoption . This has already 
been done to a certain extent both in Australia and elsewhere. The acceptance of 
non-state legal rules in relation to civil law, especially family issues, is less 
contentious than in criminal law. Criminal law is the ‘hard case’ in this debate for a 
number of reasons. The state and the population at large have a greater stake in the 
administration of the criminal law than in civil matters which affect only the 
parties. The adequate functioning of the criminal law is essential to the 
maintenance of law and order. Similarly, given that the sanctions for breach of 
criminal law are greater than for civil wrongs, the arguments for a unified system -  
in the interests of both the defendant and society - are stronger.
Fora:
Once the subjects and content of the differential legal system are established, the 
question of fora for adjudication needs to be addressed. Essentially the options 
will be that the ordinary state courts adjudicate, that special bodies -  judicial or 
non-judicial - are set up for the purpose, or that there is some combination of the 
two. The relationship between the two bodies of law would also need to be 
considered. Customary law might add to state law, for example, by the addition 
of new offences such as taboo sexual relationships which do not fall within state 
incest laws. It could also subtract from state law, i.e. some matters, for example,
336 For example, the Administration and Probate Act. 1979 (NT) takes account of customary 
marriages.
337 For example, s. 13 o f the Adoption Act. 1994 (NT) takes account of customary marriages.
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under-age consensual sex, could be decriminalised. Both positions are 
problematical. In the first, Aborigines will be criminalised for actions which the 
remainder of the population could carry out with impunity. In the second, the 
reverse. A final suggestion might be that state law would continue to apply, but 
that it would be applied differentially, for example by systematising differential 
procedures and sentencing practice in order to take into account considerations 
of customary law.
Choice:
Finally the question of choice of jurisdiction arises.338 One way of managing 
some of the above problems might be by offering individuals a choice as to the 
law to be applied. A person who comes under one of the differential bases for 
jurisdiction would need a right to choose the state system if s/he preferred it and 
thus there would need to be an opt in or opt out provision. To leave no such 
choice would be almost certainly be contrary to human rights norms and 
equality before the law if it resulted in an individual being treated in a 
discriminatory manner, i.e. differently for the majority of the population. 
However, the possibility of opting in would only be available to certain 
individuals and this too would seem to be contrary to equality before the law as 
it would mean that some individuals had a choice of two legal systems and 
others had no such choice. There would also be practical difficulties. How
338 An interesting overview of various possible jurisdictional arrangements can be found in Shachar 
supra n 294 at 88-116.
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would this be administered? Would it be a one-off choice? Could an individual 
choose to be governed by state law on some issues and customary law on 
others? Could it be revoked? Could a person choose the state system on one 
occasion or in one circumstance and the customary system in another? Does the 
choice have to made in advance of, for example, the commission of a crime? As 
well as practical difficulties the issue of the reality of the freedom of an 
individual to choose state over custom would arise. This has been discussed 
above.
The problem is how best to advance at a time when the moral and political 
climate seems to desire ever greater recognition of indigenous rights, including 
legal systems. The difficulties inherent in the incorporation of customary law in 
respect of criminal matters have been discussed and the scope for such 
incorporation appears limited, yet the arguments remain that it is desirable to 
take it into account in some way. Given the above, it is clear that the most 
appropriate way for the Australian legal system to achieve such recognition is to 
apply uniform standards, thus dealing with many of the objections to differential 
systems339, but to apply them with flexibility thus allowing cognisance to be 
taken of many relevant factors. This is what the judiciaiy have done for many 
years and it is argued that it remains the best way to proceed, though possibly
339 It goes without saying that many Aborigines would not object to differential systems, but would 
welcome them. However, the focus of the Thesis is the approach of the state, in particular of the 
judiciary, to the incorporation o f customary law and for state organs the objections to differential 
treatment are substantial and cannot be dismissed without reason.
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combined with some measure of incorporation.340 This argument will be 
examined in detail in the next three Chapters which will examine the ways in 
which the judiciary have attempted to give some recognition to customary law 
through flexibility and discretion in reasoning. Two preliminary points need to 
be made.
First, in many cases involving Aboriginal defendants the judiciary appears to 
employ differential tests or standards. However, these are frequently based on 
social disadvantage and are largely indistinguishable from the use made of such 
devices in relation to other disadvantaged groups. This social disadvantage is 
often considered by the use of the concept of ‘factors associated with 
Aboriginality’. The precise meaning of this term in each context -  and its 
relationship to customary law - will be considered at the relevant points in the 
Thesis.
Second, it must be noted that whilst the Thesis concentrates on the consideration 
of customary law within the Court system -  on judicial activity -  such 
consideration, and indeed the use of discretion, may also arise at other stages in 
the criminal justice process. Moreover, these ‘other stages’ may themselves 
become subject to judicial consideration. A clear example of this is the taking of
340 Demi an discusses the interaction between law and custom and the way in which they can 
mutually inform each other in both Village and High Courts in Papua New Guinea. Whilst the 
context is different -  customary law enjoys constitutional status in Papua New Guinea -  there are 
instructive points on the way in which decision-makers can make use of both sources. Demian. M. 
Custom in the Courtroom, Law in the Village: Legal Transformations in Papua New Guinea Journal 
o f the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 9, 97-115 (2003)
173
confessional evidence. This obviously takes place at the stage of police 
investigation. However, both the procedure involved in the taking of evidence 
and the consequences in terms of admissibility if these procedures are ignored, 
are subject to consideration by the Courts.341
341 See Chapter 3 on these points.
Chapter 3: Judicial use of customary law in the rules on evidence and 
procedure:
3.1: Introduction:
One area of the criminal justice process342 in which the judiciary have been able 
to give some recognition to customary law is in the rules of procedure.343 This 
practice is neither as conceptually difficult nor as controversial as taking it into 
account in sentencing or, even more so, in the substantive law. However, many 
of the measures adopted by the judiciary have only tangential relevance to 
customary law and are of much less significance344 than judicial practice in 
relation to the substantive law and sentencing.
The Australian Law Reform Commission identified various areas of concern in 
respect of the procedures adopted when dealing with Aborigines. The areas 
identified by the Commission -  though not in this order -  are: jury trial; the 
provision of interpreters; the right to silence and the taking of confessions or
342 For an interesting overview of Aborigines and the criminal justice system, see: Broadhurst. R. 
‘Crime and Indigenous People’ in Graycar. A  and Grabosky. P. (eds.) The Cambridge Handbook 
o f Australian Criminology Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, at 256-280.
343 It is possible for some recognition to be given to customary law at other points within the 
criminal justice system: for example, by non-prosecution of strictly ‘traditional’ offences, by 
prosecution for a lesser offence, by the entry o f a nolle prosequi, and by the implementation of 
various pre-trial diversion schemes. As none of these fall within the remit of the judiciary, they will 
not be discussed in detail. Similarly, police practice will not be discussed, except insofar as it is 
relevant to judicial decision making.
344 The procedural measures discussed in this Chapter are o f ‘less significance’ in terms of the use of 
customary law by the judiciary. However, some of them - such as, for example, the Anunga rules: 
R. v. Anunga and Others: R  v. Wheeler and Others (1976) 11 ALR 412 - might be of greater 
significance in terms of the overall impact on the experience of Aborigines within the legal system.
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statements; comprehension of the proceedings and fitness to plead; identification 
evidence; the taking of Aboriginal evidence, especially in relation to unsworn 
statements, dying declarations and the compellability of traditionally married 
Aboriginal spouses; and the proof of Aboriginal customary laws.345 Customary 
law is of little particular relevance to the first five areas and so they will be 
mentioned briefly and only insofar as they may involve considerations of 
customary law. Whilst the sixth area necessarily involves such considerations, 
the problems are of largely historic importance and, therefore, they will not be 
analysed in detail. The final area, the proof of customary law, is the most 
significant in terms of the subject matter of the Thesis. The questions of expert 
evidence and the problems raised by secret material will be discussed in this 
Chapter; the conceptual issues involved, already discussed to some extent in 
Chapter 2, will be mentioned and then analysed in the Conclusion in the context 
of possible future developments. It should also be noted that whilst some of 
these concerns are genuinely procedural and discrete, such as the relevance of 
dying declarations, others are not so much strict matters of procedure as 
concerns about, for example, the general level of understanding. Moreover, 
many of these latter issues -  such as the need to provide interpreters - arise not 
only in relation to Aborigines, but also in relation to other groups.
3.2. Jury trial:
345 Australian Law Reform Commission The Recognition o f Aboriginal Customary Laws 
Summary Report, Full Report 2 Volumes), Final Report No. 31 Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1986, paras. 543 and 574.
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Jury trials give rise to three main difficulties in relation to customary law. First, 
it is unlikely that any member of the jury will be an Aborigine, and even more 
unlikely that s/he will be traditionally-oriented, and thus questions arise as to the 
representativeness of the jury and the defendant’s right to be tried by a ‘jury of 
his peers’. Second, a non-Aboriginal jury is unlikely to be able to understand the 
substance and importance of customary law and its relevance in judging the 
actions and state of mind of a defendant. Third, it may be that the elements of 
customary law in the case are such that the jury is prohibited from hearing the 
details and is thus impeded in its decision-making.
The principle of trial by one’s peers is, to a certain extent, undermined by the 
under-representation of Aborigines on juries. This point, inter alia, was argued 
by the Aboriginal defendants in the New South Wales case of Binge and Others 
v. Bennett and Another346. However whilst the Court acknowledged the under­
representation, they rejected the argument that a fair trial was consequently 
impossible.347 There may be some opportunity to seek Aboriginal representation 
by exercising the right to challenge prospective jury members, but this right is 
limited. The Courts have been more sympathetic to the difficulties raised by 
customary law considerations and have been willing to accommodate these 
requirements where possible by the admission of expert evidence and by, for 
example, allowing the empannelling of juries composed of persons of a
346 (1989) 42 A Crim R 93. This argument was also rejected in R. v. Walker supra 97.
347 On the ethnic composition of juries, see: Israel. M. ‘Ethnic Bias in Jury Selection in Australia 
and New Zealand’ International Journal o f the Sociology o f Law (1998) 26, 35-54.
177
particular sex where the nature of the customary law at issue requires such a
348limitation and the parties agree.
3.3: The provision of interpreters: 349
The need for interpreters is not peculiar to Aboriginal defendants but arises in 
any case where the defendant has difficulty in coping with the language of either 
the investigative procedures or the Court proceedings. The Thesis will
350concentrate in the issues insofar as they affect Aborigines in particular. 
Various common law and statutory guidelines or provisions relating to the 
taking of evidence have addressed the need for interpretation at the stage of 
police involvement and these will be discussed below351. The need similarly 
arises at the judicial stage of criminal proceedings.352
348 See, for example: R. v. Sydney Williams (1976) 14 SASR 1.
349 For detailed consideration o f the role o f interpreters in the legal system, see: Laster. K. and 
Taylor. V.L. Interpreters and the Legal System Leichardt, NSW: The Federation Press, 1994. 
See especially, the discussion o f the ‘right’ to an interpreter at 77-83, and of the importance of 
interpreters in the criminal investigation process at 131-160.
350 There is an extensive literature on interpreting and Aborigines. See, for example: Goldflam. 
R. “‘Silence in Court!” Problems and Prospects in Aboriginal Legal Interpreting’ Australian 
Journal o f Law and Society (1997) 13, 17-53; See also: Walsh. M. ‘Interactional Styles in the 
Courtroom: an Example from Northern Australia’ 217-233, and Eades. D. ‘A Case of 
Communicative Clash: Aboriginal English and the Legal System’ 234-264, both in Gibbons. J. 
(ed.) Language and the Law Harlow: Longman, 1994.
351 Infra 187.
352 See: Australian Law Reform Commission Multiculturalism and the Law Sydney: Report 57, 
Australian Law Reform Commission, 1992 supra 53. The Report deals with the difficulties faced 
by non-English speakers and eight o f its recommendations refer to the need to improve access to 
interpreters: Recommendations 6-13. The Recommendations follow, to some extent, those made 
in the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Report Access to Interpreters in the Australian Legal 
System Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1991. Both these Reports sought 
to bring about change by procedural requirements and administrative measures. See also: 
Dietrich v. R (1992) 109 ALR 385.
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It is important to note that interpreting for Aborigines - especially traditionally- 
oriented Aborigines -  is more problematic than translating from, say, French to 
German. In the latter case, interpreting is more or less a case of providing an 
alternative vocabulary for the same concepts. However, interpreting across very 
different cultures is more difficult. There may not be an exact translation. 
Concepts may be either quite differently understood or non-existent. Cultural 
considerations and norms may make word for word translation inappropriate, 
may mean that certain matters may not be disclosed or that relationships 
between the client and the proposed interpreter render the latter an inappropriate 
appointment.353 These difficulties, combined with the practical considerations of 
a large number of languages and a relatively small number of competent 
interpreters for each, mean that it is often difficult to provide an adequate 
service. For all these reasons, whilst the provision of interpreters for (some) 
Aborigines is necessary if justice is to be done, it may not be possible or 
sufficient.354 There may be a need for further ‘translation’ in the form of
o  f C
evidence from linguistic or anthropological experts.
353 For an interesting overview of the difficulties, see Cooke. M. Caught in the Middle: 
Indigenous Interpreters and Customary Law Background Paper No. 2 Perth: Law Reform 
Commission of Western Australia, March 2004.
354 In the Northern Territory the Northern Territory Aboriginal Interpreter Service, established in 
April 2000, is the main provider o f interpreters, and serves not only the Courts, but also other 
public services including health and community organisations. For an overview of its work so 
far and o f plans for the future, see: Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department 
Evaluation o f the Northern Territory Agreement Canberra: 14 April 2004. It is worth noting that 
much of the literature on these points was written prior to the establishment of this service and 
so deals with the need for such a service as well as the problems outlined above.
355 On these points, see: Eades. D. Aboriginal English and the Law: Communicating with 
Aboriginal English Speaking Clients: A Handbook for Legal Practitioners Brisbane: The 
Continuing Legal Education Department of the Queensland Law Society Incorporated, 1992. 
The question of expert evidence is discussed below at 196-198.
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3.4:The right to silence and the taking of confessions or statements:
This area has given rise to a significant amount of discussion and caselaw.356 
The majority of the cases in which these issues arise have no connection with 
customary law: they generally relate to matters such as the suspect’s imperfect 
grasp of English or the difficulties caused by differing norms which are not part 
of customary law.357 However, customary law is sometimes relevant and so the 
matter will be discussed in some detail.
Whereas the focus of the present paper is on the treatment of Aborigines by the 
Courts and not by the police, the methods of police interrogation and 
investigation are clearly of considerable importance as they may affect the 
admissibility of evidence, especially confessional evidence, in the Courts. The 
general principle underlying the rules on the admissibility of confessional 
evidence is that confessions made in the course of police investigation are 
admissible provided that they meet the evidential rules designed to ensure 
voluntariness, fairness and compliance with public policy. This principle 
informs both the common law and the legislative positions on confessions. In an
356 See, for example: R. v. Anunga and Others: R. v. Wheeler and Others (1976) 11 ALR 412; 
Coulthard v. Steer (1981) 12 NTR13; Gudabi v. The Queen (1984) 12 A Grim R 70; Collins v. The 
Queen (1980) 31 ALR 257; MD (A Child! v. McKinlav (1984) 31 NTR 1; R. v. Weetra (1993) 93 
NTR 8; R. v. Butler (No. 11 (1991) 102 FLR 341; Fry v. Jennings (1984) 25 NTR 19; Dumoo v. 
Gamer (1998) 7 NTLR 129; R. v. Ninnal (1992) 109 FLR 203; R. v. Jabarula (1984) A Crim R 
131: R. v. Anderson 11991) 1 NTLR 149: R. V. Martin 119911 105 FLR 22.
357 See supra 39-43 for discussion of the nature and content of customary law. It should be noted 
that certain norms which would not be part of a state legal system -  for example, the prohibition on 
direct eye contact between people standing in a particular relationship to each other - are part of 
customary law. There are, however, some ‘norms’ even within customary systems which do not 
have the force of law. The lack of a clear distinction between law and culture in customary systems, 
as well as the differing details between such systems, makes it impossible to give a definitive list of 
such norms.
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attempt to ensure that these requirements are met, guidelines for the conduct of 
police officers when conducting questioning have been laid down in various 
sources. The earliest such attempts at common law were the English Judges ’ 
Rules, laid down by the King’s Bench Division in 1912 and 1918. These Rules 
were subsequently supplemented, amended and clarified and eventually in 1964 
replaced by a new set of Rules. The pre-1964 Rules apply in one form or another 
in most Australian jurisdictions358 although they do not have the force of law as
^  C Q
they do in England. They serve simply as a guide on the relevant issues. The 
Judges ’ Rules are not an entire statement of procedure but are aimed largely at 
ensuring that suspects are correctly cautioned and are thus aware of their right to 
keep silence, an inescapable consequence of the requirement that the confession 
be voluntary. As well as the general common law rules on the admission of 
confessional evidence, there are extra guidelines laid down for groups which are 
considered to be especially vulnerable to the making of confessions which do 
not meet the criteria of voluntariness, fairness and compliance with public 
policy. These groups are young people, persons suffering from a mental or 
intellectual disability and Aborigines. The general rules relating to young people 
and persons suffering from a mental or intellectual disability will, of course, also 
apply to any Aborigine who falls within those groups. However, it is the specific 
provisions relating to Aborigines which may raise issues of customary law.
358 The 1912 and 1918 Judges Rules may be found in Gillies. P. The Law o f Criminal Investigation 
Sydney: Law Book Company, 1981, at 121-122. The 1964 Rules may be found at (1964) 1 All ER 
237. Gillies contains detailed discussion of the Judges Rules in Australia. See, also: Australian Law 
Reform Commission Criminal Investigation Report 2 Interim Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1975, para. 139; The. G. ‘An Examination of the Judges’ Rules in Australia’ 
(1972) 46 Alternative Law Journal 489.
359 See: Van der Meer v. The Queen (1988) 62 ALJR 656, per Mason CJ at 659.
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Admissions by Aboriginal defendants are subject to all the general common law 
requirements and also to particular rules and guidelines which vary from one 
jurisdiction to another. The situation in the Northern Territory is governed 
basically by the guidelines set out in the case of Anunga . The case is 
primarily concerned with the way in which Aboriginal suspects in criminal 
matters should be interrogated, but also discusses other procedural issues which 
arise in relation to Aborigines and contains comment on some of the problem 
areas. Moreover, whereas its focus is police action, it has given rise to 
considerable caselaw361 and can be seen as an example of the way in which 
judicial activism has affected the wider area of the treatment of Aborigines, not 
only before the Courts but throughout the criminal justice system.
The case came before Forster J. in the Northern Territory Supreme Court in 
1975 as a trial of two Aborigines suspected of various offences. At that hearing 
Forster rejected the Crown’s tender of records of the police interviews of the 
accused. He gave ex tempore reasons and indicated that he would give full 
reasons for the rejection at a later date. These reasons were delivered in April,
360 R  v. Anunga and Others; R. v. Wheeler and Others (1976) 11 ALR 412.
361 See above n 356. For an examination of the early caselaw on the guidelines, see: Bates. F. 
‘Interrogation of Australian Aborigines.’ (1984) 8 Criminal Law Journal 373; and Coldrey. J. 
‘Aborigines and the Criminal Courts’ in Hazlehurst. K.M. (ed.) supra n 12. For more recent 
caselaw, see: Douglas. H. ‘The Cultural Specificity of Evidence: The Current Scope and Relevance 
of the, Anunga Guidelines’ University o f New South Wales Law Journal Vol. 21(1) 1998,27-54. It is 
beyond the scope of the Thesis to analyse this caselaw in detail. In the main it consists o f decisions 
on whether particular guidelines were or were not met on the facts of a particular case though it 
does, of course, provide some development o f the concepts behind the Anunga guidelines. 
However, these decisions and developments are not relevant for present purposes.
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1 9 7 6  362 By the time he came to give the reasons, Forster conceded that the
matters themselves were stale, but still thought it important to put on record
general guidelines for the police when conducting interviews with Aborigines
and the fact that failure to observe these guidelines would likely result in the
evidence of the interrogation being rejected. As a preface he makes two points.
First, he refers to the difficulty which many Aboriginal people have in
understanding English. This difficulty is not simply a question of vocabulary,
but also of the translation or comprehension of concepts, and cannot always be
solved even by the provision of interpreters as there is no equivalent word or
concept. He makes particular reference to differing concepts of time. He points
out that he is making no adverse comment on Aborigines’ intelligence:
“In case I may be misunderstood, I should also emphasize that I 
am not expressing the view that Aboriginal people are any less 
intelligent than white people but simply that their concepts of 
certain things and the terms in which they are expressed may be 
wholly different to those of white people.”364
Second, he states that difficulties can arise because Aboriginal ideas of courtesy 
and politeness often lead them to reply in the way which seems to them to be 
desired by the questioner rather than in a way which is to the ‘white’ mind an 
accurate answer to the question. Moreover, even if this is not the case, 
Aboriginal deference to an authority figure, which is partly a matter of culture
362 The delay was occasioned by Forster’s illness.
363 Much of what Forster said would, as he acknowledged, also be applicable to migrant 
communities.
364 At 414.
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and partly a matter of the experience of colonisation, will lead them to answer as 
they think is required. Forster illustrates this point by the example of the 
caution:
“Some Aboriginal people find the standard caution quite 
bewildering, even if they understand that they do not have to 
answer questions, because if they do not have to answer 
questions, then why are the questions being asked?”
The guidelines, which apply to the interrogation of Aboriginal suspects, then 
follow. They deal with many of the points which cause procedural difficulty: the 
provision of interpreters; the availability of a prisoner’s friend; rules designed to 
ensure the correct administration and understanding of the caution; guidelines as 
to neutral questioning in order to avoid the suspect being led; the requirement 
that the police seek corroborative evidence even if a confession has been made; 
the provision of physical comforts to the suspect; a prohibition on interrogating 
a suspect who is drunk, ill or tired, to such an extent that s/he is disabled; the 
requirement to take reasonable steps to obtain legal advice for the suspect if 
requested; and the provision of substitute clothing if the suspect’s own clothing 
is removed for forensic purposes.366
365 At 414.
366 The guidelines are:
“(1) When an Aboriginal person is being interrogated as a suspect, unless he is as fluent in 
English as the average white man of English descent, an interpreter able to interpret in and from 
the Aboriginal person’s language should be present, and his assistance should be utilized 
whenever necessary to ensure complete and mutual understanding.
(2) When an Aboriginal is being interrogated it is desirable where practicable that a ‘prisoner’s 
friend’ (who may also be the interpreter) be present. The ‘prisoner’s friend’ should be someone 
in whom the Aboriginal has apparent confidence. He may be a mission or settlement 
superintendent or a member of the staff o f one o f these institutions who knows and is known by 
the Aboriginal. He may be a station owner, manager or overseer or an officer from the 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs. The combination of persons and situations are variable and
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Whilst Forster concludes by saying that the guidelines are not absolute rules, 
such that failure to follow them would automatically lead to evidence being 
excluded, he points out that police should be aware that if they depart from them 
without reason are likely to find the evidence excluded. The importance of the 
guidelines in police practice has been affirmed by the Northern Territory Police 
in various departmental documents and guidelines.367
the categories of persons I have mentioned are not exclusive. The important thing is that the 
‘prisoner’s friend’ be someone in whom the Aboriginal has confidence, by whom he will feel 
supported.
(3) Great care should be taken in administering the caution when it is appropriate to do so. It is 
simply not adequate to administer it in the usual terms and say “Do you understand that?” or 
“Do you understand you do not have to answer questions?”. Interrogating police officers, having 
explained the caution in simple terms, should ask the Aboriginal to tell them what is meant by 
the caution, phrase by phrase, and should not proceed with the interrogation until it is clear that 
the Aboriginal has apparent understanding o f his right to remain silent. Most experienced police 
officers in the Territory already do this. The problem of the caution is a difficult one but the 
presence o f a ‘prisoner’s friend’ or interpreter and adequate and simple questioning about the 
caution should go a long way towards solving it.
(4) Great care should be taken in formulating questions so that so far as possible the answer 
which is wanted or expected is not suggested in any way. Anything in the nature of cross- 
examination should be scrupulously avoided as answers to it have no probitive (sic.) value. It 
should be borne in mind that it is not only the wording o f the question, which may suggest the 
answer, but also the manner and tone o f voice which are used.
(5) Even when an apparently frank and free confession has been obtained relating to the 
commission o f an offence, police should continue to investigate the matter in an endeavour to 
obtain proof o f the commission of the offence from other sources.
(6) Because Aboriginal people are often nervous and ill at ease in the presence of white 
authority figures like policemen it is particularly important that they be offered a meal, if they 
are being interviewed in a police station, or in the company of police or in custody when a meal 
time arrives. They should also be offered tea or coffee if  facilities exist for preparation of it. 
They should always be offered a drink o f water. They should be asked if they wish to use the 
lavatory if they are in the company of police or under arrest.
(7) It is particularly important that Aboriginal and other people are not interrogated when they 
are disabled by illness or drunkenness or tiredness. Admissions so gained will probably be 
rejected by a court. Interrogation should not continue for an unreasonably long time.
(8) Should an Aboriginal seek legal assistance reasonable steps should be taken to obtain such 
assistance. If an Aboriginal states he does not wish to answer further questions or any questions 
the interrogation should not continue.
(9) When it is necessary to remove clothing for forensic examination or for the purposes of 
medical examination, steps must be taken forthwith to supply substitute clothing.” at 414-415.
367 See, for example: Police General Orders Q2: Questioning People Who have Difficulties With 
The English Language -  The “Anunga" Guidelines, May 1992, unpublished, cited in Goldflam. 
R. supra n 350 at 27.
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Forster specifically addresses the question of equality before the law and makes 
it clear that the guidelines are designed to achieve substantive equality not mere 
formal equality:
“It may be thought by some that these guidelines are unduly 
paternal and therefore offensive to Aboriginal people. It may be 
thought by others that they are unduly favourable to Aboriginal 
people. The truth of the matter is that they are designed simply to 
remove or obviate some of the disadvantages from which 
Aboriginal people suffer in their dealings with police.”368
This case is critically important in the Northern Territory369 and has also been 
cited with approval and used as a guide in other jurisdictions.370
In many jurisdictions, including the Northern Territory, legislative schemes have 
been adopted which set out the powers of the police and the rights of suspects 
during criminal investigation. The relevant statute in the Northern Territory is 
the Police Administration Act 1978 (NT), Divisions 6, 6A, ss. 136-143. These 
provisions set out the information which must be given to a suspect before 
questioning - that s/he has a right to silence, the right to contact a relative or a
368 At 415.
369 There was some early reluctance, on the part of both police and Courts, to apply the 
guidelines, though this was short-lived. For discussion of this point, see: Foley. M. ‘Aborigines 
and the Police’ in Hanks P. & Keon-Cohen B. (eds.) Aborigines and the Law: Essays in Memory 
o f Elizabeth Eggleston North Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1984, 176; and Goldflam. R. 
supra n 350 at 23-31. However, in the overwhelming majority o f cases, the guidelines have been 
applied and the Courts have ruled inadmissible any evidence obtained in breach.
3 0 See, for example: Gibson v. Brooking (1983) WAR 70; Webb v. The Queen (1994) 74 A  
Crim. R. 436; R. v. W. (1988) 2 Qd. R. 308; R. v. elevens (1981) 55 FLR 453; McKellar v. 
Smith (1982) 2 NSWLR 950.
friend and the right to communicate with a lawyer371 - and the contents of the 
caution to be administered. There is also provision for discussion between police 
and suspect to be recorded. The effect of such provision is that if confessions are 
not tape-recorded, they will be inadmissible unless the Court is satisfied that in 
the circumstances the admission of such evidence would not be contrary to 
justice.372 Commonwealth and Australian Capital Territory legislation373 also 
make special provision as to the access to legal advice and attendance of an 
interview friend when the suspect is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander 
person, but there is no such provision in the Northern Territory legislation. 
Similarly whilst some jurisdictions make specific provision for interpreters in 
their legislative schemes,374 there is no such provision in the Northern Territory 
statute.
Interrogation of suspects and the admissibility of such evidence are not, of 
course, primarily matters of customary law. However, such matters may arise in 
the course of interrogation and the provisions outlined above -  especially the
3710n legal aid for Aborigines, see: Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, National 
Report, Vol. 2 Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1991, at 377-424; Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Commission Assessment o f the Funding Base o f Aboriginal Legal 
Services Draft Report Canberra: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, 1992; 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Evaluation o f the Law and Justice Programme, 
Final Report Canberra: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, 1995; Attomey- 
General’s Department The Justice Statement May, 1995. On legal aid availability in the Northern 
Territory, see: Legal Aid Act 1990 (NT) and Northern Territory Legal Aid Commission LAC NT 
Guidelines Darwin: Northern Territory Legal Aid Commission, 1991.
372 On this point, see: R. v. Maratabanga (1993) 3 NTLR 77.
373 See Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s. 23, applicable in the Australian Capital Territory by virtue of 
S23A(6) of the Act. The Anunga guidelines have been given statutory force by the Crimes 
(Investigation o f Commonwealth Offences) Amendment Act 1991. However, this deals only with 
Commonwealth offences and few Aborigines are charged with such offences.
374 See, for example: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s.23N, applicable also in the Australian Capital 
Territory; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) ss.79A(l) (3); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic') s464D.
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first four Anunga guidelines may be applicable. In any communication with an 
Aborigine, especially if s/he is from a traditional background, there may be 
customary law ramifications -  for example, as to material which may only be 
revealed to one sex, as to the difficulty of translating differing concepts, and as 
to the compulsion likely to be felt by some Aborigines to make a statement 
regardless of the caution - and these should be taken into account.
3.5: Comprehension of proceedings and fitness to plead:
The general rules on comprehension of the proceedings and fitness take account 
of mental and physical incapacity and apply to Aborigines as to everyone. As 
such, they generally raise no particular issues of customary law. The mere fact 
that an Aboriginal defendant cannot speak English, and so cannot understand the 
proceedings directly, does not render her/him unfit to plead provided that an 
interpreter is provided. Similarly, a lack of understanding of the nature or 
process of the law and the trial proceedings which is caused by cultural 
difference rather than by mental incapacity will not be deemed to be cognisable 
incomprehension.375 However, if the cultural difference is so great that the 
defendant lacks understanding of the notions of ‘guilty’ and ‘not guilty’ or of a 
concept such as ‘unlawful’ that lack may be cognisable and may invoke the 
procedural protections offered by the rules.376 To that extent, the fact that a
375 On these points, see: Neatavi v. R. (1980) 147 CLR 1; R. v. Maratabanga (1993) 3 NTLR 77.
376 On these points, see: Neatavi v. R. (1980) 147 CLR 1; R  v. Grant (1975) WAR 163.
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defendant’s understanding of laws and legality is within the framework of a 
customary system may be relevant.
3.6: Identification Evidence:
The Commission itself acknowledges that this matter has no customary law 
ramifications and is concerned simply to avoid racial generalisations in eye­
witness identification.
3.7: The taking of Aboriginal evidence377:
Various problems arise in relation to the taking of Aboriginal evidence. Some 
such difficulties are related to other procedural matters -  for example, the 
inability of an Aboriginal witness to speak English or to understand the nature of 
the process of giving evidence. However, three matters are of particular 
relevance with regard to the possible recognition of customary law within the 
legal system: the effect of unsworn statements, dying declarations, and the 
compellability of Aboriginal spouses.
i. Unsworn statements:
377 For an overview of the problems connected to Aboriginal testimony, see: McCorquodale. J. 
‘Judicial Racism in Australia?’ in Hazlehurst. K.M. (ed.) supra n 12, at 32-34.
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In the early days of the Northern Territory’s legal system the question of the 
value which could be placed on Aboriginal testimony or evidence was 
problematic, primarily because Aboriginal evidence took the form of unsworn 
statements. Such statements had two characteristics which meant that they were 
regarded as less reliable evidence than sworn statements. First, they were not on 
oath, and second, they were not susceptible to cross-examination.
Kriewaldt378 often made reference to the status of such evidence, especially with 
regard to the absence of an oath, when summing up for the jury and his 
comments demonstrated the perceived difficulties. In R. v. Aboriginal Wally379 
he said:
“ .... Now I turn to some general comments on the native evidence. In 
weighing the evidence of the natives remember first of all that they have 
a very limited vocabulary ... generally speaking their intellect is of a 
comparatively low standard. ... because their evidence is given without 
the sanction of an oath .. it is only entitled to such weight as you think it 
deserves.”380
This summing up raises several points with regard to Aboriginal evidence, some 
of which retain some validity even though they may be couched in unfortunate 
language. The comment on limited vocabulary, if read alone and without the
378 Kriewaldt was immensely influential in developing the law in relation to its application to 
Aborigines. His main contributions were in the areas of provocation and sentencing and his work 
will be further discussed at the appropriate points in the Thesis. For now, it should be noted that 
whilst some of his comments seem offensive today, they must be understood in context.
379 (1951-1976) NTJ 21.
380 Supra n 380.
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pejorative reference to intellect, may simply be the ever present difficulty of 
dealing with witnesses or defendants whose language is not that of the 
proceedings. However, taken in the context and linked to the assertion about low 
intellect the statement becomes more objectionable. The second issue which is 
raised is the question of the weight to be given to such unsworn evidence. 
Kriewaldt appears to be implying that as the evidence is unsworn it may be less 
reliable than sworn evidence would be.381 This view is further expounded in the 
case of R. and Willie382. In that case Kriewaldt reminds the jury that, in 
assessing the value of unsworn evidence given by Aborigines, they must 
remember that the absence of an oath removes the spiritual sanction to tell the 
truth. The argument is difficult to follow: presumably a witness will only feel 
compelled to tell the truth under oath and at liberty to lie when not under oath if 
he or she understands and believes the alleged consequences of breaking the 
oath. If, as in the case of the Aborigines to whom Kriewaldt is referring, there is 
no belief in the binding force of such an oath it is difficult to see why its 
presence or absence should make any difference to the truthfulness of the 
witness. The threat of the imposition of a sanction only works if the person is 
aware of and attaches some significance to the sanction.383
381 The Northern Territory Evidence Ordinance. 1939, provided that unsworn evidence given by 
Aborigines should be given as much weight as the jury, or the judge in the absence of a jury, 
considered appropriate.
382 R. v. Willie No. of 1955. Unreported, no case number recorded on Court record. Northern 
Territory Supreme Court archives. See, also: R. v. Aboriginal Smiler Unreported. Northern 
Territory Supreme Court archive
383 It should be noted that both in the case of evidence not given on oath and also of the significance 
of dying declarations there seems to have been no investigation as to the actual beliefs o f the 
witnesses involved.
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The second problem with unsworn statements is that they are not subject to 
cross-examination. Today, alternative provision being available for those who 
do not wish to take an oath, these statements are usually made -  where 
permissible - by those who are not easily able to make a dock statement or 
sustain cross-examination. However, the fact that the evidence cannot be 
subjected to cross-examination impacts adversely on the credibility of those who 
make such statements. In many jurisdictions, including the Northern Territory, 
the provision for the making of unsworn statements has been abolished , 
although it is arguable that they should be retained in the case of Aborigines, 
especially traditionally-oriented Aborigines, for whom the process of giving 
sworn evidence and being examined and cross-examined poses extreme 
difficulties. The Australian Law Reform Commission came to the unanimous 
view that this should be the case.385
ii. Dying declarations:
Dying declarations -  statements made by a person in expectation of imminent 
death -  are admissible and constitute an exception to the rule excluding hearsay 
evidence. The original rationale for this exception was that a person was more 
likely to speak the truth when faced with imminent death and possibly some
384 The provision was abolished in the Northern Territory in 1984.
385 Australian Law Reform Commission The Recognition o f Aboriginal Customary Laws 
Summary Report, Full Report 2 Volumes), Final Report No. 31 Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1986, para. 604.
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form of judgement.386 This rationale meant that dying declarations made by 
those who lacked belief in a deity or an after-life could be understood to fall
•387under the usual hearsay rules. Thus, in the case of R. v. Wadderwarri 
Kriewaldt, in summing up for the jury, said:
“If the accused had been a white person, and if the deceased had been a 
white person, it is almost certain that the evidence ... of what the 
deceased had said when he was about to die would have been admitted, 
but because I have to apply the same rules to Aboriginals and whites I 
did not admit that evidence on the basis that the reason for admitting the 
evidence in the case of a white person is that he (sic.) has a belief that 
God will punish him if he tells a lie just as he is about to die. So far as 
the Aboriginals are concerned, we know that they have not that type of 
belief in the hereafter and therefore ... I excluded any statement the 
deceased might have made shortly before his death.”388
This approach is unsatisfactory and, whilst it has never been directly overruled, 
it is unlikely that it would be followed today. There has been no decision of a 
higher Court, but cases from other jurisdictions389 have found that dying 
declarations made by anyone, regardless of religious belief -  so presumably 
including traditional Aborigines - are admissible.
iii. The compellability of Aboriginal spouses:
386 See, for example: R. v. Hope (1909) VLR 149, per Madden. CJ. at 157.
387 (1958) NTJ 516.
388 At 517.
389 See, for example: R  v. Savage (1970) Tas SR 137.
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Another issue arising in relation to Aboriginal evidence is that a traditional 
marriage will not serve to found a claim for the non-competence or non­
compellability of spouses390. This provision placed Aborigines in an 
unfavourable position in comparison with non-Aboriginal witnesses, which 
disadvantage would be removed by the recognition of customary law marriages. 
However, the rule that spouses are not compellable in criminal trials has been 
abolished in many jurisdictions, including the Northern Territory, and therefore
391spouses in all forms of marriage are now in a position of equality.
None of the three issues discussed above are of great significance today. 
Unsworn statements could be beneficial to Aborigines provided that they were 
used simply as a means of allowing an alternative method of giving evidence -  
not based on a judgement of the beliefs of the witness -  and that such evidence 
was accepted as carrying the same weight as sworn evidence.392 However, the 
difficulties faced by Aborigines, even traditionally-oriented Aborigines, in 
giving evidence have been reduced over time by specific measures such as, for 
example, the provision of interpreters and by a greater overall familiarity with 
the legal system and its concepts. The unequal treatment of dying declarations 
made by Aborigines no longer occurs. As non-compellability of spouses in 
criminal matters has been abolished, there is now no argument for the
390 See, for example: R  v. Neddv Monkey (1861) 1 Wyatt and Webb Reports (L) 40; R  v Cobby 4 
LR (NSW) 355.
391 The compellability o f spouses in criminal trials in the Northern Territory is governed by s.9 of 
the Evidence Act as in force at 1 January 2004.
392 Detailed consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of such a proposal are beyond the 
scope of the Thesis.
194
desirability of the recognition of customary law marriages on this ground. Thus, 
the difficulties faced by Aborigines in these three areas are now largely of 
historic importance.
3.8: Proof of Aboriginal customary laws393:
The question of the proof of customary law recurs throughout the Thesis and the 
conceptual issues behind the question have been considered in Chapter 2 and 
will be so again in the Conclusion. This Chapter is concerned with the 
technicalities of proof.394 Obviously if Courts are to take cognisance of 
customary law, there must be some evidence before them as to both the 
existence and the content of that law. Thus, in Mamarika v. R395, a case 
involving payback396, the Court said:
“It is of course a fact, and one that cannot and should not be disregarded, 
that the appellant did suffer serious injuries at the hands of the other 
members of the community. But, if it is to be asserted that conduct of 
this sort should be seen as a reflection of the customary law of the 
Aboriginal community or tribal group ... there should be evidence 
before the Court to show that this was indeed the case and that what 
happened was not simply the angry reactions of friends of the deceased,
393 For an overview of the issues which arise in relation to the proof of customary law, including 
some comparative material, see: Sheleff. L. n 55, 377-395.
394 This issue is not peculiar to Australia but arises in any jurisdiction where customary law remains 
a force. See, for example: Zorn. J.G. and Corrin Care. J. ‘“Barava Tru”: Judicial Approaches to the 
Pleading and Proof of Custom in the South Pacific’ International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
July 2002, 51.3(611).
395 (1982) 42 ALR 94. Similar comments were made in Jadurin v. R (1982) 44 ALR 424 at 425-426.
396 The particular problems raised by payback cases will be discussed below at 271 ff.
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particularly when the killing of the deceased and the injuring of the 
appellant occurred at a time when some, if not all, of those participating 
had been drinking.”397
There are many instances of Courts refusing to accept a submission on behalf of 
an aboriginal defendant which alleges some element of customary law for which 
no evidence is brought.398
It should be stressed at the outset that the proof required here is, of necessity, a 
matter of fact. The evidence is required in order to establish the veracity of a 
factual account being laid before the Court. The evidence required is of those 
facts, not of the status of customary law or the desirability or otherwise of its 
recognition. Two main difficulties arise. First, how is the customary law to be 
proved? This is essentially a question about the nature of the evidence required. 
Second, more specific problems may be raised by the nature of some customary 
law matters which are necessary evidence to adduce proof of the law.
The main problem in relation to the type of evidence acceptable in proving 
customary law is that the common law rules of evidence differentiate between 
matters of fact and matters of opinion. Customary law is contained within, and 
passed on by, oral traditions which are generally classified as matters of opinion 
and, therefore, may only be deposed to by experts. The rule excluding the 
admission of hearsay evidence means that a witness who is not an expert may
397 At 97.
398 See, for example; Munungurr v. The Queen (1994) 4 NTLR 63.
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only give evidence of matters of fact within his/her personal knowledge. It may 
be, on occasion, that a non-expert witness has personal knowledge of the 
relevant issues and so may give evidence as a matter of fact, but this is unusual 
and gives rise to problems as to the status and authority of an individual to give 
an authoritative view of a community’s tradition.399 Expert evidence as to the 
nature and content of the customary law at issue, usually given by 
anthropologists, will be allowed.400 This practice is governed, of course, by the 
general law on expert evidence401. It is not proposed to discuss the details of 
such law, but it is worth noting that the rules have been applied more flexibly in 
the Northern Territory than in other parts of Australia and this has been so not 
only in land claims hearings (which, as administrative inquiries, are not bound 
by the same laws of evidence) but also in ordinary criminal courts, though 
admittedly primarily in magistrates’ courts and at the sentencing stage402. In 
addition to evidence given by experts, it is also possible, in the absence of 
objection, for those with some knowledge, but no formal qualifications, to give 
such evidence. This has been allowed, for example, in the case of community
399 One possible solution to the problem of authority to speak is the use o f group evidence. It 
may be that one person alone has neither sufficient knowledge nor sufficient authority to give 
evidence on a particular matter, but that the collective evidence o f several witnesses is sufficient. 
Group evidence is not widely employed in Court proceedings , but it has been accepted on rare 
occasions: see, for example, Police v. Isobel Phillips Unreported. Northern Territory Court of 
Summary Jurisdiction (Nos. 1529-1530 of 1982) -  19 September 1983, cited in Australian Law 
Reform Commission The Recognition o f Aboriginal Customary Laws Summary Report, Full 
Report 2 Volumes), Final Report No. 31 Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 
1986, p 482, nl6.
400 On these points, see: Milirrpunx per Blackburn J. at 160.
401 For a brief overview of the general law on expert evidence, see: Gans. J. and Palmer. A  
Australian Principles o f Evidence Coogee, NSW: Cavendish Publishing Limited, (2nd ed.) 2004, 
at 243-265. For more detailed consideration, see: Freckelton. I. and Selby. H. The Law o f Expert 
Evidence Pyrmont, NSW: Law Book Company Information Services, 1999, and Expert 
Evidence in Criminal Law Pyrmont, NSW: Law Book Company Information Services, 1999.
402 On this point, see: Freckelton. I. ‘The Anthropologist on Trial’ Melbourne University Law 
Review Vol. 15, December 1985, 360-386.
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advisers.403 A general exception to the hearsay rule may also be applicable and 
allow Aboriginal witnesses to give evidence of matters which, but for the 
exception, would be excluded. The ‘reputation evidence’ rule admits evidence 
of statements made by deceased persons relating to public rights or customs. 
Aboriginal witnesses have been able to give evidence of Aboriginal law and 
traditions under this exception.404
Further problems may arise in relation to the nature of some of the evidence 
which is necessary to prove the customary law. Some evidence will raise issues 
which for a variety of reasons - such as taboo relationships, kinship obligations, 
feelings of shame -  may not be spoken of either by a particular person or 
persons or to a particular person or persons. The requirements of customary law 
on the secrecy of these issues pose a problem when their disclosure is relevant to 
the case before the Court. There will be occasions when an Aboriginal person is 
faced with a stark choice: either to observe the restrictions of customary law and 
not disclose the matter, thus losing whatever benefit would be granted by the 
general legal system if it were disclosed; or to disclose, gain the benefit from the 
general legal system, but be exposed to censure and possible sanction by the 
community for breach of customary law. This is a difficult position for the 
individual, but there is no way that it can be avoided. However, there are other 
occasions when the Courts may be able to assist by restricting the publication of,
403 See, for example: R  v. Davev (1980) 50 FLR 57.
404 See, for example: Milinpum. at 154-157.
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and access to, the secret material in such a way that it is possible for it to be 
disclosed.
The issue of secrecy has arisen most frequently in relation to land claims405 
which, of their very nature, usually require evidence of the spiritual traditions of 
a particular people and their connection to the land being claimed. The decision 
of Maurice J. in the Warumungu Land Claim406 exemplifies the difficulties 
involved in such claims. He rejected the claims for professional privilege made 
by the anthropologists and linguists who were advising the claimants and 
ordered the disclosure of their field and research notes.407 The decision caused 
dismay408 as it seemed likely that future claimants would be reluctant to discuss 
secret material with their advisers if they could not be assured of its privilege. 
Maurice, however, took the view that given the importance of land claims, it 
was necessary for him and all parties concerned to be aware of the evidence. 
Moreover, the disclosure was to take place in camera and publication for 
purposes not connected with the claim was prohibited. The alternative was 
simply to reject the claim.
405 For a discussion of the ways in which the Federal Court has adapted and developed its procedure 
to facilitate the making of land claims, see: Anderson. L. ‘The Law and the Desert: Alternative 
Methods of Delivering Justice’ Journal o f Law and Society Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2003,120-36.
406 Warumungu Land Claim Reasons for Decision 1 October 1985, cited in The Recognition of 
Aboriginal Customary Laws (Summary Report, Full Report 2 Volumes), Final Report No. 31 
Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986, at 485 n 30.
407 For discussion of the significance of the decision for the experts involved, see: Freckelton. 
I.R. The Trial o f the Expert: A Study o f Expert Evidence and Forensic Experts Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987, at 254-258; and Simpson. J. ‘Confidentiality o f Linguistic Material: the 
Case o f Aboriginal Land Claims’ 428- 439, in Gibbons. J. (ed.) Language and the Law Harlow: 
Longman, 1994.
408 The decision was, however, upheld on appeal to the Federal Court: Attorney-General for the 
Northern Territory v. Maurice in the Matter of the Warumungu Land Claim (1986) 65 ALR 247. A 
further appeal to the High Court produced the same decision.
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The most important case -  or rather series of cases -  in which secrecy was a 
crucial factor is that concerning the Hindmarsh Island Bridge.409 The facts of the 
case were, briefly, as follows410. Developers sought permission to expand their 
marina which was situated on Hindmarsh Island at the mouth of the Murray 
River. The development was opposed by environmentalists and by the local 
Aboriginal people, the Ngarrindjeri, who claimed that the area concerned was of 
particular cultural significance. Permission was given for the development under 
s.23 of the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988 ISA). The Minister for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Affairs then made a Declaration under s.9 of the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth)411 - 
relying on the evidence contained in the required Report prepared by Professor 
Saunders412 - prohibiting the building of the bridge. The developers appealed to 
the Federal Court where O’Loughlin J. allowed the appeal413 on two procedural 
grounds, only one of which is relevant for present purposes: that the Minister
409 For a detailed study of Ngarrindjeri society, including some treatment of the Hindmarsh Bridge 
cases, see: Bell. D. Ngarrindjeri Wurruwarrin: a  world that is, was, and will be Melbourne: 
Spinifex Press Pty Ltd., 1998.
410 The full facts o f the case and a detailed account of all stages of the legal proceedings are not 
relevant for present purposes.
411 The Act contains a federal power to intervene to protect significant Aboriginal sacred sites 
from desecration where, as in this case, the State or Territory concerned has failed to do so. The 
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act. 1976. contains similar provisions as to the 
protection of sites o f Aboriginal cultural significance. For a comparison of the two Acts with 
regard to evidence of secret material, see: Hancock, N. ‘How to Keep a Secret: Building Bridges 
between Two Laws’ Aboriginal Law Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 77, December 1995, 4-9. For an 
overview o f the issue of gender restricted evidence under the Northern Territory Act, see . Keely. 
A. ‘Women and Land: the Problems Aboriginal Women face in providing Gender Restricted 
Evidence’ Aboriginal Law Bulletin Vol. 3, No. 87. December 1996, 4-7.
412 Saunders. C. Report to the Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs on the 
significant Aboriginal area in the vicinity o f Goohva and Hindmarsh (Kumarangk) Island Adelaide: 
South Australia Government Printer, 1994, cited in Bell. D. supra n 353 at 4 ff.
413 Chapman v. Tickner (1995) 55 FCR 318.
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failed to consider all the material in the Saunders Report, in particular material 
which was contained in sealed envelopes, which envelopes were marked on the 
outside with a warning that the enclosed material was not to be seen by men. 
The s.9 Declaration was quashed. The Minister and two of the Ngarrindjeri then 
appealed to the Full Court which dismissed the appeal414. In the interval between 
the two hearings rumours began to circulate that part of the evidence in the 
original application was fabricated. The material contained details of the 
significance of the area where the development was to take place to ‘women’s 
business’. Some Ngarrindjeri women said that there was such a connection, 
others that they knew nothing of it. The State Government appointed a Royal 
Commission to investigate the claims of fabrication and the Minister announced 
that there would be an independent inquiry once the result of his appeal was 
known. The Royal Commission announced its findings shortly after that result 
was published and it found that there had been fabrication415. Then the Minister 
made the s. 10 Declaration. The Ngarrindjeri lodged a fresh application and the 
process began again with new Report being commissioned from Justice 
Matthews and the eventual appointment of a female Minister to examine it. The 
history of the dispute after this point is not relevant for present purposes - it 
continued to run until eventually, after the passage of special legislation to allow 
it416, the bridge was built.
414 Norvill and Milera v. Chapman and Others: Tickner v. Chapman and Others Unreported., but see 
casenote in Aboriginal Law Bulletin Vol. 3, No. 78, February 1996,24-28.
415 Stevens. I. Report o f the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Royal Commission Adelaide: South Australia 
Government Printer, 1995.
416 Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act fSAl 1999.
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The importance of the Hindmarsh Island cases for the present work is that the 
Courts essentially ruled that the secret evidence must be disclosed, at least to the 
concerned parties, and that not to do so risked decisions being overturned. 
Whilst this outcome is understandable in terms of due process and rational 
decision-making417, it gives rise to difficulties. Justice Evatt in her 1996 Review 
o f the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act, 1 9 8 f l% 
made a number of recommendations to make the Act more effective, including a 
warning that requiring the disclosure of confidential information would make 
Aboriginal people more reluctant to use the Act.
Both these cases turned on the fact that crucial evidence was not before the 
decision-maker. However, as long as the evidence is available to the judge, the 
judiciary has shown itself willing to be flexible in dealing with the issues raised 
by secret material in various ways. Thus, a Court may sit in cameram  or restrict 
publication.420 It may empanel juries of a single sex.421 In certain circumstances 
a Court may take notice of well-known facts of Aboriginal culture422 or refer to 
well-known publications for assistance423 thereby obviating the necessity for the 
witnesses to disclose such information. However in all cases, the judiciary are 
obliged to balance the various interests involved. The principle of natural justice
417 On the balancing process involved, see: Hancock. N. ‘Disclosure in the Public Interest?’ 
Alternative Law Journal Vol. 21, No. 1, February 1996,19-23.
418 Canberra: Australian Government Printer, 1996.
419 See, for example: R. v. Sydney Williams (1976) 14 SASR 1, where all inappropriate persons 
were excluded from the courtroom.
420 See, for example: R.v. B (1992) 2 NTLR 98, where an order was made to suppress publication of 
the name of a dead person.
421 R  v. Svdnev Williams (1976) 14 SASR 1.
422 See, for example: R. v.B (1992) 2 NTLR 98.
423 See, for example: R. v. Shannon (1991) 57 SASR 14, per Zelling at 19
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is paramount and that principle would usually be interpreted to provide that each 
party should have access to all the material which is relevant to the matter at 
hand. There may, however, be circumstances in which the principle requires a 
different interpretation: protecting the secrecy of Aboriginal material has been 
held to be such a circumstance424 although each case will need to be considered 
on its merits.
Moreover, there are several cases in which the judiciary has been the agent of 
protecting the secrecy of such material in circumstances unconnected to the 
judicial process. In the case of Foster and Others v. Mountford and Rigbv 
Limited425, for example, the Pitjantjara Council sought, on behalf of the 
Aboriginal people concerned, an injunction restraining the publication in the 
Northern Territory of a book containing details of secret ceremonies disclosed in 
confidence to Mountford, the author, many years previously. The book 
contained a caveat that as far as Aborigines were concerned, it should be used 
only with the permission of local male tribal leaders. Muirhead J. granted the 
injunction.
The judiciary has attempted to be flexible in relation to the proof of customary 
law. The rules of evidence have been interpreted as generously as possible, but 
the position still remains unsatisfactory. The most appropriate person to give
424 See, for example: Dalv River (Malak Malak) Land Claim 86-89, per Toohey. J., cited in in 
Australian Law Reform Commission The Recognition o f Aboriginal Customary Laws Summary 
Report, Full Report 2 Volumes), Final Report No. 31 Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1986, p 488, n 56.
425 (1976) 14 ALR71.
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evidence of Aboriginal customary law would seem to be a person who lives 
under that system. It may be possible to amend the rules on expert evidence or 
to increase the use of group evidence in order that more Aborigines could testify 
to their law. However, the rules of evidence should not be lightly dismissed and 
the acceptance of inadmissible evidence should not be encouraged. In relation to 
the issue of secrecy, the judiciary have made attempts to protect such material 
where possible, and with some success, but there are occasions when this is not 
possible and the witness must decide her/his course of action. There is adequate 
caselaw, some of which is referred to above, to show that in criminal trials, the 
existence of a relevant customary law is often asserted with absolutely no 
evidence to support it. This is obviously unacceptable. The present system may 
not be perfect, but it appears to be a reasonable one, given the necessity to 
balance various interests and considerations.
3.9: Conclusion:
Many of the issues raised in this Chapter are not specifically related to 
customary law and it is argued that they can be addressed relatively easily 
within the legal system as it currently stands. This is the argument made by 
Mildren426 who maintains that the police could make fairly minor adjustments 
which would help and that the trial judge also has scope including by giving a 
direction to the jury -  a draft form is in the Appendix to the article - on the main
426 Mildren. D. ‘Redressing the Imbalance against Aboriginals in the Criminal Justice System’ 
Criminal Law Journal, Vol. 21, February, 1997, 7-22.
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areas of concern within Aboriginal evidence. For reasons discussed above, it is 
impossible for Australian courts simply to apply different laws to Aborigines 
from those they apply to the rest of the population unless such differentiation is 
legally justified.427 It is, therefore, not open to the judiciary simply to alter or 
ignore the rules of procedure when faced with a matter of applying customary 
law. However, they may assess the impact and relevance of customary law on 
Aboriginal witnesses and defendants and be as flexible as possible within the 
rules.
427 Such differentiation would be justified by, for example, legislation on native title and land rights 
schemes. This is, of course, the perspective of the state legal system, premised on the understanding 
that Australia was acquired by settlement and on the consequences of that understanding for the 
recognition of customary law. For discussion of these points, see Chapter 1.
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Chapter 4: Judicial use of customary law in the establishment of the elements for
an offence or a defence:
4.1: Introduction:
The judiciary has shown itself willing to make use of customary law in the 
substantive areas of the criminal law as well as in relation to evidential and 
procedural requirements. The general position is, of course, that the same law 
must be applied to everyone and thus there might seem to be little scope for 
recognition of alternative systems in establishing the elements of offences or 
defences. With regard to offences this perception is broadly correct, although 
there has been some consideration of customary law in determining intent. 
However, the Courts have given extensive consideration to such law when 
deciding whether defences, primarily provocation, have been made out. Indeed 
the establishment of provocation has been the most common locus of judicial 
use of customary law apart from sentencing. The question of whether objective 
or subjective428 standards are applied is of crucial importance in relation to the 
establishment of offences and defences. The precise nature of, and difference 
between, objective and subjective tests is controversial and imprecise. It may be 
more accurate to say that what is important is whether any required standard or
428 The terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ will be used throughout the Thesis as they are 
employed in the caselaw and the secondary literature, but any such use is subject to the 
reservations here expressed. For an overview of differing concepts o f criminal responsibility, 
including the interpretation and application of objective and subjective tests, see: Findlay. M., 
Odgers. S. and Yeo. S. Australian Criminal Justice Melbourne: Oxford University Press, (2nd 
ed.) 1999 pp. 15-20.
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test explicitly allows for differential application. Objective standards are, of 
course, only the most commonly held subjective standards. It follows that if 
‘objective’ standards are applied to people from minority groups or cultures they 
will be judged by the standards of the majority which may be quite different 
from their own. This is relevant in many areas and is an issue which will recur 
throughout the Thesis.
4.2: Offences:
The question of whether the required elements for an offence are present most 
frequently arises in connection with intent. Intent is a necessary element of 
many offences, including murder and rape. In assessing the presence or absence 
of intent, the common law concentrates on the actual state of mind of the 
defendant rather than imposing standards which may be described as objective. 
There is no presumption that the accused intended the natural and probable 
consequences of her/his actions; rather the test is one of fact in each case: did 
the accused actually intend what happened?429 However, the defendant’s actual 
intention is not established by psychological investigation, but is deduced from 
her/his actions. So the test is subjective in that it is the defendant’s state of mind 
which is relevant - and there can be no assumption that s/he intended what 
seems to most people to be the natural or probable consequence - but objective
429 Until the mid 1950s there was such a presumption but it was repeatedly disapproved of by the 
High Court - see, for example: Smyth v. R. (1957) 98 CLR163 at 166-167 - and it is clear that it no 
longer exists. The modem common law position and the difficulties involved in the use o f the terms 
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ are set out clearly by Burt CJ. in the case of Schultz v. R. (1982) WAR 
17 at 172-173.
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in that the required state of mind will be deduced by others from the actions 
done even if s/he denies that such was her/his intention. Inevitably these 
deductions are based in the culture, mores and intellectual framework of those 
doing the deducing. This may result in the imputation of states of mind to 
Aboriginal defendants which were not, in fact, present due not to individual 
peculiarities, but to differing thought patterns amongst different cultures.430 The 
position under s.31 of the Northern Territory Criminal Code, which sets out the 
Code position on intention and covers unwilled acts, is rather different. The 
section provides that there is no criminal liability for non-intended acts. It does 
not, however, apply in the case of self-induced intoxication which is covered by 
s.7 of the Code, or to dangerous acts/omissions or failure to rescue which fall 
under ss.154 and 155.431
There are very few cases where the defendant has sought to escape criminal 
liability on the grounds that her/his Aboriginality and the cultural norms and laws 
associated with that status meant that s/he lacked the necessary criminal intent. 
There are no reported Northern Territory decisions on the point, but the
430 The Australian Law Reform Commission has summed up the position thus:
‘There is a danger that inappropriate monocultural or ethnocentric assumptions may be 
made, to the possible detriment of persons of ethnic minority background. The magistrate 
or jury may not take into account differences in behaviour and belief that derive from 
adherence to different cultural and religious values. In working out what was an accused’s 
state of mind, a judge or jury are likely to apply their own cultural logic and may make the 
wrong inferences from behaviour unless they have evidence of the customs, practices and 
beliefs prevalent in the accused’s community. This is particularly so if it is a minority 
community”. Supra 53, para. 8.30 and Recommendations.
431 Ss. 31, 154 and 155 -  and s.7 - were considered in a recent review of the Code and various 
recommendations were made for reform: Fairall. P. Review o f Aspects o f the Criminal Code o f the 
Northern Territory Darwin: Attorney-General’s Department of the Northern Territory, March 2004. 
Detailed discussion of the Review and its recommendations is outside the scope of the Thesis.
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Queensland case of Glen Maurice Watson432 provides an illustration of the way in 
which the issues may arise. However, as the defendant’s arguments were rejected 
on the facts, it provides little indication of the likely reaction of the Courts to such 
arguments when put before them. The accused killed his de facto wife by stabbing 
her and was charged with her murder. He sought to bring evidence that such a 
stabbing was recognised by his community as a form of domestic punishment and 
argued, moreover, that the community did not regard such wounds as serious. If 
accepted, these arguments would have meant that he lacked the necessary intent 
for murder as he considered that he was inflicting a relatively minor and widely 
used form of punishment which was not intended to result in death, nor was he 
reckless as to such a possibility. To the extent that Watson’s argument that his state 
of mind, and therefore his intent, was shaped by his community’s attitudes, it 
amounted to an assertion that he should be treated differently from a white 
offender (or possibly from an Aboriginal offender from another community whose 
mores differed) and that his Aboriginality and cultural background were relevant in 
establishing intent. The trial judge refused to allow such evidence to be brought 
and Watson, having been convicted, appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeal 
rejected the appeal and the submissions on several grounds of fact. They were, 
therefore, not required to express a view as to the relevance or effect of the 
appellant’s assertions had he been able to substantiate them, though obiter remarks 
suggest that they would have reached the same decision.433
432 (1986) 22 A. Crim. R 308
433 See, for example, McPherson J’s discussion of the applicability of the Racial Discrimination Act 
1975 at 312.
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In the unreported Northern Territory case of R. v. Old Barney Jungala434 the 
defendant sought to establish the defence of duress. This failed as there was no 
external threat, but the defendant was convicted of manslaughter instead of 
murder on the grounds that he lacked the intent to kill. It is difficult to assess 
how frequently such decisions may be made, but not reported. However, it 
seems unlikely that this case is the only one where such an analysis has been 
used, and it is not unreasonable to speculate that the judiciary may make more 
allowance for customary law in determining intent than is evident from the 
reported jurisprudence.
4.3: Defences:435
The same issues of differential treatment and of objectivity and subjectivity arise 
with regard to the relevance of ‘unusual’436 states of mind to the establishment 
of criminal defences. There are four defences where this most commonly 
occurs- provocation, duress, intoxication and diminished responsibility - and 
these defences will be discussed in some detail. However, it should be borne in
434 Unreported. Northern Territory Supreme Court (M uirhead  J .) 8 Feb 1978 cited in Australian 
Law Reform Commission The Recognition o f Aboriginal Customary Laws (Summary Report, 
Full Report 2 Volumes), Final Report No. 31 Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1986, Vol.l, p.308. n81.
435 On defences generally, see, for example: O’Connor. D. and Fairall. P. A. Criminal Defences 
North Ryde: Butterworths, (3rd ed.) 1996 and Yeo. S. (ed) Partial Excuses to Murder Leichardt, 
New South Wales: Federation Press with the assistance o f the Law Foundation of New South 
Wales, 1990. On defences and customary law, see: Eames. G.M. ‘Aboriginal Homicide: 
Customary Law Defences or Customary Lawyers’ Defences?’ in Strang H. & Gerull. S-A (eds.) 
Homicide: Patterns, Prevention and Control Canberra: Aust. Institute of Criminology Conference 
Proceedings. No. 17 12-14/5/1992.
436 The term ‘unusual’ is used to mean a state of mind or outlook not shared by the majority of the 
population: it is not intended to convey any value judgement.
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mind that other defences may from time to time raise the same issues 437 By far 
the most extensive analysis and application of such differential criteria has been 
in cases involving provocation.
i. Provocation:438
437 The other defences most likely to be relevant to the present discussion are automatism, self- 
defence, necessity and insanity. All these will, of course, also be available to Aboriginal 
defendants, but have not given rise to any substantial jurisprudence on differential treatment and 
customary law. Note, however, the less common defences of claim of right and mistake of fact 
which are governed in the Northern Territory by ss. 30 and 32 of the Northern Territory 
Criminal Code. It has occasionally been argued - both in the Northern Territory and in other 
jurisdictions -  that these defences can be raised to avoid criminal responsibility for actions 
which are justified under Aboriginal customary law, but contrary to state law. Such arguments 
have almost always failed. See, for example: Walden v. Hensler (1987) 29 A. Crim. R. 85; Colin 
Goodsell v. Galarrwuy Yunupingu (1999) 4 AILR 29; Director of Public Prosecutions Reference 
Na_l_ofl999 (1999) 128 NTR 1; (2000)134 NTR 1.
438 For a general account and discussion of the law on provocation: see any criminal law text, for 
example, Bronitt. S. and McSherry. B. Principles o f Criminal Law Pyrmont, NSW: Law Book 
Company Information Services, 2001. On the historical development of the doctrine: see Horder, J. 
Provocation and Responsibility Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. For academic debate on the 
‘ordinary person’ requirement for the establishment of provocation: see the series of articles by 
Yeo. S. ‘Provoking the ‘Ordinary’ Ethnic Person: A Juror’s Predicament’ (1987) 11 Criminal Law 
Journal 96; ‘Ethnicity and the Objective Test in Provocation’ Melbourne University Law Review 
Vol. 16, June 1987, 67; ‘Power of Self-Control in Provocation and Automatism’ (1992) 14 Sydney 
Law Review 3; ‘Sex, Ethnicity, Power of Self-Control and Provocation Revisited’ 18 Sydney Law 
Review (1996) 304; see also Leader-Elliott. I. ‘Sex, Race and Provocation: In Defence of Stingel’ 20 
Criminal Law Journal April 1996, 72; Detmold. MJ. ‘Provocation to Murder: Sovereignty and 
Multiculture’ 18 Sydney Law Review (1997) 3. For consideration of what conduct is sufficiently 
grave to establish the defence: see the expanding literature on women who have allegedly provoked 
their male partners into killing them or who have killed male partners who have battered them: for 
example, Tolmie. J. ‘Provocation or Self-Defence for Battered Women who Kill?’ in Yeo. S. (ed.) 
supra n 301; Greene. J. ‘A Provocation Defence for Battered Women who Kill’ (1980) 12 Adelaide 
Law Review 145; Horder. J. ‘Sex, Violence and Sentencing in Domestic Provocation Cases’ (1989) 
Criminal Law Review 546; Sheehy et al. ‘Defending Battered Women on Trial: The Battered 
Woman Syndrome and its Limitations’ (1992) 16 Criminal Law Journal 369; Morgan. J. 
‘Provocation Law and Facts: Dead Women Tell No Tales, Tales are Told about Them’ Melbourne 
University Law Review Vol. 21 (1997) 237; Bradfield. R. ‘Domestic Homicide and the Defence of 
Provocation: A Tasmanian Perspective on the Jealous Husband and the Battered Wife’ University o f 
Tasmania Law Review Vol. 19, No. 1, 2000, 5-37; and the Report of the Law Reform Committee of 
the Northern Territory Self-Defence and Provocation October 2000. See also the relatively recent 
debates over whether non-violent homosexual advances can amount to provocative behaviour of 
sufficient gravity: for example, Howe, A. ‘More Folk Provoke their Own Demise (Homophobic 
Violence and Sexed Excuses - Rejoining the Provocation Law Debate, Courtesy of the Homosexual 
Advance Defence)’ 19 Sydney Law Review (1997) 336, and ‘The Provocation Defence: Finally 
Provoking its own Demise?’ (1998) 22 Melbourne University Law Review 466. See also the New 
South Wales Attorney-General’s Working Party on the Review of the Homosexual Advance 
Defence Homosexual Advance Defence: Final Report o f the Working Party September, 1998.
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a. General development of the law:
The Courts have engaged in some of their most forward-looking and creative 
thinking in interpreting the requirements for the doctrine of provocation in such 
a way that weight may be given to considerations of customary law. Provocation 
in common law is a partial defence to a charge of murder in that, if made out, it 
reduces the charge to manslaughter.439 For this to be established, not only must 
the accused have lost control but the provocation must be so grave that it would 
have caused an ordinary or reasonable440 person to lose self-control441. These 
requirements have been the subject of much judicial and academic442 comment 
both in England and Australia. Only the latter is strictly relevant although the 
influence of English law has been such that some mention of it is inevitable. 
Discussion has largely centred on the definitions of ‘grave’ conduct and 
‘ordinary person’ or ‘reasonable person’ and whether these should be assessed 
by an objective or subjective test or by a test which combines both approaches. 
Although there has been more frequent recognition of both Aboriginality per se 
and of factors associated with Aboriginality443 in sentencing than in relation to
439 In all other offences provocation at common law goes to mitigation and not to liability, although 
under some Code provisions it may serve as a defence to other charges.
440 The test of the ‘reasonable man’ in relation to provocation was first expounded in R  v. Welsh 
(1869) 11 Cox CC 336 per Keating J. at 338 and this is generally treated as the starting-point of the 
modem law on the subject. There has been much discussion in the Australian jurisprudence about 
the shift from the requirement that the test be that of the ‘reasonable man’ to that of the ‘ordinary 
person’. Such a change is not significant for present purposes.
441 For interesting explorations of the psychological dynamics o f ‘loss of self-control’, see: Finkel. N  
‘Achilles Fuming, Odysseus Stewing, and Hamlet Brooding: On the Story of the 
Murder/Manslaughter Distinction’ (1995) 74 Nebraska Law Review 742; Kahan. D. and Nussbaum. 
M  ‘Two Concepts o f Emotion in the Criminal Law’ (1996) 96 Columbia Law Review 269; and 
Reilly. A  ‘Loss of Self-Control in Provocation’ in Criminal Law Journal Vol. 21 Dec. 1997 320.
442 Supra n 438.
443 These concepts are discussed in Chapter 5.
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provocation, the consideration of such matters in the application of a substantive 
legal doctrine is a more controversial undertaking. The extent to which cultural 
differences may or should be taken into account in deciding whether the 
elements of the defence of provocation are established has been widely debated 
and will be discussed below.
The origins of the doctrine lie, of course, in English common law though the test 
has since been given statutory force. From the mid-nineteenth century on, the 
test was an entirely objective one: how would a reasonable man (sic.) have 
reacted to this situation? All characteristics peculiar to the offender were 
ignored. This was so not only of truly individual characteristics, such as being 
unusually hot-tempered, but also of broader characteristics which were shared 
with other members of society, such as racial, ethnic, and cultural attributes and 
attitudes. Given the impossibility of true objectivity and the inevitability of 
those judging using their own standards and experience to assess 
reasonableness, the reasonable person was seen, in reality, as an Anglo-Saxon, 
middle-class male; that is, as the same type of person as the judges.444 The
444 Whilst it is for the judge to decide whether there is sufficient evidence to raise the possibility of 
the defence of provocation, it is for the jury to decide whether it is actually established. It follows 
therefore that there will actually be two agencies applying the ‘reasonable man’ test: the judge as a 
matter of law and the jury as a matter of fact. Both must try to imagine how an Aborigine would feel 
about a particular act and how s/he would react to it. Whilst the jury will not necessarily be male or 
middle or upper class they are likely, even today, to be white and of Anglo-Saxon origin. However, 
no evidence may be called to assist them. This is clearly an absurd position as was recognised in the 
case of R. v. Dincer (1983) VR 460. This case in fact involved a Turkish Muslim, but the point 
holds for all minority groups not represented on juries. In this case the judge, Lush J., recognised the 
absurdity of the position when he said to the jury:
“You may be asking yourselves, ‘how are we to know what an ordinary conservative 
Turkish Moslem might have done in these circumstances?’ There is no answer to that 
question ... the law does not allow the calling of evidence to assist the judgement of the 
jury on a question like that. It is your problem.” at 468.
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objective test thus understood is clearly unsatisfactory when applied to whole 
sections of society who were thereby judged by their non-adherence to standards 
which may be entirely alien -  and possibly unknown - to them. This was 
recognised as early as 1946 when the Privy Council in the case of Kwaku- 
Mensah v. R.445 - a case on appeal from the West African Court of Appeal (Gold 
Coast Session) - found that the test was not sustainable when judging people 
from backgrounds very different from the stereotypical English one and held 
that it was the characteristics of the “ordinary West African villager”446 which 
were relevant in assessing whether or not a reasonable or ordinary person would 
have lost self-control in the circumstances.
Australian law on provocation closely followed the English law. Whilst some 
Australian Courts and judges followed the strict objective test,447 others, 
especially Kriewaldt J. in the Northern Territory Supreme Court448, were 
prepared to show flexibility and adopt a line of reasoning similar to that in 
Kwaku-Mensah. A considerable amount of the case-law and much of the 
academic debate surrounding the issue of provocation relates to the possibility 
of establishing the defence where members of particular cultures have reacted to 
behaviour which clearly would not have amounted to provocation if the 
defendant had been the traditional ‘white, Anglo-Saxon male5. Whilst the focus 
of the Thesis is the application of the doctrine in the case of Aborigines and
445 (1946) AC 83.
446 At 93.
447 See, for example: R. v. Young (1957) Qd. R. 599
^  Infra 223 ff.
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customary law, it is necessary to examine briefly the evolution of the doctrine 
and the debates surrounding it in more general terms in order to provide a 
background to more specific considerations.
In England the strict objective test remained the law until 1978 when in the case 
of Director of Public Prosecutions v. Camplin449 the House of Lords declined to 
follow its own previous decision in Bedder v. Director of Public Prosecutions450 
and held that all the characteristics of the defendant (except his or her personal 
capacity for self-control) were relevant in assessing whether a reasonable person 
would have been provoked. This included age, race and ethnic origin.451 
Australian Courts remained bound by English precedent until 1986452 and the 
Camplin decision thus resolved the position in Australia, where some 
uncertainty had remained453, and established the law as it was to stand until 
1990.
449 0978) 2 All ER 168
450 0954) 2 All ER 801. The Homicide Act 1957, had been passed in the period between the 
decisions in Bedder and Camplin and one of the questions which the Court in Camplin considered 
was the effect of that Act on the common law including, in particular, Bedder.
451 Thus Lord Diplock says:
“To taunt a person because o f his race, his physical infirmities or some shameful incident 
in his past may well be considered by the jury to be more offensive to the persons 
addressed, however equable his temperament, if the facts on which the taunt is founded are 
true than it would be if they were not. It would stultify much of the mitigation of the 
previous harshness of the common law in ruling out verbal provocation as capable of 
reducing murder to manslaughter if the jury could not take into account all those factors 
which in their opinion would affect the gravity o f taunts and insults when applied to the 
persons to whom they are addressed.” at 174
452 The Privy Council remained the highest Court of Appeal for Australia until 1986 when that role 
was taken over by the High Court of Australia: Australia Act. 1986 (Cth.) and Australia Act. 1986 
(UK). Pre-1986 English jurisprudence was, therefore, of considerable influence in Australia.
453 Thus the year before the Camplin case produced a decision supporting the flexible approach - 
Moffa v R. (1977) 13 ALR 225 - and a decision based on the strict objective test - R. v. Webb 
(1977) 16 SASR 309.
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In 1990 the case of Stingel v. R.454. which originated in the Code state of 
Tasmania, came before the High Court. The Court took the opportunity to re­
examine and restate the law on provocation, now no longer constrained by 
English precedent455 The Court held that particular characteristics, including 
ethnicity, could be considered in assessing the gravity of the act alleged to 
constitute provocation:
“ the content and extent of the provocative conduct must be 
assessed from the viewpoint of the particular accused. ... In that 
regard, none of the attributes or characteristics of a particular 
accused will be necessarily irrelevant to an assessment of the 
content and extent of the provocation involved in the relevant 
conduct. For example, any one or more of the accused’s age, sex, 
race, physical features, personal attributes, personal relationships 
and past history may be relevant to an objective assessment of the 
gravity of a particular wrongful act or insult.”456
However, such characteristics, with the exception of age, could not be 
considered in assessing the required standard of self-control:
454 (1990) 171 CLR 312. A proviso needs to be made about the influence this judgement. The Court 
states that although in the area of provocation “the common law, the Codes and other statutory 
provisions, and judicial decisions about them, have tended to interact and reflect a degree of unity of 
underlying notions” (at 320) and that the Court shares this perception, nevertheless they intend in the 
present case, to focus entirely on the relevant provisions o f the Tasmanian Criminal Code. It is thus 
not clear to what extent the judgement is intended to apply to other Codes or to common law. 
However, the point on which most stress seems to be laid on the particularities o f the Tasmanian 
Code is not the one which is relevant to the present work and there seems to be no reason why the 
Court’s views on the test for provocation to be established should not be taken to apply to both Code 
and common law in all jurisdictions.
455 Camplin is no longer good law in England. See: R. v Morhall (1995) 3 All ER 659 where the 
House of Lords held that the reasonable man against whom the actions of the defendant were to be 
assessed could be held to share the characteristics of the defendant not only in terms of age, but also 
in terms of his addiction to glue sniffing; R  v. Smith (2000) 3 WLR 634 where the House of Lords 
held that in assessing the reactions o f the defendant to the provocation any characteristic which 
affected her/his ability to exercise self-control should be considered (though the judge should direct 
the jury that certain characteristics, such as being unusually bad-tempered, should be ignored).
456 At 326
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“No doubt, there are classes or groups within the community 
whose average powers of self-control may be higher or lower 
than the community average. ... The principle of equality before 
the law requires, however, that the differences between different 
classes or groups be reflected only in the limits within which a 
particular level of self-control can be characterized (sic.) as 
ordinary. The lowest level of self-control which falls within those 
limits or that range is required of all members of the community. 
There is, however, one qualification which should be made to 
that general approach. It is that considerations of fairness and 
common sense dictate that, in at least some circumstances, the 
age of the accused should be attributed to the ordinary person of 
the objective test.”457
Thus, Aboriginality and customary law may be taken into account in assessing 
whether the provoking act is sufficiently grave to found the defence, but not in 
assessing whether that degree of provocation would lead an ordinary person to 
lose control of her/himself. At first sight, this appears to be a return to a more 
objective test. However, there is still scope for taking cultural factors into 
account. The first stage in establishing the defence is to prove that the conduct is 
sufficiently grave to provoke: at this stage such factors may be taken into 
account. Thus, the improper display of taboo objects may be extremely 
offensive to an Aboriginal person -  and thus meet the test - but be of no concern 
at all to a white person. The second stage requires that the person provoked 
exercise the same degree of self-control as an ‘ordinary person’ would when
457 At 329.
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faced by a provoking act of that gravity. Thus, the Aborigine must exercise the 
same degree of control in relation to a very serious act of provocation as would 
an ‘ordinary person’. Essentially this stage requires that all people are required 
to withstand the same degree of provocation and exercise the same degree of 
self-control. There is, however, scope for differentiation in assessing what 
amounts to that degree of provocation.
The issue came before the High Court again in 1995 in Masciantonio v. R.458 
The appeal to the High Court was on the question of whether the trial judge had 
incorrectly withdrawn the issue of provocation from the jury and the discussion 
of this point is not relevant for present purposes. However, in the course of its 
judgement the Court made remarks on the general issues surrounding the law on 
provocation. It reaffirmed its earlier decision in Stingel and again held, in 
language very similar to that used in Stingel. that whilst the characteristics of the 
accused were relevant in assessing the gravity of the alleged provocation, they 
were not, with the exception of age, relevant in deciding whether the accused 
had shown the degree of self-control which would be shown by an ‘ordinary 
person’. Thus Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron who issued a joint 
judgement allowing the appeal, stated:
“The test involving the hypothetical ordinary person is an
objective test which lays down the minimum standard of self-
458 (1995) 183 CLR 58. As Victoria, where the matter originated, is a common-law jurisdiction, the 
Court was here dealing with the common-law doctrine of provocation. However, it reiterated that, as 
was pointed out in Stingel there is a good deal of convergence between common law and Code 
provisions on the matter of provocation and thus it could follow the principles of Stingel even 
though that case was dealing with the Tasmanian Code and even though the Court there had pointed 
out that it was dealing specifically with that Code.
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control required by the law. Since it is an objective test, the 
characteristics of an ordinary person are merely those of a person 
with ordinary self-control. They are not the characteristics of the 
accused, although when it is appropriate to do so because of the 
accused’s immaturity, the ordinary person may be taken to be of 
the accused’s age.
However, the gravity of the conduct said to constitute the 
provocation must be assessed by reference to relevant 
characteristics of the accused. Conduct which might not be 
insulting or hurtful to one person might be extremely so to 
another because of that person’s age, sex, race, ethnicity, physical 
features, personal attributes, personal relationships or past 
history. ... But having assessed the gravity of the provocation in 
this way, it is then necessary to ask the question whether 
provocation of that degree of gravity could cause an ordinary 
person to lose self-control and act in a manner which would 
encompass the accused’s actions.”459
McHugh delivered a dissenting judgement, taking a different view of the law - 
or, more accurately arguing what the law should be - a view more in accordance 
with the judgements of Kriewaldt and the pre-Stingel cases. He reiterates the 
commonly held view that the characteristics of the accused are relevant in 
assessing the gravity of the provocation and argues that this is the necessary 
consequence of the very rationale of the doctrine of provocation: to make 
allowance for human frailty. However, he goes on to argue that neither the 
common law nor the Codes or statutes have been able to pursue this rationale to 
its logical conclusion, that is, to make the same allowance with regard to the loss
459 At 66-67
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of self-control. The ‘ordinary person’ test employed with regard to the self-
control element departs from the rationale of provocation. It is, in fact, a policy- 
based test employed to preserve the principle of equality before the law and to 
ensure that all who seek to establish the defence of provocation are treated 
according to the same standards. Thus, the law as stated in Stingel is logically 
inconsistent in applying one type of test for the gravity of the provocation and 
another for the self-control element. McHugh concedes that to resolve the 
logical inconsistency by allowing all the characteristics of the accused to be 
taken into account at both stages would in fact be to abolish the ordinary person 
test.460 However, he maintains that this should be done. Paradoxically, 
McHugh’s main concern is the same as that of the majority: the preservation of 
equality before the law. He states that he had been a party to the judgement in 
Stingel and had then believed that the maintenance of equality before the law 
justified rejecting the incorporation of any attribute of the accused save for age. 
However, he now believes that unless the ethnic and cultural background of the 
accused is taken into account the result is in fact inequality before the law:
460 “The ‘ordinary person’ standard would become meaningless if it incorporated the personal 
characteristics or attributes of the accused on both the issue of provocation and the issue of self- 
control. In so far as the Courts have incorporated those characteristics and attributes in respect o f the 
issue of provocation, they have acted inconsistently with the rationale of the objective test. To go 
further and incorporate them in the self-control issue would require the abolition of the objective 
test, and that test is too deeply entrenched in the common law to be excised by judicial decision. 
Besides, the Codes and statutory substitutions for the common law of provocation contain objective 
tests o f self-control. It would defeat the considerable unity that exists between the common law and 
statutory regimes of provocation if the common law rejected its own doctrine and became 
inconsistent with the statutory regimes.” At 73. An entirely subjective test has in fact been 
suggested: see Murphy J. in the Moffa case: “The objective test is not suitable even for a 
superficially homogenous society, and the more heterogeneous our society becomes, the more 
inappropriate the test is. Behaviour is influenced by age, sex, ethnic origin, climatic and other living 
conditions, biorhythms, education, occupation and, above all, individual differences. It is impossible 
to construct a model o f a reasonable or ordinary South Australian for the purpose of assessing 
emotional flashpoint, loss of self-control and capacity to kill under particular circumstances.” At 
626. However, Murphy’s view was rejected by the majority.
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“Without incorporating these characteristics, the law of 
provocation is likely to result in discrimination and injustice. In a 
multicultural society such as Australia, the notion of an ordinary 
person is pure fiction... Worse still, its invocation in cases heard 
by juries of predominantly Anglo-Saxon-Celtic origin almost 
certainly results in the accused being judged by the standard of 
self-control attributed to a middle class Australian of Anglo- 
Saxon-Celtic heritage, that being the stereotype of the ordinary 
person with which the jurors are most familiar.”461
and again:
“ .. I have concluded that, unless the ethnic or cultural 
background of the accused is attributed to the ordinary person, 
the objective test of self-control results in inequality before the 
law. Real equality before the law cannot exist when ethnic or 
cultural minorities are convicted or acquitted of murder 
according to a standard that reflects the values of the dominant 
class but does not reflect the values of those minorities.
If it is objected that this will result in one law of provocation for 
one class of persons and another law for a different class, I would 
answer that that must be the natural consequence of true equality 
before the law in a multicultural society when the criterion of 
criminal liability is made to depend upon objective standards of 
personhood. Moreover, to a large extent a regime of different 
laws already exists because the personal characteristics of the 
accused including attributes of race and culture are already taken 
into account in determining the effect of the provocative conduct 
of the deceased on the ordinary person.”462
461
462
At 73 
At 74
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The law in relation to provocation was extended on two points, both of which 
have given rise to debate, in the case of Green v. R.463. Green’s appeal against a 
conviction for murder went to the High Court on the grounds of a misdirection 
of the jury on the availability of the defence of provocation and on the 
admissibility of evidence. The facts of the case are unimportant. Essentially 
Green killed a man who made persistent homosexual advances to him and 
argued that this behaviour was particularly traumatic for him as it recalled to 
mind his father’s sexual abuse of his sisters. The High Court, by a bare majority, 
allowed the appeal, directed a new trial and Green’s conviction was reduced to 
manslaughter. Much of the argument in the case turns on the interpretation and 
application of s. 23 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) which sets out the 
requirement for provocation to be established in New South Wales. However, 
some of the judicial comment is of wider application.
First, Green establishes beyond doubt that persistent non-violent homosexual 
advances are sufficiently grave conduct to allow the defence of provocation to 
be raised. This conclusion gave rise to great unease as it seems unlikely that 
comparable heterosexual advances would be viewed in the same way.464 The 
second point of controversy was that Green’s history, and his unusual sensitivity 
to matters of sexual interference, were factors which could be take into account 
in the ‘ordinary person’ assessment. Whilst this analysis concerned individual 
characteristics and not cultural factors, it seems to support the view taken by
463 (1996-1997) 191 CLR 334
464 See supra n 438.
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Kriewaldt, the pre-Stingel cases and McHugh in Masciantonio. It remains to be 
seen whether this analysis will prevail and whether it will be applied to the 
cultural and ethnic characteristics of any future defendant.
b. Northern Territory:
Having examined the general development of the law of provocation it is now 
necessary to examine the reactions of the judiciary of the Northern Territory and 
their ability to use the law of provocation to give some recognition to customary 
law. Any study of judicial activity in the early days of the Northern Territory, 
particularly with regard to Aborigines, centres largely on Kriewaldt’s 
judgements465 and, therefore, before examining the caselaw on provocation, it is 
useful to make some general comments about him. His judgements are 
important in virtually every area of law affecting Aborigines in the Northern 
Territory and are still cited, and on many points still regarded as authoritative.466
Kriewaldt sat as the sole Judge in the Northern Territory Supreme Court from 
1951 until his death in 1960. His influence was immense not only because he 
was the sole judge, but also on account of the contents of his judgements. 
Although the tone of some of his judgements seems offensive today, sounding at
465 There was no systematic record-keeping under Kriewaldt’s predecessors and, therefore, analysis 
of the caselaw can only be carried out from the date of his appointment.
466 See, for example: Jabarula and Others v. Poore: Jabarula v. Bell (1989) 68 NTR 26
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best patronising and at worst ‘racist’467, it must be understood within the context 
of the time. The argument today may be about the best way to accommodate 
cultural pluralism and how to take account of the economic and social 
disadvantages under which many Aboriginal people live, but in the 1950's the 
problem was a different one. The outcome to be sought at that time was basic 
equality. Kriewaldt understood ‘equality’ against the background of the then 
almost universally held liberal presuppositions inherent in the concept of the 
rule of law. He therefore argued that Aborigines must be treated in the same way 
as white people: they must be accorded formal equality and must be tried 
according to the same law.468 Whilst this might involve ignoring or denying 
cultural differences, he was intent on gaining for Aborigines recognition that 
they were equal. Much public opinion in the 1950’s would have seen ‘different’ 
as ‘inferior’ and differential treatment in this context would inevitably have 
meant worse treatment. Against this background, Kriewaldt’s remarks seem less 
objectionable. His refusal to admit of difference appears to have been based on 
the right desire, however patemalistically expressed, to see that the Aborigines
467 It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine in detail the debates surrounding racism. The 
words ‘racist’ and ‘racism’ are used here in an everyday sense as describing views or attitudes 
about other races or ethnic groups which views are derogatory and ill-founded. It does not 
necessarily imply hostile intent.
468 See amongst others: R. v. Wogala (alias Dick) No. of 1951 (unreported); R. v. Willie No. of 
1955 (unreported); R. v. Aboriginal Billy Marikit No. 30 of 1958 (unreported); R. v. Aboriginal 
Sandy Nitjenburra No. 32 of 1958 (unreported) and R. v. Aboriginal Jack Wheeler No. 36 of 1959 
(unreported) and R  v. Aboriginal Timmy (1959) NTJ 676 in all of which Kriewaldt insisted that 
Aborigines must be treated and tried in the same way as white people. Nor should judicial 
decisions be seen in isolation. The assimilation policy o f the Northern Territory commenced in 
1951 and thus most of Kriewaldt's judgements were delivered in its early years. This is not to say 
that he formulated the judgements with that policy consciously in mind, but presumably he was 
affected by the general climate of opinion. At least some academic opinion took a similar line. 
Thus, Tatz writing in 1964 said: “There can be no perfect formula for applying the criminal law to 
Aborigines ... In view of the assimilation policy it seems wrong to introduce codes of tribal law 
and exempt Aborigines from the criminal law”. Tatz. C. supra n 85 at 261.
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were not treated as inferiors. Moreover, even though cultural pluralism was not 
a live debate in the 1950’s and Kriewaldt still spoke the language of superiority, 
he did tiy to show sensitivity and to take account of differences as he perceived 
them.
Not surprisingly, Kriewaldt’s attempts to insist on equal treatment led him into 
difficulty. There were many occasions, such as in the cases discussed below, 
when the justice of the matter seemed to demand that the Aboriginal offender be 
treated differently. Kriewaldt’s very insistence on equality, an equality which 
seemed to include the application of objective standards and which was aimed at 
defeating harsher treatment for Aborigines, then posed a problem when he 
wanted to accord them apparently more lenient treatment. His attempts to obtain 
a just solution, recognising both equality and disadvantage, often led to him
asserting that Aborigines - or at least traditional Aborigines - were somehow
less civilised, less adult, subject to different (or less easily controlled) desires 
and passions. Sawer says in his foreword to Kriewaldt’s article (which he edited 
for publication on the author’s death) that he had formed the impression that 
Kriewaldt had come to believe that:
“ ... aborigines as a whole, or at any rate a considerable number 
of ‘pure-blooded’ aborigines, had a slightly different mental
make-up from the white man or the mixed blood, and this 
created inherent and inescapable difficulties in applying our legal
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concepts to their affairs, even after they had had considerable 
contacts with white society”.469
If Kriewaldt had reached such a conclusion, it might reveal a racism which is 
unacceptable or it might display a real, if embryonic, understanding that 
Aborigines do have very different concepts of, for example, time. This dilemma 
of reconciling insistence on equality with differential treatment is a recurrent 
theme in Kriewaldt’s judgements on many areas of law and also throughout the 
Thesis.
One of the ways in which Kriewaldt sought to achieve equality whilst 
recognising difference was by extending the meaning of the provocation 
criterion of ‘ordinary’ to include the ordinary Aborigine. Whether provocation 
is actually established is a question of fact for the jury. Kriewaldt, as judge, was 
required to direct the jury on the law and when doing this he explained that they 
were on occasion entitled to treat Aborigines differently, i.e. that it was legally 
possible to find provocation in situations where it would not be so if the 
defendant were white. However, the jury were the judges of fact. Thus, 
Kriewaldt stated that it was possible to argue that Aborigines lost self-control 
more quickly than would a white person and that on that basis provocation could 
be established, the jury had to agree that as a matter of fact firstly, that
469 Kriewaldt. M. ‘The Application of the Criminal Law to the Aborigines o f the Northern 
Territory o f Australia’. University o f Western Australia Law Review Vol. 5, No.l (1960-1962) 1- 
50 at 1.
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Aborigines did have less self-control and secondly, that the individual concerned 
had lost self-control. If they did so agree, then it was possible to establish the 
defence. However, they were entitled to say that these requirements were not 
met in fact. If they did not agree that Aborigines lost self-control more quickly, 
then they must apply the same test as if the defendant were white.
Kriewaldt’s470 approach to assessing whether provocation could be established 
in cases involving Aborigines, especially those who were of traditional 
orientation or from remote communities, was similar to that used in the Kwaku- 
Mensah case. In a series of cases,471 he set out clearly that the elements of the 
defence could, and indeed should, be established by reference to the standards 
prevailing at the time and in the place where the offender was living.472 In K 
Aboriginal v. Muddarubba473 he explains that the standards of provocation are 
not fixed and argues that just as they may alter over time so they may differ 
from community to community:
“In my opinion, in any discussion of provocation, the general principle
of law is to create a standard which would be observed by the average
470 The focus of the Thesis is the Northern Territory, but there were some -  though far fewer - 
attempts in other jurisdictions to use such an approach: see, for example, the later Queensland case 
of R  v. Rankin (1966) QWN 16 “I propose to direct the jury that the question which they must 
consider is whether the provocation was sufficient to deprive an ordinary aboriginal who lives in an 
aboriginal settlement of his power of self-control.” per Campbell J. at 17
471 See, for example: R  v. Aboriginal Patipatu (1951-1976) NTJ 18; R. v. Aboriginal Johnny Scott 
MacDonald (1951-1976) NTJ 186: R  v. Aboriginal Muddarubba (1951-1976) NTJ 317; R  v. 
Aboriginal Nelson (1951-1976) NTJ 327; R  v. Aboriginal Jimmv Balir Balir (1951-1976) NTJ 633; 
R  v. Aboriginal Timmy (1951-1976) NTJ 676.
472 There is little contemporary academic writing on the precise point. See: Marsack. C.C. 
‘Provocation in Trials o f Murder’ (1959) Criminal Law Review 697; Howard. C. ‘What Colour is 
the ‘Reasonable Man’?’ (1961) Criminal Law Review 41; Brown. B. ‘The ‘Ordinary Man’ in 
Provocation: Anglo-Saxon Attitudes and ‘Unreasonable Non-Englishmen” 13 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 203 (1964).
473 (1951-1976) NTJ 317
227
person in the community in which the accused person lives. It is clear 
from the cases decided by Courts whose decisions bind me that in white 
communities matters regarded as sufficient provocation a century ago 
would not be regarded as sufficient today. This suggests the standard is 
not a fixed and unchanging standard, it leaves it open, and I think 
properly so, to regard the Pitjinjara tribe as a separate community for the 
purpose of considering the reaction of the average man. I tell you that if 
you think the average member of the Pitjinjara tribe ... would have 
retaliated to the words and actions of the woman by spearing her, then 
the act of spearing is not murder but manslaughter. If provocation 
sufficient for the average reasonable person in his community to lose his 
self-control exists, then the unlawful killing is manslaughter and not 
murder.”474
The ‘ordinary’ or ‘reasonable’ person to be considered for the purposes of 
establishing the defence was an ordinary Aborigine in similar circumstances to 
the offender. Thus in R. v. Aboriginal Patipatu475. the earliest reported case on 
the point, he said:
“Provocation consists of anything or any action which will cause a 
normal ordinary reasonable person to lose control of himself ... If you 
think that in the circumstances prevailing in that particular locality the 
abandonment of a young child .. by the person appointed to look after it 
... would cause an ordinary reasonable person in that vicinity and of that 
description, so to lose control of his emotions as to retaliate with a spear 
then you would be entitled in this case to find a verdict of 
manslaughter.5,476
475 (1951-1976) NTJ 18
476 At 20
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It follows from this that something which does not amount to provocation in one 
community may nevertheless do so in another. He says in R. v. Aboriginal 
Jimmy Balir Balir477 that “something a white man might not regard as
A H Q
provocation might be so regarded as an Aboriginal’
In all the cases Kriewaldt stressed that Aborigines and whites must be tried by 
the same law and the same procedure.479 He is very clear that this must be so 
whatever a person’s private views about Aborigines before the Courts.480 
However, he draws a distinction between the law and its application and it is this 
distinction which enables him to justify his stance of differential treatment in 
relation to the possibility of establishing provocation: the law must be the same 
but its application may differ.481 It is when Kriewaldt attempts to explain what 
the difference in application should be, or more accurately why there should be 
such a difference in cases involving Aborigines, that he begins to get into
477 (1951-1976) NTJ 633
478 At 637
479 Subject to the sentencing discretion then allowed for in cases of murder
480 In his remarks to the juries it is clear that he feared two things: first, that the juries would be 
much harder on Aborigines considering them as somehow less valuable or important than white 
people and, therefore, less worthy of justice; second, that they would be more lenient for one of two 
reasons, either a genuine belief that it was unfair to try Aborigines by white law or a belief that it 
was best to ‘leave them to it’ so that they ‘killed each other off.
481Kriewaldt clearly realised that he was adopting a rather unusual approach to the question of 
provocation and frequently says that he may be wrong. See, for example: “I may be wrong. I do not 
know, because there is no decision of which I am aware” R. v. Aboriginal Johnny Scott MacDonald 
(1951-1976) NTJ 186 at 189; “I mentioned to you earlier that the same rules apply in the trial o f a 
white person as in the trial of a native. The rules relating to provocation have given me some worry 
in native trials. After much thought I have when summing up to a jury in cases where a native is on 
trial perhaps departed somewhat from the strict rule applied in trials of white persons. Perhaps my 
view is not correct, perhaps the white rule should be applied strictly to natives ..” and “I may be 
wrong but until put right by a higher court I shall continue to tell juries that the members of the 
Pitjinjara tribe are to be considered as a separate community for the purposes o f the rules relating to 
provocation. I shall not apply to them the standard applied to the white citizens o f the Northern 
Territory.” R. v. Aboriginal Muddarubba (1951-1976) NTJ 317, both at 322.
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difficulties. Even if it is so that the law allows of differential treatment in 
application, there must be some explanation of why particular circumstances or 
an offender from a particular background require differential treatment. His 
explanations as to why differential treatment for Aborigines was legitimate are, 
by the standards of today’s judiciary -  drawn almost entirely from the white 
population - unacceptably racist. They would, of course, always have been 
objectionable to Aborigines. Thus, in R. v. Johnny Scott MacDonald482, having 
pointed out that the reasonable man to be considered was “a reasonable native
A O 'y
inhabitant of Australia’ , he went on to explain why it was important to use 
that definition. According to him, Aborigines, at least arguably, had a lower 
standard of self-control:
“You may draw a distinction between the amount of provocation 
which is needed before the ordinary reasonable human being, 
such as you are, would lose his self-control, and the lesser, if you 
think it applies, the lesser degree of provocation needed before an 
Aboriginal of Australia loses his self-control. ... You will apply 
the law in this case that you may adopt a lesser standard as 
amounting to provocation where a native is charged with murder 
than you would be entitled to draw where a white person is 
charged with murder.”484
482 (1951-1976) NTJ 186
483 At 189
484 At 189-190
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Moreover, not only were Aborigines more likely to lose self-control than whites,
but Kriewaldt argued in R. v. Aboriginal Nelson485 that it might also take them
longer to regain their equilibrium after any dispute:
“ ... if you think that the ordinary, average native would have 
cooled down by the time Nelson hit Dann on the head with the 
boomerang, than the defence of provocation is not open. But if 
you believe the average native of the northern parts of this 
Territory would still have been smarting from the effects of that 
wound and would have been likely to retaliate, then that defence 
is open. To that extent the law may be regarded as more 
favourable to native than white people. ... We all know a white 
person cools down comparatively quickly. ... In the case of a 
native you may think it right to say the effect of provocation lasts 
longer than in the case of a white person.”486
and again in R. v. Aboriginal Jimmy Balir Balir487
“On this aspect of cooling down, the law as regards
• ^ o oAboriginals may be applied more leniently to Aboriginals than 
to whites. ... I see no objection to a jury taking the view that a 
white person will recover from the effect of provocation more 
quickly than an Aboriginal. I think it is right in law for a jury to 
say, from their knowledge of Aboriginals, that whereas a white 
man perhaps might have cooled down, an Aboriginal would
i 5 >489not.
485 (1951-1976) NTJ 327
486 At 335
487 (1951-1976) NTJ 633
488 This would seem to be a mistake in the text of the Report: it should presumably read
‘provocation’.
489 At 637
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Despite the unfortunate tenor of some of Kriewaldt’s remarks, there was much 
to be said for his approach, which was similar to that of the Privy Council in 
Kwaku-Mensah and thus not without some precedent. However, during the 
years when Kriewaldt was on the bench, the Australian judicial system was still 
relatively fragmented, distances were great and communications poor, and the 
Northern Territory especially operated, to some extent, in isolation. This is not 
to say that there was no contact -  and clearly if a case went on appeal the wider 
system became involved - but in general, and certainly in criminal matters at 
first instance, Kriewaldt operated alone. This meant that his approach had little 
influence outside the Northern Territory. Thus, the law on provocation in 
Australia as a whole was somewhat confused and unclear and different decisions 
would be reached in different jurisdictions to a far greater extent than would be 
likely today.
There are no reported cases showing any substantial development in the law of 
provocation in the Northern Territory from Kriewaldt’s death in 1960 until 
1989. The absence of such cases would seem to suggest that Kriewaldt’s 
approach was followed throughout that period -  any departure from the 
established approach would surely have been reported - and this inference is 
supported by the approach of the Court in the next important case on 
provocation. In 1989 the case of Jabarula and Others v. Poore: Jabarula v. 
Bell490 came before the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory491. Whereas
490 (1989)68NTR26.
491 By this time, the Court was concerned only with Australian jurisprudence.
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Kriewaldt’s decisions had been based in common law, by 1989 the Northern 
Territory Criminal Code492 was in force and that was the governing law where 
applicable. The relevant Sections of the Code were Section 1 which defines 
provocation as:
“ .. any wrongful a c t... of such a nature as to be likely, when done to an 
ordinary person, to deprive him of the power of self-control”
and Section 34(1) which deals with the establishment of provocation in cases
where there has not been a fatality:
“34. PROVOCATION, &c.
(1) A person is excused from criminal responsibility for an act or its 
event if the act was committed because of provocation upon the person 
... who gave him the provocation provided -
(a) he had not incited the provocation;
(b) he was deprived by the provocation of the power of self-control;
(c) he acted on the sudden and before there was time for his passion to
cool;
(d) an ordinary person similarly circumstanced would have acted in
the same or a similar way;
(e) the act was not intended and was not such as was likely to cause
death or grievous harm; and
(f) the act did not cause death or grievous harm.”
The case involved various aspects of the law of provocation. The only part of 
the judgement which is relevant to the present discussion is that dealing with the 
meaning of the words ‘ordinary person’. In discussing the concept, Kearney J. 
made extensive reference to Kriewaldt’s judgements and clearly considered 
them to be the guiding principles in assessing the meaning of the Code
492 It should be noted that the Code provisions on provocation reflect the common law position in 
relation to a charge of murder, reducing the verdict to manslaughter, but makes the defence available 
for other offences and in these cases results in an acquittal: s.34.
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provisions. He refers to and quotes from Kriewaldt’s judgements in the cases
already discussed and says:
“While Aboriginal communities in the Territory remain as 
distinct communities possessing a separate culture and identity 
and a degree of physical separation from the wider community, 
so the standard of the ‘ordinary person’ will vary in its 
application in the Territory.”493
He concludes:
“Following Kriewaldt J, I consider that an ‘ordinary person’ for 
the purposes of s.34(l)(d) of the Code means, in the 
circumstances of this case, an ordinary Aboriginal male person 
living today in the environment and culture of a fairly remote 
Aboriginal settlement, such as Ali Curung. He is neither drunk 
not affected by intoxicating liquor, does not possess a particularly 
bad temper, is not unusually excitable or pugnacious, and 
possesses such powers of self-control as everyone is entitled to 
expect an ordinary person of that culture and environment to 
have.”494
The issue came before the Northern Territory Supreme Court again in the case 
of Mungatopi v. The Queen495, one year after the decision in Stingel. The 
governing law here, as in Jabarula v. Poore, was the relevant provisions of the 
Northern Territory Criminal Code, but the question arose of the effect of Stingel 
on the interpretation of these provisions. The provisions at issue were s.l, 
which, as stated above, defines provocation, and s.34(2) which sets out the
493
494
495
At 34 
At 34
(1991) 105 FLR161
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conditions for establishing the defence of provocation where there has been a 
fatality and states:
“When a person who has unlawfully killed another under circumstances 
that, but for this sub-section, would have constituted murder, did the act 
that caused death because of provocation and to the person who gave 
him that provocation, he is excused from criminal responsibility for 
murder and is guilty of manslaughter only provided -
(a) he has not incited the provocation;
(b) he was deprived by the provocation of the power of self-control;
(c) he acted on the sudden and before there was time for his passion
to cool; and
(d) an ordinary person similarly circumstanced would have acted in 
the same or a similar way.”
There was some dispute over whether the behaviour of the deceased, the wife of
the accused, amounted to a wrongful act or insult within the meaning of s.l. The
Court stated, following Stingel:
“In our opinion, in determining whether the deceased’s actions or 
words could have amounted to provocation in law, it is 
appropriate to consider those actions and words against the 
background of what is acceptable conduct in the Aboriginal 
community to which the appellant and the deceased belong.”496
They went on to say that in the present case they were prepared to assume, 
though without finding to that effect, that the behaviour in question could meet 
the requirements of s.l. It is with regard to the second part of the test that the 
case is interesting. Despite the ruling in Stingel. the Court found that in 
assessing the loss of self-control in the face of the provocation, they were
496 At 165.
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entitled to consider an ‘ordinary person’ with similar characteristics and 
circumstances as the accused. The Court referred with approval to the 
judgement of Kearney J. in Jabarula v. Poore discussed above. Jabarula. v. 
Poore was, of course, decided before Stingel. but the Crown in this case did not 
argue that it was no longer good law or that Stingel required that, in interpreting 
the Criminal Code, the only characteristic which could be taken into account in 
deciding whether an ordinary person would have lost self-control was age. They 
went on to point out that the High Court in Stingel had stressed that its 
consideration was focused on the Tasmanian Criminal Code and that it was 
aware that the Codes of Queensland and Western Australia were very different. 
The Court here pointed out that the Northern Territory Code was also very 
different. The Northern Territory Code in both 34(1 )(d) and 34(2)(d) refers to 
“an ordinary person similarly circumstanced” and this would seem to be 
authority for taking into account factors other than age when looking at the 
ordinary person. The Court therefore assumed, though again without deciding, 
that the law stated by Kearney in Jabarula v. Poore was still correct.
The evolution of the doctrine of provocation in the Northern Territory clearly 
demonstrates the effectiveness of judicial activity in taking account of 
customary law. During Kriewaldt’s time, the concept of pluralism was virtually 
unknown in the Northern Territory.497 Legislating to ensure the rights of an 
underprivileged culture, especially an indigenous one, would have been
497 However, in many other jurisdictions, particularly in Asia and Africa, ‘pluralism’ -  although 
possibly not referred to as such -was both known and practised. See, for example, the discussion of 
the recognition of indigenous legal systems at supra 42-43.
236
unthinkable. The innovation of Kriewaldt’s judgements should not be 
underestimated. It is true that the Privy Council in Kwaku-Mensah had adopted 
a similar line of reasoning, and some ten years earlier, but their situation was 
very different. The Privy Council was the highest Court in a long-established 
legal system, sitting in London, many miles from the people in West Africa on 
whose rights they pronounced. Kriewaldt sat in the Northern Territory, the sole 
judge in a relatively new legal system, in a frontier situation amidst a large 
Aboriginal population and ruled day in and day out in ways which established 
the use of customary law within the state legal system. There was the occasional 
judgement from elsewhere -  Queensland, for example498 -  but the Northern 
Territory led the way.
After Kriewaldt’s death there was a long period with little or no development of 
the law on provocation. However, whilst there was no further evolution in the 
law, nor was there any retreat from Kriewaldt’s position and the same law 
continued to be applied consistently. When the Supreme Court came to rule in 
Jabarula v. Poore, even though the Criminal Code was by then in force, the 
precedents were followed. In Mungatopi. despite the ruling of the High Court in 
Stingel. the Supreme Court again followed the same line of analysis in 
interpreting the Code. The Code itself incorporates the same line of thinking. 
Ss.34(l) and (2) speak of “an ordinary person similarly circumstanced”. The 
Courts are now faced with interpreting and applying a Code which in any event
498 See, for example, the later case of R. v. Rankin (1966) n 342
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reflects judicial thinking. The achievement of the judiciary in relation to the 
doctrine of provocation has been substantial. The other defences have proved 
less amenable to such development.
Kriewaldt’s achievements were substantial and he was, in a sense, responsible 
for much of the development of the law of provocation in the Northern 
Territory. However, it should not be thought that he is the only judge to show 
creativity and use his discretion to give some recognition to customary law. The 
major locus of judicial activity in this respect is sentencing which will be 
discussed below. In this area there has been almost continuous development and 
the judiciary as a whole has made a significant contribution to the acceptance of 
customary law as a factor in sentencing.
• • T-k 499
11. Duress:
The defence of duress is available if the accused can show that s/he committed 
the offence under pressure which would cause a person of ‘ordinary firmness’500 
to do the same. The same issues arise as in provocation: the gravity or 
seriousness of the pressure and the means of assessing the likely reaction of the 
‘ordinary person’. However, there has been very little judicial consideration of
499 For a general account and discussion of the law on duress, see any criminal law text, for example, 
Bronitt. S. and McSherry. B. Principles o f Criminal Law Pyrmont, NSW: Law Book Company 
Information Services, 2001. See also, for example: Ashworth. A. ‘Reason, Logic, and Criminal 
Responsibility’ 91 (1975) Law Quarterly Review 102; Yeo. S. ‘The Threat Element in Duress’ 
(1987) 11 Criminal Law Journal 165, ‘Private defences, duress and Necessity’ (1991) 15 Criminal 
Law Journal 143.
500 R  v. Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531 at 545.
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the relevance of Aboriginality and/or customary law to the establishment of the 
elements of the defence. The same kind of considerations might be assumed to 
be pertinent, but the issues have rarely come before the Courts. It is, therefore, 
unnecessary to consider the doctrine in detail.
Under common law duress is established if the defendant can show that the 
offence was committed because of a threat of serious violence to the defendant 
or a third party. However, the defence is not available for murder. The position
in the Northern Territory under the Code is more restrictive. The relevant
section is s.40 which reads:
“40. DURESS
(1) A person is excused from criminal responsibility for an act, 
omission or event if it was done, made or caused because of 
duress provided -
(a) he believed the person making the threat was in a position to 
execute the threat;
(b) he believed there was no other way he could ensure the 
threat was not executed;
(c) a reasonable person similarly circumstanced would have 
acted in the same or a similar way; and
(d) he reported the threat to a police officer as soon as was 
reasonably practicable, unless the nature of the threat was 
such that a reasonable person similarly circumstanced would 
not have reported that threat.
(2) The excuse referred to in sub-section (1) does not extend to an 
act, omission or event that would constitute murder, 
manslaughter or a crime of which grievous harm or an intention 
to cause such harm is an element; nor to a person who has 
rendered himself liable to have such a threat made to him by 
having entered into an association or conspiracy that has as any 
of its objects the doing of a wrongful act.”
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It should be noted that under the Code, as well as the restrictions on the 
circumstances when the defence may be raised, there is also a limitation on the 
type of offence for which it is available: the defence may not be pleaded in 
relation to murder, manslaughter or crimes which involve grievous harm or an 
intention to cause such harm.501
It is unclear whether the test for establishing duress under either the common 
law or the Codes is subjective or objective, but it seems likely that it would be 
analysed in the same way as provocation. There has been no comparable 
detailed judicial consideration of Aboriginality as a characteristic to be taken 
into account in making such an assessment. However, there has been occasional 
caselaw on the possibility of establishing a defence of duress with regard to 
actions committed under the obligations of customary law . Such obligations 
may be accompanied by overt threats of death or physical harm if they are not 
met, the defendant may be aware that such actions are likely even though not 
overtly expressed, or s/he may be acting out of a belief that s/he is compelled to 
do so by customary law without adverting to the possibility of sanctions in the 
event of non-compliance. Opinion is divided on the availability of the defence in 
each of these circumstances. Eggleston503 argued that duress might be available 
where the defendant acts in accordance with customary law out of fear of the 
consequences -  whether or not overtly threatened -  if s/he fails to do so. She
501 Note, however, the provisions of s.41, infra 243-244.
502 This will be discussed below.
503 Eggleston. E. Fear, Favour or Affection: Aborigines and the Criminal Law in Victoria, South 
Australia and Western Australia Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1976.
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cites, inter alia, the case of Skinny Jack504. In this case several Aboriginal men 
were exhorted to kill another who had offended against customary law by 
selling a sacred item. The men were told that they would be killed if they 
refused to carry out the orders. There are, however, several difficulties with this 
argument as a support for the availability of duress in cases involving customary 
law matters. First, the main thrust is that duress may be established if the men 
acted because of the physical threat. However, this would be so even if the 
threat were made in circumstances unrelated to customary law. Eggleston 
maintains that duress would not usually be available in cases of offences 
committed because of the perceived legitimacy of customary law requirements 
alone, independent of any fear of sanction. Second, which Eggleston concedes, 
in such a case the defendant often acts under a variety of motives - fear, but also 
some belief in the rightness of the action, the legitimacy of the customary 
system - and it will be almost impossible to discern the relative weight of the 
pressures acting on the defendant’s mind, such discernment being a pre-requisite 
to deciding the availability of the defence if the foregoing analysis is accepted.
There is little caselaw on the point, but the few decisions that exist tend to reach 
the same conclusion as Eggleston: if external pressure is present, expressed or 
not, duress is available; in the absence of external pressure, the persuasive or 
compelling effect of a belief system on a person’s mind will probably not 
amount to duress under either common law or the Northern Territory Code.
504 At 289-292, 296-297.
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Thus, for example, in the case of R. v. Isobel Phillips505 the defendant, a 
Warumungu woman, was required by customary law to fight the woman 
involved with her husband. Anthropological evidence was called to substantiate 
the claim that she acted as required and that not to have so acted would have 
exposed her to possible sanctions of death or serious injury. The Magistrate 
commented that:
“ .. a Warumungu women of ordinary firmness would have carried out 
the instructions she was given .. as the defendant did ... The threats ... are 
backed up by the sanctions of the Warumungu law, and she cannot, as 
she remains in a Warumungu environment, evade these
n n n n a / i n a M n a r  »506consequences.
In this case the charges were dismissed because the defence of duress was made 
out. Similar views were expressed in the more recent South Australian case of 
Gregory Warren. Anthony Ross Coombes and Percy Gordon Tucker . The case 
came before the Court of Criminal Appeal which found on the facts that the 
appellants had not acted out of fear of the customary law sanctions which were 
applicable in the case, but for other motives entirely unconnected to customary 
law. For that reason, it was unnecessary to rule on the point and two of the judges 
expressed no opinion on the issue of customary law and duress. However, Doyle 
CJ. took the opportunity to comment and argued that it was perfectly possible for
505 Unreported. Northern Territory Court of Summary Jurisdiction (Murphy SM) 19 September 
1983, cited in Australian Law Reform Commission The Recognition o f Aboriginal Customary 
Laws (Summary Report, Full Report 2 Volumes), Final Report No. 31 Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1986, Volume 1, p.308, n 82.
506 Supra n 505 at p.308, n 82.
507 (1996) 88 A Crim R 78
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the real fear and consequent lack of freedom engendered by the threat of 
customary law sanctions to amount to duress.
However, in the case of R. v. Old Barney Jungala508, the defendant had acted as he
did merely because he believed himself compelled to do so by customary law and
not because of fear of sanction. Muirhead J. said:
“There is no suggestion that (the defendant) intended to cause the 
death of this young woman, and I accept that he acted as he 
believed the law which he respected compelled him to do.”509
Despite the element of customary law compulsion, the defence of duress was 
not available and the defendant was convicted of manslaughter on the grounds 
of lack of intent to kill.
The idea that the defence of duress should be generally available in all customary 
law cases, including those where the only ‘coercion’ is belief in the legitimacy of 
the customary system, has enjoyed some support.510 However, it does not seem to 
command general acceptance. It may be possible to achieve a similar511 outcome, 
though in strictly limited circumstances, by the use of s.41 of the Northern
508 Unreported. Northern Territory Supreme Court (Muirhead J.) 8 Feb 1978 cited in Australian 
Law Reform Commission The Recognition o f Aboriginal Customary Laws (Summary Report, 
Full Report 2 Volumes), Final Report No. 31 Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1986, Vol.l, p.308. n81.
509 Supra n 508 at p. 308, n 81.
510 See, for example: Australian Law Reform Commission The Recognition o f Aboriginal 
Customary Laws (Summary Report, Full Report 2 Volumes), Final Report No. 31 Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986, 'Submissions’ p.308, n80.
511 Similar, not the same. Duress is a defence, coercion reduces murder to manslaughter.
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Territory Criminal Code, which allows a defence of coercion to murder. The 
section reads:
“41. COERCION
(1) When a person who has unlawfully killed another under 
circumstances that, but for this sub-section, would have 
constituted murder, did the act or made the omission that caused 
death because of coercion of such a nature that it would have 
caused a reasonable person similarly circumstanced to have acted 
in the same or a similar way, he is excused from criminal 
responsibility for murder and is guilty of manslaughter only.
(2) The excuse referred to in sub-section (1) does not extend to a 
person who has rendered himself liable to have such coercion 
applied to him by having entered into an association or 
conspiracy that has as any of its objects the doing of a wrongful 
act.”
It has been contended that this could be used in cases where Aborigines are 
compelled to act simply by their belief in the legitimacy of the customary 
system.512 However, there is no reported case of such an argument being raised. 
It is difficult to predict with any certainty what the outcome would be, but the 
fact that such an argument has never been made suggests that it is not generally 
thought that it would succeed.
Thus, it is reasonably clear that duress will only be available in customary law 
cases where there is some fear of sanction. This does not seem unreasonable. 
Duress is only available to anyone -  Aboriginal or white -  as a result of some 
threat, whether expressed or not. Mere conviction of the rightness of certain 
behaviour is never enough to found the defence unless there is a sanction in
512 See: Australian Law Reform Commission The Recognition o f Aboriginal Customary Laws 
(Summary Report, Full Report 2 Volumes), Final Report No. 31 Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1986, p.308, n83.
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view. It would be stretching discretion too far to allow mere adherence to one 
type of belief system to be a basis for the defence without the other elements 
being present. However, in the acknowledgement that customary law is a system 
which operates in the minds of its adherents and which they perceive to be able 
to impose sanctions, the Courts are according some recognition to that law.
iii: Intoxication:
The defence of intoxication is available to all defendants, including Aborigines, 
on exactly the same terms. There is no scope here for introducing cultural 
factors such as customary law. It is, however, important to note the position as 
the serious alcohol problem faced by large sections of Aboriginal communities 
in the Northern Territory means that many Aborigines come before the Courts 
for offences committed when intoxicated. There is a voluminous literature513, 
including extensive judicial comment514, on this point, detailed study of which is 
beyond the scope of the present work.
513 See, for example: Broadhurst. R.G. ‘Aborigines, Cowboys, “Firewater” and Jail: the View 
from the Frontier’ Australian and New Zealand Journal o f Criminology Vol. 27 (1994) 50-56; 
Brady. M. A. & Palmer. K. A Study o f Drinking in a Remote Aboriginal Community Adelaide: 
Report prepared for Australian Associated Brewers, Western Desert Project, School of 
Medicine, Flinders University, Adelaide, South Australia, 1982, Alcohol in the Outback: Two 
Studies o f Drinking Darwin: Australian National University North Australia Research 
Monograph, 1984; d’Abbs. P. ‘Restricted Areas and Aboriginal Drinking’ and Brady. M. 
‘Alcohol Use and its Effects upon Aboriginal Women’ both papers presented at Australian 
Institute of Criminology Alcohol and Crime Canberra: Proceedings of a Conference held 4-6 
April 1989, Australian Institute o f Criminology, 1990. On alcohol and indigenous peoples, see: 
Saggers. S. and Gray. D. Dealing with Alcohol: Indigenous Usage in Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
514 See Chapter 5.
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The common law position in Australia is that intoxication, whether or not self­
induced, is relevant to criminal responsibility in that the defendant may, under 
its influence, have acted involuntarily or without the necessary intent.515 
However, under the common law in England516 and under the majority of the 
Criminal Codes intentional intoxication is irrelevant to offences of basic intent, 
though relevant to offences of specific intent.517 The Northern Territory 
Criminal Code as enacted stated under s.7:
“7. INTOXICATION
In all cases where intoxication may be regarded for the purposes of 
determining whether a person is guilty or not guilty of an offence, 
until the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed that -
(a) the intoxication was voluntary; and
(b) unless the intoxication was involuntary, the accused person 
foresaw the natural and probable consequences of his conduct 
and intended them.”
As amended, with retrospective effect, it reads:
“(1) In all cases where intoxication may be regarded for the purposes of 
determining whether a person is guilty or not guilty of an offence -
(a) it shall be presumed that, until the contrary is proved, the 
intoxication was voluntary; and
(b) unless the intoxication was involuntary, it shall be presumed 
evidentially that the accused person foresaw the natural and 
probable consequences of his conduct.”518
515 O’Connor v. R. (1980) 29 ALR 449. See, also: Herbert and Others v. The Queen (1982) 62 
FLR 302. For discussion o f this case, see: Bell. D. ‘Exercising Discretion: Sentencing and 
Customary Law in the Northern Territory’ in Morse. B.W. and Woodman. G.R. (eds.) Indigenous 
Law and the State Dordrecht: Foris, 1988, at 367-394.
516 See: Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard (1920) AC 479; Director of Public Prosecutions v. 
Maiewski (1977) AC 443
517 Manslaughter and assault are crimes of basic intent. Offences of specific intent - wounding with 
intent, theft and murder - are those crimes where the intent to cause a specific result is an element of 
the offence. The status of rape is uncertain.
518 For discussion o f the drafting history, see Australian Law Reform Commission The 
Recognition o f Aboriginal Customary Laws (Summary Report, Full Report 2 Volumes), Final 
Report No. 21 Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986, para. 439.
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Thus, self-induced intoxication is irrelevant to intention.
Whilst there is widespread recognition of the effect of alcohol on Aboriginal 
criminality, it appears to be beyond the ability - or indeed the jurisdiction - of 
the Courts to deal with the problem. Muirhead summed up the dilemma of the 
Courts in R. v. Douglas Wheeler Jabanunga519:
“The courts cannot effect a cure or diminution of the incidence of 
alcohol induced violence, but the situation cries out for 
community concern, intelligently planned programs and action 
rather than words. All the courts can do in the meantime is to 
punish those who kill or injure, but the deterrent value of what 
we do is, I am afraid, precisely nil.”
and again in The Queen v. Steward Colin Mugkuri and Simon Nvaningu (aka 
Peter Roger):520
“As is usual in this depressingly frequent type of offence, the root 
cause was alcohol. For over ten years sitting in this Territory, I 
have endeavoured to draw attention to the need for something to 
be done about the marketing, the regulation and supply of 
alcohol, particularly to our Aboriginal community, the need for 
detoxification units, modem treatment and rehabilitation centres. 
I have not been alone in this exercise but it’s been entirely 
fruitless. The Courts can achieve little, if anything. The 
Aboriginal councils appear to recognise the problem and it is the
519 Unreported. Northern Territory Supreme Court, 16 October 1980, transcript of proceedings, 
27-8, cited in Australian Law Reform Commission The Recognition o f Aboriginal Customary 
Laws (Summary Report, Full Report 2 Volumes), Final Report No. 31 Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1986, p.313, nl 11.
520 (1985) 12 Aboriginal Law Bulletin 11
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Aboriginal people who almost entirely suffer its consequences. 
One can only keep hoping that at national level there will be 
recognition of the seriousness and complexity of the problems 
coupled, I hope, with some action.”521
There is considerable judicial authority for treating intoxication in Aboriginal 
defendants differently from that in white defendants, but this intervention takes 
place at the sentencing stage and will be discussed below.
iv. Diminished Responsibility:
The defence of diminished responsibility may only be pleaded in response to a 
charge of murder. If made out, it reduces the offence to manslaughter and 
thereby attracts a sentencing discretion in those jurisdictions which carry a 
mandatory life sentence for murder. It was established specifically in order to 
overcome the strict limitations on the availability of the defence of insanity, 
which were such that a person who was mentally ill but understood their actions 
would be convicted of murder.
There are three elements to the defence: first, an abnormality of mind; second, 
the abnormality must have arisen from a condition of arrested or retarded 
development of the mind or inherent cause or have been induced by disease or 
an injury; third, the abnormality of mind must have substantially impaired the 
defendant’s mental responsibility for his conduct. The defence is not available at
521 Supra n 520 at 11
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common law in Australia and is, therefore, only mountable in Code states which 
make provision for it. The relevant section of the Northern Territory Criminal 
Code is Section 37 which reads:
“37. DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY
When a person who has unlawfully killed another under 
circumstances that, but for this section, would have constituted 
murder, was at the time of doing the act or making the omission 
that caused death, in such a state of abnormality of mind as 
substantially to impair his capacity to understand what he was 
doing or his capacity to control his actions or his capacity to 
know that he ought not to do the act, make the omission or cause 
that event, he is excused from criminal responsibility for murder 
and is guilty of manslaughter only.”
The scope of “abnormality of mind” as described in the Code is unclear. It is,
however, both wider and more flexible than is required to make out a plea of
insanity. The scope of the notion in English common law, no longer binding in
Australia but still instructive, has been described thus:
“‘Abnormality of mind’ ... means a state of mind so different 
from that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man 
would term it abnormal. It appears to us to be wide enough to 
cover the mind’s activities in all its aspects, not only the 
perception of physical acts and matters, and the ability to form a 
rational judgement as to whether an act is right or wrong, but also 
the ability to exercise willpower to control physical acts in 
accordance with that rational judgement. The expression ‘mental 
responsibility for his acts’ points to a consideration of the extent 
to which the accused’s mind is answerable for his physical acts
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which must include a consideration of the extent of his ability to 
exercise willpower to control his physical acts.”522
The defence of diminished responsibility has little particular relevance to 
Aborigines or to customary law. However, it has been argued that it may be 
applicable in cases where Aborigines have suffered stress on account of cultural 
dislocation and being subject to differing, often conflicting, cultural 
expectations. There is no direct caselaw on the point. The defence was raised in 
the case of R. v. Alwvn Peter523, but a plea of guilty of manslaughter on the 
grounds of intoxication was accepted and so the point was not argued. The 
argument in that case was not that mere adherence to Aboriginal customary law 
is evidence of abnormality of mind, but that the strain caused by cultural conflict 
may lead to psychiatric disorder which is sufficient to make out the defence.524 
However, it is also possible that the mere adherence betokens an abnormality of 
mind.
Whilst this analysis might be unacceptable on the ground of insensitivity to 
cultural difference, it is nevertheless possible. It requires the judiciary to take the 
opposite line to that taken in relation to provocation. There they established that the
522 R  v. Bvme (1960) 2 QB 396 at 403 per Parker LCJ.
523 Unreported. Queensland Supreme Court, 18 September 1981, reasons for sentence, 2, cited in 
Australian Law Reform Commission The Recognition o f Aboriginal Customary Laws (Summary 
Report, Full Report 2 Volumes), Final Report No. 31 Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1986, p.316, n 133.
524 See: Hellon. C.P. ‘Legal and Psychiatric Implications o f Erosion o f Canadian Aboriginal 
Culture’ (1969) 19 University o f Toronto Law Journal 76, cited in Australian Law Reform 
Commission The Recognition o f Aboriginal Customary Laws (Summary Report, Full Report 2 
Volumes), Final Report No. 31 Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986, 
p.316, n 132.
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concept of ‘ordinary5 should be understood to mean ordinary for someone in the 
circumstances of the defendant, i.e. in this case, subject to customary law. To 
establish diminished responsibility in the same circumstances, it would be 
necessary to argue that ‘normal5 was a fixed concept, from which anyone who 
adhered to customary law was departing. If the concept of ‘normal5 were 
understood to mean normal for someone in similar circumstances, it would be 
impossible to establish the defence. Whilst there is little indication that the 
judiciary generally interpret the requirements of the defence in these terms, such 
interpretation would not be without precedent. As already discussed , 
‘customary law5 includes many matters which would not be part of a modernist 
legal system, matters which in such a system would be understood to belong to the 
realm of religion or spirituality. One such matter is ‘spirit killings5 or sorcery 
which remained, at least until relatively recently, quite common in some 
Aboriginal societies and are governed by customary law.526 In the case of R. v. 
Gibson527 Forster J. explicitly analysed such a belief in sorcery in terms of 
diminished responsibility:
“ .. I accept that you felt yourself in danger from spirits who would take 
your kidney fat while you were asleep. Your behaviour has be to a 
considerable extent irrational and although you neither were nor are insane
525 Supra 39-43.
526 The issue of Aboriginal belief in sorcery was raised in the Alwvn Peter case though it was not 
relevant to the decision.
527 Unreported. Northern Territory Supreme Court, 19 November 1974, cited in Australian Law 
Reform Commission Appendix: Cases on Traditional Punishments and Sentencing Sydney: 
Research Paper 6 A, Australian Law Reform Commission, 1982, at 4. See also the discussion of
sorcery in Lemaire. J.E. The Application o f some aspects o f European Law to Aboriginal Natives o f 
Central Australia .ELM.. Thesis, University o f Sydney, 1971, at 118-126.
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in any legal sense, you would, I think, clearly come within the concept of 
diminished responsibility (as it is) known to our law.”528
However, there are very few cases where such an argument is employed, none of 
recent date, and it seems unlikely that it will be used extensively, if at all, in the 
future.
4.4: Conclusion:
The practice of according recognition to customary law in the substantive law 
doctrines of offences and defences is both difficult and controversial. It is 
difficult because the elements of offences and defences are relatively clearly 
defined and there might seem to be little scope for discretion or flexibility. It is 
controversial because the differential application of substantive doctrines seems 
to erode the principle of the rule of law on which the Australian legal system is 
based. The judiciary has shown considerable creativity in fitting customary law 
considerations into these doctrines without undermining the integrity of the 
system. Whilst the defence of provocation has been much the most amenable to 
such developments, there have been some developments in the other areas and 
issues have been identified which might give rise to future recognition. As well 
as an evolving understanding of the interpretation and application of the discrete 
offences and defences,529 it might seem desirable to introduce a specific
529 In customary law cases where both the defendant and the victim are operating under the 
requirements o f that law, it might be possible to raise the defence of consent. However, the
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customary law or cultural defence. Such a defence has been suggested at various 
stages, but never developed. The advantages and disadvantages of the proposal 
will be discussed in the Conclusion.
availability of such a defence is limited: it is not available in cases of homicide or bodily harm. 
There has been very little caselaw on the issue, but see: R. v Barnes (1997) 96 A Crim R 593, R  
v. Minor (1992) 79 NTR 1, R. v. Jungarai (1981) 9 NTR 30. The general law on consent is, in 
any event unclear. The possible extension of the defence o f consent to include indigenous 
punishment on the grounds o f public policy is analogous to the introduction of a customary law 
defence and will be discussed in the Conclusion.
530 Infra 330-331.
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Chapter 5: Judicial use of customary law in sentencing:
5.1: Introduction:
It is in the area of sentencing531 that the judiciary has been most active in 
furthering the recognition and use of customary law within the state legal 
system. There is a variety of reasons for this. First, sentencing is, in any event, 
the stage of the criminal justice process at which the judiciary has the most 
discretion. Whilst there are several accepted aims of sentencing -  retribution, 
deterrence, rehabilitation and the protection of society being the most commonly 
held -  there are very few limits on the way in which the judiciary seeks to 
further those aims within the context of each individual sentence. Generally, the 
legislature provides no guidance, although the permissible range of penalty for a 
given offence may be laid down. However, within the permissible range, a judge 
is free to impose any penalty s/he wishes. This possibility has both 
disadvantages and advantages.
531 For an overview o f the law of sentencing, see any general text, for example: Findlay. M., 
Odgers. S. and Yeo. S. Australian Criminal Justice Melbourne: Oxford University Press, (2nd ed.) 
1999, 237-277. There is a great deal of literature on the sentencing o f Aboriginal offenders, see, 
for example: Nicholson. J. ‘The Sentencing of Aboriginal Offenders’ Criminal Law Journal 
Vol. 23, April 1999, 85-89. There is surprisingly little literature specifically on the effect o f 
customary law on the sentencing, but see, for example: Coles. G. A M atter o f Principle and 
Practice: The Sentencing o f Australian Aborigines in the Northern Territory Supreme Court 
1974-1982 B. Litt. Thesis. Department of Anthropology, Australian National University. 
Canberra, 1983; Sarre. R. Sentencing in Customary Australia in Sarre. R. and Wilson. D. 
Proceedings o f Roundtable on Sentencing and Indigenous Peoples Griffith, ACT: Australian 
Institute of Criminology Research and Public Policy Series No. 16,1998, 7-14.
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The first major disadvantage is the possibility of inconsistency. The principles 
of natural justice would seem to require some consistency in sentencing, that 
two defendants convicted of the same offence in similar circumstances and with 
similar personal profiles ought to receive similar sentences. For it to be 
otherwise is manifestly unjust.532 The second disadvantage is that there is no 
clear policy on the question of quantum of punishment. Whilst consistency 
might be said to involve attaining an appropriate ‘match’ of defendants, 
quantum is concerned with the ‘match’ between the severity of the offence and 
the sentence imposed: a serious offence should, in general, receive a severe 
penalty. However, it is submitted that neither considerations of consistency nor 
of quantum require that the judiciary’s discretion be fettered. The major 
advantage to the discretion enjoyed by the judges is the ability to impose a 
sentence which is appropriate to the defendant before them. The exercise of this 
discretion is a difficult undertaking, not least because the aims described above, 
which the sentence is intended to further, may often be in conflict. The judge 
then, must weigh up all the factors in a given case, consider any statutory 
restrictions which are set in respect of the range of penalties for the offence 
involved, balance the relevant sentencing aims and come to a decision as to the 
appropriate sentence. The complexity of the process is one of the strongest 
arguments for the maintenance of the widest possible area of discretion for the 
judiciary. Of course there are occasionally aberrant decisions, but remarkably 
few. The most important factor in the judicial process of sentencing is, for the
532 The importance o f consistency was stressed in the case of R. v. Lowe (1984) 154 CLR 606 
where Mason J. spelled out clearly that inconsistency offended against the principles of equality 
before the law, at 610-611.
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purposes of the Thesis, the way in which facts about the defendant -  and 
possibly the circumstances of the offence - are taken into account.
The rules on sentencing do not provide for differential treatment of Aborigines.533 
In the absence of such specific provision, any differential sentencing must be 
justifiable under the general rules. Whilst the basic position is that everyone should 
receive equal treatment under the law, the judiciary is able to use the discretion 
outlined above to take into account that the defendant is an Aborigine. However, 
judges may not, even when exercising discretion, act arbitrarily and, therefore, the 
use of customary law would seem to require a coherent and consistent explanation 
and an at least basic framework within which decisions can be made. The judiciary 
has devised various rationales for such a use: the rationales, and indeed the 
methods of putting them into practice, have differed from time to time apparently 
in response to prevailing political and cultural mores. There are essentially three 
bases534 for using customary law in this way. Two of these rationales involve using 
different criteria in sentencing an Aborigine from those used in sentencing a white 
person for the same offence.535 This may be done by using either Aboriginally per
533 There has been such provision in the past. See especially the Northern Territory Crimes 
Ordinance. 1934, and The Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance. 1939, which abolished the 
mandatory death penalty for Aborigines convicted of murder and allowed for differential 
sentencing by the provisions of s.6A. This was repealed in 1983 by the Northern Territory 
Criminal Code Act.
534 It should be noted that there are many possible frameworks within which the judgments of the 
Courts can be analysed. Many of the factors involved in the different rationales overlap and 
frequently more than one is present in the same case.
535 Whilst the focus of the Thesis is on the Northern Territory, it should be noted that other 
Australian jurisdictions have encountered the same difficulties in making sentencing decisions in 
respect of Aboriginal offenders. This is particularly so in Western Australia and Queensland which 
also have a large number and, at least in the case of Western Australia a high percentage, of 
traditionally oriented peoples. Reference to these decisions will be made where relevant. The same 
issues have also arisen in jurisdictions outside Australia: see, for example: Newton Cain. T.
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se or ‘factors associated with Aborigmality’ as criteria in deciding a sentence. The 
third is to take account of customary law as a relevant factor in itself (rather than as 
a factor associated with Aboriginality) in the sentencing process.536
5.2: Aboriginalitv per se in sentencing:
The consistent use of Aboriginality per se as a factor in sentencing in the 
Northern Territory began with Kriewaldt J. It is clear that from the earliest point 
of European settlement of the Northern Territory until at least the 1940's, 
Aborigines had received harsher treatment from the Northern Territory judicial 
system than did white people.537 Wells J. was appointed to the Supreme Court in 
1933 and remained on the bench until succeeded by Kriewaldt. The jury system 
had been suspended538 in all but capital cases prior to his arrival, and, therefore, 
his remit and influence were immense. Wells had little understanding of, or 
sympathy with, Aborigines.539 This was amply demonstrated in two notorious
‘Convergence or Clash? The Recognition of Customary Law and Practice in Sentencing Decisions 
of the Courts of the Pacific Island Region’ Melbourne Journal o f International Law Vol. 2 (2001) 
48-68.
536 It is possible to analyse the caselaw in various ways. Thus, customary law may be treated as a 
factor to be taken into account in sentencing per se or it may be treated as a factor associated with 
Aboriginality. In one sense, this is not a question of differential criteria as a white person will not be 
subject to customary law. However, it could be argued that in taking into account a non-state 
normative system which weighs upon a defendant, the judiciary is treating an Aborigine who 
adheres to customary law differently from, say, a Muslim who follows the tenets o f Islamic law.
537 See: Markus. A  Governing Savages North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990, especially Chapter 7 
‘The Judge’.
538 Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1933 (NT)
539 The lack of complete reports for this period makes it impossible to deal with Wells’ judgments in 
a systematic manner, but his decisions in two particular cases are widely known . Whilst these two 
cases are not sufficient in themselves to draw any definite conclusions about his attitudes, they are 
presumably indicative. There are no verbatim reports of the proceedings of the Northern Territory 
Supreme Court available for the period 1933-1938. The only accounts, therefore, are from 
newspaper reports and the judge’s notes. On the career of Wells generally, see: Markus. A ‘The
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cases. In the Borroloola case Constable Stott was charged with common assault 
on an Aboriginal woman who had been in his custody and who had 
subsequently died. The prosecution came as the culmination of a long saga over 
Stott’s treatment of Aboriginal prisoners, including a previous prosecution and 
acquittal, and there was considerable evidence against him. Moreover, the 
Aboriginal evidence was accepted by a number of prominent white people. Due 
to the public concern at the apparent unwillingness to investigate, and if 
necessaiy punish, Stott’s activities, the Minister for the Interior had given 
instructions to the Administrator of the Northern Territory that every witness 
who could testify against Stott should be called. Wells, however, stopped the 
trial and declined to receive all the evidence. In the Tuckiar case the defendant 
was convicted of murdering a police constable. There appear to have been a 
number of irregularities in Wells’ conduct of the trial which led to the Crown 
appealing to the High Court on behalf of Tuckiar. The High Court ruled 
unanimously540 that the verdict should be overturned.
These cases demonstrate the inadequate standards of justice offered to 
Aborigines prior to the appointment of Kriewaldt. As already discussed, when 
Kriewaldt was appointed to the bench he attempted to ensure that Aborigines 
were given fair treatment and showed an understanding, however unfortunately 
expressed, that real equality might require differential treatment. An
Impartiality o f the Bench’: Judge Wells and the Northern Territory Aborigines 1933-1938’ in Kirby. 
D. (ed.) Law and History in Australia Vol. VUI .1987, at 109-122, from which the following 
accounts are substantially taken.
540 Tuckiar v. The King (1934) 52 CLR 335.
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examination of his judgments reveals his basic thinking. At that time, many 
people -  including some of the judiciary, as has been demonstrated in the case 
of Wells -  were not concerned about equality before the law in relation to 
Aborigines. Kriewaldt repeatedly asserted that they were entitled to the same 
treatment as white defendants. This understanding informed his sentencing 
practice, as it informed his application of the doctrine of provocation, and the 
same issues arise. Thus, when he wanted to use different criteria in sentencing 
Aborigines, either generally or by taking customary law into account, he 
encountered problems in justifying the practice. This led him to use the same 
type of reasoning as that which he had used in relation to provocation: 
essentially, Aborigines were not as ‘civilised’541 as white people and, therefore, 
allowance must be made until they reached the same standards. The reasoning is 
analogous to applying differing standards and requirements to children in legal 
matters: this practice is not considered to breach equality before the law 
principles, but as the children grow towards adulthood they will progressively 
be judged by the same criteria as other adults. In making this argument 
Kriewaldt was taking account of the fact of Aboriginality per se, that is, the 
defendant was to be treated differently simply because s/he was an Aborigine.
Having justified differential treatment in principle, the question arose of how to 
assess whether an individual Aborigine had need of such treatment. This was done
541 The notion was common in various areas of life, but perhaps most commonly held in the beliefs 
that Aborigines were more sexually promiscuous and more prone to violence than were white 
people. The combination of these two beliefs has often led to the unfortunate belief that domestic 
violence and even rape are less serious matters in Aboriginal society than in white society.
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by reference to a continuum of contact with white society. The more contact the 
Aborigine had experienced, the less likely that s/he would be treated differently or 
the less the permissible difference in treatment. Conversely, the less contact, the 
greater the likely differentiation in treatment. The first reported case in which 
Kriewaldt sets out clearly the continuum approach was R. v. Anderson542 in 1954. 
Anderson was convicted of various sexual offences perpetrated against a white 
woman. The interest of the case for present purposes lies in the sentencing 
remarks. Kriewaldt pointed out that the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance. 
1939, which required judges to take cognisance of the fact that a defendant charged 
with murder was an Aborigine and to hear any relevant native law and custom, 
gave him authority in such a case to impose any penalty which seemed to him to 
be just and proper. Apart from that instance, the law drew no distinction on the 
grounds of colour or race as to guilt or punishment. In other words, there was no 
authority in the present case, which was not one of murder, for differential 
treatment. However, Kriewaldt said that he had always taken account of such 
evidence whatever the charge before him:
“In every case where I have been under a duty to pass sentence on a 
native, irrespective of the charge, I have heard such evidence as has been 
available throwing light on the background and upbringing of the native. 
Where tribal law or custom might possibly be relevant I have in every 
case endeavoured to inform my mind on these topics either by hearing
542 (1951-1976) NTJ 240.
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evidence in Court or perusing any material available to me which 
seemed to bear on the point.”543
In the present case, Anderson had been described as ‘sophisticated’ and 
‘substantially civilised’544 and the only mitigating factor deemed to be present 
was his consumption of alcohol. Kriewaldt also pointed out that it had generally 
been his practice to impose a lesser sentence on an Aboriginal offender than if 
s/he had been white. This was so even when, as in the present case, there was no 
element of customary law and the consideration of Anderson’s Aboriginality 
appears to be of his Aboriginality per se. However, in all the cases which had 
come before Kriewaldt prior to the present one, the victim had also been wholly 
or partly Aboriginal. The present case raised the question as to whether the 
practice should be followed when the victim of the offence was white. In reply 
to that question Kriewaldt enunciated two general principles for sentencing 
Aborigines:
1. an Aborigine, by reason his (sic.) colour, should never receive a heavier 
sentence than would a white accused; his colour may work to his 
advantage but never against him
2. the extent to which the accused has adopted white manners and customs 
is relevant in sentencing; the nearer he is to living as a white, the nearer
543 At 248.
544 At 249.
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his sentence should be to that which would be imposed on a white 
accused.545
These principles provided the baseline for many of Kriewaldt’s subsequent 
judgments, for example, in R. v. Aboriginal Roy Pananka546. In this case 
Kriewaldt took the opportunity to apply them to a case where the victim was 
also an Aborigine. He stressed that in this case both the defendant and his 
community had a sufficient understanding of what he had done and why he was 
being punished. The matter could, therefore, be dealt with in the same way and 
sentence passed as if the defendant were white, but subject to the criteria in 
Anderson. Kriewaldt pointed out that although the injuries inflicted were of the 
type which would be inflicted in a case of payback, there was no element of 
customary law involved and the motive was simply ill temper, aggravated by 
alcohol. Nor was there any element of background sufficient to mitigate 
sentence.547
545 At 249.
546 (1951-1976) NTJ 453.
547 Kriewaldt also made some interesting remarks about the Aboriginal concept of time and how 
this affects the question o f sentencing: at 454. He acknowledged that as the Aboriginal concept of 
time was different, a short sentence is probably as useful as a long one. On this point, see also: 
The Queen v. Nadiji Tialpaltiari. Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, Alice Springs, 
Blackburn J., No. 3223 of 1969, 17-18 September, 1968. Unreported. Cited in Lawrence. J. The 
Sentencing o f Aboriginal Offenders in the Northern Territory Unpublished, undated paper, at 11. 
In this case it was submitted that to impose a custodial sentence on the defendant was, in reality, 
to impose a sentence o f solitary confinement as he would be unable to communicate with anyone 
and because o f the distance from his family and community. The argument that, certainly in the 
case o f traditionally-oriented Aborigines, a long sentence is not necessarily more effective than a 
short one is now widely accepted.
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As the concept of equality of races became more commonly accepted, 
Kriewaldt’s continuum of civilisation became, in its turn, unacceptable. It was 
increasingly argued that there should be no difference in treatment: equality was 
understood to mean uniformity.548 This led to the conclusion that Aboriginality 
per se should not be taken into account when dealing with a defendant. Indeed 
the consideration of Aboriginality per se could itself be a breach of the law.549 It 
was, and to an extent still is, widely believed that, in general, race, sex and class 
should not be taken into account in sentencing for the obvious reason that 
unacceptable discrimination may result. This approach has been called 
“deceptively simple”550 and it certainly needs qualification otherwise it fails to 
take account of structural injustice and racism.551 As the unease with taking 
account of Aboriginality per se increased, the judiciary began to develop the 
second basis for the use of customary law in sentencing: the consideration of 
‘factors associated with Aboriginality’.
548 See Chapter 2 for discussion o f the rule of law, equality, and the circumstances in which 
discrimination and/or affirmative action are permissible.
549 See Mark Rogers and Albert Murray (1989) 44 A Crim. R 301 infra 247-248.
550 Zdenowski. G. ‘Contemporary Sentencing Issues’ in The Australian Criminal Justice System: 
The M id 1990's Chappell. D. and Wilson. P. (eds.) Sydney: Butterworths, 1994, 171-212.
551 Zdenowski points out that this approach has been favoured by the Australian Law Reform 
Commission, albeit with qualification, at least in relation to sex and race: see: Sentencing 
Canberra: Report 44, Australian Law Reform Commission, 1988. The Discussion Paper 30 had 
argued in favour of Aboriginality as a mitigating factor in sentencing, but this argument was 
rejected in the final Report. The reasoning behind the suggestion was that such an acceptance was 
the only way o f recognising the unique position of Aborigines and the inherent differences in 
thought, action and motivation, and that its acceptance as a factor to be considered specifically 
draws these problems to the attention of a sentencing body, and, moreover, that it is an attempt to 
redress two hundred years of negative discrimination, cited in Zdenowski. G. supra n 550 at 179- 
180.
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5.3: Factors associated with Aboriginality:
The most frequent rationale for the use of differential sentencing criteria in 
recent years has been that many Aborigines come from situations of economic 
and social disadvantage. In this respect they are in the same position as any 
group suffering similarly. Taking account of such disadvantage, often by 
explicit reference to ethnicity or culture, enables the judiciary to make partial 
redress for, or at least to mitigate, systemic injustice. In this way something 
approaching justice may be done whilst the integrity of the principles of the rule 
of law are preserved. This rationale will be applicable to any defendant from an 
ethnic or cultural background which is perceived to be less advantaged than that 
of the majority.
This shift in emphasis from Aboriginality per se to factors associated with 
Aboriginality was discussed in Neal v. The Queen552. Neal was convicted of 
unlawful assault and unlawful entry on to property and eventually appealed to 
the High Court of Australia. Whilst the greater part of the judgments deal with 
technicalities which are not material here, they also contain discussion of 
‘factors associated with Aboriginality’ and the effect of such factors in 
sentencing. The Court found that the original sentence had failed to take account 
of the conditions on Aboriginal reserves and the general climate of race relations
552 (1982) 42 ALR 609 This case is of particular importance as it went to the High Court, the 
highest Court in Australia. Comments made by that the High Court will be o f general 
applicability, unless on a matter peculiar to one jurisdiction. For discussion of the political 
context of the case, see: Chesterman. J. and Villaflor. G. ‘Mr. Neal’s Invasion: Behind an 
Indigenous Rights Case? Australian Journal o f Law and Society (2000-2001) 15, 90-100.
264
which constituted a “special mitigating factor”553. However, Brennan J. stressed 
that whilst factors associated with Aboriginality could, as in the present case, be 
mitigating factors554, Aboriginality per se was no ground for differential 
treatment:
“The same sentencing principles are to be applied, of course, in every 
case, irrespective of the identity of a particular offender or his 
membership of an ethnic or other group.”555
Neal was applied in the case of Rogers and Murray556 in 1989. This case 
involved applications by Mark Rogers and Albert Murray for leave to appeal 
against sentence. They had committed separate offences, but the applications 
were heard together as they raised similar issues relating to the treatment of 
Aboriginal offenders from remote areas. The Court accepted that the racial 
origin of the applicants -  i.e. Aboriginality per se - was irrelevant, but that there 
was the possibility of special mitigating factors which operated by reason of 
their Aboriginality. Malcolm CJ. made very similar points to those made in 
Neal:
“It follows from this that the sentencing principles to be applied in 
relation to a sexual offence committed by an Aboriginal must be the 
same as those in any other case. It is apparent, however, that there may
553 Per Murphy J. at 617, citing R. v. Alwvn Peter supra n 523.
554 “But in imposing sentences Courts are bound to take into account, in accordance with those 
principles, all material factors including those factors which exist only by reason of the offender's 
membership of an ethnic or other group. So much is essential to the even administration of 
criminal justice” at 626.
555 At 626.
556 (1989) 44 A Crim. R. 301. This is a Western Australian case but has been referred to and 
followed in several Northern Territory cases.
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well be particular matters which the court must take into account, in 
applying those principles, which are mitigating factors applicable to the 
particular offender. These include social, economic or other 
disadvantages which may be associated with or related to a particular 
offender's membership of the Aboriginal race.”557
Rogers had pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault. He was a young man of 
eighteen and a full-blooded tribal Aborigine with little education or experience 
of town life. It was accepted that he was unused to alcohol and that the fact that 
he was influenced by alcohol at the time of the offence was relevant.
fCO
Drunkenness will not usually serve to mitigate. It can, however, be relevant in 
the case of Aborigines in that the circumstances which lead to the widespread 
misuse of alcohol in some Aboriginal communities may themselves be 
mitigation.559 Rogers’ sentence was reduced. The case of Murray was 
considered by the Court to be of a different order. He was a twenty-six year old 
Aboriginal man who had committed a sexual offence after consuming a great 
deal of alcohol. He pleaded guilty to sexual assault. In his case, although leave 
to appeal was granted, the appeal was dismissed.
557 At 307.
558 See supra 245-248 on intoxication.
559 Malcolm cited, inter alia, Campbell C. J. in the Court of Criminal Appeal in Queensland in 
Ellen Dawn Friday (1985) 14 A Crim. R 471. In that case, the respondent had stabbed her 
brother and been convicted o f manslaughter. Both parties were under the influence o f alcohol. 
Campbell said:
“Crimes o f violence by Aborigines, when they occur on Aboriginal reserves and after the 
consumption of alcohol, have been dealt with by the courts in this State more leniently or 
sympathetically than has been the case with offences of a similar nature committed by 
Europeans and people o f non-Aboriginal extraction.” at 472.
Concern was expressed in Friday, as elsewhere, that leniency for the Aboriginal offender might 
result in injustice for the Aboriginal victim. See also, for example, Kathleen Jean Bulmer and 
Others (1987) 25 A Crim. R 155, per Derrington J. at 162.
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The list of factors which may be taken into account is not closed, but it certainly 
includes560 abuse of alcohol caused by deprivation561, the background of the 
defendant562, the remoteness of the defendant’s place of residence563, the 
prevalence of violence in Aboriginal communities564, that the effect of a 
custodial sentence would be unduly harsh given the background of the 
defendant565, and most relevant for the purposes of the Thesis, Aboriginal 
customary law. The last factor will be considered in detail in this Chapter. 
However, it should be noted at this point that there are difficulties in the 
inclusion of a defendant’s adherence to customary law on such a list. Such 
adherence is not a disadvantage, it is simply a difference. Moreover, the use of 
customary law in mitigation, a frequent practice in colonial territories, is 
premised on the right of the state legal system to determine the nature of 
offences and consequent sanctions. Many of those governed by customary law 
would not accept this premise. The Papua New Guinea Law Reform 
Commission, for example, rejected such use and argued for a customary law 
defence:
“We reject this solution because we believe it unacceptable that a 
person who is innocent in the eyes of his people in his community
560 The caselaw of the Northern Territory is very similar in this respect to that of the other 
jurisdictions in Australia and, therefore, caselaw from those other jurisdictions will be cited 
where appropriate.
561 R. v. Jabanunga supra n 519; R. v. Sampson (1984) 68 FLR 331.
562 R  v. Herbert (1983) 23 NTR 22; R  v Sampson (1984) 68 FLR 331; Neal v. The Queen (1982) 
149 CLR 305; Houghasen v. Charra (1989) 50 SASR 419; R  v. Yougie (1987) 33 A Crim R 301.
563 Leech v. Peters (1988) 4 A Crim R 350.
564 R. v. Yougie (1987) 33 A Crim R 301.
565 R  v. Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58; R  v. Tjami (2000) 77 SASR 232; Ingomar v. Police 
(1988) 72 SASR 232.
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and well believes he is doing right should be convicted of an 
offence”566
It should be noted, however, that whilst the usual effect of taking account of factors 
associated with Aboriginality is to mitigate, this will not always be so. Such factors 
will not mitigate if, for example, the Court considers that a deterrent sentence is 
necessary. The most frequent reason for such a sentence is to discourage violence, 
usually aggravated by alcohol and often inflicted on members of the defendant’s 
own family, particularly women and, more rarely, children. The fact that the need 
for deterrence will defeat the otherwise mitigating effect of many of the factors 
associated with Aboriginality has frequently been recognised by the Courts.567 In
366 Papua New Guinea Law Reform Commission The Role o f Customary Law in the Legal System 
Report No. 7, Waigani, 1977, at 60. See Conclusion on customary law defences.
367 See, for example: R. v. Wurramara (1999) 105 A Crim R; R. v. Daniel (1998) 1 Qd R 499; IL 
v. Friday (1984) 14 A Crim R 471; R. v. Bulmer (1986) 25 A Crim R 155. There is a serious 
problem of domestic violence in many Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory. Any 
study o f the Sentencing Remarks of the judiciary will demonstrate the frequency with which 
such violence occurs: see, for example: R. v. Ronald Patrick Campbell Transcript of 
Proceedings, Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, SCC No. 20107500, Martin CJ., 10 May 
2002; R. v. Basil Jurra Transcript o f Proceedings, Supreme Court o f the Northern Territory, SCC 
No. 20214870 and 20307902, Mildren J., 14 October 2003; R. v. Joshua Edwards Transcript of 
Proceedings, Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, SCC No. 20215110, Bailey. J., 19 
December 2003; R. v. Tonv Connelly Transcript of Proceedings, Supreme Court of the Northern 
Territory, SCC No. 20325778, Olsson AJ., 9 September 2004. On domestic violence, see: 
Larsen. A-C. and Petersen. A  ‘Rethinking Responses to ‘domestic violence’ in Australian 
Indigenous Communities’ Journal o f Social Welfare and Family Law 23(2) 2001, 121-134; 
Greer. P. ‘Aboriginal Women and Domestic Violence in New South Wales’ in Stubbs. J. (ed.) 
Women, Male Violence and the Law Sydney: Institute of Criminology Monograph Series No. 6, 
Institute of Criminology, Sydney University Law School, 1994, 64-78; Atkinson. J. ‘Violence 
against Aboriginal Women: Reconstitution o f Community Law -  the Way Forward’ (2001) 
Indigenous Law Bulletin 62; Rogers. N. ‘Bush Women confront Male Violence’ Alternative Law 
Journal Vol. 22, No. 2, April 1997, 99-101; Spowart. H. and Neil. R  ‘Stop in the Name of Love: 
Reality and Rhetoric in the Domestic Violence Debate’ Alternative Law Journal Vol. 22, No. 2, 
April 1997, 81-85; Randall. M. ‘Domestic Violence: Uniting Law and Community-based Strategies’ 
Alternative Law Journal/Aboriginal Law Bulletin Vol. 20, No.l/Vol. 3, No.72, February 1995, 3-6; 
Upton. J.C.R ‘By Violence, By Silence, By Control: The Marginalization of Aboriginal Women 
under White and ‘Black’ Law” Melbourne University Law Review Vol. 18, December 1992, 867- 
873; Thomas. C. and Selfe. J. ‘Aboriginal Women and the Law’ Aboriginal Justice Issues Canberra: 
Conference Proceedings 21, Australian Institute of Criminology, 1992; University of New South
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rare cases, the fact that the defendant is an Aborigine will not only not mitigate, but 
may result in the imposition of a more severe sentence on the grounds, at least 
partly of her/his Aboriginality.568
It would be interesting to see how the Anderson and Pananka cases decided by 
Kriewaldt would be decided today, or perhaps more accurately how the 
decisions would be reached as there is no reason to believe that the result would 
be any different. The obvious way would be to argue that the lack of 
‘education’, or in Kriewaldt’s terminology, ‘civilisation’, would amount to the 
factors mentioned by Malcolm in Rogers and Murray. However, it is not easy to 
determine the dividing line between Aboriginality per se and factors associated 
with Aboriginality. Moreover, the difference between the two concepts is not
Wales ‘Forum: Family Violence in Indigenous Communities: Breaking the Silence’ University o f
New South Wales Law Journal Vol. 8, No. 1, 2-23; Paxman M. & Corbett H.‘Listen to Us:
Aboriginal Women and the White Law’ Criminology Australia Vol. 5, No.3, Jan/Feb. 1994, 2-6;
Bolger. A  Aboriginal Women and Violence: Report for the Criminology Research Council and the
Northern Territory Commissioner o f Police Darwin: Australian National University, North
Australia Research Unit, 1991; Cunneen. C. and Kerley. K. ‘Indigenous Women and Criminal
justice: Some Comments on the Australian Situation’ in Hazlehurst. K.M. (ed.) Perceptions o f
Justice: Issues in Indigenous and Community Empowerment Aldershot: Avebury, 1995, 71-93, at
86-88. On the role and position of women in Aboriginal society, see: Bell. D. ‘Aboriginal Women
and the Recognition o f Customary Law in Australia’ in Morse. B.W. and Woodman. G.R. (eds.)
Indigenous Law and the State Dordrecht: Foris, 1988, at 297-313, and ‘Considering Gender: Are
Human Rights for Women too? An Australian Case’ in An-Na’im. A  A  Human Rights in Cross-
Cultural Perspectives: Quest fo r Consensus Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992,
339-362; Burbank. V.K. Fighting Women: Anger and Aggression in Aboriginal Australia Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1994; Payne. S. ‘Aboriginal Women and the Law’ in Easteal. P.W.
& McKillop. S. (eds.) Women and the Law Australian Institute o f Criminology Conference
Proceedings No. 16, 1991 at 65-74.
568 In this context the case of Jabanunga v. Williams (1980) 6 NTR 19 is interesting. The 
appellant had been convicted of possession of two cans of beer at Warrabri, a restricted alcohol 
area. On appeal Muirhead J. cited with approval the remarks of the Magistrate on sentencing:
“‘This community has chosen to have that legislation incorporated to protect the 
Warrabri community. It is very special in that regard. It is very important that courts are 
seen to apply this legislation strongly. ... I propose to impose very heavy fines, fines 
higher than I would normally impose, but I feel that this legislation is o f a special 
character. The courts have to give it every possible chance of succeeding.’” at 21.
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always made clear and terms are used loosely and interchangeably. Thus, for 
example, Toohey J. says569:
“Aboriginality may in some cases mean little more than the conditions in 
which the offender lives. In other cases it may be the very reason why 
the offence was committed. It is demeaning to Aborigines to suggest that 
somehow their Aboriginality is necessarily a mitigating 
circumstance.”570
In making this argument he does not distinguish between Aboriginality per se 
and factors associated with Aboriginality. However, it is undeniable that the use 
of Aboriginality or factors associated with it in sentencing considerations 
usually either has no effect or operates to mitigate. It is interesting to note that 
most of the recent cases attempting to expound and list the grounds for 
differential treatment of Aborigines come from jurisdictions other than the 
Northern Territory. In the Northern Territory the position has seemingly been 
accepted for so long that it no longer requires explanation or justification. Thus, 
Mildren J. in Gadatiiva v. Lethbridge571 in 1992 says quite simply:
“ .. the appellant is an Aboriginal and is a member of a section of the
579community for whom special leniency has always been shown”.
569 Toohey. J. The Sentencing o f Aboriginal Offenders Paper given to 2nd International Criminal
Law Congress. June, 1988.
570
571
572
At 21.
(1992) 106 FLR 265. 
At 273.
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5.4: Customary law ver se as a factor in sentencing:
The relevance of the defendant’s adherence to customary law to sentencing arises 
in various ways, most frequently in connection with the administration of payback. 
Customary law punishment, payback, is essentially retribution for a tribal wrong. It 
may be executed by the relatives of the victim or by other members of the 
community. In most, if not all, cases it is discussed and takes a particular form. 
Until it is administered the matter remains unresolved. Once administered, the 
matter is finished and harmony restored to the community. The issue of the 
relevance which payback should have for sentencing gives rise to several different 
issues: first, if payback has already been undergone, should it be taken into account 
in the sentencing process in order to avoid double punishment?; second, if it is still 
to be undergone, should it be taken into account?; third, if the act of payback is 
illegal, are the Courts condoning illegality by taking it into account?; fourth, should 
the perpetrators of the payback be prosecuted if it is an illegal act?; fifth, which 
factors should be considered in deciding how and whether it should be taken into 
account -  for example, the views of the community?; how can the Court be certain 
that a prospective payback which has been taken into account will happen? Each of 
these questions is considered in the caselaw which will be discussed in some detail. 
There will inevitably be some overlap in the analysis of the various issues as the 
cases often raise more than one.573
573 The issue o f payback is not, of course, peculiar to Australia. It is of particular importance in 
Papua New Guinea. However, consideration of that jurisprudence and literature is beyond the scope 
of the Thesis.
271
The beginnings of systematic judicial consideration of the relevance of payback 
to sentencing in the Northern Territory are to be found, unsurprisingly, in 
Kriewaldt’s judgements. In this situation, the question is not should different 
standards be used when - in the application of the same law - sentencing 
Aboriginal defendants from those used when sentencing white defendants, but 
whether a law which is not part of the state system may be considered at all 
within that system. Kriewaldt was prepared to consider payback at the stage of 
sentencing, but was clear that it was not relevant to the verdict.
i. Payback administered by the defendant:
The situation where the defendant is being sentenced for an offence the 
substance of which was the administration of payback, is relatively 
straightforward. According to statute574 the only way in which customary law 
could be taken into account in Kriewaldt’s time was by considering it as 
evidence in deciding on a sentence for a charge of murder. He was apparently 
prepared to take it into account in circumstances other than those authorised by 
the statute. Thus, he was prepared to hear evidence as to the customary law on 
payback in order to make decisions about sentence, but, in accordance with the 
substantive law discussed in Chapter 4, he considered that it was unlikely to be 
relevant in the determination of an offence or defence. This is spelled out very 
clearly in R. v. Aboriginal Timmy575 and reiterated in R. v. Aboriginal Jack
574 Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance supra 533.
575 (1951-1976) NTJ 676 at 677.
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Wheeler576 where he again stated that customary law, in this case payback, does 
not provide a defence.577
The difference between what may be taken into account at the stage of verdict 
and what may be taken into account at sentencing was clearly demonstrated in 
the 1953 case of R. v. Aboriginal Charlie Mulparinga (No. 2)578. The defendant 
had, at the order of the tribal elders, killed the deceased for a breach of 
customary law. Kriewaldt held that, as an Aborigine must be tried under the 
same law as a white person, the fact that the killing had taken place at the order 
of the elders was no defence as it would not be a defence for a white person. Nor
576 No. 36 of 1959. Unreported.
577 However, in this case he points out that payback may be relevant to a verdict not because it is 
a defence in itself but because it may be relevant in establishing the elements of an offence or 
defence. Here, the state of mind of the accused was relevant in determining whether he was 
guilty o f murder or manslaughter. In his summing up, Kriewaldt says:
“I would also suggest that you may take another view entirely, namely that the accused 
did not intend to do any more than inflict a wound of the type commonly inflicted by 
natives when there is a payback. ... I f ... you ... think it more likely that the intent was 
merely to inflict a wound within the limits permitted by native custom then you are up 
against a problem. You may say, with perfect fairness, that even a wound of that kind 
falls within the concept of grievous bodily harm. If you do take that view, the proper 
verdict is one o f murder. Equally fairly you may say a wound of that kind among 
Aborigines is so commonly inflicted, and has so little effect, that it is not fair to regard 
a wound of that description as amounting, amongst Aborigines, to grievous bodily 
harm. In those circumstances, the proper verdict is not murder but manslaughter.” 
Kriewaldt is saying that action which may be assumed to display the necessary elements of intent to 
establish murder if carried out by a white person, or by an Aborigine when not sanctioned by 
customary law, need not necessarily be taken as establishing the same intent when carried out by an 
Aborigine as an act of payback in accordance with such law. It goes without saying that this analysis 
may only be applied when the defendant is acting under customary law and not simply to any 
violence between Aborigines. This point is reaffirmed in other cases. See, for example: R. and 
Wogala (alias Dick) unreported: R. v. Aboriginal Nelson (1951-1976) NTJ 327. The argument to be 
made in the cases where he appears to have taken it into account in terms of establishing offences or 
defences is, of course, not that he considered different elements - such as customary law - in the 
application of the substantive law, but that the presence or absence of elements were judged by 
different standards, i.e. the mens rea for murder is the same for an Aborigine acting under customary 
law as it is for a white person but the presence o f customary law constraints may enable a different 
interpretation of facts in establishing the presence of mens rea. Would the outcome have been 
different if Aboriginal Timmy had said “I meant to kill”? See Chapter 4 on this point.
578 (1953) NTJ 219.
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was it a defence579 that had he not obeyed the orders of the tribal elders he 
would himself have been killed. It was, however, relevant to sentencing. The 
jury found the defendant guilty of murder and Kriewaldt sentenced him to 
imprisonment with hard labour for eighteen months. His remarks on passing 
sentence are instructive as to the principles to be applied in fixing sentence in 
such cases. He states that he has received evidence from two expert witnesses 
since the verdict and he has taken this into account. He asserts that the main 
objects of punishment are retribution, reformation and deterrence, but that he 
considers that the facts of the present case make punishment on the first two 
grounds unnecessary. However, he does believe that there is a ground for 
punishing in order to deter others from similar acts.
ii. Payback suffered bv the defendant:
Payback either undergone or to be undergone by the defendant was, according to 
Kriewaldt, also irrelevant to the verdict. He spells this out clearly in several 
cases. In R. v. Aboriginal Wallv. for example, he says in summing up to the 
jury: “The second matter you are to disregard is this: that the accused has 
already been punished or that he will be punished by his tribe if he ever returns 
to it.” 580
579 There was no argument on the possibility o f establishing duress.
580 R. v. Aboriginal Wallv (1951-19761 NTJ 21; see also R. v. Aboriginal Patipatu (1951-1976) 
NTJ 18.
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After Kriewaldt’s death there was a considerable period with apparently almost 
no caselaw -  or at least no reported caselaw - in this area.581 A major factor was 
almost certainly the inadequacy of the record keeping of the Northern Territory 
Supreme Court during the relevant years which means that there may have been 
some cases which it was impossible to trace. Whatever the reasons, there is little 
or no available jurisprudence on the issues until the mid to late 1970’s.582
Kriewaldt’s position was clear and largely consistent. There was one law which 
was to be applied to all, though application may involve differential treatment. 
Payback may be relevant in considering the application of the law, but only with
581 It has been suggested that the judges who followed Kriewaldt were not only less interested in 
Aborigines than was he, but also less interested than they should have been. Interview with Jon 
Tippett, Northern Territory Bar. 2 September 1994.
The work done by the Australian Law Reform Commission in preparation for the The 
Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws (Summary Report, Full Report 2 Volumes), Final 
Report No. 31 Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986. The research 
undertaken on the caselaw relating to traditional punishments and sentencing published in 
September, 1982 - Appendix: Cases on Traditional Punishments and Sentencing Sydney: Research 
Paper 6 A, Australian Law Reform Commission, 1982 - covers a selection o f cases from the period 
1974-1982. The forty-seven cases are overwhelmingly from the Northern Territory, although 
there are two from South Australia and three from Western Australia; only four of the cases are 
from lower Courts, i.e. Courts o f Summary Jurisdiction; only cases where there has been some 
substantial discussion o f the issues are included; and the cases are all from the period 1974- 
1982, except one Western Australian case from 1965. The Commission explains how the cases 
were selected. The fact that the preponderance of cases is from the Northern territory does not 
mean that there are no other cases in other jurisdictions, simply that the Commission has not 
been made aware of them. It had had access to the transcripts of all Northern Territory Supreme 
Courts cases (reported or unreported) whereas it had not had the same access to the transcripts 
from other jurisdictions. There is no explanation of why this was so. The Commission says that 
it has had access to such Northern Territory transcripts “in recent years” (at 2), but there is again 
no indication of what is meant by “recent” nor indeed why that is so. It is possible, of course, 
that there were an equal number of cases in the years before 1974 and the Commission did not 
have access to them but this seems unlikely. The only other point which they make in terms of 
the period covered is that they have chosen to concentrate on this period because such decisions 
as are available from earlier periods are based on outmoded thinking and attitudes towards 
Aborigines, such as assimilation. They therefore considered that those decisions were not 
relevant to the inquiry which should be against the background of current thinking on 
Aborigines’ rights. However, the fact that they say: “earlier cases - for example, decisions of the 
Northern Territory Supreme Court in the 1950’s - are sometimes available” (at 2) suggests that 
the earlier decisions which were available to them and which they chose not to use were those of 
Kriewaldt. It is true that they do not actually state that there is nothing available between 1960 
and 1974, but this does not seem an unreasonable inference.
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regard to sentencing not, in general, with regard to verdict. On the whole, that 
has remained the position of the Courts who will still not apply customary law 
in preference to state law except in very limited cases. However, it is arguable 
that they have so far extended the ways in which customary law in general, and 
payback in particular, are taken into account that this amounts to at least partial 
recognition of the law. If sufficient weight given is given to a customary law 
factor in sentencing, the result may be that the application of the state law has 
little or no effect on the defendant. If this is so, whilst the theoretical position of 
one law applicable to all is maintained, the reality is that two are laws operating 
even though one does so only by the ‘permission’ of the other.
iii. Recent developments in the practice of the Courts in assessing the relevance 
of payback:
By the early 1980’s payback was again coming to prominence before the Courts 
but against a very different political and social background. There are relatively 
few reported cases, but they - and the unreported decisions and sentencing remarks 
- show attitudes and reasoning significantly different from those displayed by 
Kriewaldt in the 1950’s. One difference is that the Courts began to show concern 
with three issues when making sentencing decisions: discrimination, the purposes 
of punishment and the views of the relevant Aboriginal community. On the whole,
583 It might be thought that payback is a practice which is gradually falling into disuse. This is 
not the case, especially in the Northern Territory where it is still practised widely. For an 
overview of its continuing prevalence, see: Finnane. M  ‘Payback’, Customary Law and
Criminal Law in Colonised Australia International Journal o f the Sociology o f Law 2001, 29, 
293-310.
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Kriewaldt had been concerned only with the first. Various views on the purpose of 
punishment have been outlined above and it has been demonstrated when 
considering the various factors which may be considered to be associated with 
Aboriginality that there is often a need to balance these aims. The views of the
584Aboriginal community are today considered to be extremely important , although 
not determinative585.
However, the major change is that Courts today are bound -  not merely able, but 
bound - to consider evidence relating to payback in determining a sentence even
584 See: R. v. Davev (1980) 50 FLR 57; Robertson v. Flood (1992) 111 FLR 177; Munungurr v. 
The Queen (1994) 4 NTLR 63; R. v. Mivatatawuv (1996) 6 NTLR 44; Joshua v. Thomson 
(1994) 119 FLR 296; Putti v. Simpson (1975) 6 ALR 47; Mamarika v. The Queen (1982) 63 
FLR 202. Moreover, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Deaths in Custody recommended that 
Aboriginal communities should be consulted on the appropriate range of sentencing in general 
and, where permissible, in relation to individual cases, and that there should be a range o f non­
custodial sentencing options available in areas where there is a significant Aboriginal population 
and that the communities should be involved in the administration o f community service orders: 
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody National Report o f the Royal Commission 
into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (5 Volumes) Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1991-1992, Recommendations 104, 109-115. On the Royal Commission’s Report and 
subsequent consideration o f the issue, see: McDonald. D. and Whimp. K. ‘Australia’s Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody: Law and Justice Issues’ in Hazlehurst. K.M. (ed.) 
Legal Pluralism and the Colonial Legacy: Indigenous Experiences o f Justice in Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand Aldershot: Avebury, 1995, 187-215; Harding. RW. ‘Prisons are the Problem: A 
Re-Examination of Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Deaths in Custody’ The Australian and New 
Zealand Journal o f Criminology Vol. 32, No.2, 1999, 108-123. See also, various papers in the 
Australian Institute of Criminology: Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice series 
Canberra : Walker. J. and McDonald D. The Over-Representation o f Indigenous People in Custody 
in Australia No. 47, August 1995; Dalton. V. No. 131 October 1999; Carcach. C., Grant. M. and 
Conroy. R  Australian Corrections: The Imprisonment o f Indigenous People No. 137, November 
1999; Williams. P. Deaths in Custody: 10 Years on from the Royal Commission No. 203, April 
2001. On the general issue of Aborigines in prison, see: Hogg. R  ‘Penality and Modes of 
Regulating Indigenous Peoples in Australia’ Punishment and Society Vol. 3(3) 355-379; Eddey. R. 
‘Indigenous Punishment in Australia: A Jurisprudence o f Pain?’ International Journal o f the 
Sociology o f Law 30 (2002) 219-234.
585 R  v. Minor (1992) 79 NTR1; Munungurr v. The Queen (1994) 4 NTLR 63.
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if that payback itself constitutes an offence. This has been stated and reaffirmed 
in numerous cases586, the most important of which will be considered in detail.
  t t C Q H
The first case of significance was The Queen v. William Davev which came 
before the Federal Court on appeal from the Supreme Court of the Northern 
Territory. Davey had pleaded guilty to manslaughter, an offence punishable by a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment, before Gallop J. There was some 
dispute about the facts, but evidence had been called which showed that there 
had been a considerable degree of provocation, that the community to which the 
deceased belonged considered that the trouble was the fault of the deceased and 
that, should the Respondent return to his home, there would be no payback. 
Apart from one minor conviction, the Respondent had no prior criminal history. 
The Crown appealed to the Federal Court on the grounds that the sentence 
imposed by Gallop was manifestly inadequate. It argued, inter alia, that the trial 
judge failed to give proper consideration to the retributive and deterrent aspect 
of sentencing and that he had erred in taking into account that the actions of the 
Respondent were such as laid down by traditional law. Muirhead commented:
“In the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction the Supreme Court of the 
Northern Territory concerns itself with many aboriginal people. Of these, 
a number live under tribal culture and tradition and come from areas 
remote from the court. The court has for many years now considered it
586 R  v. Mivatatawuv (1996) 6 NTLR 44; R  v. Wilson (1995) 81 A Crim R 270; R  v. Minor 
(1992) 79 NTR 1; R  v. Anderson (1954) NTJ 240; Namatiira v. Raabe (1958) NTJ 608; R  
v.Junearai (1981) 9 NTR 30; Mamarika v. The Queen (1982) 63 FLR 202; Jadurin v.. The Queen 
(1982) 7 A Crim R 182; Atkinson v. Walkelv (1984) 27 NTR 34.
587 (1980) 50 FLR 57.
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should, if practicable, inform itself of the attitude of the aboriginal 
communities involved, not only on questions of payback and community 
attitudes to the crime, but at times to better inform itself as to the 
significance of words, gestures or situations which may give rise to 
sudden violence or which may explain situations which are otherwise 
incomprehensible.”588
Muirhead considered that the evidence leading the trial judge to assume that 
there was traditional provocation was slight, but it had not been challenged by 
the Crown at the time and it seemed to him a reasonable hypothesis, and proper 
to be taken into account. The trial judge had also, correctly in Muirhead's view, 
paid attention to the views of the Aboriginal community that the Respondent 
should be returned to his home. The Crown had contended that the respondent 
had had contact with white society having worked in a leprosarium and as a 
stockman. Muirhead pointed out that such contact did not necessarily “erase 
deep-rooted customary fears or beliefs, nor does it eradicate the sense of what is,
fOQ
or what is not, acceptable or appropriate”. The appeal was dismissed. This 
case is important because it demonstrates the evolution of the judiciary’s 
approach to the consideration of payback. The fact that the Court attached so 
much weight to the opinion of the community, part of which was based on the 
nature of the traditional provocation and its consequences in terms of the 
imposition of payback, is a clear indication that payback is held to be cognisable 
and an important factor in sentencing.
588 At 60-61.
589 At 61.
279
The following year the case of R. v. Jungarai590 came before the Supreme Court
of the Northern Territory. It has proved to be one of the most controversial cases
in this area as it appears that the accused was released with the intention,
certainly with the knowledge, that he was to undergo tribal punishment. This
decision, taken at a still relatively early stage in the present phase of decisions
on payback, signals just how far the courts had moved from the views of
Kriewaldt. The accused applied for bail pending trial for murder and, when this
was denied by the committing Magistrate, he appealed to the Supreme Court.
Evidence was brought in support of the bail application that the accused would
be held responsible for the killing by Aboriginal law and custom and would be
punished by the community, which punishment he was willing to undergo.
Forster C.J. accepted the evidence as to the likelihood of punishment by the
community and of continuing unrest in the community until that punishment
was administered. He granted bail giving the following reasons:
“ ... it is plain that according to Aboriginal law and custom the accused 
is held responsible for Jackson’s death and must accordingly be 
punished. The precise tribal punishment appropriate for the accused is 
not absolutely certain
Since the accused has to come to court in August to be tried, it will not 
be possible for his banishment to be effected by the community. As a 
result of the court proceedings the accused will either be convicted of 
murder or manslaughter or will be acquitted. If he is convicted, it is 
likely that he will be in prison for a period which will satisfy the 
banishment requirement, even though this is as a result of the court’s
590 (1981) NTR 30.
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action rather than the community’s. If he is acquitted, or, having been 
convicted, is dealt with in such a way that he is not in prison, the accused 
will return to the community and may then be banished if it is thought 
necessary to do so to avoid trouble. Whatever may happen as to this 
aspect, it is almost certain that until the spearing has taken place the 
matter of retribution or payback in Aboriginal terms will be unresolved 
and the community will be ill at ease and serious trouble may flare up at 
any time. It is equally certain that once the spearing has occurred, the 
unease and the probability of serious trouble arising out of the killing 
will be at an end.
... This should not be regarded as a precedent in the sense that the mere 
assertion of similar facts from the bar table will be sufficient, in my view 
at least, to justify a similar order in every case. There must be credible 
evidence to support such a course being taken. As is well known, at least 
to the people of the Northern Territory, Aboriginal customs vary greatly 
from place to place and, of course, the circumstances of killings may 
differ. What may be almost certain to occur in one place with respect to 
the circumstances of one killing may be unlikely to happen in another 
with respect to the circumstances of another killing.
I should also say for the purpose of dealing with the application for bail I 
express neither approval nor disapproval of the course proposed to be 
taken by the family of the deceased, endorsed as it is by the community - 
including the family of the accused. Whether or not the proposed action 
constitutes an offence under the law of the land seems to me, for present 
purposes, to be irrelevant. The order for release on bail should not be 
interpreted as necessarily involving approval of what will happen nor, of 
course, should my failure to approve it be interpreted as disapproval. 
What will almost certainly happen is simply, for present purposes, an 
important fact to be considered.”591
591 At 31-32. Forster makes it quite clear that it will not be sufficient merely to assert that 
payback either has been or will be administered, there must be evidence. This requirement has
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The matter finally came before the Federal Court of Australia592 on Jungarai’s 
appeal against the sentence imposed at the eventual trial. The appellant was 
described in the proceedings as:
“ .. an Aboriginal of full blood, aged about forty, with no formal 
education. He has five children. His usual occupation is that of stockman 
or ringer but during the last five years he has been doing labouring work 
at Ali Curung. It was said by his counsel that he ‘has lived a tribal type 
of existence for most of his life’, a statement that was not elaborated. He 
has a substantial record of convictions between 1964 and 1979, including 
crimes of violence (though none since 1972) and offences relating to 
alcohol.”593
The appeal was dismissed and the Court had the following to say on the 
sentence:
“There is no doubt that, in sentencing the appellant, his Honour had 
regard to the fact that, after his release on bail, the appellant returned to 
Ali Curung where he was beaten by members of the community with 
nulla nullas and boomerangs until he was unconscious.
... the case that the sentence was excessive was based upon the 
proposition that insufficient weight had been given to the actions of the 
community at Ali Curung. Counsel expressly conceded that if the matter 
were viewed without any of the overtones arising from the notion of
been repeatedly stressed in later cases: see, for example, Munungurr v. The Queen (1994) 4 
NTLR 63; R. v. Wilson (1995) 81 A Crim R 270. It has similarly been stressed that the Court 
must have sufficient evidence to be able to assess the view of the community as to appropriate 
sentencing if it is to take that view into account: see, for example: Robertson v. Flood (1992) 
111 FLR 177; Munungurr v. The Queen (1994) 4 NTLR63.
592 (1981) 5 A  Crim. R 319.
593At 320. For discussion o f this case, see: Fisher. M. & Hennessy. P. ‘Aboriginal Customary 
Laws and the Australian Criminal Law in Conflict’ Law and Anthropology Vol. 3,1988, 83.
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tribal punishment, neither the head sentence nor the non-parole period 
would be open to challenge.”594
Thus, the payback which had been taken into account in the bail application 
when it was prospective, was also take into account in the imposition of the 
sentence once it had been undergone.
In the 1981 case of R. v. Moses Japonia Mamarika595 the accused pleaded guilty 
to a reduced charge of manslaughter. Muirhead J. sentenced him to 
imprisonment for seven years and six months. The charge related to an incident 
in the course of which the accused had fatally stabbed a tribal brother. After the 
incident the accused was attacked and speared as payback, but the anger in the 
community was not satisfied. Counsel for the defence argued that the Court 
should accede to the views of the accused’s community, expressed in a letter 
addressed to the Court, that he should not be imprisoned, but sent to a mainland 
outstation for at least three years, and that this banishment taken together with 
the physical reprisals already suffered constituted a serious enough punishment 
without imposing a custodial sentence. However, Muirhead J. took the view that 
a custodial sentence must be imposed both as a punishment and by way of 
deterrent although he admits that it may not be the best method. He says:
“The reasons are these. There are too many cases involving killing of 
Aboriginals by Aboriginals coming before this court. Most are liquor
594 At 320.
595 Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, SCC No. 293 of 1981. Unreported. Transcript of 
Proceedings. 22 December 1981.
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induced killings. People who have been drinking become careless of 
each other and lose tolerance to insult or wrong doings. Only in 
exceptional circumstances, so far as I am concerned can a sentence for 
manslaughter result in immediate conditional release.
Your community may regard what is virtually temporary banishment 
from your home land as adequate sanction and that I understand. I doubt 
whether imprisonment has ever made sense to your people. Traditional 
punishment methods were probably far more effective, if at times 
salutary. But imprisonment is now well understood as a punishment 
handed out by the courts of this territory and my experience is that an 
order for conditional release is too often misunderstood or ignored..
I take these matters very much into account, and if they were not so 
significant, I can only say that the punishment would have been 
heavier..”596
He sentenced Mamarika to imprisonment with hard labour for seven years and 
six months with a non-parole period of two years.
Mamarika appealed arguing, inter alia, that the sentence was too severe. The 
matter came before the Federal Court which allowed the appeal597 and reduced 
the sentence. The basis of the argument that the sentence was too severe was 
that the trial judge had not paid sufficient attention to the traditional punishment 
which the appellant had undergone, nor to the wishes of the community and that 
he had failed to give sufficient emphasis to the isolated and tribal nature of the 
Umbakumba community. The Federal Court stated that there has been no
596 Sentencing Remarks of Muirhead J. Unreported. 22 December 1981. At 73.
597 (1982) 42 ALR 94.
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suggestion by either side that these matters should not be taken into account the 
only point of disagreement was whether they were given sufficient weight. The 
Crown, in seeking to defeat the appeal, argued that there was no real evidence 
that the appellant had suffered payback. The physical injuries could not be 
denied but the Crown sought to draw a distinction between injuries incurred 
admittedly in customary tribal manner and injuries incurred as a result of the 
application of customary law. In other words, just because the injuries were of a 
type which would be used in the infliction of payback does not necessarily mean 
that their infliction in this case was payback. To support their argument, they 
asserted that there had been no time for a meeting or discussion of the 
appropriate penalty and thus the injuries had in fact been retributive in nature. 
The Federal Court avoided deciding whether or not the violence had actually 
been payback, though the tenor of their comments seems to suggest that they 
thought not, but stated that even if it were simply retribution it could be taken 
into account:
“It is of course a fact, and one that cannot and should not be disregarded, 
that the appellant did suffer serious injuries at the hands of other 
members of the community. But, if it is to be asserted that conduct of 
this sort should be seen as a reflection of the customary law of an 
Aboriginal community or tribal group, we are of the opinion that there 
should be evidence before the court to show that this was indeed the case 
and that what happened was not simply the angry reaction of friends of 
the deceased..
In the circumstances we are of the opinion that this court should 
approach the matter on the basis that, by reason of his action, the
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appellant brought on himself the anger of members of the community 
and that, as a result, he received severe injuries... So seen, it is a matter 
properly to be taken into account in determining an appropriate sentence, 
without giving any sanction to what occurred.”598
Given these injuries,599 the time already spent in hospital or prison and general 
sentencing considerations, the Court allowed the appeal. In fact whilst the 
outcome of the appeal may have been satisfactory for Mamarika, the Court 
avoided deciding either the status of the relationship between traditional law and 
Australian law or the status of the wishes of the community.
Shortly after the Mamarika case came Jadurin v. R600. This case came before the 
Federal Court on appeal from the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory. The 
facts were as follows. The appellant was convicted of the manslaughter of his 
wife and was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment with a minimum non-parole 
period of twelve months. He appealed against the severity of the sentence, 
arguing that he had already undergone some tribal punishment - and would 
undergo further - and that the sentence should be reduced to a suspended one to 
avoid his being punished twice for the same deed. The Federal Court made 
several pertinent comments in dismissing the appeal.
At 97.598
599 The three men who speared Mamarika were prosecuted in connection with the attack and two
were convicted.
600 (1982)44 ALR 424
286
First, and as a side issue, it was suggested on behalf of the appellant by way of 
explanation and not by way of justification, that it is not unusual in Aboriginal 
society for men to beat their wives if they consider that they have not been 
obedient. The Court was of the opinion that the evidence proffered simply 
established that this might sometimes occur and certainly did not establish that it 
was an accepted feature of Aboriginal society.601 It is clear that the Court 
considers that this argument is too simplistic and too easily advanced in 
circumstances where it has no real basis in Aboriginal culture or law:
“The suggestion overlooks the fact that, at least in the experience of the 
courts, when such beatings take place it is usually after a great deal of 
alcohol has been consumed. It also ignores the very complex web of 
relationships between men and women in Aboriginal society. In the 
present case we are of the opinion that the court should approach the 
matter on the basis that the appellant beat his wife in anger when they 
were drunk, and that this brought about her death.”602
The main argument advanced on behalf of the appellant was that he had already 
undergone some traditional punishment - and was likely to undergo more -  and 
that if he received a heavy sentence which did not take account of that fact, he 
would thereby be being punished twice for the same offence. The Court 
considered that there were three questions to be considered: was there evidence 
for tribal punishment undergone and to be undergone?; did the sentencing judge 
take it into account?; if he did not, was the sentence imposed in consequence
601 For literature on domestic violence, see supra n 567.
602 At 426.
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excessive? The Court reviewed the evidence which had been tendered as to what 
had already happened and as to what would be likely to happen in the future. It 
held that the trial judge had clearly been aware of such evidence and had given 
due consideration to the question of tribal punishment, but was still of the 
opinion that such matters were not sufficient to lessen the seriousness of an 
unlawful killing. Moreover, the Court held that it was clear that the trial judge 
had taken them into account because the sentence set was in fact already a very 
lenient one. They went on to say that once it was clear that the tribal factors had 
been taken into account then the argument that he was being punished twice lost 
much of its force: the punishment meted out by the Courts had in fact been 
mitigated by that meted out by the Aboriginal community. However, the point 
of the possibility of double punishment always needs to be considered and the 
extent of the mitigation can only be decided on a case by case basis. The Court 
was very clear that what was definitely not possible, and indeed had not been 
argued, was an abdication of the right or duty to punish by the state courts to 
Aboriginal communities:
“It was not suggested on behalf of the appellant that he, (sic.) being an 
Aboriginal, the court should in any way abdicate its function of dealing 
with him. It was submitted that the court should arrive at a penalty which 
reflected matters in mitigation arising from the appellant’s personal 
situation and which recognised the structure and operation of Aboriginal 
society. This would avoid a situation in which the appellant was 
punished twice for what he had done, thereby producing in him
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resentment against a system of law of which he had little 
understanding. ”603
The Court then made reference to the judgements in both Mamarika and Neal 
discussed above. In the first case the Court was not convinced that the injuries 
suffered had truly been payback, but still felt entitled to take into account the 
fact that the accused had been seriously injured as a result of his actions. The 
Court in the present case quoted from the Mamarika judgement - “So seen, it is 
a matter properly to be taken into account in determining an appropriate 
sentence, without giving any sanction to what occurred.”604 - and considered that 
the same considerations applied with regard to the punishment already 
undergone by the appellant. With regard to the Neal case the Court quoted the 
judgement of Brennan J. in which he said:
“The same sentencing principles are to be applied, of course, in every 
case, irrespective of the identity of a particular offender or his 
membership of an ethnic or other group. But in imposing sentences 
courts are bound to take into account, in accordance with those 
principles, all material facts including those facts which exist only by 
reason of the offender’s membership of an ethnic or other group. So 
much is essential to the even administration of criminal justice.”605
One of the factors which is likely to arise solely because of the membership of 
particular ethnic group is of course traditional law and payback. The Court
603 At 428.
604 At 97.
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argued that this should be taken into account and that to do this is not in any way 
to sanction unlawful violence:
“In the context of Aboriginal customary or tribal law question will arise 
as to the likelihood of punishment by an offender’s own community and 
the nature and extent of that punishment. It is sometimes said that a court 
should not be seen to be giving its sanction to forms of punishment, 
particularly the infliction of physical harm, which it does not recognize 
itself. But to acknowledge that some form of retribution may be exacted 
by an offender’s own community is not to sanction that retribution; it is 
to recognize certain facts which exist only by reason of that offender’s 
membership of a particular group. That is not to say that in a particular 
case questions will not arise as to the extent to which the court should 
have regard to such facts or as to the evidence that should be presented if 
it is to be asked to take those facts into account.”606
However, the Court concluded that in the present case there was no need to 
explore the issues any further because the sentencing judge had clearly taken the 
matters into account and given that he had a wide discretion it was not possible 
to argue either that there was an identifiable error in his reasoning or that error 
could be inferred form the sentence. The appeal was therefore dismissed.
Three years after the Mamarika case two more cases came before the Courts 
within a few days of each other. Both involved defendants from traditional
606 At 429.
607 Jadurin later killed his second wife. Interview with Colin McDonald. Northern Territory Bar. 
1, 2 September 1994
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backgrounds. The first was R. v. Jackv Jagamara.608 The case resulted from 
Jagamara having been speared in the thigh by the man he then killed. This 
spearing was highly improper as the deceased was Jagamara’s son-in-law. He 
therefore speared the deceased who died as a result of that injury. Jagamara was 
then speared by relatives of the deceased on three separate occasions. In this 
case, O’Leary J. sentenced the accused to the rising of the Court, recognition 
being given to the punishment already meted out by the community and 
seemingly incidentally to the time already spent in custody:
“The prisoner is about 40 years of age, he is a full-blood Aboriginal, a 
Pintubi, and one of the last Pintubis to come in from the desert in 1966. 
He has had no education, and has virtually no command of the English 
language.
He has been married for some 15 years, and since 1979 has lived with 
his wife and son at Warakuma in Western Australia. I have been told 
that he is well-regarded as a useful member of that community. He has 
no other convictions either before or since the present offence. It was an 
offence that was committed in an entirely tribal and traditional 
Aboriginal setting, and the prisoner has received very severe traditional 
punishment by way of pay-back at the hands of the deceased man’s 
family.
In my opinion it is not an offence that calls for any deterrent or 
retributive punishment by this court. ... I think that in all the 
circumstances he ought not to be subjected to any further punishment 
beyond the very severe punishment he has already received.”609
608 Supreme Court of the Northern Territory SCC No. 292 of 1979. Unreported. O’Leary J. 25 May 
1984.
609 Sentencing Remarks of O’Leary J. Unreported. 25 May 1984.
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However, it is worth noting that the facts of this case are somewhat unusual in 
terms of the characteristics of the accused and the offence. Indeed O’Leary said 
that on “any score this is quite an exceptional case”610.
A few days later the case of  R. v. Charlie Limbiari Jagamara611 came before the 
same Court. The accused was an old man from a traditional background who 
had speared the deceased thus causing his death. The accused had then 
undergone particularly severe traditional punishment, being speared, cut, beaten 
and h it612 He had also been banished from his birthplace. The dispute arose 
from a suggestion that an improper liaison had taken place between the deceased 
and Jagamara’s wife. Anthropological evidence was called613 which established 
the following: that the accused followed traditional law and was traditionally 
married; that the accused’s wife had behaved in a way which could lead to the 
belief that she was engaged in a relationship with someone who stood as a son- 
in-law to her, one of the most taboo relationships; that the accused would see his 
wife’s actions as involving a very serious transgression which required a 
response from him; that the accused intended merely to teach the deceased a 
lesson; and that the accused held an important position within the community 
and that his presence was critical for the continuance of certain ceremonies. The
610 Sentencing Remarks.
611 Supreme Court of the Northern Territory SCC No. 22 of 1984 Unreported. Transcript of 
Proceedings. 28 May 1984.
612 No-one was ever charged with the infliction o f the traditional punishments. It is interesting that 
according to the submissions of Jagamara’s counsel at the sentencing hearing the police offered 
Jagamara the choice of remaining in custody or accepting bail. She alleged that he had been offered 
that choice as the police knew that he would undergo payback if he left custody. He accepted bail 
and did indeed undergo payback.
613 Transcript o f Proceedings. At 8-18.
292
Crown accepted that there had been no intention to kill but merely to wound 
which would satisfy his traditional views as to the correct response to the 
situation. Jagamara was sentenced to imprisonment until the rising of the Court. 
Muirhead placed stress on the importance of traditional law to Jagamara and his 
importance within the community. He stated that the situation had caused 
difficulties in the community which was attempting to resolve them and to avoid 
further disturbance or bloodshed.614 In those circumstances, the Court should not 
intervene. He went on to say:
“I am satisfied that if I impose a sentence of imprisonment, and in this 
case I have no wish to do so, the problems of the Aboriginal people 
would probably be exacerbated, and his withdrawal from Aboriginal 
society would increase the difficulties. In all these circumstances I 
propose to treat this matter as a somewhat exceptional matter. Many 
cases that come before this Court which involve the killings of other 
people, especially where alcohol comes along and serves to confuse the 
issues, may have a cultural or traditional basis and at times it is 
necessary, or at times I have considered it necessary, that punishment
614It is clear from the transcript of the proceedings that Muirhead was concerned firstly about the 
encouraging effect which leniency might have and secondly about the role o f the defendant in the 
community. In his questioning of Bell, the anthropologist:
“His Honour: The disposition of this matter by this court is not relied on in any way as a matter of - 
as a solution towards any residual problems that may arise? — No. I think, in a sense, this court is 
running very peripherally to ..
The exercise o f leniency won’t stoke the fires of pay back in many of the communities? — I don’t 
think so, Your Honour, because that has been taken in hand by very senior persons who wish to 
continue the process.
Ms. Ditton” If, in fact, he were to receive a custodial sentence - what effect do you believe that 
would have within the relevant Aboriginal community? — Well, it would create enormous hostility 
from his family, who feel that he faced pay back in the way in which he should have.
His Honour: It also makes him unavailable for some of the responsibilities? — Exactly. On the 
wider community level, it would make it very difficult for them to continue the procedures. And in 
terms o f his future input into Warlpiri society, it would mean that a very important knowledgeable 
person has been removed, so they would have lost a resource.”' at 16.
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provided by the law that we administer must be imposed for the general 
protection of Aboriginal people, and to prevent larger areas of 
misunderstanding.
But in this event, this is truly a cultural matter which has been tackled 
energetically by the people. The accused has already suffered 
punishments far more severe than any that I would be authorised to 
inflict, and beyond the physical matters that I have adverted to, he has 
also the continuing knowledge that he is no longer welcome in his 
birthplace and his future in the Aboriginal society is by no means yet on 
a fixed course.”615
He went on to make a very clear statement that there are some cases in which 
traditional law should prevail completely:
“.. There are cases, I don’t say necessarily many of them, but there are 
cases where I consider complete regard should be had for Aboriginal 
custom and tribal law. This is one of them.”616
The two Jagamara cases are unusual and shared several relevant characteristics: 
both defendants came from a traditional background and still lived that lifestyle; 
in both cases the acts which were the substance of the offences were committed 
for no reason other than adherence to customary law; and in neither case was 
any complicating factor -  such as excessive alcohol consumption. In both cases 
the Court stressed that the nature of defendants and the circumstances of the 
offences were crucial to the apparent leniency of the sentence. Such
615 At 20-21.
616 At 21.
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uncomplicated cases are rare, but it is clear that when they arise, the judiciary is 
prepared to give very considerable weight to the fact that payback is involved.
In the same year the case of Atkinson and Another v. Walkelv617 came before 
the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory and was heard by O’Leary J. The 
matters were appeals on the grounds that the sentences were manifestly 
excessive. The appellants had pleaded guilty to indecently assaulting a young 
Aboriginal girl. After the offences the men had been banished by their local 
community for a year, but had been allowed to return after five or six months. 
For some time after the assault the girl’s relatives threatened the men with 
retaliation and O’Leary considered that the banishment was probably aimed at 
preventing further trouble as well as being a punishment and a sign of 
disapproval. O’Leary found that in fixing the sentence the Magistrate had failed 
to give the requisite weight to the fact that the offenders had already been 
punished by their community. It is clear from the transcript of the Magistrate’s 
reasons for sentence that he did consider the issue but it is not clear what weight 
he gave to it. The main thrust of his comments seems to be that he considered 
the community punishment too light. O’Leary goes on to consider the 
authorities:
“It seems to me that what the learned magistrate is here considering is 
the degree of seriousness which the local community attached to the 
offence - which he seemed to think was ‘a most lenient view’ - and what 
he then says is that that view cannot, in this kind of case, be allowed to
617 (1984) 27 NTR 34.
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prevail over the view taken by the community at large which would 
regard it as a serious offence. He does not seem to be directing his 
attention to the fact that both prisoners have been banished by the 
community for the purpose of taking that into account in fixing the 
appropriate penalties.
I think it is clear on the authorities that, in fixing penalty, a court should 
take into account the fact that the offender, by his actions, has brought on 
himself the anger of members of his community and that, as a result, he 
has received, or is likely to receive, punishment of some kind or other at 
their hands: see Mamarika v. R (1982) 42 ALR 94; Jadurin v. R. (1982) 
44 ALR 424. That, of course, as was pointed out in those cases, is not to 
be seen as necessarily giving any sanction to the punishment or 
retribution imposed.”618
He disagrees with the Magistrate that the sentence imposed by the community 
was very lenient and also considers that in fixing the sentence the Magistrate did 
either fail to take the banishment into account or if he did take it into account 
did not give it sufficient weight. The appeal was therefore allowed and the 
sentences reduced. There is little development of judicial thought in relation to 
payback in this case. However, it demonstrates clearly that the Courts consider 
themselves obliged to take account of payback.
In 1990 the case of The Queen v. Phillip Daniel Berida619 came before the 
Supreme Court of the Northern Territory. In his remarks on passing sentence 
Angel J. dealt with the question of traditional law punishment. Berida had
618 At 37.
619 Supreme Court of the Northern Territory. Unreported. Transcript of Proceedings. 30 March, 4 
and 5 April 1990.
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pleaded guilty to unlawful killing. The judge accepted that the accused had 
brought shame on his family and he took that into account in accordance with 
the principles in Jadurin v. R. Moreover, there was a real risk of payback and 
that risk would last for a very long time. It was unlikely that the accused would 
be able to return to Port Keats in the near future, possibly never. Angel does 
point out the necessity for fixing a sentence which will serve as a deterrent both 
to the accused and to the community at large. He concedes that the deterrence 
aspect must be set against the background of the accused and quotes the 
comments of Derrington J. in the case of  Yougie:620
“Of highest importance is the deterrent effect for the protection of 
potential victims and the turning of the court’s face against violence as a 
general proposition is justifiable. At the same time it would be wrong to 
fail to acknowledge the social difficulties faced by Aboriginals in this 
context where poor self image and other demoralising factors have 
placed heavy stresses on them leading to alcohol abuse and 
consequential violence.”621
However, whilst he appears to be prepared to take account of general factors 
relating to Aboriginality he makes no further mention of the question of 
customary law or payback other than as contained in general comments about 
the factors taken into account in reaching the sentence:
“In fixing penalty, it is for me to have regard to, and I have regard to, the 
background I have mentioned, the nature and circumstances of your
620 (1987) 33 A. Crim. R. 301
621 At 304.
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offence, your previous criminal record and your personal circumstances 
and general considerations of retribution, deterrence and your personal 
rehabilitation.”622
He sentenced Berida to seven years imprisonment and directed that after three 
years the remainder of the sentence be suspended on condition that he reside at 
Pareda Outstation for the balance of his sentence. The judge does seem to have 
taken into account in reaching his decision that Berida would be safe from 
retribution at the Outstation. The interest of this case for the present discussion 
lies in the fact that comparatively little attention is paid to the payback point and 
it appears simply to be subsumed into the consideration of the other factors 
related to the individual defendant and his Aboriginality.
The next case of significance was R. v. Minor623. This case came before the 
Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal on appeal by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions against the decision of the trial judge. Evidence had been presented 
to the sentencing judge that the accused would inevitably be subjected to 
payback, which his community had decided would take the form of being 
speared in the thigh and the accused had consented to that punishment. The trial 
judge sentenced Minor to ten years’ imprisonment but he was to be released on 
a three year good behaviour bond after serving four years. The Director of 
Public Prosecutions appealed on various grounds, two of which are relevant 
here: that by taking into account the payback in setting automatic release after
622 At 197.
623 (1992) 59 A  Crim. R. 227.
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four years, the judge erred first, by sanctioning unlawful violence, and second, 
by having regard to an irrelevant consideration, i.e. the judge took account of the 
interests of the respondent’s community rather than those of the respondent and 
the community at large. The Court held allowing the appeal in part: first, the 
sentencing judge by merely taking into account the fact that the respondent may 
be subject to payback did not sanction unlawful violence; second, that the 
sentencing judge is entitled to have regard not only to the interests of the wider 
community but also to the special interests of the community of which the 
respondent is a member. Mildren J. delivered the leading judgement which 
included observations on the extent to which the Court is entitled to take account 
of payback. It was, Mildren said, clear from the trial judge’s remarks that he 
knew that the sentence which he was imposing was unusual. The trial judge had 
said:
“The tribal factors affecting these crimes, payback, which according to 
the evidence will almost inevitably follow the prisoner’s release from 
gaol, and the fact of the prisoner’s otherwise good character, have 
persuaded me in this case to take the unusual course of ordering that he 
be released after serving a specific portion of his sentence.
The fixed release date will give special recognition to the factors to 
which I have referred. I have particularly in mind that desirability that 
payback - not condoned, but recognised as inevitable - should be given 
effect as soon as possible on order that the community may put the
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whole episode behind them and get on with the more positive aspects of 
their lives.”624
The trial judge had clearly given special consideration to payback and the 
Director of Public Prosecutions did not suggest that he had erred in taking into 
account the possibility or the likelihood of future payback. Mildren went on to 
point out that the Northern Territory had a long history of taking tribal law into 
account when sentencing a tribal Aborigine.625 There was therefore ample 
support for the trial judge in considering the matter. After reviewing the 
authorities, some in considerable detail, he explained that he had examined 
previous caselaw in order to demonstrate that the trial judge had not in the 
present case sanctioned unlawful violence by the way in which he structured the 
sentence: firstly, because he was acting in accordance with the authorities 
discussed; secondly, because there was not in any event any evidence that the 
payback would consist of unlawful violence: an assault is not unlawful if 
consented to unless it is intended to kill or to cause grievous harm and there was 
no evidence to suggest that the payback was intended to have such an effect; and 
thirdly, even if the payback spearing were unlawful, it should still be taken into 
account on the principles of Mamarika. He went on to stress that it is one thing 
for the court to take into account the likelihood of future retribution, lawful or
625 At 10-11. He points out, citing Elder. P. Northern Territory Charlie Unpublished Thesis, 
University o f Adelaide, at 71, that the earliest recorded example o f such consideration is in 1900 
when Dashwood J. sentenced an Aborigine to three months’ imprisonment for the manslaughter of 
another Aborigine. There had been earlier examples, but they reveal no consistent pattern as record­
keeping was intermittent.
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unlawful, it is another for the Court to facilitate the imposition of unlawful 
punishment. A sentencing judge may not structure his sentence so as to 
facilitate an unlawful act. He then referred with approval to the decision in R. v. 
Sydney Williams626 where Wells J. imposed as a condition of a bond that the 
accused should be for a period of one year “ruled and governed by the tribal 
elders and shall in all things obey their lawfuf27 orders and directions”. Mildren 
then went on to say that to the extent that the contrary might be implied in the 
judgement of Forster J. in R. v. Jungarai628 he disagreed with that judgement. 
However, there was no facilitation of an unlawful act in this case. He then 
turned to the second ground of appeal: that the trial judge had taken into account 
an irrelevant fact in sentencing, i.e. the wishes of the tribal community. He also 
rejected this ground saying that a judge was entitled to take into account the 
interests and needs not only of the community as a whole but also of the 
particular community of which the accused is a member provided that the 
wishes of the narrower community did not, as they had not done here, prevail 
over what would otherwise be a proper sentence:
... the sentencing judge was called upon to exercise a degree of 
ingenuity to give proper effect to all of the competing interests and 
factors which were necessary for him to take into account. This was no 
occasion for blindly following an unthinking conservative path; it 
required, as this court often has in the past been called upon to do when 
dealing with the approach to Aboriginals and the criminal law, to find a
626 (1976) 14 SASR 1.
627 Emphasis placed by Mildren at 14.
628 R. v. Junsarai (1981) 9 NTR 30
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solution by means which ensured that justice was done, even if the 
means adopted were unusual or novel.”629
Asche CJ. and Martin J. concurred with Mildren that the judge was entitled to 
take account of the wishes of the narrower community as well as the wider one 
and that payback was a relevant sentencing consideration although Martin 
wished to reserve for further consideration in the light of the facts of a particular 
case whether such action is unlawful. The appeal was partly allowed on the 
shortfall period of the bond.
Minor is an important case as it contains a thorough review of the authorities by a 
superior Court. The judges make it clear that the fact that a defendant is released in 
the knowledge that s/he is likely to undergo payback does not mean that the Court 
is sanctioning an illegal act. The case also raises the issue of whether a form of 
payback which is prima facie illegal can be rendered legal by the consent of the 
person undergoing it. This point is argued more fully in the later case of Steven 
Barnes v.R.630
In 1993 the case of  Munungurr v. The Queen631 came before the Court of 
Criminal Appeal of the Northern Territory on appeal against the sentence 
imposed by Kearney J. in the Supreme Court. The Court in discussing the 
background of the accused, pointed out:
629 At 14.
630 (1997) 96 A Crim R 593. Infra 309.
631 (1994) 4 NTLR 63.
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“The applicant has a strong traditional background and plays an 
important part in traditional ceremonies ... His youngest son had just 
been initiated and there was evidence that the applicant was needed to 
pass on to his son the traditional and cultural skills and learning he 
would need for the future. He was acknowledged as a respected leader of 
the Djapu clan.”632
When the matter came before Kearney J. for trial there had been various 
submissions made by the appellant’s counsel and a letter from the local 
community had been tendered which stressed the appellant’s importance in the 
community and his good character. The community did not wish the appellant to 
be sent to jail, but wanted him returned home to be dealt with in the traditional 
manner. The letter also contained a general plea that the judicial system should 
take more account of traditional or customary law and should return Aboriginal 
offenders to their communities for punishment. The letter contained errors, but it 
was not much relied on or discussed by either counsel at the trial. The appeal 
was based on various grounds. The argument that the sentences were manifestly 
excessive was rejected. However, the Court considered that the trial judge had 
been in error in the way he had dealt with the letter from the community. They 
were not persuaded by the argument about the need for the appellant to advise 
his son: loss of parental guidance is common when fathers are imprisoned and is 
in any event only delayed. However, the broader issues of the appellant’s place 
in the community and preservation of the traditions should have been taken into 
account:
632 At 3 of Transcript o f Proceedings.
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“The applicant ... played an important role in the ceremonies of his 
people generally. He was a clan-leader, a non-drinker, and strongly 
attached to traditional culture. This term of imprisonment was likely to 
have an effect upon his community as a whole - a community, be it 
noted, which was experiencing difficulty with the harmful effects of 
alcohol and the consequential breakdown in traditional tribal discipline. 
These were matters which should have been taken into account. It 
appears from his Honour’s sentencing remarks that they were not given 
any weight at all.’633
The views of the community as to traditional punishment and the anticipated 
nature of that punishment should also have been taken into account:
“In view of the applicant’s importance to his community, and the likely 
effect that imprisonment would have on the community as a whole, we 
consider that the expression of this view by the applicant’s community 
ought to have been given considerable weight by a sentencer, 
particularly as the letter also stated that a ‘reconciliation’ ceremony had
I already taken place and ‘there was no bad feeling in the community’.
The views, wished and needs of the community of which the applicant is 
a member are clearly relevant considerations, although they cannot 
prevail over what is a proper sentence”634
Counsel for the Director of Public Prosecutions argued that Kearney had been 
entitled to place little or no weight on the letter because the facts were in error, 
there was no explanation of the proposed nature of the traditional punishment 
and the assault on the police raised the question of protecting the wider
633 At 10 of Transcript of Proceedings.
634 At 11 of Transcript of Proceedings.
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community. The appellant’s counsel argued in response to the objections on the 
form of the letter that because of the difficulties of putting the views of 
Aboriginal communities, especially remote ones, before the Supreme Court it 
was necessary to accept as evidence information which might strictly be 
inadmissible. This need had been clearly expressed by the Court in The Queen 
v. Davev635:
“The court has for many years now considered it should, if practicable, 
inform itself of the attitude of the aboriginal communities involved, not 
only on questions of payback and community attitudes to the crime, but 
at times to better inform itself of the significance of words, gestures or 
situations which may give rise to sudden violence or which may explain 
situations which are otherwise incomprehensible. The information may 
be made available to the court in a somewhat informal and hearsay style. 
This is unavoidable as it will often depend on consultation with 
aboriginal communities in remote areas.”
The Court here accepted the principle but pointed out that conditions had 
changed since 1980, both education and facilities have improved and the format 
and content of the letter were not satisfactory. Further attempts should have been 
made and the presentation of evidence in proper manner is vitally important. 
However, the Court went on to say that this should not have been resolved by 
ignoring the letter but by asking for further information. The Court therefore 
considered that there had been error on the part of the judge on this ground and 
for that reason as well as others, the sentences should not stand.
635 (1980) 50 FLR 57, per Mildren J. at 60-61.
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During the course of the appeal further evidence was admitted as to the nature of 
the tribal punishment which the applicant would undergo. The answer in the 
form of a statement from a leader of the community was that the punishment 
would be a traditional meeting with the possible undertaking of mutual 
responsibilities which would seal the peace. The court therefore imposed a 
sentence of four and a half years for the grievous harm and six and twelve 
months respectively for the assault charges all to run concurrently. It was 
ordered that the applicant should serve three months which had already 
happened and then the rest of the sentence should be suspended. The Court also 
imposed a good behaviour bond with conditions including that the traditional 
meeting should take place and the applicant should abide by its proceedings and 
keep the peace. The Director of Correctional Services was required to make a 
report as to whether the meeting had taken place and if not the court would 
reconsider the matter.
Munungurr highlights the importance of the views of the Aboriginal community 
from which the defendant comes and of her/his place in that community. To 
some extent, this case raises less difficulties than many of the previous ones 
because of the non-corporal nature of the payback. However, it could be argued 
that the importance of avoiding double punishment -  one of the main arguments 
for taking account of payback -  reduces as the severity of the payback reduces.
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The case of R. v. Wilson Jagamara Walker636 caused great controversy. Walker 
was originally charged with murder and pleaded not guilty. After four days of 
evidence he pleaded guilty to manslaughter. In his remarks on sentencing Martin 
CJ addressed the accused’s circumstances:
“You are a 23-year-old Aboriginal man. You have lived in the 
Yuendumu area all your life and, in common with most people of your 
race, living in that area you had little education, there is no employment 
available to you and thus you have not had a job. You come from a 
socially deprived class of people of whom we have spoken so often in 
the territory and who, through circumstances, find themselves in the 
situation where they have no prospects of self-esteem and get on the 
grog and commit crimes, including all too often enough unfortunately 
crimes such as this.”637
He goes on to say that he has been told that it is likely that Walker will suffer 
payback for the killing, that he required evidence of that (which had been 
proffered) and that whilst the Court takes it into account it does not condone it:
“ .... it was likely that you would suffer a form of pay-back when you
were available to the people involved for that to be done. I will say it 
again, as I have said before, that when such an issue is raised this court 
will henceforth, as it has done in recent times, require evidence about it.
I make it clear, as has been made abundantly clear in the last, that 
although the court must take into account the fact that a person is to be 
punished in whatever manner it hears about, it does not condone it. It
636 Northern Territory Supreme Court No. 46 of 1993. Unreported. Transcript of Proceedings, 
Martin CJ. 10 February 1994.
637 At 5.
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must be understood that just because the court is told and takes into 
account the fact that a person is to suffer punishment in another way, is 
not to indicate that it in any way condones the use of violence upon 
people at all; in particular, in the quite deliberate way in which pay-back 
is apparently administered.
I say no more about it. It is a fact of life and the courts have adopted that 
view of the Territory for some time past. I might say that so far as I’m 
aware, notwithstanding that it has happened, nobody has ever been 
charged with administering payback, so far as I’m aware.”638
Martin sentenced Walker to three years’ imprisonment backdated to take 
account of the time already spent in custody. The sentence was then suspended 
forthwith upon the entry by the defendant into a good behaviour bond on his 
own recognisance in the sum of one thousand dollars. A condition of the bond 
was that the accused return to Yuendumu immediately and that he be subject to 
the supervision of the Director of Correctional services and obey all reasonable 
directions.639
The decision in this case attracted much attention on the grounds that the judge 
had released Walker in order to undergo payback. However, in reality, Martin 
was doing nothing that had not been done before, and done frequently. Apart 
from the Jungarai case it had perhaps never been expressed so openly that the
639 Walker subsequently appeared before the Court again in respect of a breach o f the bond: 
Northern Territory Supreme Court No. 46 of 1993 Unreported. Transcript o f Proceedings. Martin 
CJ. 1 September 1994.
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release was in order to undergo payback, but in many other cases the judges 
were clearly aware of the likelihood of payback and so the result was the same.
The recent case of Barnes v. R640, before the Supreme Court of the Northern 
Territory, is significant. The defendant was in custody, awaiting trial on a charge 
of murder. He applied for bail in order to return to the community to undergo 
payback. His counsel argued that the facts of the case were similar to the 
Jungarai case in which Forster granted bail to a defendant for such a purpose. 
Bailey distinguished the case on various grounds, two of which are relevant for 
present purposes: first, in Jungarai the payback was likely to put an end to 
prevailing community unrest, in the present case there was no such unrest; 
second, the payback in Jungarai was much less severe in physical terms. In those 
circumstances he did not think that the defendant could give valid consent to the 
infliction of such a punishment. To the extent that this finding was incompatible 
with that of Forster in Jungarai. he dissented from the latter. Bailey cited with 
approval the remarks of Mildren in Minor641 that there was a difference between 
releasing a defendant on bail knowing that payback might occur and actually 
structuring the Court order to facilitate it. The latter was not permissible. Bail 
was refused. Similar facts arose in the recent bail application of Jeremy Anthony 
v. R.642 which came before Martin CJ. in the same Court and was decided in the 
same way.
640 Steven Barnes v. R. (1997) 96 A Crim R 593.
641R. v. Minor H99212 NTLR 183, at 195-196.
642 Jeremy Anthony v. R  Unreported. Supreme Court of the Northern Territory (2004) NTSC 5,12, 
13 and 17 February 2004.
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The same issues arise in the Sentencing Remarks of the judiciary. A study of the 
transcripts of seven of the most recent sets of Sentencing Remarks which 
include reference to the issue payback amply demonstrate this point. However, 
in Sentencing Remarks - as opposed to judgments - the judges rarely explain 
why they are making a particular decision. They are, of course obliged to give 
reasons for the sentence being imposed and do so, but the reasons do not usually 
include an analysis of the legal principles informing the decision.
1. The case of The Queen v. Joshua Bobby Poulson643 came before 
Thomas J., in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, for 
sentencing in May 2001. The defendant had pleaded guilty to an 
offence under s. 154 of the Criminal Code which governs dangerous 
acts. The maximum imposable penalty for the offence was ten 
years. He had already undergone payback and the Court had 
received evidence to that effect. When considering the effect of the 
payback on the sentence to be imposed, Thomas made it clear that 
although the Court did not condone or sanction the payback -  
which was of a physical nature -  it took note of the fact that it had 
been of value to the family of the victim. She then considered the 
other relevant factors such as the defendant’s remorse and allowed 
a twenty-five percent discount.
643 The Queen v. Joshua Bobbv Poulson Supreme Court of the Northern Territory No. 9905624 
Transcript of Proceedings 11 May 2001.
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2. The case of The Queen v. Sebastian Walker644 came before Angel 
J. in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, for sentencing in 
August 2001. The defendant had pleaded guilty to manslaughter 
under s. 163 of the Criminal Code. The maximum imposable 
penalty for the offence was life imprisonment. In fixing the 
sentence, Angel says that he has taken account of all the matters 
which he has been asked to take account of including the likelihood 
of future payback.
3. The case of The Queen v. Bruce Dhurkkav645 came before Bailey J. 
in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, for sentencing in 
August 2002. The defendant had pleaded guilty to an offence of 
sexual intercourse without consent. His family believed that he 
should be sent away to undergo payback and he was agreeable to 
that. Bailey agreed to take account of some of the factors which 
had been urged as mitigation and to discount a third from the 
sentence, but he was not prepared to suspend any part of it as he 
considered that it was important to impose a deterrent sentence.
644 The Queen v. Sebastian Walker Supreme Court of the Northern Territory No. 20005210 
Transcript of Proceedings 2 August 2001.
645 The Queen v. Bruce Dhurrkav Supreme Court o f the Northern Territory No. 20011848 
Transcript of Proceedings 1 August 2002.
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4. The case of The Queen v. Watson Jungarai Corby646 came before
Angel J. in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, for
sentencing in August 2002. The defendant had pleaded guilty to 
three offences under the Criminal Code: manslaughter under s. 163, 
unlawful assault causing bodily harm under s. 188(l)(2)(a), (b) and 
(m), and unlawful use of a motor vehicle under s. 218(1). He had 
already undergone payback. Angel declined to suspend any of the 
sentence and stated that the penalty needed to be one of both 
personal -  the defendant had a long criminal record - and general 
deterrence.
5. The case of The Queen v. Jeffrey Jungala Pollard647 came before
Angel J. in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, for
sentencing in August 2002. The defendant had pleaded guilty to an 
offence of manslaughter under s. 163 of the Criminal Code, an 
offence for which the maximum sentence imposable was life 
imprisonment. The defendant was to undergo future payback. 
Angel pointed out that the evidence presented about that payback 
did not make it clear what form it would take, nor when and how it 
will take place. Nor is there any evidence as to the effect, if any, 
that the sentence of the Court would have on that payback. He
646 The Queen v. Watson Jungarai Corby Supreme Court o f the Northern Territory No. 20113660 
Transcript of Proceedings 23 August 2002.
647 The Queen v. Jeffrey Jungala Pollard Supreme Court o f the Northern Territory No. 20116064 
Transcript of Proceedings 23 August 2002.
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concludes that he is prepared to take account of the future payback 
in a general way.
6. The case of The Queen v. Dominic Joran648 came before Angel J. 
in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, for sentencing in 
July 2003. The defendant had pleaded guilty to three offences 
under the Criminal Code: aggravated unlawful assault under 
s. 188(1) and (2)(b), unlawfully entering a dwelling house under 
s.213(l), (4) and (5), and aggravated assault under s,188(l)and 
(2)(a) and (b). He had already undergone some payback. Angel 
accepted that the payback was a mitigating factor. The sentence 
was suspended.
7. The case of The Queen v. Ivan Jaeamara Mark649 came before 
Angel J. in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, for 
sentencing in September 2003. The defendant had pleaded guilty to 
an aggravated offence under s. 154 for which the maximum 
imposable sentence was fourteen years imprisonment. He had 
already undergone payback. Angel suspended the sentence and 
stated that the payback was one of the factors he had taken into 
account.
648 The Queen v. Dominic Joran Supreme Court of the Northern Territory No. 20217594 and 
20306234 Transcript o f Proceedings 4 July 2003.
649 The Queen v. Ivan Jaeamara Mark Supreme Court of the Northern Territory No. 20106731 
Transcript of Proceedings 22 September 2003.
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It can be seen that in several of these cases the judge expressly states that s/he 
has taken the payback into account even where it has yet to happen. However, 
none of them gives any guidance as to what the effect is of having taken it into 
account. The cases all involve other mitigating factors as well as the payback -  
for example, remorse shown by the defendant or the presence of alcohol - and it 
is impossible to calculate the relative importance of each factor. The practice 
revealed by the Sentencing Remarks is important as these, of course, are given 
in every case. Very few cases become the subject of the type of judicial 
consideration outlined above.
It is clear from the above review of the major caselaw and of the sentencing 
remarks in this area that the practice of the judiciary has been to take account of 
payback as a factor which in almost all cases will reduce the severity of the 
sentence imposed by the Court. This appears to be so whether the payback has 
already taken place or is in prospect, although the latter case has given rise to 
more difficulty. Two questions arise. The first is whether it is possible to derive 
any clear principles from the decisions which might give some guidance as to 
the way the judiciary might analyse a particular case. The second is to ask 
whether the presence or absence of such a set of principles matters.
In reply to the first question, it seems from the analysis of the caselaw that there 
are very few guidelines. Only one principle appears to be unassailable -  that 
payback already undergone must be taken into account. None of the caselaw
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would argue against this. There is, however, a divergence of views on the issue 
of prospective payback with some of the decisions arguing that it may be taken 
into account and others saying that it is not possible to do so. Of course the 
judges refer to previous decisions, but it is not difficult to distinguish cases in an 
area such as sentencing where there is a very wide discretion. Thus, the judiciary 
is able to maintain a coherent framework, but to operate with considerable 
freedom within it. The second question which arises is whether the lack of clear 
guiding principles on when and how payback should be taken into account is of 
any consequence. It appears not to matter and indeed as suggested above, it can 
be seen as an advantage.
The sentencing process is not like the application of the substantive law: it is a 
process which requires the freedom to make a decision on the particular 
combination of factors in a given case. In such decisions, maximum freedom is 
desirable.
5.5: Conclusion:
It has been demonstrated that the judiciary has made a substantial contribution 
to the use and recognition of customary law in the area of sentencing.650 It was 
argued at the beginning of the Chapter that there were essentially three 
rationales underlying the decisions. The first, the use of Aboriginality per se is
650 The following remarks are equally applicable to decisions on bail applications.
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no longer employed as for the reasons explained. The vast majority of sentences 
imposed on Aborigines are justified in terms of the second rationale ‘factors 
associated with Aboriginality’. It is usually the case that there will be several of 
these factors operating in one decision. There is considerable caselaw 
identifying which factors can be taken into account and, although the list is not 
closed, the most likely factors are well-entrenched and exemplified. Whilst there 
is little legislative guidance or control on sentencing - other than the statutory 
tariff for a given offence -  the judiciary is aware of the public policy 
requirements of consistency and quantum and, therefore, seeks to ensure that its 
decisions meet those demands. As the doctrine of precedent does not operate in 
sentencing decisions, the judiciary has evolved various sets of guidelines in 
relation to particular areas of sentencing. These are not, of course, binding, but 
are indicative of the way in which the judiciary is likely to consider a given 
case. One such set of guidelines in relation to the sentencing of Aborigines is 
that found in the Supreme Court of New South Wales case of R. v. Fernando651. 
In this case Wood J. laid down eight principles which should be considered in 
sentencing Aborigines:
“(A) The same sentencing principles are to be applied in every case 
irrespective of the identity of a particular offender or his membership of 
an ethnic or other group but that does not mean that the sentencing court 
should ignore those facts which exist only by reason of the offender’s 
membership of such a group.
651 (1992) 76 A Crim R 58, at 62-63.
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(B) The relevance of Aboriginality in an offender is not necessarily to 
mitigate punishment but rather to explain or throw light on the particular 
offence and the circumstances of the offender.
(C) It is proper for the court to recognise that the problems of alcohol 
abuse and violence which to a very significant degree go hand in hand 
within Aboriginal communities are very real ones and their cure requires 
more subtle remedies than the criminal law can provide by way of 
imprisonment.
(D) Notwithstanding the absence of any real body of evidence 
demonstrating that the imposition of significant terms of imprisonment 
provides any effective deterrent in either discouraging the abuse of 
alcohol by members of the Aboriginal society or their resort to heavy 
violence when affected by it, the courts must be very careful in pursuit of 
their sentencing policies to not thereby deprive Aboriginals of the 
protection which it is assumed punishment provides. In short, a belief 
cannot be allowed to go about that serious violence by drunken persons 
within their society are treated by the law as occurrences of little 
moment.
(E) While drunkenness is not normally and excuse or mitigating factor, 
where the abuse of alcohol by the person standing for sentence reflects 
the socio-economic circumstances and environment in which the 
offender has grown up, that can and should be taken into account as a 
mitigating factor. This involves the realistic recognition by the court of 
the endemic presence of alcohol within Aboriginal communities, and the 
grave social difficulties faced by those communities where poor self- 
image, absence of education and work opportunity and other 
demoralising factors have laid heavy stress on them, reinforcing their 
resort to alcohol and compounding its worst effects.
(F) That in sentencing persons of Aboriginal descent the court must 
avoid any hint of racism, paternalism or collective guilt yet must 
nevertheless assess realistically the objective seriousness of the crime
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within its local setting and by reference to the particular subjective 
circumstances of the offender.
(G) That in sentencing an Aborigine who has come from a deprived 
background or is otherwise disadvantaged by reason of social or 
economic factors, or who has little experience of European ways, a 
lengthy term of imprisonment may be particularly, even unduly, harsh 
when served in an environment which is foreign to him and which is 
dominated by inmates and prison officers of European background with 
little understanding of his culture or society or his own personality.
(H) That in every sentencing exercise, whilst it is important to ensure 
that the punishment fits the crime and not to lose sight of the objective 
seriousness of the offence in the midst of what otherwise might be 
subjective circumstances, full weight must be given to the competing 
public interest to rehabilitation of the offender and the avoidance of 
recidivism on his part.”
These guidelines are basically a synthesis of the principles which seem to have 
emerged from sentencing practice across the various jurisdictions in Australia. 
Interestingly, they contain no mention of customary law as a factor to be taken 
into account in sentencing. This may be on account of the origin of the case - 
New South Wales -  or it may be a reflection of the reality that most cases where 
Aborigines come before the criminal Courts have no customary law 
connotations. The use of customary law is, of course, the third rationale outlined 
at the beginning of this Chapter. The judiciary’s development of sentencing 
practice on payback has been considered in detail as it is the paradigmatic case 
of the difficulties faced by the state legal system in the recognition of customary
652 This would appear to be a mistake in the text of the Report: it should presumably read “ .. public 
interest in rehabilitation
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law. Despite the difficulty in identifying a set of principles analogous to those in 
Fernando, it is arguable that it is in the use of customary law in sentencing that 
the judiciary has made the greatest contribution to its recognition. There are 
relatively few cases where customary law can be incorporated into the state’s 
substantive law, and even fewer where it is critical in -  certainly criminal - 
procedural matters. Much of the judicial effectiveness in the practice of 
sentencing is due to the very flexibility and creativity which makes that practice 
difficult to categorise. It is the same flexibility and creativity which make the 
judiciary the arm of state best fitted to achieve such recognition.
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Conclusion:
The proposition agued in the Thesis is that the use of judicial reasoning and 
discretion is the most effective way of according some recognition to customary 
law in the criminal justice process in the Northern Territory.
6.1: Overview of judicial reasoning and discretion in the use of customary law to 
date:
It has been demonstrated that from 1770-1788 onwards, the judiciary has been 
engaged with this issue. The first considerations of the relationship between the 
newly-established -  or, more accurately, newly-establishing - state law and 
customary law took place in the years immediately after the arrival of the British.
A coherent and fully-functioning legal system was established by about the 1850’s 
and by that date the judiciary had reached a virtually unanimous view that 
Australia had been terra nullius and that, therefore, it had been acquired by 
settlement. It followed from that finding that no customary law could have 
survived: there had, on this view, been none to survive. Morally and politically 
unacceptable though this view is today, it was based on a correct understanding 
and application of the international law as it then stood: the judiciary would have 
been unable to come to any other conclusion. When a hundred and fifty years later 
the High Court in Mabo found that Australia had not been terra nullius, it 
nevertheless declined to overturn the view that the acquisition had been by
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settlement, thus inventing a new method of acquisition of territory: settlement of 
land which is not terra nullius. It has been argued that the decision was motivated, 
at least in part, by political considerations. In any event, the relevance and 
applicability of Mabo to areas of law other than native title is minimal and any 
attempts to extend that applicability have failed. Moreover, even if the original 
finding of terra nullius and settlement was incorrect, the alternative understanding 
of the events of 1770-1788 is that the territory was acquired by conquest. In that 
event, there would not have been an automatic assumption that no customary law 
existed, and any which did exist would have survived until extinguished by 
subsequent incompatible law. However, in the case of criminal law that subsequent 
extinguishment would almost certainly have been total. There were a few 
dissenting judicial voices in the early days of the legal system, but, in the main, 
they did not dispute the findings of terra nullius and settlement, and certainly did 
not deny the acquisition of sovereignty. They were concerned primarily with the 
question of the extent of jurisdiction, with the perceived injustice of the application 
of English law to the Aborigines, especially in the case of the criminal law applied 
for offences committed inter se. However, as the received legal system developed, 
there was less dissent.
The period from the 1850’s to the early 1950’s yielded little recorded caselaw on 
the subject, especially in the Northern Territory where settlement and the 
establishment of the legal system took longer to effect However, when Kriewaldt
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came to the bench, the issues again came to prominence. Despite the reservation 
expressed above as to some of his views -  and certainly as to his language - 
Kriewaldt was concerned with ensuring that the Aborigines were treated fairly by 
the legal system and, within the context of his understanding of equality, tried to 
achieve this. His judgments had relatively little effect in the areas of evidence and 
procedure or, indeed, in the elaboration of the substantive law relating to offences. 
However, he almost single-handedly extended the understanding of the 
requirements for the establishment of the defence of provocation by applying the 
test of the ‘ordinary’ Aborigine, a person who was subject to customary law. 
Kriewaldt was not unique in this interpretation of the law654, but he was unusual. 
He also made extensive use of customary law as a factor in sentencing. His 
consideration of Aboriginality -  and of customary law -  was of Aboriginality per 
se and reflected the paternalistic attitudes of the time. However, it allowed him to 
develop, for example, the principles enunciated in Anderson, which laid down that 
an Aborigine should never be sentenced more severely than a white person for a 
similar offence. There can be little doubt that Aborigines who came before 
Kriewaldt received fairer treatment than they would have received in many other 
Courts of the time. Moreover, he left an extensive body of caselaw which remains 
influential today.
653 For an overview o f Kriewaldt’s contribution, see: Douglas. H. ‘Justice Kriewaldt, Aboriginal 
Identity and the Criminal Law’ Criminal Law Journal Vol. 26, August 2002,204-222.
654 Kwaku-Mensah and R. v.Rankia for example, employed a similar analysis, although the extent 
of Kriewaldt’s access to decisions from other jurisdictions is unclear.
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The period between the death of Kriewaldt and the mid- to late- 1970’s produced 
little caselaw developing the use of customary law.655 The only case of 
significance from this period is Milirrpum. The Milirrpum decision has been much 
criticised, but rather unfairly. Blackburn J. was a perfectly competent judge. His 
decision was almost certainly a correct application of the law as it stood. Judicial 
discretion is not limitless; he could not simply ignore the existing law. Moreover, 
he acknowledged openly that there had been a customary legal system in existence 
at the time of settlement.
The judiciary, whilst creative, is, of course, a product of the social and political 
conditions prevailing at any given time. The 1960’s and early 1970’s was not a 
period when the position of the Aborigines and the status of customary law was 
much considered by wider society. However, by the late 1970’s times were 
changing. A fresh series of legal challenges -  inspired largely by the increasing 
politicisation of Aboriginal communities - was mounted to the categorisations of 
terra nullius and settlement. None were successful, but some of the decisions -  for 
example, Walker and Murphy’s dissenting judgment in Coe -  began to reveal an 
unease which was to culminate in Mabo. In the area of criminal law, there was 
little consideration of terra nullius or settlement -  and Mabo. when it came, did not 
change that -  but the judiciary displayed an increasing readiness to take account of 
Aboriginality and customary law in their decision-making. The consideration of 
such issues was, however, not within the framework of Aboriginality per se -  this
655 The reasons for this are unclear, but see supra n 581.
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was no longer thought to be acceptable -  but of factors associated with 
Aboriginality. Customary law was sometimes treated as one of these factors and 
sometimes as a separate matter to be taken into account, the result being the same 
whichever rationale is adopted. The judiciary in the Northern Territory has been 
especially creative in its development of the law in this area656, by, for example, 
the production of the Anunga Rules and by continued development of the rules on 
provocation. It is, however, in sentencing that the judiciary has been the most 
ready to take account of customary law, especially in relation to the issues raised 
by payback. Judicial use of discretion in sentencing is the area which most 
frequently causes controversy and it will be discussed below.
It is, therefore, clear that the judiciary has engaged extensively with customary law 
and has made the utmost attempts to recognise it and make use of it where 
possible. In this it has led the way, often developing the law, and ensured that the 
issue is considered more widely: for example, the Australian Law Reform 
Commission Report on customary law was prompted by the decision in R. v. 
Sydney Williams -  and the Native Title Act and subsequent legislation by Mabo.
6.2: The extent and desirability of judicial discretion:
656 According to Pam Dhton, former Principal Legal Officer with the Central Australian Aboriginal 
Legal Aid Service, the Northern Territory in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s was fortunate to have 
a number of outstanding judges -  notably Forster, Muirhead and Nader. Interview with Pam Ditton. 
23 August 1994.
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The question arises as to whether such extensive judicial discretion and flexibility 
are desirable. This is, of course, a wider debate and confined neither to the issue 
under discussion, nor to Australia.657 It is beyond the scope of the Thesis to discuss 
the debate in detail, suffice it to say that in both Code and common-law 
jurisdictions, the role of the judiciary is crucial. However, whilst few would deny 
in theory that some discretion is necessary, the way it is exercised in practice may 
give rise to criticism.658 In general, judicial development and application of the 
rules on evidence and procedure are not controversial and apart from a few 
examples -such as the initial reluctance of some police and some judiciary, 
although mainly magistrates, to apply the Anunga Rules and some concern over 
the practice in relation to secret evidence -  have given rise to little complaint from 
academics, other organs of the state or the public. Similarly, the use of factors 
associated with Aboriginally in general and customary law in particular in relation 
to the substantive law, which is in any event fairly limited apart from provocation, 
has given rise to little disquiet in those quarters. However, the use of judicial 
discretion in sentencing is a different matter. Given that sentencing is the area 
where the judiciary is most able to give recognition to customary law factors, this 
is a major concern.
657 For an interesting overview o f role o f the judge and the debates in this area, see: Toohey. J. 
“Without Fear or Favour, Affection or Hl-Will’: The Role o f Courts in the Community’ Western 
Australian Law Review Vol. 28, January 1999, 1-12; Craven. G. ‘Judicial Activism in the High 
Court -  A Response to John Toohey’ Western Australian Law Review Vol. 28, July 1999, 214-224; 
Kirby. M. ‘Judicial Activism’ Western Australian Law Review Vol. 27, July 1997, 1-20; Campbell. 
T. ‘Judicial Activism -  Justice or Treason?’ (2003) Otago Law Review, 2.
658 Whilst most o f the criticism o f the exercise o f judicial discretion made by other organs o f the 
state or by the white population is directed at perceived over-use o f that discretion, it is possible that 
some -  including many, if not most, Aborigines -  would argue that the discretion is under-used.
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The recent case of Hales v. Jamilmira659 illustrates the difficulties. Jamilmira, a 
fifty year old man, was convicted of two offences, one of which - and the only one 
which is relevant for present purposes - was unlawful sexual intercourse with a 
minor, an offence under s. 129(1 Xa) of the Northern Territory Criminal Code. The 
girl in question was fifteen years old and was Jamilmira’s promised wife according 
to customary law. The intercourse was consensual and was sanctioned, even 
encouraged, by that customary law and by tradition. Jamilmira was sentenced to 
thirteen months imprisonment, to be suspended after four months, for this offence. 
He appealed against the sentence and Gallop J., sitting in the Supreme Court of the 
Northern Territory, reduced it to twenty-four hours. The state then appealed to the 
Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court and Gallop J’s sentence was found to be 
manifestly inadequate: too much weight had been given to cultural considerations, 
and whilst these should be taken into account, the sentence must also reflect the 
expectations of the wider community. The case caused enormous controversy. 
Public opinion in both the Aboriginal and the white communities was split: some 
argued that customary law on promised marriages should be respected and that the 
eventual sentence was too heavy; others that if the girl had been white, there would 
have been no question of a sentence as light as that given by Gallop and that 
Aboriginal minors were entitled to the same protection as white minors. The 
provisions of the Northern Territory Criminal Code were changed with effect from 
17 March 2004. The Code had previously laid down that it was an offence to have 
sexual intercourse with a minor, a minor being anyone under sixteen years old,
659 (2003) 142NTR1.
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unless the parties were married. The Code also laid down that the minimum age for 
marriage was sixteen except in the case of customary law marriages. The effect of 
this exception was that sexual intercourse with a minor was lawful within the 
context of a customary marriage. The Code now lays down a blanket prohibition 
on sexual intercourse with a minor. The provisions as to the minimum age for 
customary marriages remain unaltered and thus, as the law now stands, a minor 
may contract a customary marriage, but there must be no sexual intercourse until 
both parties are sixteen. Although neither this amendment - nor indeed the original 
Code provisions - had any application in the Jamilmira case, as the parties were 
only in a promised marriage relationship, there seems little doubt that the change in 
the law was prompted by the case. Moreover, the Northern Territory Law Reform 
Committee Report on customary law recommends the establishment of a 
consultation process on the issue of promised marriages660, again presumably 
influenced by Jamilmira.
However, whatever view is taken of Gallop’s sentence, there seems to be little 
reason to consider that the exercise of judicial discretion in this case was 
somehow at fault or in need of legislative constraint: it was, after all, the 
exercise of judicial discretion by the Court of Appeal which found his sentence 
to be ‘manifestly inadequate’. It is arguable that the judiciary itself is the best
660 Northern Territory Law Reform Committee Towards Mutual Benefit: An Inquiry into Aboriginal 
Customary Law in the Northern Territory Darwin: Northern Territory Law Reform Committee, 
2003, Recommendation 5, supra 46.
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overseer of its exercise of discretion.661 Certainly too much legislative 
intervention is undesirable. Of course, the legislature is the primary agent of 
lawmaking, and, as such, can always overrule judicial lawmaking and practice 
by legislation. However, this power should be used sparingly. The very purpose 
of judicial discretion is to allow a careful analysis and interpretation of the law, 
to be able to distinguish between cases and to make what seems to be the 
appropriate decision, either in relation to the application of the law in general or 
to its application to the instant case. Legislation is too blunt an instrument to 
carry out these functions. Moreover, all legislation may ultimately be the subject 
of judicial application and, unless extremely tightly drafted, of judicial 
discretion. Too great a use of legislation to constrain or overrule the judiciary 
would erode the proper purpose of discretion and would lead, in effect, to a 
dismantling of the separation of powers.
Judicial discretion is not total, of course, even in sentencing, but there are very 
few limitations. Generally the only legislative constraint is the tariff set for each 
offence, which usually sets out the range of penalties within which a judge must 
sentence, but, on occasion, sets a mandatory sentence which has the effect of 
eliminating all or part of the discretion. The only other limitation on the way in 
which a judge may sentence is where a guideline judgment has been issued. 
These are judgments handed down by appeal Courts which set out the range of 
penalties within which a lower Court is advised to sentence. They are not
661 There are, o f course, occasional aberrant decisions, though remarkably few. Some consider, for 
example, that Forster was unwise -  if not actually incorrect - in the case o f R. v. Jungarai. Interview 
with John Coldrey and Frank Vincent, Justices o f the Supreme Court of Victoria. 8 August 1994.
328
binding -  there is no doctrine of precedent in sentencing -  but they do give an 
indication to a lower Court that if a sentence outside the suggested range is 
imposed, the sentencing judge is likely to be faced with a successful appeal. The 
use of guideline judgments is not universal, nor is their scope and effect clear. 
Moreover, there is a sense in which they are not a constraint on judicial 
discretion. Certainly they limit the discretion of a lower Court judge, but so does 
the ordinary system of appeal. However, as they are issued by judges, they 
cannot be said to be a constraint on the exercise of discretion by the judiciary as 
a whole. In effect, when followed they achieve the same result as a series of 
appeals, but prospectively rather than retrospectively.
6.3: Alternative or pre-Court criminal justice mechanisms:
Whilst it has been argued -  and is maintained - that judicial discretion is the best 
method of taking account of factors associated with Aboriginality and customary 
law in the criminal justice process, there are other mechanisms in place which seek 
to achieve the same aims. Most notable of these is the variety of alternative dispute 
resolution or community justice processes which are either partly or entirely under
C jC /y
the control of the Aboriginal communities involved. It should be stressed at the 
outset that these are not premised on any separation from the state legal system, but 
are authorised by that system in an attempt to give Aboriginal people a greater role
662 For a survey o f recent developments in such community justice mechanisms, see: Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner Submission to the Expert Seminar on Indigenous 
Peoples 12-14 November 2003, at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/socialJustice/madrid/issue3.htm (last 
accessed 11 April 2004).
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in the administration of justice in their communities. These are not customary law 
mechanisms in the sense that they derive their validity from the customary legal 
system, nor do they apply only or primarily customary law, but they do, on 
occasion, employ such law in their decisions. Other methods of achieving greater 
Aboriginal involvement in the criminal justice system are by increasing the role of 
community leaders or representatives in the ordinary Court process by, for
663example, sitting as assessors at hearings or by taking part in circle sentencing. 
The purpose, detail and experience of these schemes is the subject of considerable 
discussion664, but detailed consideration of it is beyond the scope of the Thesis 
which is, by definition, concerned with judicial practice. It is, however, worth 
noting that whilst the legal system may be prepared to delegate control over the 
administration of justice in minor matters, it is very unlikely to do so in the case of 
major offences such as murder.
6.4: Possible future developments:
663 As discussed in Chapter 5, it is also the practice of the ordinary criminal Courts to take account 
of a community’s view when sentencing an Aboriginal offender.
664 See, for example: Lofgren. N. ‘Aboriginal Community Participation in Sentencing’ Criminal 
Law Journal Vol. 21, June 1997, 127-133; Tyler. W. ‘Community-Based Strategies in Aboriginal 
Criminal Justice: The Northern Territory Experience’ (1995) The Australian and New Zealand 
Journal o f Criminology 28, 127-142; Brown. K. ‘Indigenous forums: laughed out of Court?’ 
Alternative Law Journal Vol. 25, No. 5, October 2000, 216-217; Hazlehurst. K.M. ‘Australian 
Aboriginal Experiences of Community Justice’ Law and Anthropology 6 (1991) 45-65; Marchetti. 
E. and Daly. K. Lndigenous Courts and Justice Practices in Australia Trends and Issues Series, No. 
277, Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, May 2004.
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There is virtually no possibility that the state will totally relinquish control over the 
administration of the criminal law.665 Indeed, such relinquishment would be, in 
theory, impossible. Even if the state were to enact legislation to that effect, it could 
subsequently revoke it. The only way to entrench such an abdication of 
sovereignty would be by granting powers of self-government analogous to those 
enjoyed by the domestic dependent nations of, for example, the United States of 
America. It is unlikely that this will be done in the foreseeable future. Apart from 
state resistance to the idea, there is little demand for this type of self-determination 
amongst (at least the majority of) Aboriginal people. More likely is an extension of 
the types of schemes already in operation. Any such extensions, and any new 
schemes, would need to take account of the questions raised at the end of Chapter 
2 and make decisions on content, jurisdictional base, forum of adjudication, and 
choice of law, all of which raise the difficulties already discussed. There may be 
some future developments along these lines, but it is suggested that they are likely 
to be few, certainly in respect of criminal law matters.
In terms of the possible future extension of the criminal law in relation to its use 
of customary law, there are two specific issues which are often raised. Both are 
complex. The first is the possibility of the introduction of a cultural or 
customary law or defence, which would serve either to reduce the offence 
charged to a lesser one or to relieve the defendant of any criminal liability666; the
665 This option will not be considered in detail as it would, of necessity, remove all power from the 
judiciary which is the focus of Thesis.
666 For an extensive study of the concept of cultural defence, see: Renteln. AD. The Cultural 
Defense Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Renteln’s work, like most of the literature on this
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second, a limited form of the first, is the extension of the defence of consent to 
cover indigenous punishment.
The Australian Law Reform Commission Report Multicultural ism and the 
Law667 rejected the notion of a cultural defence except in extremely limited 
circumstances.668 The idea of a general customary law defence was rejected by 
the Australian Law Reform Commission669. It drew a distinction between 
allowing customary law to serve as a defence to specific offences, such as, for 
example, traditional hunting and fishing pursued on native title lands, and the 
provision of a general customary law defence to all offences. The former was 
justified, the latter was not. The Report did consider briefly the specific question 
of a customary law defence where the offence in question was the 
administration of traditional punishment, that is, payback. However, after 
considering various arguments against allowing such a defence in those 
circumstances - including the difficulty of translating the concept of payback 
into something which would fit within the framework of a defence as 
understood by the state criminal Courts, the fact that such a defence would 
reduce the protection available to victims, and the necessity thereby caused to
subject, concentrates on the United States. Moreover, she adopts a wider meaning for the term 
‘cultural defence’ than is usual, employing it to cover not only a substantive criminal defence, but 
also cultural evidence adduced at any stage of criminal or civil proceedings. On ‘cultural defence’ as 
usually understood, see 185-210. On these points, see also: Golding. M.P. ‘The Cultural Defense’ 
Ratio Juris 15(2), June 2002, 146-158; Torry. W.I. ‘Multicultural Jurisprudence and the Cultural 
Defense’ Journal o f Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law (1999) 4,127-161; and Sheleff. L. supra n 
55 at 262-289.
667 Supra 53.
668 Supra n 70.
669 The Recognition o f Aboriginal Customary Laws (Summary Report, Full Report 2 Volumes), 
Final Report No. 31 Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986, paras. 442-453.
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expose customary law to public examination670 - it recommended against the 
adoption of such a defence, even in payback cases. It went on to recommend a 
partial customary law defence, analogous to diminished responsibility, which 
would reduce murder to manslaughter671, but considered that, in general, the 
best way to deal with payback matters was by using the general sentencing 
discretion of the Courts. It is unlikely that the judiciary could simply introduce a 
either a cultural or general customary law defence without legislative initiative 
and even the partial defence would be a substantial innovation. It may be that, 
over time, the judiciary could evolve a doctrine akin to these, or interpret 
existing law in a way which would achieve the same results, but it most 
certainly could not do so immediately.
The second proposal is less radical. It has often been suggested that the existing 
defence of consent could be extended to situations of payback. The argument, 
which has already been mentioned, has been considered in several cases 
including Minor and Barnes. As the law stands, consent is no defence to 
homicide or to very serious injury, although it may be to more minor injury. 
There is probably scope for the judiciary slowly to extend the category of injury 
for which consent is a defence, but it seems unlikely, on the grounds of public 
policy that it would go too far.
670 The Report maintains that such exposure is undesirable because it would tend to impair the 
flexibility o f the law, would remove at least some control over the law from Aborigines, and might 
require the disclosure o f secret aspects of the law in Court: para. 449.
671 No such defence has been introduced.
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6.5: Conclusion:
Whilst the judiciary is unlikely -  at least in the near future - to develop the criminal 
law in relation to either of the matters discussed above, that is not because it is not, 
in general, the most effective body in terms of developing the use of customary 
law. It is rather that both matters are controversial, and, arguably, unwise. The 
legislature is also unlikely to introduce either measure. Much more probable is that 
the judiciary will continue to develop the law as it has done in the past, piecemeal, 
by careful reasoning and discretion.
The Thesis has argued that the reasoning of the judiciary is the most effective 
method of incorporating customary law within the state criminal justice system. It 
is, therefore, both inevitable and desirable that any future development will involve 
it. Whilst there are compelling arguments for the further recognition of customary 
law, on the grounds of multiculturalism and legal pluralism, the best way to 
achieve this is by minimal legislative incorporation, thus maintaining uniform 
standards, but with discretionary and flexible application by the judiciary.
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